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ABSTRACT
This research concerns the collective identity of Korean diasporas who have settled in 
China, Japan, and post-Soviet central Asia, with special attention to Uzbekistan. The main 
research considers how the Korean diasporas define their collective identities in their respective 
host states, and the political implications of the constitution of such identities.
The means by which a collective identity is secured vary, depending on a diaspora’s 
relations and interactions with its homeland and host state, and vision of its own community. 
Despite sharing many features common to not being assimilated by host societies, the three 
Korean diasporas have maintained their distinctive identities in each case under this study. A 
diaspora’s identity is thus to be understood as having a particular nature, which I see as a third 
type of national identity.
I argue that the features of diasporas are generated by the following three factors: the 
homeland, the hostland, and the diaspora organisations. A diaspora identity is reflected in the 
intrinsic quandaries it experiences within this triangular structure. These quandaries are created 
by fundamental tensions; such as the dilemma between seeking a fuller degree of inclusion and 
maintaining autonomy, the psychological conflicts between the awareness of the need for 
collective resistance against assimilation and the aspiration for overcoming sub-national 
collectivity, and the difficulties that arise from the process of accepting a different national 
identity while not detached from their ancestral motherland.
The Korean diasporas are nearing the point of creating self-determined communities 
with stable dual-national identities. The formation of such an identity has prerequisites; such as 
the knowledge and understanding of the two national cultures involved, clear and sufficient 
communication, the preservation of the diaspora’s own history, and the sustaining of various 
forms of collective existence, all of which will legitimise a diaspora’s aspiration for recognition.
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1 Introduction
Research question and focus
This study explores how diasporas define their national identity in exile; in other words, what 
collective national identity means to diasporas and how these definitions and meanings should 
be explained. This research concerns Korean diasporas in China, Japan and post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan as cases. These cases show how the identity of Korean diasporas has been evolved 
over generations, rather than disappearing or assimilating to other nations.
Including diaspora studies in general and studies of Korean diasporas in particular, 
existing research affords anthropological explanations of identity, sociological descriptions of 
the forms of diaspora communities, historical approaches to the formation of ethnic nationalism 
among diasporas, or theoretical studies of identity politics and multiculturalism. This research, 
in contrast, is a political analysis of the collective identity of Korean diasporas from a macro 
perspective. In the field of political science, studies on ethnic relations to date tend to focus on 
conflict-prone groups. This explains one of the reasons why the related issues on the national 
identity of Koreans are relatively under-researched. Existing work on Korean diasporas is rarely 
full-length academic research, and none has yet employed comparative qualitative methodology 
with theoretical explanations of diasporas.
Previous studies on the identity of Korean diasporas tend to frame diaspora groups 
within one of the, supposedly, official nationalities involved; either in the official nationality of 
the host state or in that of the motherland. As a result, they offer insufficient account of the 
nature of diaspora identity. Korean diasporas represent an under-researched field, more so in 
Anglophone academia. Not only in the Korean cases but in general, diasporas have been a 
constant phenomenon. Many diasporas have shaped their own sphere in host societies where 
they have been politically scape-goated, economically exploited, and legally overlooked. In a 
globalising world, efforts to shift the existing agenda from the exclusive nation-building process 
to a multi-nation building project may provide opportunities to normalise diaspora identity, 
rather than putting it into the rigid and exclusive existing framework of political membership. In 
this regard, I propose that diaspora identity needs to be more accurately characterised and 
categorised in political and legal terms. This can be achieved, above all, through better 
understanding of the nature of diaspora identity itself.
How do Koreans define their collective identity in exile and how should those 
definitions be explained in a political context? This question implies a correlation between 
diasporas and national identity. The question, in fact, infers tension between cultural and official 
political identity. Thus, in relation to the primary question, the following questions also need to 
be answered: To what extent do Koreans perceive themselves as Koreans? Why does the
7
question of national identity matter to them, and to what extent is this the case? How acceptable 
is the preservation of dual nationality to the modem multinational states where Koreans have 
settled?
The question of dual or plural nationality could connote further tensions for diasporas 
than for other ethnic groups or other kinds of cultural minorities, as the term ‘diaspora’ implies a 
more or less involuntary migration, as well as, not always but very commonly, the historical 
inevitability of attachment to another nation-state. According to conservative assimilationist 
scholars, the national identity of diasporas should be regarded as somehow abnormal or immoral 
and, consequently, regarded as something that should be adjusted and fixed. This view is related 
to the conventional way of considering the conditions, meanings and ethics of national identity. 
Scholars of this group tend to believe national identity is and should be completely separate 
from cultural identity. Disagreements are therefore provoked by questions as whether a 
diaspora’s collective identity is merely cultural and how one should distinguish the collective 
identity of a national group or a part of a national group from other kinds of cultural identities?
Defenders of multiculturalism have suggested both normatively and practically 
legitimate grounds for recognising cultural or sub-national minorities from the social to the 
political levels by demonstrating the positive roles of immigrants. Meanwhile, anthropologists 
and sociologists engaged in this field are more concerned with how, why and under what 
conditions national identity is evolved. The modernist approach within these particularistic 
views on nation and national identity is commonly categorised as a de-mythfying way of 
viewing cultural and sub-national sentiment. Applying this view to the national identity of 
Korean diasporas may lead to the conclusion that their national and political identity has become 
differentiated from cultural identity because they have undergone different nation-building 
processes during the focal historical period. The factor of citizenship in relation to national 
identity is the key issue in such analyses. It considers sub-national identity separately from 
political membership. A question, however, remains unresolved. Are cultural and political 
identities always so obviously separable? How can one understand a group of people claiming 
their own separate identity regardless of outsiders’ understanding of their cultural sense of 
belonging and their political citizenship? This study highlights the relatively disregarded aspect 
of diasporas’ collective national identity; that is to say, it considers diasporas’ endeavours to 
form their own kind of national identity. In addition, it also proposes an alternative view on 
creating or controlling a collective identity that has been perceived as either politically imposed 
or naturally given, and thus difficult to overcome when necessary.
The phenomenon of diasporas is increasing in this era of globalisation. A clearer 
conceptualisation of diasporas and its application to the real political and legal situation may aid 
acceptance of the inevitable emergence of a different type of national identity; one that has 
evolved as diasporised groups have become more distinctive. This, in turn, will foster an
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inclusive political attitude to national identity by, ideally, perceiving national allegiance as an 
individual choice. The accommodation of diasporas is one of the barometers of the modem 
multinational state’s tolerance towards differences. The various concepts of citizenship in each 
host state help counter overemphasis of the distinctiveness of sub-national groups as being the 
most important aspect of their collective identity. Rationalist views, however, overemphasise 
constitutional membership as the normative and crucial variable and fail to explain why 
different minority national groups do not react in the same way to a common host society’s 
public policy and notion of citizenship.
Not all the sub-national or ethnic groups within Chinese territory, for example, have 
formed the same relations as the Koreans have built with the Han Chinese. For instance, some 
indigenous ethnic minorities such as the Manchurians and the Subei have almost either 
disappeared or been assimilated, and Tibetan and Muslim populations are regarded as ever 
troublesome minorities, at times threatening the harmony of multinational China. In post-Soviet 
central Asia, the Korean community failed to form an autonomous prefecture under Stalinist 
rule, whereas many other diasporas, such as the Jewish community, succeeded under the same 
regime and the same policy. As Martin (2001) mentions, it remains an interesting historical 
question as to why, from the beginning, the already concentrated Korean population was 
dispersed to barren land away from cultivated agricultural areas, whereas the dispersed Jews 
experienced the contrary; although in early twentieth century Russia both diasporas were 
equally categorised as untrustworthy disloyal peoples.1 Meanwhile, South-east Asian diasporas 
in Japan or the indigenous Ainu population have been living in isolation, inhabiting remote areas 
in Japan, whereas Koreans appear to have been incorporated into Japanese society to a greater 
degree. The key factors determining such differing situations are, broadly, the historical context 
of a diaspora’s resettlement, external influence framed by the diplomatic relations between host 
state and homeland, and a diaspora’s response to the host society and the influence of its 
motherland.
In the postcolonial and post-Cold War era, potentially political group identities were 
regarded as an ever-present menace to the existing international order. The burdens of ancient 
multiracial states, dealing with and taming minority groups and immigrants, seem still to be 
carried by the modem multinational states. The xenophobic reactions to foreign immigrants in 
the postwar world have not been mitigated. Political actions have been encouraged by a popular 
perception of threat, opportunistic politicians and the media. Both in theory and practice, 
through comparative analyses of the three cases, I argue that providing more room for minority 
national groups to form their own kind of collective identity does not necessarily threaten the 
host societies’ political stability, economic development or cultural harmony. I also argue that 
the relationship between diaspora and host-nation should be mutual. Diasporas’ demand for 
recognition involves prerequisites.
9
The cases in this study suggest that recognition of the collective identity of a minority 
group may encourage the group to develop a positive sense of obligation as a citizen towards the 
host country, without necessarily giving up their sense of belonging to the sub-national 
community. By recognition, I mean, the recognition of the group’s historical claims or 
justification for their raison d'etre in the host state. Diaspora history, set by shared collective 
memories, determines the fundamental distinctiveness of a diaspora from other groups within 
the host state. Historical facts and events may be in the past, but shared collective memory and 
interpretation of such collective memories are vividly present, as a reality determining the 
relationships among different national groups. Sufficient negotiation over interpretations of 
diaspora history in the public sphere helps enhance the relations between diaspora and host- 
nation. Research into the self-definition of Korean diaspora identity demonstrates the degree of 
their sound incorporation into mainstream society. Sound incorporation can mean dealing with 
dual nationality adroitly, and gradually accepting such particular nationality positively as a 
further choice. The continuous process of Korean diasporas* self-identification is the process of 
building diaspora identity, reflecting their search for safe grounds of recognition while, at the 
same time, managing the various levels of diaspora tensions.
Employing Panagakos’s (1999) perspective, broadly, I consider that Korean diasporas 
have three different paths or choices regarding incorporation: first, complete assimilation into 
the host society without minimal institutionalised collectivity; second, remaining as perpetual 
foreigners, maintaining close political and cultural attachment to the ancestral motherland, and 
preferring to be categorised as overseas Koreans, undistinguishable from other types of 
immigrant societies; third, a self-determined community, reasoning their connection with the 
Korean motherland.2 Korean diasporas demonstrate features of transition from the second stage 
to the third in differing degrees. Unlike the commonly accepted perception of diasporas, in spite 
of the absence of collective action and a nationalist movement, Korean diasporas have 
manifested resistance against assimilation and the desire for recognition through various levels 
of discourse. In turn, such discourse on national identity has built a bounded diaspora identity.
Methods and methodological issues
In order to make such an intangible issue as national identity more researchable, one can 
understand it as interpretations of a collective self as one of the members of a nation. Identity 
should be understood in the context of continuity rather than as a static feature. The formation of 
diaspora identity is focused on a diaspora’s effort to identify itself with or against other national 
groups within the structure in which it has been evolved. The history of building its collective 
identity creates a diaspora’s own sphere within its host society. A diaspora’s own sphere can 
result in various levels of collective communities, which is not always obviously explainable
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within the dichotomy of public and private. A common, and the most crucial, basis for a 
diaspora identity is the fact that a diaspora group bares their shared collective memory of 
becoming a diaspora and thus remains distinctive. In other words, the diaspora’s memory of 
common history is composed of the particular process of incorporation into a host society, as 
well as a shared memory prior to becoming a diaspora. Accordingly, the process of forming the 
diaspora identity involves both the process of differentiation and the identification. Such process 
can be best analysed by looking into diaspora Koreans’ self expression and interpretation of 
collective selves as diasporas, and by viewing it in relation to the three factors framing the 
diaspora identity: identity vis-it-vis the host country, the motherland and the minority 
organisations and/or institutions.
Selecting cases
While sharing the general features of diasporic identity, the Korean diaspora also shows 
distinctive patterns from the existing models of diasporas in terms of origins, roles, goals and 
forms of collectivities. The selection of cases is made valid for the reason that, first of all, the 
first generation of Koreans who flew to these three countries were not voluntary immigrants in 
real terms. The Koreans who settled in these countries therefore do not possess distinctive 
collective or personal dispositions; for example, in terms of political attitudes or social and 
cultural values, which may mean they fit well into the corresponding host state.
Second, the Korean nation was not divided before and during their migration period. 
This means that they are neither South Koreans nor North Koreans, although their collective 
identity is still associated with the Korean territory. Third, what matters most in discussing a 
diaspora identity is a traumatic historical memory. Colonisation heavily influenced Korean 
diasporas particularly in these cases of migration, as they occurred collectively and involuntarily 
before 1945. Their shared memories of historical events such as Japanese colonisation of the 
homeland and the former Manchu and Stalin’s re-location project have structured Korean 
diasporas’ national identity.
Finally, the three cases demonstrate the impact of South Korea’s de-territorialised 
transnationalist agenda on moulding a distinct collective identity of a nation abroad. For 
political and economic reasons, both South and North Korean governments have paid particular 
attention to those areas. Among the post-Soviet central Asian cases, I focus particularly on 
Uzbekistan. The Korean population in Uzbekistan outnumbers that in the rest of the 
Commonwealth Independent Sates (CIS). Since 1991, Korean diaspora communities have been 
reshaped, as with the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The Korean population was 
incorporated into different political regimes. I should leave the task of detailed comparison of 
Korean diaspora identity among CIS host countries to some future researchers, when the
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reshaped identity becomes more differentiated according to the new host state. Nonetheless, I do 
include some comparative analyses whenever there are significant differences among CIS, and 
when the differences are relevant to post-Soviet Korean identity.
The period researched
Identity is fluid and subject to change. Potential characteristics of diasporas become salient at 
certain historical events. Considering the three examples simultaneously, one can divide them 
into two broad periods. The first period falls between 1953, the division of the Korean 
motherland, and 1988 until which time communication between diasporas and the capitalist 
world including South Korea was restricted in China and the Soviet Union, and around which 
period international pressure was imposed on Japan’s minority issues. In spite of some changes 
in the Korean diaspora communities, their national identity was fairly stable without external 
impacts between 1953 and 1988. The second period, between 1989 and 2003, can be described 
as a disruption of stability, the end of imagination of the ancestral motherland, and the formation 
of a diasporic identity. The changes in the second period imply that the diasporas came heavily 
under the influence of capitalisation, urbanisation and globalisation in the case of the two post 
communist states, while in Japan the issues of Korean minority came under the spotlight. Since 
the late 1980s, in accordance with rapid changes in the host countries, Korean diasporas have 
faced a new phase of identity formation. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 demonstrate the vicissitudes in the 
formation of this diasporic identity.
Interaction between homeland and diaspora is focused on the period between the late 
1980s and 1990s, during which diaspora identity was more openly expressed, and thus exposed. 
Some of the primary materials used in my analyses are diaspora people’s recently published 
contemporary writings but such writings reflect diasporas’ history and their way of perceiving 
their collective pasts. The foundation of diasporas’ collective identity is their own interpretations 
of collective shared memories. Expression of minority’s collective identity is founded on a 
historical process of incorporation into the host society. Analyses of such processes tell us of 
diasporas’ self-justification of their collective existence along with their determination to seek 
for legitimate political membership of the host state. Diasporas’ attempts to make their life 
stories public and authentic is central to making themselves understood; who they are and how 
they hope to be identified by others.
The period between the late 1980s and the present shows a growing awareness of 
national identity among Korean diasporas. Primordial anthropologists would interpret this as the 
revival of ethnicity which has potentially existed since time immemorial. I stress the external 
changes, the end of the Cold War and globalisation as the main forces influencing diasporas’ 
awareness of who they are in collective terms. This is because such growing awareness has
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much more to do with how outsiders define them. That had not been the case during the rigid 
Cold War era, following which they faced sudden exposure to outsiders. In this context, the 
period of diaspora history since 1953 demonstrates how the diasporas’ initial confusion of where 
to belong has been gradually disappearing, and is interpreted in a positive manner during the 
period of shaping a stable diasporic identity.
It is also relevant to discuss the re-emerging nationalist sentiments led by a group of 
South Korean scholars, defending ethnic nationalism over the issues of overseas Koreans. 
Questions relating to the Korean diasporas have often been raised by scholars of Korean studies: 
Why are Koreans in the three regions not courageous enough to act more collectively in order to 
claim recognition and to gain practical interests? How should they be guided to preserve their 
Korean national roots and identity for the sake of consolidating Korean nationalism? It is 
assumed that Koreans abroad should act more collectively with a clearer national agenda, 
otherwise they will be gradually excluded from special benefits while conflict-prone ethnic or 
sub-national groups effectively succeed in securing group-oriented political rights. Considering 
only the diasporas’ historical and cultural heritages as a part of the Korean nation, observations 
on diaspora identity will lead to the erroneous conclusion that diasporas’ national roots, even in 
different soils, have survived and been resurrected almost intact, as opposed to the effect of 
political changes. As I will extend in the main chapters, diasporas’ identity formation vis-&-vis 
their motherland does not adequately explain diasporas’ resistance to the unilateral political and 
cultural influence of their ancestral motherland.
Reasons for comparisons
One of the primary reasons for undertaking comparative studies is to discover and expound the 
differences and similarities among selected cases. It is beyond question that there are 
considerable dissimilarities between the three examples. This is because the three communities 
are incorporated into different political regimes. At the same time, there are also similarities, 
owing to the fact that they all share some common historical memories and cultural features, as 
they were once parts of the same nation. Accordingly, the explanations of why their identity is 
similar or dissimilar, are less significant in this research; what, instead, is of greater interest to 
me is the examination of the implications of differences and similarities in the political domain. 
A political scientist is more likely to be interested in the comparative issues of different diaspora 
groups whose collective identities are either already or potentially political, and consequently 
often regarded as conflicting with officially promulgated loyalty to a dominant nation and a host 
state. The issues include patterns of co-existence of plural nationalities within a state, degrees 
and consequences of political mobilisation of diaspora identity, interplay between the host
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state’s autonomy and a diaspora’s response, and a homeland’s political influence on a diaspora 
community.
To put the logic of comparison in a simpler way, one may imagine three brothers who 
happened to be brought up in different families during their childhood, who grew up as totally 
different kinds of human being, but all of whom managed to survive in their own fields as 
adopted children through having made the most of given resources: one as an educated 
intellectual, a successful Josbnjok; one, as an honourable farmer, a Korei'ski; the other, as a 
politically-oriented, ambitious mobster, a typical Zainichi. Chapter 5 goes into this comparison 
in detail, by showing the host state’s accordance of different degrees and aspects of autonomy to 
the Korean diasporas. The metaphor above does not insinuate a biological explanation of 
nationhood by assuming that a nation is the natural extension of kinship based on genetically 
identical families. It is almost infeasible to prove whether the origin of a nation is purely 
primordial, perennial or modem. Modernism has predominantly occupied debates on 
nationalism. One of the important reasons behind this may well be the fact that the modem 
aspect of a nation is relatively perceivable and provable. As Gorski (2000) appropriately 
delineates, ‘[mjodemists generally answer the what question in essentialist terms, focusing on 
some features of nationalism which are regarded as essential, and then use these definitions to 
distinguish real nationalism from pseudo nationalism.’ As he concludes, ‘it [nationalism] has a 
genealogy, a raptured and fragmented history whose only unity lies in the national category 
itself (1461-2).
In this research, however, it is possible to leave the polemic debate aside considering 
that my comparison only started with their childhood, when identity has already been influenced 
by the social and political environment. In each of them, there was an intrinsic desire to do 
something and become someone, but they had to compromise with external pressures and 
constraints. Stronger motivations could have been generated, but the external pressure would 
have been harsher than if they had been protected by their own parents. The desire to become 
someone is intrinsic, motivated by inner compulsion,3 but differently expressed because not only 
is identity self-defining, it is also inescapably contextual.
Major differences are compared and analysed within the structure of the main 
commonalities depending on the case in accordance with the politically significant period, 
regional particularities and circumstantial determinants. Despite the commonalities, what I 
cannot logically argue is that the commonalities are causally linked with any particular national 
features shared by Koreans or the diasporas’ own features in general, apart from an indirect 
deduction through comparing my observations with studies of other cases; such as other 
diaspora groups in the same host countries and Korean immigrant societies in other countries. In 
this regard, I avoid making hasty generalisations. I remain concerned with explanations of 
background and analysis of the commonalities within the scope of my research. In order to
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clarify how Korean diasporas define themselves in exile, I elaborate further on how diaspora 
identity varies, under what conditions these variations occur and what the political implications 
of such variations are within the structure of commonalities which I consider as controlled 
variables, although these commonalities have fluctuated in all three cases over time.
I have relied on qualitative content analysis of those materials which, I judge, best 
reflect diaspora identity. These mainly include minority literature written by diaspora Koreans in 
the Korean language or in the language of a host nation but translated in Korean, which has 
generally created a clear boundary of identity in a multinational setting. As additional primary 
sources, my observations are based on in-depth interviews with public-minded diasporas 
including local officials, academics, lawyers, writers, businessmen, researchers, graduate 
students, artists, social activists, and religious practitioners. Various written forms of 
communication are also used. They include newspapers, yearbooks and pamphlets published in 
each researched region. In-depth, face-to-face interviews using semi-structured questionnaires 
were conducted primarily with local people who, in my view, hold relatively strong ideas, 
knowledge and information in relation to the collective identity of diaspora. Having conducted 
between fifteen to fifty formal and informal interviews in each country, I analyse, from the 
complicated multilayers of personal and collective identities, the extractions of the aspects 
expressing identity in relation to nations. Not all of the interviews were directly related to my 
research question, but I allocated generous time to all interviewees, on average approximately 
one hour each, but on some occasions up to four hours. Although no contentious matters 
regarding legally banned nationality issues and inter-ethnic conflicts were discussed during my 
fieldwork, some interviewees wished to remain anonymous, or, in some cases, wished that some 
parts of their information and view not to be included. In any case, the expression and 
interpretation of personal or social views on nations cannot be exclusively personal as such 
expression and interpretation can never be totally isolated from the collectivity to which a 
person belongs. It is based on personal experience but inevitably occurs in a historical and 
political context. I also referred to other forms of communication materials, for instance, 
unpublished writings, novels and personal letters. As Butler (2001) points out, ‘much of 
diaspora experience is unwritten: it is inscribed in the creative arts, material culture, and oral 
traditions’ (212). My close observations on diasporas’ ways of life and their overall views 
towards their own communities and the outside world throughout my fieldwork allowed me to 
produce a useful analysis on their complicated identity beyond mere explanations of what is 
written and actually spoken.
Apparently, diasporas’ collective identity is diluted as generations pass, losing the 
mother tongue, and forgetting national pasts. Nonetheless, the strength and degree of national 
identity is more dependent on community-level management rather than aggregation of 
individuals. Researching national identity as a collective identity attached to the notion of nation
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does not address the sum of an individual’s personal identity. Discussion of how many people 
preserve how much Korean national identity does not help to articulate a collective identity 
itself. Although the majority of ordinary people has never seriously thought about such concepts 
as nation and collective identity, and does not necessarily understand what these terms mean, it 
is not safe to conclude that national identity does not exist among Korean diasporas and living 
as a Korean minority means nothing to them. Have the majority of people ever agreed with the 
present national and ethnic boundaries anyway? National identity can be imposed by external 
situations, consciously and subconsciously. The focus of this study is the impact of such 
external environments on the particular group of people who are seemingly unaware of national 
identity. The diaspora community is continuously replenished over generations, and collective 
national identity is reformulated and reproduced as a diaspora identity rather than simply a 
regional identity.
Who are the Korean diasporas?
The Korean diaspora as a whole is a group of people whose ancestral land is the Korean 
peninsula, which group is more or less aware of a sense of common origins and historical 
memories and, to a certain degree, distinctive culture. The particular ethnonyms of each Korean 
diaspora in the regions, however, reflect their own individual history. Korean diasporas were 
named as Josdnjok, Koreitsy and Zainichi when they were resettled away from the Korean 
homeland. Depending on the vicissitudes in their official nationality while being incorporated 
into a particular nation-building process, such ethnonyms were followed with public perceptions 
of poverty-stricken and powerless peoples. The ethnonyms are used pejorative sense depending 
on outsiders’ perceptions of the people.
On ethnonyms: who are the Josdnjok, Koreitsy and Zainichi?
The English word, Korean includes Koreans abroad but it is the official term for external usage. 
In South and North Korea, the Josdnjok, Koreitsy and Zainichi are called as dong-po in the 
Korean language, literally meaning the same nation living abroad, or j ’aeoegyopo, meaning 
Koreans abroad. The different ethnonyms for Korean diasporas are however accidental. Joson 
refers to unified Korea from 1392 till 1910. Goryo refers to the name of the ancient Korean 
kingdoms between AD 918 and 1356. Although the origins of diasporas are similar in all three 
cases, the former Soviet Koreans were named in a different way to distinguish them from 
Koreans in China.
Ethnonyms can be originated from physical and cultural differences, but social 
perceptions and political misrecognition are later incorporated into their meaning. Zainichi is a
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simplification of Zainichi Josenjin, a literal translation of Koreans living in Japan at the 
beginning. However, the word Josenjin has taken on the negative image of a colonial subject 
under the Japanese occupation in Korea. Koreans in Japan have recently use Zainichi to refer 
themselves. The ethnonym, Josdnjok, used for Koreans in China, began to have an image of a 
less modernised people, especially upon their renewed communication with South Korea. The 
former Soviet Korean is also called Goryoin, which is the Korean translation used among 
Koreans in Korea. In this research, however, I mostly use the ethnonyms, Josdnjok, Koreitsy 
and Zainichi.4 In South and North Korea, the Josdnjok were barely regarded as gyo-po or dong- 
po. Under a legal arrangement in 1998, Korean diasporas who moved to the three countries 
before 1953 are not regarded as members of the Korean nation. Such an arrangement allowed 
clarification of South Korea’s official position towards diaspora Koreans - especially those in 
diplomatically troublesome regions. Ever since its increased interaction with diaspora 
communities, South Korea has witnessed various social and political problems. These include 
diasporas’ sudden labour flows to South Korea, and subsequent questions of the legal status of 
the Korean returnees, while provoking public discussions regarding issues such as the historical 
and political responsibilities of a homeland for once orphaned people. In dealing with such 
issues as diaspora nationality, the national myth of racial homogeniety in Korea has been one of 
the sources of confusion.
The social debates over such issues are related to the interpretation of Korea’s pre­
modem history: can one regard Jos6n as a continuity of the Korean nation? If there is continuity 
between pre-modem Korean identity and modem Korean national identity, an identity shared by 
all Koreans including diaspora Koreans in other words, the collective identity crystallised in the 
Jos5n dynasty could be understood as the shared legacy of Korean national identity. I use the 
term national identity rather than ethnic identity on the ground that pre-modem Korea, Jos6n, 
can be referred to as a crucial foundation for national identity5 although there are some 
difficulties in defining it as a modem nation. In addition to the historical and cultural base of 
Korean national identity, anti-colonial nationalism as a political movement and ideology 
obviously consolidated Koreans’ national identity at the time that diaspora was becoming a 
phenomenon among part of the Korean population. Meanwhile, although I rarely use it, the term 
‘ethnic identity’ in my study is employed as a situational and relational concept rather than as an 
exclusively spatial term. Thus, when such terms as ethnic group or ethnic community appear, 
they are used as opposed to a dominant ethnic group. Meanwhile, I use the terms ‘national 
identity of diaspora’ or simply ‘diaspora identity’ instead of ethnic identity when explaining 
diasporas’ collective identity distinguishable from the national identity of host nations. The 
ground for this distinction is that a national identity can exist separately from a designated 
national territory where diasporas settle. This is not because the concept of ethnic identity is 
unuseful, but because my primary concern lays more in the political identity of Korean
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diasporas. In addition, what they have formed throughout history can be sufficiently categorised 
as a national identity rather than a cultural, regional or religious identity. This is not always the 
case for all other ethnic groups; that is, not all diaspora groups are a part of a nation from the 
beginning although they are not nation-less once incorporated into a new nation. My view on 
this point will become clearer as my argument is developed in the following chapters.
Certainly, there are national boundaries that can be explained in concrete terms in 
relation to those who are not obviously included within those boundaries. Within the boundaries, 
people share the same cultural codes and national heritage of Koreans, although these 
boundaries could become blurred and inclusive. Despite the fact that expression of collective 
identity among the Josdnjok, Koreitsy and Zainichi has been a recent development, their 
collective movements reflect the will to demarcate a distinctive identity. It tends to be quite 
clear that while an identity can be blurred, having an identity is an essential condition for a 
human being. The identity that earlier generations had is fading away, but new types of identity 
are continuously shaped and reformulated by younger generations. Even people who do not 
have confused source of multiple national identities cannot clearly explain their national 
identity. Questions as to what it is to be Chinese or English are difficult to answer. For 
diasporas, such a question can be even more difficult. What I have examined in this regard is 
policy towards Korean minorities, visibly imposed on a particular group of people identified and 
defined as Koreans by both insiders and outsiders. I researched minority organisations and 
institutions developed and preserved by Koreans. One can argue that the official boundaries 
between Korean diasporas and host societies are fading away as an increasing number of 
diasporas naturalises, or mingles by inter-racial marriage and so on. Nevertheless, the name 
Korean remains, and will remain for the foreseeable future. Korean organisations and 
institutions are transformed but continue to exist, perhaps with different agendas, and are still 
identified as Korean organisations. The Korean peninsula will always exist as their ancestral 
homeland, although the identity attached to the Korean motherland will not remain the same, as 
members are changed by new generations and new immigrants from the Korean motherland join 
the old diasporas and contribute to the evolution of a new kind of collective identity.
Organisation of the thesis
Chapter by chapter, I show the evolution of the diaspora identity, beginning with a minority 
national identity vis-a-vis the host nation in Chapter 4, a diaspora identity in relation to their 
organisations and institutions in Chapter 5, and finally, in Chapter 6, a clearer national identity 
as a diaspora vis-a-vis the homeland. Each of the main chapters shows the search for distinctive 
identity, compromise for sound incoiporation, and formation of a stable diasporic identity as the 
commonality of all three cases. This is followed by the theoretical framework and
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conceptualisation of key terms in Chapter 2 and the historical background prior to the period 
researched in Chapter 3. The analysis of the dynamics of diaspora identity in Chapter 4 is of the 
continuous interactions between the diasporas’ desire for inclusion and the host state’s 
exclusivity of political membership. The Korean diasporas in each case have developed different 
patterns of national co-existence and incorporation, namely, segregation, isolation and dispersal 
in Japan, China and post-Soviet central Asia, respectively. This chapter discusses how the 
different policies of host states have affected such relations. The way Korean diasporas define 
their collective identity is reflected in how they select and interpret shared memories within the 
structure of the various concepts of citizenship of the host country. This chapter ultimately 
presents the tension experienced by a diaspora between political membership and a distinctive 
identity, in other words, the tension between full inclusion and recognition.
In Chapter 5, I take the origins and roles of minority organisations or institutions as 
litmus to reflect the historical accumulation of diaspora identity. This chapter demonstrates how 
Korean diasporas have secured a collective identity since their early settlement. The minority 
organisations and institutions are the by-products of interactions among host states, diasporas’ 
communities and homelands. I focus on the origins and the activities of the major minority 
organisations and institutions, namely, Y6nby6n [Yanbian] Josbnjok University in China, 
Mindan (Association of Korean Residents in Japan) and Joch6ngry6n/Chory6n (General 
Assembly of Korean Residents) in Japan, and the Korean kolkhozes, together with the recently 
developed Korean organisations. This chapter is a historical comparison focusing on the 
outcome of diasporas’ political, economic and cultural adaptation. Those selective minority 
organisations and institutions are neither necessarily officially recognised by the host 
government nor unanimously supported by diasporic communities as a whole. Yet, unarguably, 
they have been regarded as voluntarily built symbolic and practical centres of diasporic 
Koreans, such organisations having functioned as the means of shaping and reshaping a 
diasporic identity.
Successful inter-ethnic management is decided by the host country. Factors include 
citizenship regulations and specific policies as, in most cases, bargaining power lies in the hands 
of the dominant national group. For a diaspora, however, its power is also constrained by the 
diapora’s and the host country’s relationship with the diaspora’s homeland. In this regard, 
Chapter 6 analyses the diasporic identity in a broader setting vis-^-vis its ancestral motherland, 
or the sending country.6 This chapter, in this context, highlights the evolution of the self-defined, 
stable identity. It shows the process as an awareness of the need to accept the differences of 
other nations and, simultaneously, the awareness of the necessity of generating their own 
identity. As mentioned earlier, the Korean diasporas in all three cases are currently moving 
towards more self-sufficient communities - for the sake of their own community’s well-being 
rather than for the sake of preserving the Korean national identity in an abstract sense or being
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separate from the host state. Renewed communications with the ancestral motherland and other 
Korean diasporas elsewhere have provided an opportunity for them to clarify who they are and 
what it means to be a Josdnjok, Korei'tski and Zainichi. Finally, in Chapter 7, I recap the 
findings in comparative terms along with concluding remarks and suggestions for further 
research in this field.
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2 The Politics of Diaspora Identity
On the theoretical level, the primary question underpinning this research relates to the 
implications of the collective identity of Korean diasporas on modem multinational states. This 
question suggests two levels of inherent tension: tension between two national identities, and 
tension between culture and politics. The first tension is that between a diasporic identity and an 
official national identity, fundamentally caused by the fact that a state is an involuntary 
association. In the present international setting of nation-states, we do not live in a world where 
everyone can freely choose a preferred nationality or plural nationalities voluntarily. The second 
tension relates to the first and is the fact that culture is undeniably one of the most powerful 
means by which to claim the legitimacy of a political boundary. Consequently, both minority 
national groups and dominant national groups often use their historical and cultural heritage as a 
source of legitimacy for a political unity.
The tension between diasporic identity and official nationality1 is unavoidable in a 
multinational state. Hence, important questions may be raised regarding how to reduce the 
tension on a practical level. In the case of diasporas, the question connotes different kinds of 
tensions than those experience by other ethnic or national groups, or other kinds of cultural 
minorities. This is because, to a certain degree, the term ‘diaspora’ implies involuntary, or at 
times forced, migration and strong political and cultural adherence to another nation-state.
National culture and citizenship are practically inseparable and have not been entirely 
separated.21 do not normatively suggest that conflation of the two concepts is desirable. I argue 
that looking into relationships among various national or ethnic groups requires understanding 
of the agenda behind a modem multinational state which commonly uses dominant culture as a 
tool for justifying solidarity and the psychological bond of a nation, and where cultures of 
minority national groups who lack bargaining power are regarded as private or inferior to an 
official national culture. The historical context of a relationship between national or ethnic 
groups is necessary in order to avoid overgeneralised classifications of various kinds of ethnic or 
national groups. In this sense, positive discrimination may be required in a multinational society 
until perception of a minority group does not imply anything other than difference.
Conceptualising key terms
Diaspora
In my research, I use the term ‘diaspora’ rather than ‘ethnic Koreans’ to refer to Koreans, for the 
reason that the ethnic Korean does not clearly distinguish between Koreans living abroad with 
non-Korean official nationals and Koreans with official Korean nationality. Regardless of their
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Vofficial nationalities, ethnic Koreans can refer to all Koreans in the world, including Koreans in 
Korea with official Korean nationality. And yet, these ethnic Koreans can possess Korean 
national identity along with identities attached to other nations. The term ‘ethnic’ often implies 
geopolitical confinement, referring to a certain group of people who have different cultural and 
historical backgrounds within politically designated boundaries, in which only a dominant 
ethnic group claims sovereignty over the territory. Just as Han Chinese in Chinese territory are 
still ethnically Han Chinese while being official Chinese nationals, Koreans in Korea with 
Korean nationality are still ethnic Koreans. This subsequently requires a term defining those 
who are ethnically or nationally Korean but dispersed and resettled away from the Korean 
homeland, in other words, Korean diaspora.
Diaspora as a social form is like an amoeba, which does not have organs but is still 
categorised as a living thing; as with the diaspora, its identity is also very fluid and unfixed. It is 
often said that diasporic people are alienated from both societies by virtue of building their own 
identity; they can be included in both societies simultaneously. As Armstrong (1976) states, 
*[m]uch of the literature on contemporary diasporas appears to consider them to be anomalies or 
at least very transitory. ... A deeper historical perspective suggests... that other types of 
diasporas; like multiethnic polities themselves, are the norm rather than the exception’ (393). 
Despite the varying degrees among different types of diasporas, in general, the history of a 
diaspora is a history of remembering, forgetting, and imagining an identity attached to the 
ancestral motherland and, at the same time, making a history of searching for full membership in 
another state from the moment of having become a diaspora.
The term diaspora originates from the Greek word dispersion (dia + speirein). As an 
ancient prototypal model, according to the Webster Dictionary, Diaspora refers to ‘the settling 
of scattered colonies of Jews outside Palestine after the Babylonian exile’, but it also means ‘the 
Jews living outside Palestine or modem Israel’ (1976, 3rd edn., vol.l). Today, the word has 
been coined as a generalised concept describing similar cases to that of the exiled Jews. It 
implies the phenomenon itself, the breaking up and scattering of people, the scattered people 
who settled far from their ancestral homelands, or the place where the scattered people settle. 
Having combined the three elementsm ‘diaspora’ refers to a group of people with cultural 
distinction involved in a particular phenomenon, dispersal, which resulted in spatial changes by 
long-term and short-term resettlement.
In academic writings, the term has been used to refer to a group of people who are 
scattered and settled away from their ancestral homelands3 and regarded as a form of ethnic 
group in today’s world. ‘[A]s diasporan population proliferated, communities that scholars had 
once labelled as immigrant, nomadic, or exilic also began to be called diasporas’ (Butler: 2001, 
190). However, the concept of diaspora needs to be distinguished from other forms of ethnic 
group and immigrants. Due to the short history of diaspora studies as an academic field, so far
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attempts at conceptualising diasporas have been somewhat sporadic. Some, for example, 
Armstrong, Sheffer, and Cohen, indirectly conceptualise diasporas by categorising them in 
accordance with their origins and patterns of incorporation. Others such as King (1998), G. 
Smith (1999), and Butler (2001) suggest conceptualisation of diasporas by providing the 
common features of the diasporas that have been researched. Scholars of major nationalism, on 
the other hand, only briefly suggest the definitions of diasporas in relation to other similar 
groups of people but, in their definitions, diasporas are regarded rather as a transitory 
phenomenon or an ethnic group lacking crucial conditions and ethics for qualification as a 
proper ethnic group.
Armstrong (1976) defines diasporas as various types of ‘ethnic collectivities which lack 
a territorial base within a given polity, i.e., it is a relatively small minority throughout all 
portions of the polity’ (393). He suggests two models: ‘proletarian diaspora’ and ‘mobilized 
diaspora’. The former is a ‘disadvantaged products of modernized polities’ (ibid.), especially 
referring to guest-workers during early stages of their existence. Most other diasporas are 
mobilised ethnic groups which do not have particular advantages in status but ‘enjoy many 
material and cultural advantages compared to other groups’ (ibid.). Mobilised diasporas have 
some characteristic of a quasi-society in a larger polity with a few social features. Mobilised 
diasporas have boundary-maintenance mechanisms that enable diasporas to persist.
Nevertheless, Armstrong’s distinction is mainly based on historical pre-modem 
diasporas, thus, it is not always applicable when attempting to explain the changes in and 
dynamics of diasporas within the structure of various host states. Besides, his definition of 
diasporas is too loose to understand diasporas as opposed to other types of ethnic collectivities. 
All diasporas exhibit some kind of ethnic collectivity but not all ethnic collectivities are 
diasporas, although a nation or a state can be built by a diasporic group; for example, English 
diasporas and the subsequent establishment of new states in America, New Zealand and 
Australia, and Jews in Israel. In this sense, nations could be diasporas in terms of their origins 
but obviously not all nations are diasporas.
In the pre-modem era the term ‘diaspora’ is strictly confined to people who, exiled or 
expelled for political reasons, consequently have a strong attachment to and connections with 
the ancestral motherland in their aspiration to return to their homeland when the time comes. In 
this sense, territorial attachment is emphasised and the reasons behind such diasporas are limited 
to either the political or the religious. The implications of pre-modem diasporas to outsiders are 
traumatic, negative and opportunistic. Such diasporas naturally maintained a strong collective 
identity and were highly mobilised. In the modem era, however, the term is loosely defined as 
both voluntarily and involuntarily dispersed people, not only for political or sacred but also 
economic and cultural reasons. Such diasporas, however, are less territorially bound and not 
necessarily mobilised.
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There is an increasing number of diasporas who consider their exposure to plural 
national cultures and societies as advantages, even among marginalised proletarian diasporas. 
Whereas some scholars, such as Soysal (1994), regard denizens as disadvantaged and 
marginalised people, especially in reference to guest-worker immigrants who possess a 
modicum of civil and social rights, Cohen (1999) sees them in a positive light. In the global era, 
‘diaspora’ becomes a more inclusive term to refer merely to dispersed people, including 
privileged global ‘denizens’4 who are ‘citizens of other countries... not necessarily seeking 
permanent settlement and normally professionals, managers and entrepreneurs from other 
countries’ (198). Still, however, all three types of diaspora co-exist. Within the boundary of a 
state, pre-modem, modem and global diasporas exist simulataneously. As Sheffer (1984) 
explains, ‘[s]ome of the existing diasporas are ancient, for example, Jews, Indians and overseas 
Chinese, certain diasporas have been created in the more recent past, for example, Poles and 
Irish in the United States, and some diasporas are only now emerging’ (12-13).
By outlining the features of diaspora one can make the concept clearer. Tololyan makes 
a useful point regarding the attributes of diasporas. He explains that, in terms of origin, coercion 
has to be involved from the beginning. Secondly, a diaspora shows persistence in not being 
assimilated and reluctance to assimilate. Thirdly, a diaspora shows a tendency to innovate a new 
identity, especially with semiotic, political and illusionary links with its homeland. Fourthly, a 
diaspora lacks power, being relatively weak in relation to the majority. Therefore diasporic 
anxiety is expressed that identifies the homeland with cultural anxiety.5 Tololyan’s tighter way 
of conceptualising diasporas, however, suggests a working definition for certain cases - in his 
case Armenian or Jewish diasporas - as his conceptualisation is deduced from certain prototypes 
of diasporas.
King, Smith and Butler delineate the concepts of a diaspora by illuminating the specific 
qualities of diasporas as opposed to other ethnic or national groups. For King (1998), ‘the 
migratory memory, strong inter-generational solidarity buttressed by communal institutions, 
permanent residence’ outside the homeland, and ‘a sense of divided loyalty between the state of 
residence and the homeland are the qualities differentiating [diasporas] from other ethnic 
communities’ (7-8).6 Meanwhile, Butler suggests the common features of diasporas as multiple 
destinations after dispersal, some kind of relationship to an actual or imagined homeland, self- 
awareness of the group’s identity, (that is to say, consciously being part of an ethnonational 
group), and the feature of being multi-generational with a collective history.7 These general 
qualifications of being a diaspora are commonly deduced from features of researched diasporas 
confined in a certain host country. Consequently, it is likely that the attributes of under- 
researched diaspora cases will be overlooked. In this sense, an agreed scholarly concept of 
diasporas is somewhat discursive and significant research is required so as to avoid the present 
problems of conceptualising diaspora.
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If considering the factors such as the degree of attachment to their ancestral homelands, 
the final goal of diaspora communities and the degree of internal solidarity, the concept of a 
diapora may be considerably loosened. Taking into account the recent changes regarding 
diaspora issues, including such aspects as perceptions, size and roles of diasporas and so on, the 
definition itself needs transforming. As generations pass and the present territorial national 
boundaries are more or less stabilised, people who historically belong to the same diaspora may 
share only some of the features of the existing concept of diasporas. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the diaspora is a transitory phenomenon and that diaspora people are 
destined to be assimilated or to disappear. Ancient and pre-modem diasporas were the more or 
less victimised people created by the abrupt international arrangement of the present national 
territories. ‘As the history of the formation of nation-states shows, new national boundaries give 
rise to new national minorities’ (Solinger: 1999, 127).
There is an increasing amount of such international spillover and the withdrawal of the 
choice returning to ancestral homelands, including political refugees, asylum-seekers, economic 
diasporas and stateless people. Immigrant groups are a kind of diaspora, but not all diasporas are 
immigrants. Whereas legal immigration involves a change of official membership to another 
state, diasporas are not always clear in this matter. Diasporas occur between two or more states 
involving plural ethnic or national groups. Dispersal can occur as an individual or as a group, 
thus an individual can become a member of a diaspora community. Spatial changes occur by 
resettlement, which could be either short term or long term.
Involuntary migration is often considered one of the key differences between diasporas 
and immigrants. If considering diasporas to be an exclusively involuntary phenomenon by 
applying the dichotomised categories such as voluntary migration and involuntary migration to 
the real world, a more specific approach is required. Kukathas (1997), among many other 
scholars, has raised the question regarding the fact that children from voluntary immigrants have 
not voluntarily chosen to be bom in the country to which their parents voluntarily moved.8 Even 
in the case of voluntary immigrants, if the conditions in their original homeland pushed them to 
choose to leave their own countries, should it be regarded as voluntary immigration? It is 
different from a physically forced migration but this situation still has involuntary connotations. 
Involuntary migrations include not only forced expulsion or exile, but also the withdrawal of the 
choice to return by their hostland or the international system. Some choose to leave their own 
countries to seek better opportunities than their own country can provide. Some individuals have 
firm beliefs that s/he was bom in the wrong place. Some accept it and others do not. In this 
sense, in most cases, official nationality is an involuntary choice. But, a problem stems from the 
fact that in the present international system such an involuntarily acquired nationality is often 
used as a source of discrimination accompanied by unfavourable perception and unequal 
treatment without legitimate grounds. For some, however, nationality is a less involuntary
25
identity. Thus, a more helpful categorisation of an ethnic or national minority group seems to be 
its particular historical context, features and goals of minority groups in relation to other nations 
involved rather than whether its migration is voluntary or involuntary.
In modem multinational states, diaspora communities, mainly filled with old settlers, 
are mixed with other types of immigrant groups and new immigrants from the homeland. The 
issues of diasporas are inevitably political and international in the sense that a diaspora exists 
between international borders and different sovereign states. Accordingly, the crucial debate 
regarding immigrants juxtaposes open-border with restrictionist closed-border arguments; 
whereas for the case of diaspora, the focal point of discussion is inclusion versus exclusion. 
Many different levels of debate are engaged and there is a number of different cases of diasporas 
that do not neatly fit into any single typology.
One needs to consider the different aspects of diasporas: the origins of diasporas, the 
forms of diasporas, the roles of diasporas, and the ultimate goals of diasporas. Due to the 
complexities and inter-connections among the many variables, a more concrete way of defining 
diasporas is problematic unless each diaspora is scrutinised. The focal disagreement among 
scholars on the concept of diasporas is also rested on the range of the term. Thus, their first 
question would be among the numerous kinds of ethnic groups: which groups are qualified to be 
called diasporas? The common attributes of diasporas are classified on the basis of the cases 
falling in a certain range. Each scholar has drawn his/her own borderline between diasporas and 
the rest.9 Consequently, scholars interested in comparisons of great ranges of diaspora cases 
naturally prefer a looser definition of diasporas, and vice versa. Bearing in mind the difficulties 
and disagreements regarding the concept of a diaspora, I would suggest, for my case, a working 
definition of a diaspora as follows:
A diaspora is a group of people from a distinctive nation or ethnic group,10 being settled 
or resettled away from their ancestral homeland in another territory where the dominant national 
group has a different culture and history and, this group, to a certain degree, being aware of a 
collective memory preserved due to a shared history of collective relocation for inevitable 
political reasons. Consequently, they become categorised as a minority ethnie or sub-national 
group11 with implications of more non-voluntary migration than other migrants in general. They 
naturally have the features and dispositions of a distinguishable group due to their separate 
historical and cultural origins. Accordingly, I suggest that the important conditions to qualify as 
a diaspora are a shared migratory memory resulting from collective relocation,12 duality in 
political loyalty and cultural attachment, collective existence, and linkage with an ancestral 
motherland.
On the following grounds, I define relocated Koreans under this study as a diaspora 
rather than an ethnic group, migrants, refugees, or overseas Koreans. Firstly, commonly for the 
three, collective settlement or resettlement occurred, despite the various causes. In consequence,
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cultural and political clashes between two different nations occurred. Not all ethnic groups fall 
into this category. Secondly, political and historical inevitability is involved in their resettlement, 
implying that the causes of migration were rested on political forces further to individual 
choices, unlike migrants. The term ‘overseas Koreans’ does not necessarily signify collective 
resettlement for its origin. Thirdly, even after several generations, collective memory of 
relocation shapes and reshapes their community within the triad frames of homeland, hostland 
and organisations. Having described a particular section of the Korean population under this 
research as diaspora, I do not mean to exclude other ways of naming them. By my judgement, 
the term most clearly signifies a particular kind of collectivity which generates another type of 
collective identity on which this research is focused. Although the decisive condition for being a 
diaspora, collective relocation, ceased generations ago, diaspora identity has been continuously 
generated and regenerated by various diasporas’ public activities, including recording their 
historical memories, providing Korean education for children, participating in nationalist 
movements, being involved in minority organisations and institutions, having knowledge of 
public affairs in the societies of both homeland and hostland, and so forth.
The analytical framework in the third section of this chapter emerges from the 
conditions of a diaspora given so far. Suggested conditions are extracted from my working 
definition of a diaspora. The conditions provide the major variables to be analysed; namely, 
origins of a diaspora, the exclusivity of citizenship notion, collectivity of a diaspora and 
ancestral motherland. These key variables comprise the structure of the rest of the chapters. 
Diasporas’ features are analysed in each chapter and ultimately show the nature of diaspora 
identity as a third type of national identity. I finally argue that such a third type of national 
identity somehow needs to be accepted for what it is. As for the theoretical grounds for this, the 
views of assimilationists, multiculturalists, and post structuralists are presented in the later part 
of this chapter.
Studying diaspora has only been a marginalised field, to the extent that diasporic people 
have been regarded as marginalised outsiders with the few exceptions of privileged groups. 
Diasporas have existed historically as a phenomenon that has been economically exploited and 
politically mistreated owing to their host societies’ suspicion of their conspiracy with their 
homelands. It is the more recent force of globalisation that has evoked academic interest in the 
field of diasporas and international migration.
National identity
Although my intention is not to discuss identity itself, it is necessary to make the concept clear 
to a certain extent. Psychologists tend to emphasise the inside mechanism of identity as a 
categorisation of human selves, whereas sociologists and political scientists pay more attention
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to the objective conditions and visible qualifications by which various identities are categorised. 
Sigel (2001) succinctly summarises the common views on identity among social scientists; 
mainly social psychologists. First, all consider it socially constructed and, therefore, not 
immutable. Second, it implies a social relation; in other words, it encompasses notions of self 
and of the groups in which the self is embedded or with which it feels identified. Third, by such 
group identification, one defines oneself, differentiates oneself from, or at least compares 
oneself to, ‘groups believed to be different from one’s own. A person’s sense of self thus 
included the I, the we, and the not-we’ (112). Fourth, individuals tend to have multiple group 
identities, but their priority depends on the salience of a certain group to which they attach it. 
Lastly, ‘social identities and their manifestations reflect the social structure and culture of which 
they are a part’.13
An identity refers both to the self and to the social group; in fact, it provides the link 
between the two. Whereas personal identity is discovering and knowing oneself in relation to 
others, awareness of collective identity would mean perceiving oneself as a member of a larger 
group and, at the same time, having consciousness of one’s own group within the context of, or 
in opposition to larger groups. This identification and differentiation process is inevitably 
accompanied by understandings of the group to which one supposedly belongs. In this sense, 
‘identity... bridges the gap between the “inside and the outside” - between the personal and the 
public worlds’ (Hall: 1992, 276). When discussing the political aspect of collective identity, we 
may regard states and the international community as our public world. In the case of diasporas, 
in particular, states as the public world include both: the state of host nation and the state of 
homeland. The collective identity, however, is not to do with knowing or contacting members of 
the same group. Marxist-oriented post-modernism believers have emphasised the illusive 
features of a national identity following Anderson’s (1983, 1991) assumption. Yet, discussion 
has gone further from the debates over falsity or actuality of a nation, as the falsity-actuality 
debate provides little help in understanding problematic relationships among different ethnic or 
national groups in real politics. Whether an outcome of pure imagination or not, national 
identity has eventually become real.
When one is aware of identity attached to, for instance, family, community or society, 
one tends to behave in the way that one is expected to, within the boundaries where one belongs. 
There may be a different type of member who behaves coherently in the opposite way to norms 
of the group according to which they are expected to think and behave. Yet, it is hard to 
maintain that such people are unaware of their collective identity and live completely in 
personhood. Being aware of an identity attached to an external world is inseparable from how 
one understands the world. Unless one considers what family, community or society means to 
her/him, one can hardly be aware or consciously unaware of collective identities. Identity is both 
intrinsic and extrinsic. It is subjective only in the context of objectivity.
28
As Sigel further suggests, identity is continuously being shaped and constructed at the 
same time. For instance, discovering how people understand the objective conditions of a nation 
to which they belong is the way to explain how they perceive themselves as a part of such a 
nation, regardless of whether or not they are satisfied with their identity. It can be argued that 
even people who do not have a strong sense of belonging towards their nation, or who wish to 
deny such communitarian feeling or obligation attached towards larger groups, still have a 
shared national identity, by virtue of outsiders’ perception and categorisation. Thus, national 
identity can also be discovered and explained by outsiders, even if those of that national identity 
are unaware of what a nation is, or if it means nothing in particular to them in their everyday 
lives. National identity coexists with other kinds of identities. National identity is not essential, 
nor is it the primary kind of collective identity. There are numerous kinds of collective identities 
that simultaneously exist in complex layers.
In the studies of nation and nationalism, conventionally, liberal sociologists tend to 
explain identity within a theoretical framework of pre-mordialist versus modernist, and recently, 
post-modernist. Meanwhile, Marxist sociologists view the issue of nationalism as class versus 
nation.14 They commonly criticise anti-Marxist nationalism theories as ‘bourgeois 
rationalization on the irrationality of nationalism’ (Berberoglu: 1996, 218), arguing that national 
identity is an irrational, invented, forged, imagined or constructed ideology, set by an imaginary 
allegiance to the nation, independent of any direct links to class and social processes.
National identity can be defined as a collective consciousness of belonging to a nation. 
A nation, as one of the socio-political categories for dividing population, is a group of people 
that shares certain distinguishable features from other groups. Smith (1991) enumerates its 
features as ‘(1) an historic territory, or homeland, (2) common myths and historical memories, 
(3) a common, mass public culture, (4) common legal rights and duties for all members, and (5) 
a common economy with territorial mobility for members’ (14). Disagreements among scholars 
stem from the origins of a nation, components of the features of a nation, internal and external 
conditions of being a nation, and relationship with interlinked concepts such as ethnie and state. 
There has already been sufficient academic research on this aspect of nationalism studies based 
on rich case studies.
Whether the Korea of around the time when its diaspora was emerging in the nineteenth 
century can be called a nation may draw an academic attention. Whether judged to be nation or 
ethnie, one clear fact is that the particular group of people that were confined in the territory of 
the Korean peninsula had existed for over several thousand years. Undeniably, they shared most 
of the basic elements of a nation, including shared myths, territory, culture and religion, 
fundamentally suggesting its continuity to the present Korean nation. And, a sense of belonging 
possibly called as a kind of collective identity allowed them to distinguish themselves from 
outsiders. Jos6njok, Zainichi and Korei'tsy are evidently a part of this particular group of people
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called Korean. The emergence of Korean diasporas between 1860 and 1945 can be viewed as a 
transitory historical phase. During this period, Korean people as a group became gradually more 
modernised, unified and politicised through creating and developing common public culture, 
harmonising economic and legal system by force of modem and bureaucratic institutions and 
development of social infrastructure. These developments enforced the objective and subjective 
boundary determining Korea vis-^-vis outside world. During the colonised era, negative 
collective self-image began to be incorporated into the concept of nation. This happened through 
official publications and public discourses provided by colonial power. At the same time, 
modem institutions were set up, including social infrustractures, business corporations, a 
banking system, markets, schools, printing media, armies, courts, constitutions, police, 
government, and so on. A unified common economy and legal system were set up in the 
colonised national territory, Josdn, later renamed as D’aehan j ’aeguk. In addition, in the period 
of emergence of Korean diasporas, anti-colonial nationalism certainly stimulated collective 
awareness of being one of the members of a distinctive political entity.
As the period of migration is not identical among these diasporas, their identities related 
to the Korean motherland and the Korean people are also varied. One clear point is that these 
diasporic Koreans have been incorporated into the period of nation building in each host state. 
Thus, it is safe to call their collective sense of belonging to a nation(s) as a national identity. It is 
self-evident that such national identity of Korean diasporas is composed of or related to not only 
the Korean nation, but also the nation of the host state. In this sense, they can also be named as a 
part of a nation, thus, a national group, becoming a sub or minority national group within 
another state. Not all ethnic groups are sub-national groups but Koreans under this study, for the 
historical grounds that I have explained so far, form an ethnic group at the same time as a 
national group. Also, not all diasporas are part of both an ethnic group and a nation. However, 
Korean diasporas can be considered as a part of the Korean nation. Nonetheless, due to 
continuity and the de-tenitoriality of identity, one cannot presume that the exact moment of 
diaspora migration was the exact borderline of possessing Korean identity and then having 
another national identity; that is, the one of a host state. Therefore, the national identity of a 
diaspora is explicable only when analysing it within the context of the plural nations involved. 
However, I restrict my use of the particular components of each relevant nation as variables to 
those generating each diaspora’s own collective identity, although such national identity is 
always formed in relation to the Korean nation and the nation of host state.
In the particular case of diasporas, the nation to which their collective identity is 
attached refers both to the nation they left behind and the new nation of the hostland. The 
diasporic collective identity can also be formed without necessarily being engaged in nation- 
building process of the homeland. Such process inevitably continues within the triad structure. 
The constitution of a diasporic identity cannot be entirely isolated from the homeland due to
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their historical and cultural involvement. For some diaspora cases, this is merely imagined. Not 
only visible direct influences but also the imagination of Korea and related historical memories 
evoke a particular kind of collective identity. In this sense, a diaspora community is aware of the 
public issues in Korea. In some cases, they indirectly but continuously participate in political 
affairs in their homeland. Therefore, by the term national identity of diasporas, I mean that a 
diaspora’s identity belongs or relates to both of the nations, old and new. It is crucial not to 
confuse the two different concepts: the national identity of the Korean diasporas called 
Josonjok, Zainichi and Koreftsy and the Korean identity of Josbnjok, Zainichi and Koreitsy. In 
this sense, one may think that a diaspora’s own nation is not a precondition of generating a 
diaspora’s national identity. The history of a diaspora is formed through the process of 
forgetting and remembering collective memories while separated from the host society and 
thinking of the ancestral homeland, but at the same time keeping their own collective life stories. 
In this sense, a diaspora identity is continuously shaped and reshaped vis-^-vis the factors that 
structure the particular groups of people to be defined as diasporas. These factors include the 
ancestral homeland, the hostland and minority organisations or institutions. Identity includes the 
meaning of nation to self; perception of nation; significance of nation to self, relationship 
between self and nation, awareness of the relationship between self and nation, and sense of 
belonging to the nation. Identity can and should be in-and-out of the national culture rather than 
always entrapped or nested in the culture within which diasporas are involved.
One cannot see a diaspora’s national identity unless it is expressed. Although expression 
of identity is not the same as an emergence of a collective identity, the expression of identity 
and formation of identity interplay. For the Korean diasporas’ case, I take sharing collective 
memories and keeping a distinguishable history of their own as the key markers of diasporic 
identity. Accumulated historical writings and interpretations of historical incidents reflect the 
process of moulding a diaspora’s collective identity. Such records and interpretations create a 
conflictual sphere with related nations; that is, the Korean nation and nations of host states. By 
interpretation, I intend inclusion of cognition, understanding and expression of oneself vis-^-vis 
something. I used the term ‘vis-^-vis’, as an interpretation of oneself is not necessarily either for 
or against, and neither strongly within (as a member) nor beyond the boundary of a collectivity. 
Of collectivity, I include subjective psychological bonds and objective components marking a 
certain kind of boundary between insiders and outsiders. In this particular case, collectivity 
means the forms of a diaspora’s existence, and the interpretation of being a diaspora is how 
Koreans in exile perceive the meaning of being a member of a diaspora vis-^-vis the previously 
mentioned factors forming and influencing diasporas.
The process of understanding and writing a diaspora’s shared history is the process of a 
diaspora’s self-justification and search for legitimate grounds of political membership in its host 
state. In this process, various visible and invisible cultures are used as the means of cognition
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and recognition. Claims on historical lands, vernacular language, customs, values and religious 
faith are only a few examples. Diasporic identity is based on accumulated, collective memories 
of misrecognition or non-recognition. The next section develops why recognition is necessary 
for a diaspora, and how a diaspora can be recognised if it aspires to develop its collective 
identity by appropriate recognition.
Whether such an identity-based categorisation of human beings is useful in 
understanding the real world differs from whether such categorisation is normative. 
Universalistic observers tend to suggest the notion of citizenship as the right category of 
grouping people in politics, as it implies a culture-free legal individual as the basis of the whole 
political entity. Liberal republicans would suggest a more nationalised concept of citizenship as 
the most useful categorisation in understanding modem political societies, whereas Marxists 
view class as the fundamental cleavage defining human beings. Culturalists tend to hold that 
human beings are fundamentally divided by racial, ethnic and cultural differences. Feminists 
would view society and politics as seriously divided by gender. All these different ways of 
categorising people are equally necessary and thus significant, as long as they provide a sound 
framework by which to understand the problems of present societies. The categorisations are all 
political, as they provide different angles on problems hidden in every aspect of a world that 
can, and should, be politically adjusted.
Recognition of identity in the political context
Recognition of a minority national group’s collective identity
Apart from the Zainichi case, the issues of recognition for Korean diasporas might be regarded 
as premature. This is seemingly because Korean diasporas themselves have not yet openly 
questioned the issue of recognition in China and Uzbekistan. Recognition of minorities provides 
positive motivation for becoming an active citizen of a host state rather than necessarily 
encouraging antagonism or nurturing a separate identity, depending on the specific relationship. 
The question of political recognition of sub-national groups is directly related to the issue of 
citizenship. There seems to be no covering principle judging whether rational or national 
citizenship is normatively right or wrong. But in practice, overemphasis on the cultural basis of 
citizenship seems to cause more tensions in multinational states,15 where an increasing number 
of minority groups with different cultural backgrounds are mixed together.
The grouping of the theories below is only to provide a convenient framework for my 
research focus; that is, the political implications of diasporic identity. The grouping is based on 
the fundamental disagreement among scholars engaged in the field of identity politics. The 
following theoretical explanations are not, of course, originated from the practice of relationship
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between dominant and minority national groups in Japan, China or the former Soviet Union. I 
take only those parts that provide general but fundamental issues and questions of power 
relations between a state and a group divided by differences in culture and history.
Assimilationists versus multiculturalists
Assimilationists highlight the negative nature of culture itself, negative effects on political 
process or negative effects of minority cultures on dominant culture. Despite holding various 
views on how to assimilate sub-national minorities, most conservative nationalism theorists and 
republican nationalists are included in this group. They advocate the assimilation of minority 
cultures and identities into mainstream society for the sake of political justice. Although they 
generally have fundamentally different philosophical stances on the particular issue of minority, 
Barry (2001) and Miller (1995) basically share the same normative ideas about cultural 
minorities in multinational states but on totally different grounds. Barry does so on egalitarian 
grounds while Miller’s is a result of scepticism about universalist beliefs in the neutrality of 
public affairs. Habermas’ (1992) concept of constitutional patriotism has also been criticised as 
assimilationist. Having focused on my research interests, restrictions of the tension between 
official nationality and a minority’s collective identity are given in Barry’s additive assimilation, 
Miller’s explanation on the relationship between national identity and communal identity, and 
Habermas’ constitutional patriotism.
Barry gives an answer to the question of why minority identity as a group should not be 
problematised and unnecessary to be collectively recognised in the political arena. Miller has 
explained why assimilation is the best answer for minority ethnic and national groups in modem 
states. Habermas, meanwhile, explains why migration and minority issues become more and 
more crucial, and how modem democracy should react to such minority issues. Such issues are 
directly relevant to understanding why multinational democratic states, regardless of the rough 
geopolitical division of East and West, including China and Japan, have developed a public fear 
against collectivity of different sub-national groups within their territories.
Miller views the cultural core of the citizenship notion both as a vision and a 
perspective, consequently there is little room for including other identities with difference in his 
liberal national world. He views nationality and citizenship as complementing each other, being 
deeply sceptical about a universalist understanding of nationhood. According to him, the 
national boundary should be congruent with the state boundary by assimilation and adaptation 
through rational deliberation. A group of people that possesses a justifiable national culture 
should have an independent state. For him, the pre-conditions of national identity are shared 
belief and mutual commitment, common history, its active character, connections with territory 
and distinct public culture, which provides ethical reasons for present national boundaries.16
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Undoubtedly, for him, a state is the best and most ethical arrangement of such national 
boundaries. The more homogenous public/national culture is, the more efficiently the state can 
function. ‘Social justice will always be easier to achieve in states with strong national identities 
and without internal communal divisions’ (1995, 96). Miller poses the causal relationship 
between common national identity embodied in a shared public culture and successful 
redistributive schemes of social justice by explaining both strength and character (quality) of 
national identity, and the existence of national identity along with communal divisions within 
multinational-looking states.
Following Miller, one can hardly prove the qualities of public culture and national 
identity of a nation without a sovereign state as all qualified nations with national cultures are 
likely to claim self-determination and are likely to be contained in the institutional form of a 
state. ‘[Historically, national identities have very often developed out of prior ethnic identities, 
and where a cohesive ethnic group finds that its legitimate claims are ignored by the state, a 
natural response is for the group to begin to think of itself as an alternative nationality’ (ibid., 
112-13) which will claim self-determination. Diasporas are the counter-examples of Millerian 
ideas. Diasporas are one of the sub-national groups that can plausibly possess plural national 
identities that are not necessarily territorially confined. Can one follow Miller and argue that 
Jews in Israel have a cohesive national culture whereas Jews elsewhere do not have a national 
identity as Jews? Taiwanese, Scottish, Corsicans and Tibetans, among many others, have their 
own national culture without having an externally recognised state. De-territorialised national 
identity could also be feasible and normative, and there exist qualified and cohesive national 
cultures without independent states. The common falsity among assimilationist views on this 
matter is the fact that their understandings of national or ethnic minority identity underestimate 
its political aspect and overlook their differences from other kinds of identities. Miller’s term 
‘private cultural phenomenon’ is itself a contradiction in terms. Culture inevitably possesses 
public characteristics. One does not understand a culture as personal dispositions and individual 
preferences. Also, the crucial difference of sub-national groups’ collective identities from other 
kinds of cultural identities lay in their self-sufficiency as potentially independent political 
groups.
Barry, in the meantime, separates cultures from political rationality more radically by 
endorsing the idea of defending nationality as irrational and non-universal. For him, the concept 
of citizenship should be strictly based on legalistic and institutional understandings of 
membership to a modem state. He basically denies special attachments to the intrinsic 
significance of national boundaries, and criticises nationalists’ irrational and particularistic 
sentiments in giving special weight to national allegiances. Barry argues that a politics of 
multiculturalism undermines a politics of redistribution. He is explicitly against the concept of 
equal citizenship embodied in equal rights needing to be replaced by a set of culturally
34
differentiated rights. For this argument, he gives examples of extreme racialised nationalisms in 
western history, such as Nazism and fascism, as the practice of particularism and politicisation 
of group identities.
Barry’s main purpose is to show the theoretical loopholes of multiculturalist claims. The 
fundamental disparity between the two polemic debates multiculturalists versus 
rationalist/universalists is on how to reach a world where justice and equality are implemented 
without any risk of discrimination on the public level against sex, race, age, property, nationality 
and so on. The debate naturally involves the next stage of discussion as to whether it is fair to 
discuss the issues of cultural differences as the political means of negotiating public goods. In 
other words, the nature of the debate is the disagreement between problematising and neglecting 
the prevalent social and political injustice, either deliberately or accidentally, framed by more or 
less cultural lines. Barry basically means culture is not the kind of rights as intrinsic human 
nature that should be collectively protected in the political sphere as he perceives culture as a 
mere mannerism.
Speaking of the irrationality of culture, however, normally refers to the formality of or 
ways of practicing cultures. One needs to consider the logic behind such irrationality and its 
interconnection with power. The desire to keep cultural distinctiveness among diasporas, for 
example, is not only associated with feelings, sentiments or nostalgia attached to a group but 
also rational calculation. Human beings consciously or unconsciously tend to follow the customs 
and values of an existing culture, and to associate with people who share the same cultural 
norms, rather than changing or breaking commonly accepted cultural codes and rules. When one 
as a member of a group is aware of the rule of a particular group’s culture, including customs 
and values, it becomes much easier to predict and calculate the benefits and outcomes of a 
relationship with others. This tendency is rested not only on comfortable feelings towards 
insiders but also on rational calculations of reciprocity and mutual cares and benefits. Among 
de-territorialised diasporas or migrant groups, in most cases, such cultural norms substitute for 
moral codes. Some ceremonies or rituals survive symbolically and often irrationality is 
involved. The purpose of such irrationality, however, is often to preserve the core of the 
rationale of culture. Some within the cultural circle follow the formality without understanding 
or questioning the core of the culture, and few tend to apply their own cultural codes beyond 
their own cultural circle for various reasons, including cultural pride, rational calculations 
caused by uncertainty of continuity in relationship and fear of a free-rider without ensuring 
reciprocity, not only with heterophobia. These seemingly unreasonable symbolic formalities of 
culture are necessary from a cultural minority’s point of view because such cultural boundaries 
are not protected by the rationality of constitutional law. This is obviously applicable to any 
relations between diasporic communities and dominant national groups elsewhere.
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Taking a risk in order to defend particular beliefs is harmless for a liberal society and 
does not impinge upon the principles of liberal democracy. Similar kinds of debates have 
occurred in most multinational societies, regardless of a liberal or non-liberal stance. The 
problems evoked by Japanese extreme nationalists targeting North Korean-affiliated Zainichi 
students wearing traditional costumes as school uniforms are one of those numerous examples. 
The point seems to be more a question of tolerance than the debate over whether principles of 
democracy are put in danger by minority cultures. Barry’s argument is focused on why, for the 
sake of equal distribution and ultimate political justice, culture is not worth taking seriously in 
the political arena.17 However, different levels of cultures seem to be mixed up and 
indiscriminately left aside as personal, private and irrational dispositions, lacking clarification of 
the different kinds and levels of cultures. On assimilation, in the same manner, Barry juxtaposes 
the ideal of assimilation with the ideal of diversity and finally suggests additive assimilation. 
However, the concept of additive assimilation, which Barry equates with plural identities, is 
itself paradoxical. Assimilation implies becoming one. Additive may suggest the process of 
assimilation but this is no alternative to forced or involuntary assimilation and it is only a milder 
way of expressing assimilation.
Identification within a group already involves assimilation. Even from the egalitarian 
point of view, there seems to be no logical ground for understanding that assimilation within a 
smaller group is acceptable whereas larger scale assimilation should be resisted for the sake of 
maintaining the mechanism of assimilation within a smaller group. In theory, such an argument 
seems to be convincing but what most multiculturalism theorists are concerned about is the fact 
that smaller and less powerful groups have been systematically oppressed or discriminated 
against only because someone is a member of that particular group. Barry argues that they are 
oppressed because of the very reason that they are in the form of such a distinguishable group 
rather than individuals. Barry downplays the gravity of deep-seated collective identities that 
have been politically and historically oppressed only because of the particular collectivities and 
the practical difficulties of rooting out all kinds of cultural identity. Such problems, according to 
his ideas on collective identity and political justice, fundamentally result from his clear-cut 
division of public and private arenas, which are not in reality always so neatly distinguishable, 
especially where culture and identity are concerned.
One may argue that his theory is developed set by western liberal democratic states, thus 
of little relevance to other cases, likewise multiculturalism theories with which I shall deal 
shortly. Yet, more accurately, his theory is developed based on the relationship between a state 
defending liberal traditions and a group from non-liberal traditions. In this sense, liberal cannot 
be understood simply as an absolute culture-free official political ideology. It can hardly be a 
separate issue from the cultures and traditions of a state. Although political regimes and 
ideologies can hardly be seen as universal, human relationships are universal. The nature of
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problems, exhibiting misrecognised or under-represented collective identity, needs to be taken 
into account regardless of the geographical origins of theoretical debates. Diasporas’ response to 
their host societies may be varied; a host society’s manner of excluding minorities differ 
between countries; historical contexts and the traditions for deciding on membership are also 
different. All the countries under my research have officially presented themselves as either 
multinational or homogeneous democratic states. China and the former Soviet central Asia 
proclaimed socialism, but their policies towards ethnic minorities were nothing of the kind. 
Japan is more or less a liberal democracy in common with western countries, although the 
Japanese way of perceiving outsiders is not identical with other liberal democracies. In this 
sense, there seems to be little logic in exceptioning certain regions from useful theoretical 
concerns. When discussing the patterns of incorporating minority identities, I take the traditions, 
historical perceptions and cultures of each host state more seriously. This is not because I 
endorse Asian particularism but because my view is that political ideology cannot be separately 
developed from cultural and historical contexts. Even within liberal democracies, there exists a 
great variety, as there is in totalitarian regimes. In addition, theories modelled on western 
multinational societies are more organised owing to early exposure to racial problems among 
diverse national groups with more visible racial differences. Racial problems in Europe, for 
instance, have a longer history than, say, in northeast Asia, where differences among national 
groups were cultural and historical rather than racial, at least until the Japanese version of the 
theorisation of racial hierarchy spread throughout the region. Naturally, in western cases, one 
can learn more about racial, ethnic and national relations. But even in the major western 
European countries, patterns of ethnic and racial relationships are determined by particular 
historical and cultural contexts rather than by principles of liberal democracy. In this respect, 
Brubaker (1992)18 or Soysal (1994)19 have significance for the reason that they shed light upon 
how the supposedly same consensus on the universal principle of citizenship, in practice, 
functions differently in major European countries.
For Habermas, on the other hand, cultural diversity in the political arena is viewed as a 
perspective, but rational political allegiance is a vision. Habermas does not openly suggest the 
inevitability of the assimilation of minority cultures. He emphasises the process of 
accommodating cultural differences in a modem democratic state. Habermas does not deny the 
deeply embedded cultural ingredients within the notion of citizenship as a perspective, but as a 
normative vision he suggests the detachment of cultural differences from political citizenship. In 
this sense, he neither dismisses nor overemphasises nationhood or national identity as the basis 
of a modem state. Consequently, he opens a space in which to discuss the issue of various 
cultures and identities in political terms and the relationship between ethnic nationalist 
convictions and political citizenship.
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The controversial issue on universal citizenship versus national citizenship has been 
sharply divided into two groups of scholars, including political theorists on multiculturalism and 
its critics, and sociologists who are interested in the relationship between nationalism and 
citizenship. Habermas is one of the former. The main question is whether constitutional 
patriotism against national citizenship is normative. He outlines a proposal for a less ethno- 
nationally20 defined citizenship in his defence of constitutional patriotism as a basis of political 
belonging. In this sense, his concept of citizenship is pivotal to understanding the core argument 
on the relationship between citizenship and national identity, which is the main theme of chapter 
4 of this study. ‘The nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common ethnic 
and cultural properties, but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil 
rights’ (Habermas: 1992, 3). For Habermas, constitutional patriotism should be based on 
political culture, which ‘must serve as the common denominator’ and ‘simultaneously sharpens 
an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a 
multicultural society’ (ibid., 7).
In Habermas’ view, immigration from Third World and poverty-stricken regions may 
intensify the social diversity of multinational states. It is argued that although immigration may 
give rise to social tensions, such tensions can also enhance political mobilisation, and might 
encourage the endogenous type of new social movements, provided that those tensions are 
processed in a productive way. However, he strictly views minority identities separately from 
constitutionally bound identity. The identity of a political community, which may not be 
touched by immigration, depends primarily upon constitutional principles rooted in a political 
culture and not upon an ethical-cultural form of life as a whole. That is why one can expect that 
the new citizens will readily engage in the political culture of their new location, without 
necessarily giving up their cultural life. As much as his theory on the public sphere, Habermas’ 
view on communicative pluralism regarding minority identities shows his elitist ideal of 
deliberation. His conditions of rational bourgeois public culture only exist under well- 
established democratic institutions. However, the issues raised in his 1992 article directly 
address one of the most fundamental dilemmas that any multinational states face today.
I consider that national culture and citizenship are, in practice, difficult to separate. Nor 
is the conflation of the two concepts desirable. Instead, in my view, the cultural aspect of 
citizenship should be taken into account and become a separate issue, so that individuals are 
treated as individuals without any risk of being judged by their cultural or historical background 
unless they wish to be. The three diaspora cases under this research clearly demonstrate the 
different ways and degrees of a host state’s exclusion of non-Japanese, non-Han Chinese and 
non-Russians/non-Uzbeks through explicit and implicit nationalised political programmes 
embedded in the notion of citizenship. Even if there is no conflict or collective action, diasporas 
in those cases search for their own identity and recognition, which is part of intrinsic human
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nature. Apprehension of and resistance to assimilation are the fundamental motivation of 
maintaining their own kind of collective identity; the only difference is the the way in which that 
identity is defended.
Following the major conservative assimilationist scholars, the national identity of 
diasporas or immigrants should be understood as abnormal, immoral at times, and consequently 
something to be adjusted, fixed, or at least fully melted away into mainstream society, although 
not by coercion but by rational democratic deliberation and communication. Contrary to the 
assimilationist view, contemporary theories categorised as multiculturalism highlight the role of 
minorities in host multinational states in terms of economy, and cultural richness. They try 
systematically to reveal experiences of discrimination and victimised pasts; criticise 
mistreatment.
In spite of the great variety, multiculturalism theorists problematise minority-dominant 
national relations as a perspective in the practical world, not necessarily suggesting further 
concrete visions of what multiculturalised nationality could be. For advocates of 
multiculturalism, the answer to the tension between official nationality and minority identities is 
the implementation of multiculturalism, where cultural diversity is respected and minority 
identities are recognised in public. The scholars in this group sympathise with cultural 
minorities on various grounds. They do so for the sake of protecting the intrinsic value of 
culture, the cultural diversity of human beings as individuals and societies, for the sake of 
political and social justice, for the sake of the intrinsic need for the recognition of identity, and 
for the sake of group rights to access to various resources. Multiculturalists, viewing the present 
society from a multicultural perspective, problematise the prevalent issues caused by benign 
neglect.
Kymlicka (1995 and 2000)21 argues that the politics of identity, in other terms, the 
politics of difference, do not hamper the principles of democracy as they are interpreted as an 
inclusive democracy through achieving multiculturalism. He disagrees with the idea that cultural 
issues22 should be strictly divorced from politics. In his view, making decisions regarding 
minority rights, such as the language of schooling, writing of history and choice of public 
holidays, is inevitably political, and not as simple to deal with as strictly individual matters. I 
also consider that more and more issues related to cultural choice become inevitably political. 
Cases of cultural choice involving political decision are infinite. A modicum of such examples 
include decisions on religious symbols at public schools, budget allocation for minority 
organisations and institutions, decisions on contents of school textbooks, introducing a quota 
system for cultural minorities in government institutes, regulations on promotion for minority 
nationals in the police or army, decisions on conditions for aquisition of citizenship and so on. 
Such policies towards minority groups are all unavoidably under political control. In this regard, 
the questions which Kymlicka raises are fundamentally relevant to the understanding of
39
prevalent issues in multinational states. These issues have remained, as ever, unresolved in 
Japan since the Korean diaspora community was formed, and to a lesser degree in the other two 
cases, but likely to be increasingly applicable.
In this sense, seeking group-differentiated rights is not a communitarian approach. 
Denial of such differences is even more against liberal principles and culturally-biased, 
imposing double standards towards the dominant ethnic group and disadvantaged groups. If 
members of certain groups are marginalised by virtue of their very differences, neglecting such 
differences would not be truly liberal. National membership seems to be based solely on 
accepting political principles of democracy but, in reality, civic or constitutional nationalism 
imposes a dominant culture. It is illogical to maintain that external protection causes internal 
pressures for the sake of solidarity and consequently violates individual rights, but immigrant 
groups have the choice of whether to preserve their identity. Kymlicka considers the causal 
relationship between internal restrictions and external protections. When implementing group- 
differentiated rights, there could be internal restrictions within minority groups, but Kymlicka 
perceives that this does not result from a recent policy of protection in any case. None of the 
categories of group-differentiated rights, including polyethnic rights, representation rights or 
self-governing rights is a threat to democracy. The final goal of national minorities is full 
inclusion as a citizen.23 For these people, freedom involves making choices about social 
practices and values. In their view, assimilation is not desirable because cultural ties are too 
strong to be given up and this is not something that we should regret.
Parekh (2000), meanwhile, sees multiculturalism as a perspective on human life, neither 
as a political doctrine nor as a philosophical theory. His apprehension of a multicultural and 
multinational world becoming culturally homogenised and politically unjust is based on his 
fundamental understanding of culture, human beings and society.24 As a response to critics 
maintaining that defence of cultural boundaries will result in the oppression of individuals 
within a cultural group, he stresses the internal plurality of culture, along with the richness and 
complexities of cultures. A multicultural perspective sees a society both as a community of 
citizens and as a community of communities. Concerning the relationship between citizenship 
and culture, because his concept of citizenship is nationalised and culturally-based, Parekh 
focuses on how to settle the problems of coexistence between unity and diversity in a 
multinational state. Being conscious of the universalist notion of culture-free citizenship, he 
naturally puts an emphasis on the sense of belonging to one’s political community, which is a 
crucial factor in defining the quality of citizenship. He argues that the feelings of being a full 
citizen and yet also being an outsider are difficult to analyse, ‘but it can be deep and real and 
seriously damage the quality of their citizenship and their commitment to the political 
community’. Culture is integrally tied up with political power ‘because culture is itself 
institutionalised power and deeply imbricated with other systems of power’ (342-3).
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He remains on the level of suggesting a different perspective, conceiving a society 
rather than a concrete way of explaining the alternative identity formed as the result of 
successful resistance to force of assimilation and in a successful multicultural society. By 
encouraging all levels of cultures and identities and bringing them into the political sphere to be 
incorporated into a political procedure, in Parekh’s view, it is not discussed how all those 
diversities should be multiculturalised. If a sense of belonging and a feeling of commitment to 
making a political entity just is so decisive and desirable, and at the same time culture and 
diversity are of such intrinsic value to all human beings, and also all those cultures should be 
incorporated into political arena with plural cultural identities and a love of diversity, a 
multiculturalised society in reality seems to be next to impossible to realise. As he has criticised 
the ethnicising procedure of modem states and the implication of political symbols, images, 
national identity and social values on people in order to integrate a society, it is contradictory 
when Parekh, maintains we cannot integrate them so long as we remain we; we must be 
loosened up to create a new common space in which they can be accommodated and become 
part of a newly reconstituted we,25 stressing the significance of national identity in fostering 
political unity and holding the shared national identity as a crucial role in a multicultural society 
considering its greater demand of cultivating a sense of belonging among its diverse 
communities.
Unless one coherently criticises thick culturally, ethnically or racially based collective 
identity on both sides (i.e. dominant national group or minority national group), it seems more 
difficult to solve the vexed relationship between official nationality and minority collective 
identities. He urges multinational societies to be ready to understand other cultures, in order to 
know the people better so that they can implement the most appropriate policies to accomodate 
different nationals, ultimately to embrace their differences and legitimately incorporate them 
into the dominant societies. Nevertheless, understanding and adopting other cultures, cultural 
features and group dispositions based on biological differences is a separate issue from 
understanding the nature of culture as a principle, the special emotional attachment to and 
inalienability from a culture of human beings. What he expects and what he thinks we should 
expect from dominant national groups of multinational states is an understanding of both. In that 
case, Miller or other liberal secessionists are the only answer to his paradox. When bringing all 
ethnic, racial and cultural ingredients from all collectivised minorities into the political arena, if 
we all accept not only different cultures as contents but also their exclusivity, as he explained, 
only insiders understand the rules are painful to discard, it seems infeasible to expect there to be 
any room to consider adjusting or giving influence to different people from different cultures. 
Being ready to understand other cultures and being ready to adapt to other cultures are two 
different matters.
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When applying a multiculturalist view on minority identity for the analysis of diasporic 
identity, one can understand the view that considers minority identities, including diasporic 
identity, as merely a negative identity in relation to a dominant national identity. By taking a 
minority identity as a passive agency, such view theoretically supports a certain viewpoint that 
perceives the host state or dominant national group as the fundamental and only cause of a 
minority’s exclusion and misrecognition. Consequently, such viewpoint justifies a critical but 
negative and passive national identity of a minority group. For that reason, I emphasise 
interactions between a dominant national group and diasporic communities rather than pressure 
for unilateral assimilation from the government of the host state.
Recognising third-ness
I do not intend to consider scholars such as Hall (1990, 1992b) and Soysal (1994) as a 
theoretical development in that field, but they do deal with alternative collective identities more 
directly from a different point of view. In consequence, with their views, diasporic identity can 
at least be normalised, and thus be regarded as something to which it is worthwhile to pay 
attention. This is because their theories explicitly recognise the feature of a third identity and 
hybridity, instead of framing conventionally regarded aliens in either of the other two categories. 
In this sense, I consider that multiculturalism is understood as a perspective, and further these 
scholars propose a vision of post-nationality. The theorists I categorise next are those influenced 
by postmodernism, trying to apply it to migrants’ identity. I mention Soysal and Hall for the 
reason that their views are applicable to diasporic identity. They both deal directly with the 
identities of diasporas and migrants. They view the issues of national identity in the international 
setting in relation to changes in the world order and, consequently, the conventional concept of 
territorially confined nationality is questioned.
Soysal, paying more attention to practical policies of host states towards immigrant 
communities, argues that the rights of the person transcend those of the citizen, which itself is an 
obsolete postwar arrangement defining membership in a territorially confined nation-state. She 
argues that the significance of nationals as a group adhering to the meaning of citizenship 
is/should be replaced by a more individual de-territorialised notion of citizenship based on 
universal human rights because of the incompatibility of the two notions of national sovereignty 
and universal human rights in a globalised world order. Consequently, she points out the 
inevitable inadequacy of the conventional concept of nationally based membership principle in 
protecting individual human rights of nation-less and state-less persons rather than as groups. 
Rather than a theoretical justification of full citizenship for immigrants, she gives a more 
concrete picture of how western democracies systematically exclude immigrants, especially 
guest-workers and refugees from less developed areas. Although her analytical framework is
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only partially applicable to Korean diasporas, her concept of post-national identity as another 
type of national identity, as opposed to the national model of citizenship, explains how to 
understand the phenomenon of diasporas in the changing postwar world. Both as a practice and 
a vision, she perceives that there has been ‘a profound transformation in the institution of 
citizenship, both in its institutional logic and in the way it is legitimated’ (1994, 139). She 
explains that modem national citizenship was a postwar phenomenon introduced by passports, 
identity cards and visas, and which had not existed before the First World War. At the same 
time, the construction of the dichotomy between national citizens and aliens began. Naturally, 
according to the conventional model of citizenship, membership and territory were congruent. 
Although the boundaries of membership are fluid, the boundaries of the nation-state are not. 
‘Indeed, the nation-states, still acting upon the national model - since their existence is 
predicated on this model - constantly try to keep out foreigners by issuing new aliens laws and 
adopting restrictive immigration policies’. Soysal makes it clear that nation-states remain ‘the 
central structure regulating access to social distribution’, as ‘[t]he world is still largely organized 
on the basis of spatially configured political units; and topographic matrixes still inform the 
models and praxis of national and international actors’ (ibid., 141-3).
The post-national model of citizenship, on the other hand, implies de-territoriality and 
multiplicity. In this sense, she believes, national identity reflecting the new trend can be called 
transnational. In her view of the post-national model, the basis for the legitimacy of citizenship 
has shifted from nationhood to universal personhood, as it is no longer located within the nation­
state system and states’ obligations to foreign populations go beyond the national boundary. 
Thus, the individual transcends the citizen. Soysal discusses refugees in the same context. 
However, stateless people should be viewed differently from guest-workers when discussing a 
state’s obligations towards foreigners. In her view, the reconfiguration of citizenship occurred, 
first by a transformation in the organisation of the international state system resulting in 
increased interdependence and connectedness beyond conventional national sovereignty and 
jurisdiction; second, by the emergence of universalistic rules regarding the rights of the 
individual formalised and legitimised by international codes and laws embedded in complicated 
international charters, conventions and treaties, which she views as substantiated examples of 
‘the impacts of transnational instruments in the rationalization of the status of international 
migration’ (ibid., 151). Consequently, her assumption endorses free, open borders as a more 
appropriated model for the globalised world and this has already happened. It is argued that 
nation-states mainly those industrialised welfare states preferred by international immigrants 
and refugees, ignore and either do not adjust or only reluctantly accept reality due to the 
dialectical dualities of the global system; the coexistence of national sovereignty and universal 
human rights.
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Soysal expounds the reality, but she does not sufficiently discuss why modem welfare 
states should or should not resist those conventionally considered to be outsiders, apart from her 
empirical proofs of the seemingly irreversible changes in the trends of international migration, 
let alone the enthusiastic debates as to whether the world is as globalised and whether it is so 
dramatically different from the era of national citizenship as to be worthy of the term ‘post’. An 
important issue regarding diasporic identity is how and to what extent diaspora should be 
included in the host societies, rather than open-closed border debates. An obvious tendency in 
the field of identifying minority national groups is that diasporic identity is discussed within the 
same category as other types of immigrants. Soysal’s belief is that universal human rights can be 
protected in individuals rather than collectivities. Any more sophisticated examinations of 
collective rights and individual rights are missing. There are numerous counter examples 
discrediting the individualistic approach towards protecting cultural minorities. In practice, 
highly complicated modem multinational relations necessitate much more specified 
consideration. Suggestions of the individualistic view towards the notion of citizenship will not 
always be the ultimate solution for some minority groups who pursue recognition in collective 
terms. Bearing in mind such difficulties, Chapter 5 of this work concerns diasporas’ 
psychological conflicts, caused by the dilemma between maintaining nationhood and a deeper 
degree of incorporation into mainstream society as individuals.
Meanwhile, Hall (1990) takes the concept of diasporas rather broadly. ‘[D]iaspora does 
not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to some 
scared homeland to which they must at all costs return,...’ (235). The later passage contains his 
post modem position on national identity. ‘The diaspora experience ... is defined not by essence 
or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of 
‘identity’ which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity’ (ibid.) (emphasis in 
original). His main emphasis on the process of the representation of cultural identity can be 
discovered throughout his article. For him, identity is ‘something’ - not a mere trick of the 
imagination. It has its histories - and histories have their real, material and symbolic effects. The 
past continues to speak to us’ (ibid.) (emphasis in original). But for him, its discontinuity is 
emphasised as much as its continuity, suggesting a crucial difference from ethnicists and 
historians of sociology. Cultural identity no longer addresses diasporas ‘as a simple, factual 
‘past, since our [diaspora’s] relation to it ... always constructed through memory, fantasy, 
narrative and myth’ (ibid.).
Identity, for Hall, is highly fluid, but not a subject to be ignored as being falsified and 
constructed; cultural identity is always from somewhere, continuously changing: ‘There can be 
few political statements which so eloquently testify to the complexities entailed in the process of 
trying to represent a diverse people with a diverse history through a single, hegemonic 
“identity”’ (ibid.). He contends that, ‘We all write and speak from a particular place and time,
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from a history and a culture which is specific. What we say is always “in context”, positioned* 
(222). Hall’s emphasis is on the continuous necessity of representing identities; identification, 
which is the crucial process of naming, renaming, recovering and constructing history in a 
specific context. Bhabha’s explanation on hybrid identity further suggests how to perceive 
diasporic identity in the same vein as Hall’s hybridity:
The notion of hybridity comes from the two prior descriptions ... of the 
genealogy of difference and the idea of translation, because if ... the act of 
cultural translation (both as representation and as reproduction) denies the 
essentialism of a prior given original or originary culture, then ... all forms of 
culture are continually in a process of hybridity. ... [T]he importance of hybridity 
is not to be able to trace two original moments from which the third emerges, 
rather hybridity to me is the ‘third space’ which enables other positions to 
emerge. This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new 
structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately 
understood through received wisdom.26
Bhabha’s concept of hybridity, describing the construction of cultural authority within 
conditions of political antagonism,27 is to be read in a similar sense. Diasporic identity is formed 
through a continuous negotiating process with time, geopolitical locations, and power by coping 
with an exclusive nation-building process throughout the history of their having become 
diasporas. Hall emphasises the discursive accumulation of identity. For example, British history 
is written by those who want to create a singular national identity; it denies the experiences and 
histories of some, such as black people who are not part of that singular identity. In the same 
way, the Korean diasporas’ efforts to keep their own history has contributed to the creation of 
diasporic identity. Such efforts are made always in the context of continuous power relations 
between diasporas and host nations: the Japanese, the Han-Chinese, the Russian and the Uzbeks 
who aim to create a single national identity.
Identity is an endless negotiation between subjective and objective identification. 
Perception becomes representation when one tells stories in a narrative way that identifies and 
locates oneself in a historical perspective at a certain dramatic point and historic moment. But 
one needs to speak from it to become a part of it, which means stitching together such moments 
with oneself rather than disconnecting them into parts. Human beings are products of such 
narration. There may be some intervening moments as a moment of watershed in narratives, 
which have important effects on identity.28 The expression of collective identity in Korean 
diasporas can also be understood in this way. Such expressions are normally made through 
selecting and organising previously discursive individual stories and memories into the form of 
a collective history. Identity is expressed rather than constructed. Diasporic identity is a novel 
and flexible identity built in a new global space. Today’s diaspora is justified and consolidated
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by dint of globalisation and transnationalism. Some are disappearing, but this can be hardly 
applied to Jewish diasporas, for example, which are constantly reproducing identity.29
In Hall’s view, the issues of multiculturalism are not novel in the global era, but there 
are different kinds of multiculturalisms. Specificity, in terms of different stages and forms, 
rather than identical force as particular kinds of fragmentation (that is, different elements and 
moments of social change within seemingly identical forces, say, modernity or globalisation) 
should be considered. Difference should be recognised in terms of needs and outcomes. 
Additional costs would be incurred. Levelling difference completely is not feasible, and equality 
and difference are fundamentally paradoxical and inevitably contradictory; therefore, one cannot 
strictly have both. Among various ethnic groups, we notice notions of rivalry of victimhood and 
subsequent rising hierarchy within minority groups. Then, privatisation of culture occurs, but 
there no longer exists a space for private life. Today, seemingly, it is the end of politics but at 
the same time every aspect of life is politicised. Perhaps a certain kind of politics has ended, but 
different issues become political. New forms of racism with multiculturalism, for example, are 
more often associated with other kinds of culture rather than only with physical distinctions.30 
Following Hall’s view, I also consider history building through the continuous representation of 
collective identity as a necessary task for minority national groups. Building a national identity 
is making a distinctive history together with the host nation, but diasporas participate in the 
process with their own collective memories. Accordingly, such process of the formation of a 
diaspora’s identity is fulfilled through continuous negotiation with the dominant national group 
over conflicting interpretations of historical events.
One might be puzzled, then, why recognition is necessary for seemingly dormant groups 
such as Korean diasporas. Not only because I consider that the crucial condition for co-existence 
of plural national identities within one state is the recognition of minority history, but also 
because, after close examination, I found that what diasporic Korean people are searching for or 
are (un)satisfied with is how their historical existence is perceived in the host society. Their 
desire for recognition, sometimes hidden, sometimes explicit, is defining them through an 
outsider’s identification of them and ultimately repositioning them in the mainstream societies 
as a stable category, diasporas. In this context, I maintain that diasporic identity is to be 
considered as a third type of national identity, as opposed to one of the conventional types of 
national identity. This third-ness of Korean diasporas’ collective identity, as Bhabha suggests, 
can be something totally different from any of the existing national identities involved, although 
formation of a diasporic identity is begun with Korean identity and the official nationality of the 
host nation. The problems are caused by a tendency to frame a particular group of people with a 
seemingly unstable collective identity as citizens or non-citizens through exclusive nation- 
building in practice. Multinational states have always existed, but nation-building rather than 
multination-building has been the legitimate state agenda in modem political history.
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Collective memory and national identity
How, then, should diasporic people experience positive discrimination and be politically 
recognised? As implied earlier, successful negotiation over interpretations of shared historical 
events is the central condition for the peaceful co-existence of plural nationalities involved. A 
minority group’s collective identity grows side by side with the official history and culture of a 
national group in power. In my view, it is not impossible to share the dominant national culture, 
public or private, with another nation, especially for a diasporic group that has participated in a 
host state’s nation-building process for a sufficient length of time. This is on the ground that a 
certain degree of acculturation and assimilation of a minority national group to a host nation is 
more or less natural and necessary. On the other hand, diasporas’ historical memory of 
collective oppression is something inalienable. This is simply because negative history will 
never be welcomed by a host nation.
Fortunately, however, diasporas’ collective memory comprises the second phase, which 
is participation in the nation-building agenda of a host nation. Here, one needs to consider the 
fact that not all diasporas are cooperative towards a host state’s national projects. I say this is 
fortunate due to the fact that positive historical memories are ready to be shared, no matter what 
distinctiveness the minority national group has as opposed to the host nation. Both phases of 
diasporas’ collective memory, oppression and participation, form diasporic identity. Diasporas’ 
interpretations of such historical relationship with the host nation are self-justification of their 
existence. Recognition of diasporas’ self-justification includes negotiations over history. How a 
host nation interprets and how much it accepts such diasporas’ history determine the patterns of 
coexistence between the host nation and a minority nationality. Negotiations can take concrete 
forms through official history books, public speeches and actual policies, and so on. My view 
will become clearer in the main chapters when discussing Korean diasporas’ selection of 
historical events and interpretations of them. As Renan’s well known phrase rightly illuminates, 
‘nation-building requires getting one’s history wrong ... The society has to be capable of 
forgetting those parts of its history that will interfere with the development of a sense of pride in 
it’.31 Inclusion of conventionally outcast minority groups’ stories into official history is a 
painstaking process. Getting the written history right during the exclusive nation-building period 
is almost a process of rebuilding a nation as an inclusive multi-nation. However, it is important 
to discuss who has the power to get the history officially wrong or right.
Diasporas’ national identity is built while interpreting, understanding or identifying one 
as a person to a member of a group, who actively possesses or is passively webbed in a 
particular history and culture. Diasporic identity emerges when they become aware of the 
relationship between nations and self, interpreting one in the context of their plural nationalities,
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by positioning self in the several national contexts. A diasporic person identifies the self as a 
person in the way s/he understands the nations around him/her, at times figuring out or 
questioning the meaning of one’s existence within multiple nations to which they voluntarily 
and involuntarily belong. All these activities of identification and differentiation of a diaspora’s 
identity formation evolve both by the state’s passive indoctrination and by their active 
involvement in national projects.
Ananalytical framework for understanding Korean diasporas
The following analytical framework suggests a way to comprehend the particularities and 
generalities of Korean diasporas. I formulated this framework mostly based on the researched 
cases, but also by comparison with other diasporic cases within my knowledge that are not dealt 
with in this resarch. It is not my ambition to provide an all-covering grand model explaining all 
diasporas. Thus, although the four factors are all very crucial to an understanding of Korean 
diasporas’ national identity, this may not be the case for other examples. For instance, one may 
have little to talk about relations between motherland and diaspora in cases such as the Basque 
diasporas. One should begin with ethnic oppression and religious faith in order to discuss Jewish 
diasporas. One needs to begin with the system of slavery to discuss formation of the identity of 
the Black population in the United States. As I mentioned earlier, the primary conditions of 
being defined as a diaspora provide the four main factors of the analytical framework. A 
diaspora identity is generated from the structure conditioned by these factors. The primary 
conditions of a diaspora are extracted from my working definition of a diaspora, and such 
definition is selectively modified from existing research directly addressing diasporas discussed 
in the first part of this chapter. A chapter has been dedicated to each of these factors. I then 
repeat this framework in the concluding part, while adding concrete explanations of findings 
from empirical research. It may explain other diasporas with some limitations and 
modifications; otherwise, one should judge that Korean diasporas are unique.
Origins of a diaspora
The origins of becoming a diaspora decide the first stage of the relationship between a diaspora 
and the dominant nation. It is the beginning of transforming discursive collective memories into 
a national identity vis-a-vis host nation. At this stage, the fundamental causes of abhorrence or 
amiability between a diaspora and the host nation occur. Colonial and political diasporic identity 
tends to develop a relatively firmer linkage with the ancestral homeland, and tends to demand 
further recognition from receiving countries. In addition, when the host state is politically liberal, 
a minority national group is likely to demand further rights of citizenship from the host state. 
Within the category of colonial diasporas, the case of forced resettlement tends to develop 
stronger emotive, national sentiment, and show a stronger collective will to survive at the
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community level. This is because deportation ends in an inappropriate social and natural 
environment for the oppresssed group. The origins for being incorporated into a host society, 
however, are not sufficient to explain later developments of a diaspora’s national identity due to 
the fact that identity is not static, and the host state plays a greater role in moulding a collective 
identity from the time of diaspora’s resettlement and incorporation.
Exclusivity o f citizenship notion
The host country’s policy towards diasporas or immigrants32 based on different notions of 
citizenship, both intentionally and unintentionally, have somehow abnormalised diasporic 
identity through exclusive nation-building. An analysis of diaspora identity concerns changing 
memberships between two states: legally, politically and, at times, culturally. The specific 
policies of each host state, based on the different notions of citizenship, shape the present 
national identity of diasporas. The key issue is how far minority national identity should and can 
be accommodated by the official citizenship, the legal scheme of a whole range of rights and 
duties. Under the traditions of national citizenship and a liberal democratic regime, in Japan, as 
a notable example, ethnic or national minority groups tend to be culturally excluded from or 
ignored by the mainstream society as a deeper degree of cultural incorporation is required for 
full inclusion. When diasporas are economically exploited involuntarily under a totalitarian 
communist regime, owing to communist vision emphasising the agenda of inclusive 
multinational state-building, diasporas tend to highlight their contributions to the state. When a 
host state adopts policies of positive discrimination, a minority national group with a negative 
image of their history shows less tension against a host societies and a stronger desire for 
inclusion. And yet, without any explicit collectivity as a distinguishable group, a diaspora 
cannot be in the position from which it could demand official recognition. The awareness of the 
necessity of preserving collectivity develops hand-in-hand with substantial activities of 
differentiation of their identity vis-^-vis the host state.
Collectivity o f a diaspora
Identity expressed in relation to minority organisations demonstrates the collectivity of 
diasporas in a tangible way, by looking into why and how certain types of minority 
organisations have emerged in a specific situation. The institutionalisation of diasporic identity 
is the means of making a diaspora space. Major minority organisations and institutions reflect 
the interactions between diasporas and a host society. The collectivity of diasporas becomes 
more active and visible when at least the following four conditions are met simultaneously: 
collective memory of historical oppression; the interconnection of interests and collective 
identity in the region where the territorial line is congruent with an ethnic or a sub-national line; 
an exclusive national bond within the group, especially through common religious beliefs with 
emphasis on collective rituals; circumstantial conditions stimulate collective actions. A diaspora 
without those conditions is still a diaspora, and can develop a collective identity with some
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visible collectivity. Such diasporas secure collective features as psychological and cultural 
relief, but are highly unlikely to develop a collective action by means of a fully fledged 
collective identity alone.
Ancestral motherland
The factor of the ancestral motherland also affects the formation of a diasporic identity. 
Commonly, the more diasporas communicate with their ancestral motherland, the following 
features are deduced. First, there is a tendency to identify diasporas themselves as 
distinguishable groups of people vis-h-vis not only host state, but also the ancestral motherland. 
Some diasporas believe that they have more cultural and political options, thus positively accept 
and interpret their multiplicity, whereas some develop an antagonistic collective identity against 
one of the nationalities involved. The second feature is the development of a diasporic network, 
both within a host state and with diasporas elsewhere. In this process, for some, a stronger in­
group identity is developed while, for others, a stronger desire to remain in personhood is also 
developed. The third tendency is to compare their own situations with diasporas from the same 
historical root but incorporated into other host states. Awareness of being a diaspora is nurtured 
while learning about those in a similar situation. In this process, diasporas develop sympathy for 
and a sense of competition with other diasporas. Lastly, diasporas tend to make political, 
economic and cultural demands of the ancestral motherland by emphasising their contributions 
to the state of the homeland and the maintenance of national features of the homeland, by 
identifying themselves with the nation of the homeland. Diasporas’ demands increase when their 
homeland is politically opened and economically wealthier. In the opposite case, the denial of 
the historical root is more likely. Zainichi have demanded political rights from the South Korean 
government whereas the Josdnjok demand is for economic support, and, the Korei'tsy demand 
substantial cultural linkage with societies of the Korean motherland. If a diaspora has a divided 
ancestral motherland, analysis of their national identity becomes more complicated. Additional 
variables need to be considered, such as the relationship between the divided nations and 
diplomatic relations between the host state and motherland. Commonly, however, in such cases, 
the division among diasporas is inevitable to the extent that the diasporic group is transformed 
into a more self-sufficient community33 that is more or less distanced from homeland.
As for the consequences of the interplay among these four basic factors, Josdnjok 
developed rather a stable, nested identity compatible with the official Han-Chinese nationality. 
The features of Josdnjok identity are best represented in their intellectual activities in the forms 
of literature, educational institutes, research centres, publishing companies, journals and 
magazines as a means of cultivating spiritual heritages. They have built their community in 
isolation, geographically and culturally, which can also be explained as a positive element in 
developing a culturally and territorially confined sub-national community. Over the last fifteen 
years, various levels of tensions have been exposed upon their extensive communications with
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the South Korean motherland. Having undergone a period of confusion, the factor of the South 
Korean motherland has added to their process of re-forming a diasporic identity; that is, 
expressing Jos5njok identity vis-k-vis the Korean nation, which includes simultaneous 
identification and differentiation.
Meanwhile, I analyse that the evolution of Zainichi identity as a history of crystallising 
their distinctive collective identity rather than one of passive assimilation and subsequent 
disappearance. Unlike Japan’s official rhetoric of smooth assimilation, the Zainichi identity vis- 
21-vis the Japanese nation has remained segregated, legally and socially. This hampered the 
creation of a sphere in which the Zainichi antagonism against Japan could be negotiated and 
their collective pathology cured. Actual interactions with, or mere imagination of their 
motherland have been their psychological exit and an important source of national salvation. 
Yet, the historically rooted triad structure, motherland-organisation-hostland, has been gradually 
loosened.
In the meantime, the Koreitsy population has been highly dispersed and recently mobile, 
spread all over the former Soviet Union Republics in central Asia not only in Russia, but also in 
Russian Far East. They have nurtured well tamed and adaptive multiple nationalities from the 
Soviet Union to the post Soviet central Asian states. Their collective identity has been expressed 
through the unique experience of deportation and success in collective farms, although this 
remains merely symbolic at present. Ethnic revivals have been the agenda of the Koreitsy 
community, with support from the South Korean motherland. Similarly with the Josbnjok 
community, some intellectuals are sceptical or cautious about South Korean influence on the 
region. Such reflections among intellectuals and community leaders will, in the end, lead 
Koreitsy to form a distinctive diasporic identity.
Speaking of diasporas’ paths, on the other hand, in general diasporas may be explained 
broadly within the following three categories: highly politicised diasporic groups with exclusive 
solidarity; inclusive diasporas with a third type of identity; and loosely bound diasporas with 
weak in-group identity.
The first type of diaspora would utilise cultural features and religious allegiances for 
political bargaining. In such cases, the means and ends became intermingled. They may be 
highly politicised and ready to develop their collective will towards aggressive actions. With the 
variable of a collective identity alone, however, one would not be able to analyse the 
developments of collective action. When it is exposed, one needs to consider other causes and 
the conditions of each group under particular circumstances.
The Korean diasporic cases, however, do not resemble any of the volatile diasporic 
groups. It is also true that the national identity of a diaspora without an explicit collective action 
is difficult to analyse. I argue that the way of expressing collective identity itself varies. It 
explains the various patterns of co-existence of multiplicity. In this regard, one can consider the
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second type of diaspora, one that has built its own sphere of collective identity. All the Korean 
diasporas fall into this type of group. Such a type of diaspora does not use cultural features as a 
political means, although there is a considerable degree of cultural maintenance. The identity of 
such groups is stable. Diasporas from such a category demonstrate fewer tendencies for political 
mobilisation for the sake of collective aims. Intermittent democratic collective movements 
among Zainichi should be understood in a different context, for their demand is a fuller degree 
of inclusion in Japanese society, rather than to be separate or to achieve a special arrangement of 
any kind of an independent political unit. In my view, the other two cases will develop in a 
similar way to the Zainichi when their host states, China and the former Soviet Republics, 
become less rigid in terms of type of regime and the degree of social openness.
Finally, the last type comprises diasporas who are destined to disappear and melt away 
into another national group. For this type of group, collective identity would be weak and the 
level of maintenance of distinctive cultural features is relatively low.
Conclusion
While problematising diasporas’ collective identity, diasporas have become a new category of 
human collectivity. Diasporas have necessarily been highlighted, both in academia and real life. 
I do not particularly intend to moralise on diasporas, but intend to highlight the fact that 
minority groups such as diasporas have somehow been demoralised and considered to be an 
abnormal, disloyal and opportunistic people in the modem history of nation-building. Whether 
diasporas’ national identity is constructed or not, and whether diasporic people should be treated 
as a group or individuals, it has been true that Korean diasporas as groups with a distinctive 
culture and history have been mis-treated or marginalised. Also, diasporic identity is 
insufficiently expressed, and consequently under-represented. Such mis-recognition and under­
representation have been enforced by the dichtomy between citizen and non-citizen, which is 
framed and imposed during the early nation-building period as the implicit political agenda. In 
such a way, building a positive collective identity with confidence has been systematically 
discouraged. Consequently, diasporas have been alienated and their identity has had to be 
concealed. By expressing a diaspora’s existence, both by insiders and outsiders, as a group and 
as individuals, a new sphere has been restored or created in which Korean diasporas can 
comfortably represent and articulate their identity. In this way, diasporas, as an academic field 
and as the human category, become meaningful. Otherwise, diasporas would have been left, 
being perceived as an ever-dishonoured or inferior group of people in history. I regard this trend 
as a development.
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3 Becoming Diasporas
Origins of the Korean diasporas
As historical events and memories are the essential parts of discussions on the diaspora’s 
national identity thoughout the main chapters, here I only provide a broader historical account of 
how and why Korean diasporas came into existence. Until recently, little has been written on the 
origins of Korean diasporas. As Cummings (1997) noted, the origins of Korean migration 
beyond the present northern territorial boundary go back to an earlier period of history.
The northern border between Korea and China formed by the Yalu and Tumen 
rivers has been recognized by the world for centuries, much longer than 
comparable borders in Europe, and so one might think these rivers always 
constituted Korea’s northern limits. In fact, Koreans ranged far beyond these 
rivers, well into northeastern China and Siberia, and neither Koreans nor the 
ancient tribes that occupied the plains of Manchuria considered these riparian 
borders to be sacrosanct (23).
Considering its special relationship with Korea, the region, Manchuria, has crucial 
significance in the history of Korean migration. Bate (1948) is correct to note that two inherent 
factors are involved in northeastern affairs in general: ‘the latent and actual wealth of 
Manchuria’ and ‘Russia’s absolute necessity for warm water ports on the North Pacific seaboard 
to serve her vast and comparatively undeveloped hinterland’.1 In terms of racial components, it 
is known that Manchuria comprised several groups including Buy6, Suchens, Shanjungs, 
Tunghus, Wuhuans, Fuyus, Mais, Wuchis, Wei, Shihweis, Mujungs, Mohos, Khitans, Nurchens 
and so on.2 Manchuria3 was a major target for China, Japan and Russia. This was due to the 
territorial interests of Manchurian rulers, primary resources of interest to the Japanese empire, 
and the importance of the transcontinental railway to the Russians. Geographically and 
historically, the issues of Manchuria and Koreans are also inseparable when considering the 
prosperous periods of ancient Korean history, which flourished in the Manchu region. Korean 
history between the 1860s and 1953 in relation to the major neighboring countries - China, 
Japan and Russia - is crucial to understanding the origins of Korean diasporas. ‘The process of 
diasporization is the logical starting point for diasporan studies. Variations in the experience of 
the initial dispersal’ (Butler: 2001, 197) are categorical in order to make distinctions between 
various types of diaspora. I suggest that, based on their origins, Korean diasporas should be 
defined as a mixture of economic and colonial diasporas and voluntary, involuntary and forced 
migration.
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The political history of Korea between the 1860s and the beginning of the twentieth 
century included the continuation of external threats by foreign powers and Korea’s struggle to 
secure national sovereignty. ‘Korea was the “Sick Man” of the Far East’, as Lensen (1966) 
states. As ‘[a] tributary state of the Chinese empire’, Korea ‘had been ‘opened’ to the world by 
Japanese warships in 1876. China gradually reasserted her suzerain authority and a triangular 
struggle developed between China, Japan and Russia’ (2). Until 1953, colonisation, 
decolonisation, the Korean War and the subsequent division of the nation were the major 
watersheds of Korean history.
Unlike the relatively stable era during the early Josdn Kingdom, on the eve of 
colonisation, overheated political struggles among political factions reached their peak while the 
long traditional stance of the policy of extreme seclusion towards foreign countries was kept. 
These struggles reached the worst during the Daewongun regime. The Yi dynasty recorded a 
relatively well developed bureaucratic system and enjoyed cultural prosperity before the 
dynastic rules began to decline and it had to face well-equipped modernised foreign powers. 
Overlooking the imminent necessity of modernising military power and lacking knowledge of 
the outside world and diplomatic skills, in addition to corruption within the dynasty, eventually 
gradually ruined the country. This finally put the country in the middle of the international 
turmoil, depriving of its sovereignty until the end of the Second World War. The history of 
diaspora marked between 1860 and 1953 reflects the continuous political chaos of the country 
ever since. Depending on the relevant period, collective migration of Koreans can be explained 
in different ways.
The origins of a relatively large Korean migration towards Manchuria began as early as 
the 1860s under the late Yi dynasty. Nevertheless, the migration was not an entirely sudden 
event. For example, at the end of the seventeenth century, King Sukjong, having been inspired 
by advice from officials such as Nam Goo-man and Lee Yi-myung, initiated exploitation of the 
frontier area so that civilians living nearby could move freely and settle down in the region. He 
regarded this as a safeguard in order to secure the territory against Qing China’s occasional 
threats.4 King Youngjo carried forward the plan by investigating the area near B’aekdu 
Mountain, developing the Hamgy6ngdo region and establishing government institutions in 
charge of encouraging migration and protecting Korean settlers. During this period, the 
allegedly erroneous interpretation of the demarcation stone, b’aek-du-san-j6ng-gye-bi, between 
Qing and Josdn was pointed out by Song In-myung.5 Among ordinary people living in the area, 
it had already become an unofficial custom both for the Chinese and Koreans to move back and 
forth across the territorial border in order to gather lucrative herbs, especially ginseng. Clear 
regulations were not set for controlling such activities, which sometimes involved serious 
diplomatic questions on social crimes committed in the region. There are no accurate historical 
records regarding exactly how many Koreans crossed the border between Korea and Qing China
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and in which year. Until the b’aek-du-san-j6ng-kye-bi was built in 1712 to demarcate the 
frontier line between Qing and Josdn,6 the concept of national frontiers between China and 
Korea remained unsettled. However, because the deciding of the territorial border did not follow 
any clear principles, the two countries had continuous disagreement and had undertaken several 
investigations regarding the nature of the stone and the frontier region itself, especially the north 
Gando7 area, which later became the main object of political bargaining between Japan and 
Russia.
It is said that there were earlier migrations than those the 1860s, even as early as the 
1660s. Historians believe, however, that a collective form of migration began in the 1860s. As I 
deal with nations after the 1860s by this time unarguably there were distinctive political 
boundaries, more than just cultural groups, although the degree of modernisation of such groups, 
the Josdn, the Japanese, and the Chinese under the Qing dynasty, was not perhaps sufficient to 
meet the conditions of the modem definitions of a nation. It seems to be clear that there existed 
certain degrees of understanding of one’s neighbour’s racial origins, and cultural and political 
differences among the three distinctive peoples, territories and countries. It is safe to suggest 
that the story of political elaboration of distinctive collective identities with clear markers 
between insiders and outsiders among the three neighbouring countries should go back to a 
much earlier period than modernists would propose.
Anthropologists and historians of the three countries have shown hysterical reactions to 
each others’ claims on the origins of races, as such claims inevitably involve perceptions of 
people in the neighbouring countries. Korean historians make efforts to incorporate the history 
of Buyo as an extension of Goguryd into Korean history by highlighting the identical racial 
origins and cultural heritages from ancient Korea developed in the southern part of the present 
Korea. Meanwhile, Chinese historians tend to view Buyo as an independent political entity that 
existed between China and Korea, rather than one of the ancient kingdoms that belonged to the 
history of the three kingdoms. Korean historians mostly claim that the Buy6 tribe inhabiting 
Manchuria was composed of people originally from Gogury6. Chinese official history mentions 
that Buy6 were from inner China or that they are originally either Manchus or Mongolians. This 
became an important historical debate for the reason that the issue is related to the establishment 
of the Goguryd kingdom, the origins of Gogury6-in [man] and history of Balh’ae. Conservative 
Korean historians’ expansive psychological map has clashed with reality. Recently, the local 
government of Jilin [Gilim] banned the exploration of historical heritages in North Gando 
where, supposedly, Goguryo remains are buried. The official reason is to rebuild the destroyed 
historical remains, but a group of Korean experts’ rampant territorial claims followed by 
frequent investigations on the Goguryd heritages were known to have displeased China.
China had viewed Korea as one of the subordinate countries in the same category as 
Vietnam (Annam), Indochina, Andaman Islands, Taiwan and Malaya. The relations between
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ancient China and its neighboring countries are deeply rooted in the Chinese view of the outside 
world often described as Sino-centrism. As a perspective and ideology, Sino-centrism has been 
reflected in China’s attitudes and views towards minority ethnic and national groups and 
embedded in policies towards them during the modem era. Throughout the Chinese modem 
state building period until recently, allowing a great deal of autonomy to minority nationals and 
isolation of those minorities from mainstream society can be understood in the historical and 
cultural context of Sino-centrism. China has been regarded as the regional centre of civilisation 
since the period of West Chu (BC 1120 - 770) for over 3000 years. For the Chinese, the peoples 
of the surrounding world were regarded as barbarians and enemies at the same time. They were 
named differently. Those from the eastern area of the river including Korea, Manchu and Japan 
were called Dong-I, meaning barbarians of the East. Until the Opium War broke out, weak and 
small countries were constant targets of China. Most of the present Chinese territory adjacent to 
the border was taken over by China by force during this period. In its heyday, the relationship 
between China and its neighboring countries was set by the semi-colonised tributary system.
The tributary custom was started from the fourth century and was firmly established and 
institutionalised in the seventh century, being continued until the late Qing dynasty. It is quite 
natural for all the semi-colonised countries to be deeply influenced by China in many ways, 
especially in terms of culture and ideology.8 The East Asian world order, or the treaty system, 
lasted for over a millennium. The system ‘was somewhere between the European-style 
international relations and the outright colonial arrangements’ (Iriye: 1974, 9). Jos6n was a 
‘dependency of China, but in matters relating to internal administration or foreign relationships 
Joson had always enjoyed autonomy’ (Hsu: 1926, 109). The obscure definition of Chinese 
suzerainty over Josdn provided a convenient way for Japan to alter the interpretation of Korean 
sovereignty from time to time. In diplomatic negotiations over the issue of Korea, Japan could 
easily exploit the confusing Sino-Josdn relationship, excluding Josdn and China tactically.9 Prior 
to official annexation, Japan made it clear that Josdn was an independent country. As Hsu 
explains, 'Chao hsien (Josdn), being an autonomous state, shall enjoy the rights of equality with 
Japan’, which Japan clarified in 1875. ‘This was, of course, nothing more than a declaration of 
historical facts’, Hsu observes, ‘for Korea had been an autonomous state ever since she came 
into existence. ... and had always enjoyed the rights of equality with Japan, not excluding the 
days of the Hideyoshi invasion’ (ibid., 109). By ensuring the status of Korea as an independent 
country, Chinese influence on Korea began to be mitigated and, at the same time, foreign 
powers could deal with Korea more directly while excluding China.
Naturally, ethnic interaction in the region started much earlier than the recorded 
migratory history of people in today’s Korea, Japan and China. Lee (1997) refines the earlier 
stage of migration and ethnic mixture of this region.
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Large-scale immigration of Koreans took place in several waves eastward 
through southern Mongolia, into Manchuria, and then to the Korean peninsula in 
the period of 5000 to 4000 B.C. until they reached the eastern sea. Even the sea 
did not stop them: when their civilization advanced and acquired riches to build 
large enough ships, they started to immigrate into the Japanese islands, 
conquering and assimilating the indigenous Ainus and Kumasos there from the 
second century B.C. to the fourth century A.D. Large waves of immigrants 
continued to move into the Japanese islands from the Korean Peninsula until the 
eighth century A.D., even after the Yamato state was established in Japan (7-8).
As much as Korea, Japan has kept the myth of racial homogeneity. Yet, Japan’s 
population was much more heterogeneous than outsiders have been informed even after Japan 
evolved into a centralised state. The tribes in the southwest and northeast, the Kumasos and the 
Ainu, maintained their distinct characteristics. Even the Yamato who populated part of the 
central island were far from being homogeneous. When the debate developed from the issue of 
race to cultural heritages during ancient times, each country’s efforts to discover the evidence of 
cultural superiority from time immemorial is an ever unfinished national project. It seems to be 
quite the case that history, race and cultural heritages have been politically misused or overused 
for the purpose of visualising the obscurity of a national boundary and enhancing political 
legitimacy relying on it. Anyhow, due to the geographical proximity, cultural interaction among 
the three nations was vigourous. During the fifth and sixth centuries, for example, Japan’s 
domestic politics were closely tied to Korea, ‘where Japan was involved in the conflict among 
the kingdoms of B’aekje, Shilla, and Goguryd. Each of the three kingdoms attempted to form 
alliance with a second and to eliminate the third’ (Mitchell: 1967, 2). Japan attempted to make 
the most of this situation for its own advantage through military forces.
Under the described geopolitical conditions, a large scale Korean migration started 
toward firstly China and spread into Japan and Russia in the later period. Broadly, the period of 
Korean migration beyond the present border between North Korea and China can be divided 
into the following four periods: firstly, between 1860 and 1910, late Qing dynasty of China; 
secondly, from the beginning of colonisation until 1931 when the Manchurian crisis broke out; 
thirdly, after the Manchurian crisis and the rest of the colonial period until 1945; and finally, the 
decolonisation period between 1945 and 1953 including the periods of American occupation, the 
Korean War and the division of the nation. These periods are, however, merely for the sake of 
efficient explanation of the historical background of diasporas. The migration process and the 
formation of immigrant communities were continuous throughout these times.
Diasporas in the early years of migration during the Yi Dynasty, 1860 -1909
This period represents the beginning of the Korean diasporas when destitution necessitated such 
migration. When the harsh famine began in the northern Hamgy6ngdo region adjacent to the
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Duman River, a number of Korean households crossed the border between Qing China and 
Jos6n, in spite of the risk of severe punishment by either government. As the borderline between 
Russia and Qing was unsettled during this period, Koreans who had settled in Chinese territory 
could easily cross up towards Russia when the political and economic situation of Qing China 
worsened, and exploitation from landlords and local officials became harsher from time to time. 
In this way, the early population of Koreitsy was generated during approximately the same 
period. Koreans living in Manchuria had moved to Siberia, and Vladivostok was founded as the 
largest Russian port and a naval base in East Asia in 1860 in accordance with the Peking Treaty. 
From this time, Russian territory reached the other side of the Duman River and Russia emerged 
as a new neighbour of Korea.
Historians discovered that the Koreans moved to Ydnh’aeju in the early nineteenth 
century, as early as 1811, immediately after the Hong Kyung-rae uprising. They consisted of 
poverty stricken peasants and political rebels among the yangban, the upper class which was 
against the Jos6n regime. Officially, however, it was the early 1860s when people of Goryo first 
moved to Russia. The current territorial boundary between China and Russia was set in 1860 
and was based on the Aihun Treaty in 1858. In 1869, immediately after economic disaster in 
Josdn, an increasing number of Koreans moved towards northern China and the Russian Far 
East. By 1870, there were approximately 8,400 Koreans settled in these regions. Since the 
Russo-Korean Treaty on Trade of 1888, Korean farmers became more actively involved in 
cultivating farms in the region. In the absence of established policies towards the Koreans in this 
area, their fate was very much in the Russian governors’ hands.
Koreans who had initially settled in the Manchu region, mostly southern Manchuria, 
had to face unbearable exploitation from landlords, and heavy and unfair taxation under the 
Qing regime.10 Korea, since the Gory6 regime, had suffered from insecurity regarding the border 
areas adjacent to Qing. Depending on the fluctuating relationship between Josdn and Qing, 
however, the problem of migration was overlooked at times, and it was even encouraged by both 
Qing and Josdn. In the 1870s, for example, the then Korean provincial governor of 
Hamgydngdo, Eur Yun-jung, decreed not to punish people crossing back illegally over the 
Duman River for economic activities after thorough investigation of the situation of Koreans 
there.
In the Ydnh’aeju and Manchu areas, around this time, there were over 1,000 uprisings 
mobilised by Koreans but these were mostly unreported and promptly quelled by both Japanese 
and Chinese troops. This period, when Japan began to expand its army in the South Manchu, 
shows that the issue of a steadily increasing Korean population in the region became sensitive 
and burdensome for both China and Japan. After the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese war 
between 1894 and 1895, Japanese troops gradually penetrated into southern Manchuria.
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Three years later in 1898, Russia successfully leased the Liaonyong peninsula from 
China. The two treaties offered Russia and Japan the chance to enhance their dominance over 
Manchuria and provided a legitimate excuse to control the Korean population. By this time, 
Japan had just begun to monopolise influence in Korea by murdering Queen Min who was 
virtually in power. While China, being threatened by Japanese aggression, signed a secret treaty 
with Russia, Japan signed two treaties with England in 1902 and 1905. The significance of the 
first treaty was the recognition of British interests in China and Japanese interests in Korea. The 
second meant to secure British recognition of Japan’s further actions for influence in Korea. 
Russia, in the meantime, became more involved in Korean domestic affairs. Comments by 
Ernest Satow, the then British Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan, written in a memo in August 
1895 insinuate the situation in a conversation with Ito Hirobumi, the then Japanese prime 
minister. Regarding the question of independence of Korea, it read as follows:
[I]t seemed to me advisable to join other Powers besides Russia and Great 
Britain. Explained the relations between Great Britain, Spain and Italy regarding 
status quo in Mediterranean, and suggested that Italy would be very willing to 
join, also perhaps Austria. He observed that it would be best to invite all the Great 
Powers, but it was not yet opportune. That ‘independence’ of Corea [Korea] 
would leave the question open, and he hinted that Russia would then be able to 
deal directly with Corea, and obtain her aims more easily and securely. We 
agreed that ‘neutralization’ was rather the term to employ than independence ... 
at any rate, Japan had gained two things by the [Sino-Japanese] war, namely, the 
annexation of Formosa; and secondly, that Corea was now independent of 
Chinese tutelage. (Lensen: 1966,44)
Largely supported by a Treaty of Friendship with England in 1904, Japan nullified the 
diplomatic relationship with Russia and attacked Russian warships in the Yellow Sea which 
initiated the Russo-Japanese War between 1904 and 1905. Japan’s initiative to induce British 
overtures as a co-stabiliser of Asia and the Pacific guaranteed British support of Japanese claims 
to a special position in Korea, and ‘to enhance national prestige and provide concrete evidence 
of Japan’s status as an Asian-Pacific power’ (Iriye: 1974, 15). Meanwhile, in Korea, as 
Latourette (1957) notes, ‘[t]he ruling house and most of the leading officials were hopelessly 
inept and corrupt’. He adds ‘[t]he British government believed that Korea must fall under the 
control of Japan’ (512).
Japan gained Lianyong peninsula and Mukden with British help in blocking the passage 
of the Russian fleet at the Suez Canal. The war was ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth in 
September 1905 with the mediation of the then American president Theodore Roosevelt. 
Through the treaty, Japan gained rights of protection of Korea, the lease of Port Arthur and 
Darien with adjacent territories, and the lease of Jangchun and the south Manchurian railroad in 
addition to the southern part of the islands of Sakhalin and all the islands adjacent territories. By
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this time, Japan had successfully eliminated Russian and Chinese influence in Korea. Korean 
independence movements had spread everywhere, not only in mainland Korea but among 
Koreans in China, Russia and the United States and had continued ever since. A Japanese plan 
for official annexation of Korea was successfully completed in 1910 and used as a base for 
Japan’s firm occupation of Manchuria afterwards.
Migration to Manchuria and Japan during the first colonial period, 1910 -1931
This period witnesses an increasing volume of Korean migration to both China and Japan. The 
reasons for migration varied accordingly. Not only farmers with a mainly economic reason 
crossed the border, but also a number of political activists moved around the whole of 
Manchuria in order to avoid supression and surveillance from the colonial government in 
mainland Korea. After 1911, nationalist activists moved towards the north as far as the Urals. 
By the year 1914, there were 63,000 Koreans living in Y6nh’aeju. The Jos6n Socialist League, 
backed by the Russian Red Army, was established in 1917. Lee (1978) gives detailed 
explanations on the background of Bolshevik support of the Korean independence force in the 
region. ‘Since the Koreans possessed some organized strength in both political and military 
terms [Lee means in the region] ... Bolsheviks turned to the Koreans ... The Bolsheviks 
promised to provide material support for the cause of Korean independence once they put the 
situation in Siberia under their control’ (4). The Bolsheviks’ support of Korean communist 
parties ceased in late 1922 when the Bolsheviks consolidated their power in eastern Siberia and 
Japan withdrew their troops from Siberia in October 1922.
Russian military forces, meanwhile, had been strengthened at Vladivostok and eastern 
Siberia during this time, although Russia wished to delay the confrontation with Japan in the Far 
East while completing the Five-Year-Plan and the industrial, mineral and railway developments 
under construction in central Siberia without costly warfare. ‘Orthodox Russian 
communists...regard the Japanese aggression as an effective basis for propaganda for 
communism in Asia and are inclined [...] to hold off and permit the development of this 
exhibition of Japanese imperialism’ (Doenecke: 1981, 154). According to Doenecke’s 
explanation, this was ‘to drive the Chinese and other Asiatic masses in the direction of Moscow’ 
(ibid.).
During this period, a forced migration arranged by the colonial government added to the 
statistics. The farmers who lost their lands or those who were on the fringe of losing their lands 
were ready to be attracted by government propaganda describing Manchuria and Japan as 
paradises. Mitchell (1967) quotes the situation of Korea by the time agricultural society was 
about to be reshuffled:
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After Japanese annexation, farm tenancy rose rapidly and a large landless class 
developed in Korea. Before 1910 all land was owned by the sovereign, but 
farmers had recognized cultivation rights if they paid tax and fulfilled other 
obligations. The Japanese government, in an effort to modernize the Korean 
economy and to fix land-ownership, carried out an extensive land survey between 
1910 and 1918. Farmers were instructed to register their lands within a specified 
period, but many of the illiterate farmers did not understand the procedure and 
lost titles to their land. The Yangban (local gentry) enriched themselves during 
this period of confusion by filing claims to public lands and even to the lands of 
independent farmers. The increase in the use of money and a new tax structure 
caused other farmers to fall into debt.11
One of the chief architects of the Imperial Defence Plan, Tanaka Giichi, stressed the 
feasibility of large-scale agricultural settlement in the territory as Japan’s long-term goals. 
Tanaka pointed out that ‘recent survey reports had shown much of the arable land in southern 
Manchuria already occupied’ (Matsusaka: 2001, 180), but he also stressed ‘that the relatively 
low population density left room for doubling ... the current population’ (ibid.). Devastated 
Korean farmers had little choice when the government promised a better life with the purpose of 
filling up the lack of labour in a rapidly industrialising Japan. At the same time, as the colonial 
oppression in Korea worsened, Korean nationalists in the region became more active by 
organising numerous uprisings and confrontations. The structure of the Korean economy 
became increasingly dependent on Japan’s industrialisation process and the colonial economic 
relationship became firmly established. ‘Most of the produce, however, was exported at a 
devalued price to Japan’ (Bate: 1948, 23). As Latourette (1957) also rightly notes, while Korea 
cultivated large quantities of rice, few farmers who produced it could afford it.12
The tight confrontations between Japan and China in the region were exposed in the 
Manchurian crisis, which began in the autumn of 1931. Doenecke’s (1981) account helps us to 
understand the power vacuum of Manchuria on the eve of the crisis and Japan’s gains from it:
During the 1920s, Manchuria was legally a part of China proper. In reality, 
however, it was ruled by a local warlord and possessed considerable 
independence. As a result of agreements imposed upon Russia in 1905, and upon 
China in 1915, Japan had received far-reaching concessions there. Included was 
the right to station troops along 690 miles of the South Manchurian Railroad ...
Yet local Chinese troops could operate legally in the rest of Manchuria (3).
In October 1920, during the Gando crisis, Korean nationalistic activism, as the extension 
of the Sam-il independence movement in 1919 in Korea and Japan, was rooted out for a while. 
In order to quell armed Korean independence activists, the Japanese army marched towards 
Gando. In the wake of the crisis, to the outside world Japan successfully imprinted the idea that 
Gando securely belonged to the Japanese territory and was out of Chinese control, although 
legal confirmation was completed after the Manchu crisis in 1931. Japan began to face internal
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problems as well; its economy during the 1920s was unstable, suffering from inflation and 
chronic depression with financial crises in 1920, 1927 and 1929. In addition, Japan had to deal 
with the spread of communist movements as the consequence of rapid industrialisation, and the 
country’s more open attitudes in accommodating Western ideas and trends. Since 1910, ‘Tokyo 
had become the intellectual center of eastern Asia to which Chinese and Korean students were 
drawn to study the modem Western philosophy and the industrial techniques of Western 
civilization’.13
Communist ideology and social movements organised by leftwing Japanese associations 
could easily attract Korean students and workers in Japan owing to the communist call for the 
abolition of private property which was mostly owned by Japanese. As Lee (1978) rightly 
contends, however, ‘the largest proportion of those who had either been affiliated with the 
(communist) movement or become a part of it before 1945 did so because they saw in the 
movement a way of restoring Korea’s independence’ (16). After the failure of the Sam-il 
Movement, in the meantime, Korean students in Japan became increasingly radical, a typical 
stage of developing anti-colonial nationalism elsewhere in the Third World.
The Wanpaoshan [Manbosan] incident was one of the major cases which resulted from 
the harsh confrontations among different national groups, and complicated the political situation 
in Manchuria prior to the Manchu crisis. By 1931, ‘China had been casting a wary eye on some
800,000 Korean residents in Manchuria’ (Doenecke: 1981, 9). After Japan’s annexation of 
Korea, China considers that Japan attempted to take a protective interest in Koreans who were 
formerly regarded as Chinese subjects. Japan was ready to make territorial claims on any parts 
of the region wherever Koreans were heavily populated. ‘For some time, the Japanese had 
demanded the right to establish a subconsulate at Wanpaoshan on the Chinese side of the Yalu 
[Amrok] River, a district like Chientao, heavily settled by ethnic Koreans’ (Matsusaka: 2001, 
326). Japan took the initially minor dispute between Korean residents and local Chinese at the 
Wanpaoshan as an opportunity to instigate anti-Chinese sentiments among Korean farmers. In 
July 1931, Korean tenants and Chinese farmers fought over irrigation concessions at 
Wanpaoshan, a small village near Jangchun, initiated by Korean farmers under contract with 
Chinese landowners. By the time the construction was nearly completed, Chinese farmers made 
a protest against the irrigation system on the grounds of protection of their own farmlands. ‘[A] 
group of Chinese attacked the Korean farmers. The Chinese farmers were backed by Chinese 
police and the Koreans by Japanese consular police’. The incident ‘highlighted long-standing 
issues relating to Japan’s right to lease land and engage in commercial activity in Manchuria’ 
(Wilson: 2002, 18). The Chinese government ordered Korean farmers to cease the construction 
and evacuate the region. The Koreans protested. At the beginning, the incident was the conflict 
between Korean farmers and Chinese residents. Later, however, with Japanese involvement, it 
developed into a political confrontation between China and Japan.
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Unlike the earlier period, as the territorial occupation of South Manchu was by and large 
completed through the Manchu crisis, the colonial government turned the strategy of locating 
Koreans who legally became Japanese. By 1931, Japanese from Japan formed only 0.7 per cent 
of the population but were equipped with arms and colonial institutions whereas Korean 
population was estimated as over 800,000 or 2.7 per cent, and Manchus 15 per cent.14 The 
hometowns from which the Koreans in Manchuria originated became more various; previously, 
they were mostly from the northern Hamgyongdo but later mixed with many from other areas of 
southern Korea.15 As much as the region was perturbed by continuous military and political 
turmoil with Chinese, Japanese and Russian involvement, the ethnic relationship in Manchuria 
became complicated and unruly.
Colonial diaspora between 1931 -1945
By 1931, Japan had invested 1.2 billion yen in Manchuria, controlled 690 miles of railroad and 
leased 1,400 square miles of arable land. Japan became ‘increasingly dependent on Manchurian 
lumber, coal, iron, and steel; her populace was increasingly fed by Manchurian grain’ 
(Doenecke: 1981, 7). Bate also explains that compared with no production of steel, synthetic oil 
and aluminium in 1932, by 1944, the amount of production of those goods reached 1,200,000,
384,000 and 12,000 tons respectively.16 However, in terms of population, ‘only a few thousand 
Japanese have gone to Manchuria or even to Korea. ... A modem nation which depends on 
colonies to support its population does not necessarily send settlers’ (ibid., 59). Such nations 
dispatch ‘engineers, teachers, administrators, planters, prospectors and others to develop its 
resources in order that the resulting trade may benefit its people at home’ (ibid.). As exploitation 
from Korean farmers and miners in Manchuria became severe during this period, the Koreans’ 
hatred of Japan was an ever-growing phenomenon and in turn oppression from the colonial 
government also became harsher.
The Korean population was seen as a danger to all three parties; Russia, Japan and 
China.17 In response to external pressures, Korean nationalist activism began to take an indirect 
route instead of reckless uprisings. Schools, churches and socialist armies on the Soviet side 
were among those. For example, in 1932, there were 380 Korean educational institutions and a 
number of periodicals and newspapers written in the Korean language. The main purposes of 
such social movements establishing media in the Korean language were to instigate a nationalist 
spirit of ordinary people and to provide nationalist education to the younger generation of 
Koreans in consideration of the situation of mainland Korea when education in the Korean 
language was strictly banned throughout the colonial period. Such efforts to keep their own 
language and history through education played a great role in instigating national sentiments
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among early diasporas and memories of such activities have been proudly displayed in their 
writings and discourse since that time.
The situation of Manchuria after the Manchu crisis drove Stalin to decide the relocation 
of the Korean population for the preparation of the Russo-Japanese war. Russia was looking to 
the development of Siberia and central Asia for the economic and political reasons. Recent 
research has discovered that around this time, approximately 2,000 Korean socialist leaders in 
the Korean community began to disappear one by one. In September 1937, when Stalin’s secret 
order finally reached the region, travelling outside Korean residential areas was strictly 
prohibited. The project of forced relocation was fulfilled between September and November in 
1937. The total number of deported Koreans was 36,000 to 37,000 households, or 175,000 to
180,000 individuals. As Gelb (1995) holds, ‘[tjhere may have been sporadic resistance, for 
observers recorded the arrest of 2,500 Koreans’ (390). Taking one month, Korean people had 
arrived in a semi-desert called Ushutove, Kazakhstan and started to cultivate the barren area. As 
both Kazakhs and Uzbeks are nomads, Koreans spread agricultural skills to the local people. It 
took three years to settle down after great labour to utilise the wastelands. Soon after, the 
Korean community managed to establish thirty collective farms. From 1938, however, all 
Korean schools were shut down and use of the Korean language was strictly banned until the 
end of the Korean War.
The most convincing account on the background of deportation is Stalin’s fear of 
Japanese expansion to the region and subsequent pro-Japanese Koreans’ participation in the 
Japanese army. There is evidence that quite a large number of Koreans in the region were on the 
side of Japan, especially among earlier settlers who had experienced severe discrimination by 
Qing local officials and landlords and later Kuomindang’s (KMT) hostility towards Korean 
settlers. There were some Koreans who naively believed that the power shift from China to 
Japan in Manchuria would bring them a less oppressive life. At the end of 1932, the Korean 
population reached about 650,000 in Manchuria and 200,000 in Siberia. The Korean population 
was a great concern for the Japanese government. Japan had set an arrangement by completing a 
treaty with the Soviet Union in 1925, ‘in which the Russians agreed not to permit any Koreans 
in their territory to engage in anti-Japanese activities’ (Lee: 1978, 59). Lee adds further 
explanations on Stalin’s project of uprooting Koreans in the Maritime Provinces. It is stated that 
it was necessary for the Japanese not to be concerned about the possibility of using Koreans 
against Japan. Two contradicting explanations, Stalin’s amicable decision eliminating Japan’s 
fear of anti-Japanese Koreans and Stalin’s fear of Japan’s use of Koreans, in fact, lead to the 
conclusion that both Japan and the Soviet Union predicted Koreans living in the troublesome 
area would be against them under any foreseeable confrontations.
Nonetheless, anti-Japanese feeling was also prevalent among later migrants who had 
experienced severe oppression by the colonial government in Korea before moving to
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Manchuria. From this period already, the Korean population in Manchuria was not 
homogeneous in terms of political orientation, regional identity and social class. Some Koreans 
were cooperative with the colonial government, some were on the side of the KMT which had 
been in power since 1927, and some became enthusiastic nationalistic activists. Under the 
Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, the gwangbokgun (Korean Liberation Army) was 
formed. Even the groups of nationalists within, however, political orientations were diverged. 
Nationalist activists in this region were moving around other regions rather than situating in a 
certain place. They mostly travelled around Shanghai where the Korean provisional government 
was based, as well as Japan, Korea and Russia. Before the Stalin’s deportation project, however, 
most nationalist activists were purged as mentioned earlier.
On the contrary, the case of Koreans in Japan during this period is categorised as a 
colonial diaspora. With the help of earlier settlers, migrating to Japan became easier for the late 
comers. Some were mobilised to make up for the labour shortage during wartime economic 
boom producing military hardware to Japan. Some were drafted to be sent to labour camps for 
mines, factories and military construction. Others were sent to the Japanese army especially 
during the second Sino-Japanese war between 1937 and 1945. Consequently, the number of 
Koreans in Manchuria and Japan steadily increased.
Similarly with the Korean community in Manchuria, during this period, the background 
of Korean migrants in Japan became more diversified. Among activists, political ideology was 
also involved as an important variable. Some Koreans had already become used to the colonial 
government giving up the hope of independence.
The decolonisation of Korea and the diaspora, 1945 -1953
During the first stage of modernisation, Korea was under foreign rule, which made Korean anti­
colonial nationalism burgeon outside Korea. As explained in the previous sections, due to harsh 
oppression, nationalistic activists mostly built their bases in Shanghai, Siberia and Japan. After 
emancipation, those nationalist activists armed with various foreign ideas, modem political 
ideologies and secured networks with foreign powers overwhelmed domestic activists within 
Korea. Korean anticolonial nationalism combined with several different political ideologies held 
by nationalists inspired by foreign countries and even different regions. When the primary 
purpose of anticolonial nationalism gradually waned at the end of the Second World War, 
debates over political ideologies and power struggles took priority in discussions concerning a 
new vision of how to rebuild the country. As a small and weak state immediately after 
independence, superpowers’ deep involvement in internal affairs was fatally influential as 
elsewhere in other Third World countries. The decolonisation period of Korea, accordingly, was 
as equally chaotic as the colonial period. During this period, the fate of Korea was shifted to the
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Western allies while Japan was eliminated. At the same time, the Soviet Union sent a large army 
into Korea and Manchuria in August 1945 a week before the Japanese emperor announced 
Japan’s surrender to the allied powers. The Soviet army was already deep into Korea. A hasty 
decision was made to draw a demarcation line dividing Korea into two.
By the time a democratic system and communist ideology backed by superpowers were 
introduced, Korea was still in a great confusion and turmoil after thirty five years of colonial 
rule. Political disunity among so-called nationalist leaders within the nation naturally provided 
foreign powers with legitimate pretexts for protecting and dominating the nation once again. 
The national economy during this period showed a typically unbalanced colonial structure. The 
future of Korea was in the two powers’ hands, as Iriye (1974) rightly describes.
Elsewhere in Asia, the two powers [the United States and the Soviet Union] 
behaved essentially in accordance with the same principle. Korea was a good 
example. While some sort of trusteeship sponsored by the United States, the 
Soviet Union, Great Britain and China had been accepted at the Yalta Conference, 
it was the first two powers that in fact exercised control (126).
A trusteeship of independent Korea under the United Nations and western allies was 
considered with the excuse of internal disunity at the Cairo Conference in 1943 and at the 
Potsdam and Moscow Conferences in 1945. The American-backed Rhee Seung Man could take 
up the power vacancy as the counterpart of Soviet-backed General Kim II Sung.
One may question why some Koreans remained as diasporas in the host countries even 
after Korean independence, in spite of the severe suppression. Reasons were varied. Broadly, 
Korean diasporas during this period can be divided into three groups. The earlier Korean 
immigrants in Manchu, who had moved before Japanese rule, settled down and carried on stable 
lives in the region. Although a number of people moved back to Korea after independence, most 
Koreans among this group remained in the region as they had already secured social and 
economic bases to a certain degree. Secondly, apart from those who voluntarily remained or 
those deprived of any other choices, another group of people were those who desperately wished 
and actually attempted to return to Korea but failed or had to give up for practical reasons. Or, 
they were discouraged by host governments’ unreasonable conditions applied to the attempted 
returnees, mainly relating to the issues of colonial subjects’ property rights. The policies towards 
those who wished to return to their homeland varied depending on the political situation and the 
host countries’ relationship with Korea.
The third group is the political activists. As mentioned, unless they were purged either 
by the Russian or Japanese governments, major nationalist activists who moved to the region 
during the colonial period returned to Korea and participated in political factions which were 
divided into several groups according to their political beliefs, regional background and interests.
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The major faction-like parties were led by advocators of American-backed democracy, Soviet- 
style socialism, or the middle of the road parties. The third group did not appeal to the 
superpowers. Nationalist activists moved from Japan had to make a choice. A number of 
communists moved up to northern Korea regardless of their original hometowns in order to 
avoid harsh suppression from the new Korean government and the United States’ military 
regime. Otherwise, they participated in partisan movements, moving around and inhabiting the 
mountains of southern Korea. Others from Japan went back to Manchuria, where Korean towns 
had already begun to take a stable shape as a territorially confined national group. Those were a 
relatively well educated group of people, most of whom went to Japan to study during the 
colonial period but had had to discontinue due to financial difficulties or participation in 
independence movements. Most were supported by the Japanese socialist party and 
ideologically attracted to Marxism. Also, left-wing nationalists, who were based in Manchuria, 
either joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after Korean independence or move back to 
North Korea.
The Korean War broke out in 1950 and lasted for three years. It was hardly predicted 
that the 38 demarcation between South and North suggested by the United States as a temporary 
line would turn into a permanent division. Among Koreans abroad during wartime, Josonjok 
was mobilised by the CCP in support of the Kim D Sung regime. The Soviet trained Korean 
Manchu army was not mobilised as much as Josdnjok due to geographical remoteness and lack 
of unity. The strong nationalist spirit among Korean diasporas has been slowly weakened since 
Korea became independent. The present boundaries of nation-states were set. The rest of the 
history of Korean diasporas since then has been a story of surviving in foreign lands as minority 
national groups.
Conclusion
By dividing the history into four periods, I explained how Korean diasporas emerged in China, 
Japan and post-Soviet central Asia. Firstly, their migration started with Korean farmers in search 
of fertile lands when the modem concept of territorial division was not firmly established. In the 
later period, Koreans were voluntarily and involuntarily mobilised to move to Manchuria and 
Japan, and forcefully deported to central Asia during the colonial period. During the 
decolonisation period, however, the decision whether to return to their homeland or to remain in 
a foreign land was not so simple, for practical and at times political reasons. Their Korean 
motherland was still in great chaos and the Korean diaspora community in each country had 
been already set up after three to five decades of migratory history. Some returned, only to re­
experience political turbulence, civil war and the division of the nation. In Soviet central Asia 
and China, communist ideology and farming opportunities were the two major sources that
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accommodated Korean identity. They provided social and psychological comfort to the 
diasporised Koreans as a once stateless national group.
Having examined the origins of diasporas so far, it may be reasonable to conclude that 
the background of the Korean diasporas was equally heterogeneous and randomly mixed in the 
three regions in terms of their origins, including hometowns, economic background and political 
orientation. I would dismiss the assumption that, from the very beginning, different kinds of 
Korean population had moved to each region. This is unlikely to have happened because little 
choice of where to go was given to these early Korean migrants.
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4 Diasporas and Citizenship
This chapter explains one of the intrinsic dilemmas for diasporas; that is, full membership whilst 
retaining difference. It aims to demonstrate how the particular policies of each receiving country 
affect the formation of diaspora identity. The policies reflect the official rhetoric, and process of 
the political project of nation building in each host state, which, in turn, determine the degree of 
inclusion and exclusion of minority national groups.1 Political decisions on including or 
excluding certain groups of people are reflected in the citizenship device. Depending on the host 
state, the concept of citizenship connotes various aspects and levels of peoplehood.
Citizenship and nationality policies
Policy towards minority national groups is set by different notions of citizenship; in other words, 
diversified ways of choosing political membership. An analysis of diaspora identity concerns 
changing memberships between two states. Under the traditions of cultural citizenship and a 
democratic system, minority national groups are often culturally excluded from mainstream 
society due to the reality that a deeper degree of cultural incorporation, albeit implicit, is 
required for fuller inclusion. The concept of citizenship and its implementation vary in each 
case, which causes difficulties in comparing which host society offers more autonomy to its 
minority national groups. The difficulties also lie in the different political systems of host states 
as well as different political traditions and cultures. In the cases of non-liberal societies such as 
China and post Soviet central Asia, it would be absurd for a minority group to claim special 
political and economic benefits and autonomy when even the individuals of the dominant 
national group do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy from their own state.
In the case of China, to what degree the cultural and national division will be exposed 
above the surface of socio-economic division by class-line is also one of the decisive factors. In 
the same context, it appears that Japan has comparatively more serious troubles regarding 
minority issues. Yet, one needs to consider that Japan is more liberal, and consequently issues 
regarding relations between Japanese and non-Japanese are more exposed to the outside world, 
and the fact that Koreans in Japan are aware of national identity to a greater degree than other 
cases. In spite of the difficulties of scientific comparisons, citizenship, as the thematic notion, is 
still relevant here on the ground that the various relationships between different national or 
ethnic groups are structured by a particular mode of categorising members and non-members of 
a state. Such a trend is backed by various factors such as political ideology, social systems, legal 
arrangements and cultural perspectives towards outsiders. Thus, comparing the various notions 
of citizenship provides a blueprint of each hostland’s particular views towards minority national 
groups.
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Theoretical preliminary: citizenship and national policy
The notion of citizenship in relation to identity can broadly be characterised as either 
thin/universal or thick/nationalised citizenship,2 although there are a number of variants and 
disagreements among theorists engaged in this issue. The important question of the debate is 
whether citizenship proclaims the surface layers of political life or represents the deepest layers 
of cultural identity. The former tends to imply a clear distinction of civic identity from national 
dispositions, in other words, a separation of the citizenship debate from culture and identity. 
Meanwhile, the latter denotes multi-layered national citizenship emphasising the collective 
sentiments and cultural features behind the notion of citizenship. The thin concept of citizenship 
tends to mean a strictly civic rational notion of citizenship that is culturally neutral. The major 
implications of the thick concept of citizenship are often employed by immigrant symphasisers 
with emphasis on its negative consequences on protecting disadvantaged ethnic or national 
minorities from the dominant national groups by creating problems in issues relating to cultures 
and identities in the political sphere. Detailed theoretical debates on this question was dealt in 
Chapter 2, highlighting the two opposite academic camps, assimilationists and multiculturalists.
Conditional inclusion: host states’ policies toward Koreans
Table 4.1 gives a succinct overview of each host state’s official attitude towards minority 
national groups in comparative terms. As the outcomes of interactions between (un)intentional 
official policies and Korean nationality, I describe the patterns of co-existence between Korean 
diasporas and the Chinese, the Japanese and the Uzbeks as isolation, segregation and dispersal, 
respectively, although there are difficulties in representing the historically accumulated relations 
in a single word.
The terms describing the patterns of co-existence show the different types of Korean 
diaspora generated by interactions between diaspora and host state rather than the unilateral or 
intentional policies of the host country. The relational forms, however, have been changing 
especially since the late 1980s. Outside influences such as neo-nationalism and globalisation 
reshuffled diaspora groups and restructured their collective identity. The official policy in Japan 
has been assimilation, but, so far, the result of implementation of such an official policy has 
remained segregation. In China, there have been rapid changes in the previously isolated Korean 
diasporas. The consequences of the drain of the Josonjok population have been seriously 
discussed in Yanbian as one of the signs of assimilation to Han Chinese. Korean diaspora in 
post-Soviet central Asia used to be a case of dispersal as individuals or in the official 
institutions, kolkhozes. Since the independence of the CIS, the Koreitsy community has been 
moving towards institutionalising Korean identity in order to secure collective features.
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Table 4.1 Comparisons of the degrees and dimension of autonomy given by host states
China Japan Former Soviet Union 
(Uzbekistan)
Political
aspect
Officially affirmative action is 
applied for protection of 
representative rights of 
recognised minority groups
Customarily restricted 
No special
affirmative actions have 
been considered
Regionally limited but 
active participation in state 
projects is encouraged 
Exclusion process has 
begun
Economic
aspect
Special budget is allocated to 
minority region 
No intentional discriminations 
towards minority regions in 
terms of state project of 
economic development
Exclusion of minority 
nationals from major 
economic activities and 
rights which require public 
protection and state 
support
Economically incorporated 
Active participation in the 
state project of economic 
development 
No right-based citizensip
Social
aspect
Minority education is 
encouraged
Discrimination and 
oppression in many fields 
Civic associations and new 
social movements have 
provided strong support 
for minority rights
No particular attention to 
minority issues yet
Cultural
aspect
Great deal of autonomy with 
official support especially 
language usage and 
maintenance of minority 
customs and folklores
Discrimination and 
pressure
Complete assimilation is 
prerequisite in public 
inclusion
Inconsistent and 
contradicting policies of 
autonomy and assimilation 
Cultural revival of Uzbek- 
ness has begun as national 
agenda
Cultural autonomy and isolation
Having engaged China in the citizenship debates as one of the modem multinational states,3 
China can be understood as a state that imposes the thin concept of citizenship as opposed to 
national citizenship. By dint of China’s looser concept o f citizenship, territorial nationalism can 
be proclaimed, simultaneously embracing different cultural groups within its territory with a 
great deal of cultural autonomy. Both China and the former Soviet Union are, by and large, 
categorised as socialist regimes but within socialism there are considerable varieties. 
Accordingly, policy varies depending on the historical and cultural context of a host state. The 
former Soviet Union, for example, does not fit into the same socialist notion as China with 
regard to issues o f nationalism and minority nationality. Similarly, the newly independent 
central Asian republics do not promulgate identical patterns of policies. Certain gaps exists 
between socialism as a theory and its practice in real politics. Political ideology alone cannot 
explain the different official policies towards minorities in China and the former Soviet Union.
In China, citizenship is understood as a state-given benefit and the expression ‘citizen’ 
could mean a politicised individual under the condition o f active participation in state building 
projects. Since the Open Door Policy, however, the concept of citizenship is frequently 
employed as a result of economic relations with the outside world and the subsequent rise of
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newly commercialised individuals in certain areas, but they are still under state control. In 
contrast to Japan, where the existence of minority nationality itself is often officially denied, 
Chinese rhetoric has been far more inclusive. An official report, for example, reads as follows:
Unity and cooperation among the various ethnic groups have helped to safeguard 
China as a united multi-ethnic state. In particular in modem times, when China 
became a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society and the Chinese nation suffered 
from imperialist invasion, oppression and humiliation and was reduced to the 
status of an oppressed nation, in order to safeguard the unity of the state and the 
dignity of the Chinese nation, all the ethnic groups united and fought 
unyieldingly together against foreign invaders and ethnic separatists.4
The official policy towards minority ethnic and national groups on the state level can be 
described as autonomy backed by the universal or thin notion of political citizenship, and yet, 
for a variety of reasons, implementations of such a policy often turn out to be different from the 
primary intention of policy makers. ‘[Pjolicies are inspired from within the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), forwarded to the State Council [that is, the government], and passed down through 
the various concerned bureaus through central government, provincial, city or prefectural, 
county, and ultimately ‘grassroots’ levels’ (White: 1990, 13). This explains why interactions 
between the Josdnjok community and official government policy have resulted in the isolated 
pattern.
The grounds for the description of Josonjok identity and community as an isolated 
pattern are that most non-Han Chinese regions overlap with rural areas in the territorial border 
of China. They have drawn less government attention for the new state project of developing 
economically backward regions especially at the beginning of the rapid economic modernisation 
period. In addition, local governments of the minority national autonomous regions become 
more and more nominal by playing less significant roles in response to different minority 
national groups’ particular demands.
Since Deng’s era, changes in non-Han Chinese regions have been enormous. As a result 
of rapid changes in many areas, Josonjok have faced new risks; Firstly, as the strong 
implementation of official nationalism has been weakened compared with that of Mao’s era, the 
justification for the class struggle has waned, leading to a search for a new way of categorising 
people. Secondly, in accordance with societal changes, individual capabilities are encouraged, 
particularly, in order to achieve a financial success. ‘The new moral order in China is one in 
which people are encouraged to be economically productive and self-reliant’ (Keane: 2001, 14). 
State-imposed equality is less emphasised, which means a mechanism of capitalism and 
competition among individuals has been gradually adopted. The government is less effective 
and less involved in individual economic and social lives, including education and occupations. 
In those regions where various minority national or ethnic groups are loosely interconnected
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with one another under the principles of citizenship, national antagonism can easily be involved 
in many public affairs.
Government funding has gradually decreased following the new economic policies. 
Some JosSnjok swiftly adjusted themselves to the new social changes by engaging positively in 
economic sector. An increasing number of Han Chinese have flocked to a previously Josonjok 
region. It is allegedly said that the Josdnjok’s wandering disposition and rampant capitalist 
orientation have accelerated the changes. With regard to socio-economic changes in this region, 
scholars such as Luova (1999) explain how the Josonjok’s cultural background has been taken 
advantage of. Josdnjok ‘have initiated their own ethnically-based local strategies for economic 
development. Ethnic economic networks, which cross national borders, are the best example of 
these strategies’ (18). He analyses that this is due to China’s economic reforms which have 
emphasised the coastal regions rather than remote border areas where minority national groups 
populated.5
The invariable principles of China’s official policy are the encouragement of autonomy 
and positive discrimination. Such principles are embodied by China’s application of a looser 
notion of citizenship. Cultural assimilation has not been an official precondition to be 
categorised as a Chinese citizen as long as sub-national groups remain politically loyal to the 
communist China.
Segregation and assimilation
In contrast to the case of Josdnjok, Korean diasporas in Japan has been regarded as the 
remaining enemies and aliens ever since the end of the Second World War. It is evident that one 
of the reasons stems from the particular historical relationship between Korea and Japan. Japan 
had built a strong nation well before it colonised Korea following the Meiji era. Japanese 
identity was reconsolidated while incurring wars with neighbouring countries. By the time 
Korean minorities were incorporated into the Japanese nation, Japan had already established a 
strong national identity. The questions of how to re-unify the Japanese nation or how to make 
the territorial borders safer were not included in the list of immediate postwar Japanese state 
building agendas equivalent to the experiences of Soviet making and China’s national agenda of 
communist family making.
Applying the notion of citizenship in a liberal sense to Japan may be equally awkward. 
This is so in the sense that in Japan citizenship hardly connotes rights of people whereas a sense 
of belonging and obligations were over-emphasised, at least until the late 1980s. The concept of 
citizenship in Japan is inseparable from the Japanese traditions and cultures rested upon the 
agenda of national homogeneity. Consequently, the ‘ultimate Japanese policy toward the non- 
Japanese was non-assimilation to preserve the Japanese racial purity and superiority’ (Che:
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2000, 7-8). There are grey areas that do not fit into either universal citizenship or national 
citizenship. However, for a minority national group, desire for full inclusion into the host 
society, culture-free citizenship and cultural autonomy could mean political marginalisation and 
segregation from mainstream society. The excessive pressure of giving up nationality often 
causes problems for a minority national group when collective will and identity exist within the 
group.
The concept of nation substitutes citizen in Japan as Siddle (2001) rightly observes. The 
fundamental differences lie in the different relationship between the state and civil society which 
does not exist in its European sense. Nonetheless, what diaspora people require is a fuller degree 
of membership to a country not only through obtaining the legal nationality, but also through 
active participation in all aspects of public life, which is understood to be claims for rights to 
citizenship in real terms. Disparity between host society and diaspora group in terms o f political 
dispositions is also one of the reasons why applying the notion of citizenship is premature when 
discussing issues such as minority national groups. Korean diasporas have been heavily 
influenced by the American Overseas Korean organisations, Korean Christian associations and 
also by South Korea. The political socialisation of Korean diasporas has been fulfilled by 
Koreans in western countries, notably Canada and the United States while the citizenship notion 
in the three host states remains obscure at this point. This also explains why there is insufficient 
room to discuss openly questions such as who has the political rights to those countries and why 
national minorities should have such rights. Nevertheless, minorities in less developed non 
liberal multinational states are equally entitled to claim for full membership and official 
recognition.
Table 4.2 Official categorisation for minority groups in Japan
Terms C ategorisation
B urakum in A boriginal
O kinaw ajin C onquered
A inu N atives
C hosen jin  [Zainichi] Foreign residents
Japan is perhaps an extreme case of imposing a racialised and cultural concept o f 
citizenship. Taking a sophisticated form of racism, on the surface it is an assimilation policy, but 
in reality segregation is in practice. The policy has been based on the particular social ideology 
and public sentiment instigated by the political agendas, the implementation of the idea o f racial 
superiority. One o f the well-known public speeches by the then Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro in 1986, declared Japan’s superiority grounded in its character as a homogenous 
nation-state reflects Japan’s official national agenda on the issue o f ethnic and national
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relationship. This political climate continued at least up until the memorable year of 1997 when 
‘Japan’s first national legislation to promote non-mainstream ethnic culture and to encourage 
multiculturalism within society came into force’ (Siddle: 2001, 405), which was embodied by 
the Ainu Cultural Promotion Act, Law No. 52 in July 1997.6
Article 14 of the Constitution indicates principles against racial discrimination in 
political, economic or social relations. However, the official efforts of maintaining the 
continuity of Japan’s wartime ideology continue as is frequently demonstrated by the right-wing 
high officials’ public speeches. The feature of Japanese racism is its close interaction with 
Japanese culture and its well-developed discourse of moral theorisation of racism. ‘[A]s being 
related “by blood” to one another ... [k]inship, race and religion were fused together to produce 
an intensely felt collective sense of ‘oneness’ (Yoshino, in Dikotter: 1997, 201). By racialising 
nation, there is little room to make a distinction between race and nation, since it is argued that 
only pure blood-tied Japanese can fully understand and practice the superior Japanese culture.
Naturally, a dilemma stems from this. To be recognised as a Japanese citizen, 
assimilation is encouraged diaspora groups are expected to live, speak and behave like the 
Japanese, but at the same time there is a strong belief that other peoples can never become fully 
Japanese. Through proper education in Japan, it is thought that it is crucial to have strong 
national qualifications in every aspect of life. Consequently, the naturalised Korean-origin- 
Japanese, who is believed not to become real Japanese anyhow, are despised to the same extent 
as Koreans who remain as permanant foreign residents. Due to the simultaneous pressure of 
assimilation and exclusion, disguised assimilation and institutional on-and-off identity have 
been the means of survival for Zainichi where a hyphenated nationality is not accepted. As 
Fukuoka (2000) states ‘Japanese society will not tolerate ambiguous identity. ... The ambiguous 
person will be forced to abandon those characteristics and become as much like ‘pure’ Japanese 
as possible’ (3).
Throughout modem history, the Japanese way of nation building has been consistently a 
process of racialising the nation. The rest, out of Yamato blood minzoku, have been inevitably 
excluded from most aspects of political and social life, which is evidenced by various 
discriminative legal devices.
Dispersal and collectivity
The multiethnic and multinational composition of the Soviet state was rooted in territorial 
expansion, military conquests and colonisations. In 1926, there existed, officially, 178 
recognised national groups. By 1979, the number had dropped to 101, but 128 different national 
groups were officially recognised in 1989. The statistics shifted both by fluctuating 
demographics and the government’s way of categorising its people.7 The Soviet nationality
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policies can be featured as korenizatsiia,8 territorialisation, and indirect rule through local elites 
within federal arrangement. The Soviet’s policy reflected a contradicting duality. Whereas 
official policies in Japan and China have been relatively coherent, that of the former Soviet 
Union showed inconsistency in its principles according to the changes in regimes and, finally, 
caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The overall contradictions of Soviet policy largely lay in the gap between ideas and 
implementation, which resulted in the paradox of ‘nation-building and nation-destroying’, which 
aimed at, in Hirsch’s (2000) view, forming ‘a socialist union of denationalized peoples’ (225). 
This may explain, during the 1920s and 1930s, how ethnicisation and ethnic cleansing occurred 
at the same time. It is also related to the Soviet’s way of grouping and grading different national 
and ethnic minorities to decide how to deal with them differently. Martin (2001) explores 
Soviet’s East-West dichotomy and shows how this dichotomy was actually implemented in 
korenizatsiia, especially after 1923. As many as 97 culturally backward nationalities were 
singled out. Official features of backwardness were used based on literacy, written script, cadres 
and religious culture.9
The way the former Soviet Union and post-Soviet central Asia moulded Korei'tsy 
identity is fourfold: implementation of kolkhoz-based economic reforms; Stalin’s project of 
deportation; liberating re-emigration to ancestral motherlands in the late 1960s during 
Brezhnev’s regime; the independence of post-Soviet central Asia. These four factors have 
directly and indirectly influenced Korei'tsy identity formation in relation to the Soviet and Uzbek 
nations. The reasons for the absence of explicit and specific policies toward Korean minorities 
are twofolds. Koreans comprised a tiny part of the minority population in the former Soviet 
Union in terms of the size of the population and the degree of collectivity, whereas in Japan and 
China, Koreans comprise one of the major sections of the non-Japanese population. Another 
reason for such a lesser degree of direct political interaction between the Korei'tsy community 
and the central government is the geopolitical situation of the Korei’tsy community. Dissimilar to 
the other two cases, where the relationship with the motherland could develop into diplomatic 
concerns, the Korei'tsy community was established in isolation from the two Korean 
motherlands. Although a Korean diaspora community existed in Sakhalin, its population was no 
longer powerful enough to represent a significant group. Apparently, in a multinational state, 
diasporas, or any types of ethnic or national groups who have their motherlands nearby, are 
under more wary surveillance by the host state. Accordingly, in terms of the relationship 
between the Korei'tsy and the former Soviet Union, apart from Stalin’s programme of 
deportation, there were no particular official policies restricting to Korean diasporas as such. 
Yet, the rest of Soviet policy relating to minority national groups, including titular and non­
titular nationalities in general, had an indirect influence on the Korei'tsy identity.
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As for the political dimension, in terms of imposing citizenship, like China, the Soviet 
Union also imposed a thin concept of citizenship, as nationality was the substitute notion of 
citizen for them. Sovietisation in ideological terms rather than assimilation or Russification was 
attempted. The elements of Russian nationalism were incorporated into Soviet patriotism. The 
Soviet system, in a word, was de-russification, preferential advancement of underdeveloped 
peoples, and economic and administrative decentralisation. As in the Chinese case, local 
nationalisms were condemned as bourgeois nationalism as opposed to proletarian 
internationalism during the period of state building. During the period of revolution in each 
country, however, national and ethnic minorities were successfully mobilised to be cooperative 
in building a modem state in struggle against absolutism in the USSR under Stalin.
In the era of the Soviet Union, severe suppression and discrimination were accompanied 
with recognising and territorialising different national and ethnic groups which had been 
roughly categorised by their language and religion. Contradictions in Soviet policies were based 
on the collision between the two inherently contradicting ideas: recognition of nationalities as 
groups and russification as individuals. Lenin’s slogan, national in form and socialist in content, 
during the Stalin era, is implemented in the form of territorialisation and Sovietisation at the 
same time. In line with the dichotomy of national form and socialist content, cultural policy 
endeavoured to develop national cultures and languages as the basic vehicles of socialisation. In 
this regard, the features of Stalin’s policy can be summarised as granting equal citizenship, 
permission of linguistic autonomy with development of educational systems among the non- 
Russians, nurturing new national elites, setting up a constitutional structure of Soviet federalism, 
and modernisation. For Stalin, the term ‘nation’ was used to define people with common 
economic conditions, language, territory and a similar frame of mind. Meanwhile, national 
minorities meant the rest who were not from a titular nation.
Since the 1930s and throughout the Soviet regime, the internal passport system had been 
imposed. Since non-Russian national or ethnic origin is supposed to be noted in all identification 
documents, minority national groups, including the generations who were bom in Russia, had 
practical restrictions in daily lives such as migration, employment, promotion and university 
entrance. Since 1954, by which time Soviet minorities had regained rights to free movement, the 
Korean population began to be dispersed all around Russia. According to statistics, the Korean 
diaspora population in the former Soviet Union was about 460,000. Among them, around
190,000 were in Uzbekistan, 105,000 in Kazakhstan, 10,000 in the Ukraine, and so on. Dispersal 
of Korei'tsy also describes family division, which was specifically included in Stalin’s order. 
However, if the government policy toward minority national groups alone is the main reason for 
such dispersal, it does not explain other groups which could preserve a higher degree of 
collectivity.
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Overall, I describe the outcome of interplay between Soviet policy and the Korei’tsy as 
dispersal, considering the Soviet policy of diminishing the size of population as far as possible, 
relocating only a part of the Korean population, and intentionally separating family members in 
Sakhalin and Vladivostok before deportation. As the status of Korei'tsy was as a non titular 
national minority and was incorporated into other national minority regions, Korei’tsy 
community and identity can be understood as a re-marginalised national group within the 
marginalised Uzbek and Kazakh nations.
Stalin’s deportation project of Korei'tsy to the Kazakh region was planned much earlier 
than 1937, the year of the actual deportation. The first attempt was made in 1923 but the plan 
was soon dropped. The Soviet Union at that time had an apprehension of radical Korean 
nationalists who might cause embarrassing troubles such as anti-Japanese agitation by forming a 
Korean armed unit and by smuggling weapons. The Soviet authority feared that in such a way 
Koreans in the area would aggravate the unstable relationship with Japan. Hara supports this 
approach to the issue; ‘the majority of the urban Korean population consisted of newcomers and 
refugees who had actually experienced Japanese suppression and whose anti Japanese feeling 
was strong’ (Hara, in Suh: 1988, 3).
Later, however, the reasons for Stalin’s relocation project were caused by different 
grounds. Firsdy, Japan had always been a fundamental menace to Russia. On Japan’s invasion, 
as referred to in Chapter 3, the Russian government assumed that Koreans could possibly 
participate in spying activities against Russia. Immediately after the Russo-Japanese negotiation 
over the matter of Manchurian railway in 1931, the Soviet Union began to be suspicious of a 
Korean conspiracy with the Japanese. Secondly, the establishment of an autonomous Jewish 
prefecture in 1934 also provided Russia with grounds to fear potential Korean demands. The 
fear combined with Stalin’s xenophobic reaction to the yellow race in the politically sensitive 
region. There was a high possibility that Koreans would demand a separate administrative 
arrangement in order to build the Far Eastern Korean People’s Republic, which was actually 
proposed by Korean nationalists in August 1929. The Korean population in Far East Russia 
were one of the many other minority national groups targeted by Stalin for ethnic cleansing. 
Stalin’s racial harassment of the Koreans was also caused by the same kind of apprehension and 
suspicion that the Soviets had towards other nations and diaspora groups in non-Russian border 
regions. Such groups included Germans, Poles and Finns. The Soviet Union feared their greater 
loyalty to their home countries and possible influence from a capitalist society. They were 
labelled enemy nations and targeted for arrest and execution. Although the Korean peninsula 
was under Japanese occupation at that time, for Stalin, racial distinction between Koreans and 
Japanese was a serious worry in case Japanese influence became greater in the region. Thirdly, it 
was necessary to develop barren central Asia. For the purpose of advancing the dilution of 
Islamic culture in Kazakh, nomads should not be neglected as an explanation as to why Koreans
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were sent to that particularly barren area. Before relocation, Koreans were promised lands and 
farms, and an agricultural life under better conditions once resettled in central Asia. It has also 
something to do with supplementing the population shortage after a considerable number of 
Kazakhs migrated to Chinese Muslim regions bordered by central Asia during the 
collectivisation period between 1929 and 1933.
Apart from these strategic and political reasons, deterioration of the national hatred 
between Koreans and Russians in the region was also taken into consideration. According to the 
data presented by Martin, for example, by 1926 the Korean population had reached 
approximately 145,500, which is around 22.4 per cent of the population in the Vladivostok 
okrug. There were class and status differences between Koreans and Russians. Most Korean 
households were landless and non-Soviet citizens. Koreans cultivated exclusively rented land; 
that is, 7.8 per cent of Russians.10 When ‘Soviet policy called for the transfer of land to those 
who cultivated it’ (ibid.), the Russians refused to rent lands and demanded Koreans’ 
resettlement. Years later, local Russians’ view of Koreans was seriously reviewed. ‘They saw 
Koreans as potentially disloyal and economically detrimental illegal aliens, who should be 
resettled away from the sensitive border regions’ (ibid., 318). In the Soviet Far East, the hostile 
atmosphere between Russians and Koreans worsened until 1937, which in the end served as one 
of the impulses for Stalin’s decision to remove Koreans from the trouble spot.
So far, I have explained specific policies towards diasporic Koreans that were one of the 
decisive factors shaping the present national identity of Korean diasporas. Such policies are 
based on principles of citizenship of host state. Fundamental principles of various citizenship 
notions denote the mode of limiting full membership of Korean diasporas to Han Chinese, 
Japanese, and russified Soviet nations by implicit legal arrangements and physical coercion, as 
well as cultural and psychological oppression. The focal issue here is the question of full 
membership to the nation of host state. This condition is one of the features of diaspora identity 
in general; that is, conflicting hope for full inclusion and distinctiveness.
The search for full inclusion with recognition
In this part, I analyse diasporas’ self-expressions of collective existence. They reflect the process 
of forming a diaspora identity. The process includes identification with their own group and 
differentiation from the host nation. They demonstrate the evolution of a particular collective 
identity while being conditioned within another nation, that is, via-it-vis the host nation.
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Koreans in China
Collective memory of participation in state building projects
It is remembered that Josdnjok actively participated in the Sino-Japanese War, the Communist 
Revolution and the Korean War against the United States. Josonjok were effectively mobilised 
under communist ideology, which blurred the line between the Han Chinese and the rest, and 
guaranteed agricultural lands. Josonjok’s enthusiastic cooperation has been appreciated by the 
Communist Party and Chinese government until today. Consequently, the Josdnjok have been 
recognised as one of the most loyal minority national groups in China. In return for their active 
cooperation, Josonjok secured a relatively higher degree of autonomy in many aspects.
Josdnjok interpretations of their collective memory, including participation in an anti­
colonial war against Japan, contribution to the communist revolution and an anti-imperial war to 
guarantee the Korean peninsula not being colonised by America, decorate history books written 
by the Josdnjok themselves. Recording a history of their own reflects the self justification of 
being Chinese citizens; at the same time, their awareness of not yet being full members of the 
Chinese nation. It illustrates a spontaneous selection of historical memories leading to the 
building of a distinctive identity differentiating them from the dominant nation. Josdnjok’s case 
demonstrates that keeping a sub-national group’s own collective history is not necessarily 
antagonistic to the host society, although difference is very much highlighted.
Collective memory of nationalist movements against Japan is also a significant source 
of Josdnjok identity. The Josdnjok believed that Manchuria would not be successfully retaken 
by China without the Josonjok’s patriotic cooperation. Josdnjok historians hardly fail to 
highlight Josdnjok participants during the anti-colonial war against Japan in Manchu in the 
1930s.11 Self-evaluation of contributions to state building is the crucial element for a diaspora 
group who wish to represent their collective identity. It is recorded that, in total, 64 social and 
political organisations were involved in the nationalist movements against Japan in the region. 
They record that there were about 2,000 members of the Communist Party by 1931, over 90 per 
cent of whom were Josdnjok. While the Kuomintang (KMT)’s policy was ethnicised nationalist 
agenda, Hanification, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao took a different strategy 
regarding non-Han Chinese. Maoism, based on pragmatism rather than principle, successfully 
mobilised the local populace in struggling externally with foreign imperialism and, internally 
with the political rivalry against the KMT. Mao’s strategy was reinforced during his political 
experiment of the Long March through which the CCP could successfully communicate with 
minority groups, even in the remote Chinese border.
Each non-Han Chinese group during the Communist Revolution had a different 
motivation for cooperation with the CCP. During the Communist Revolution, for national and
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ethnic minorities of China, liberalism was regarded as a tool for suppression and discrimination. 
In the case of the Josdnjok, such a view is closely linked with both identity and practical 
reasons. They were at ease cooperating in the series of Chinese state-building projects for the 
reason that they shared strong anti-colonialism with the Chinese against Japan and the CCP’s 
land reform in favour of non-Han Chinese minorities. Otherwise, they would have been 
expelled, if the KMT was in power, back to their insecure motherland.
The anecdote below provided by Lee Hae Soon, an interviewee, shows the Josdnjok’s 
interpretation of their contribution to anti-colonial nationalist movements against Japan in 
Manchu.
In a Hanjok [Han Chinese] junior high school in Yanji city, Yanbian, the student 
monitor of the class, aged fifteen, protested against a Hanjok history teacher at 
the school. In a history class one day, when the teacher explained about Chinese 
nationalist movements against Japan during the 1920s and 1930s in Yanbian, the 
Hanjok teacher mentioned that at that time the Josdnjok were mostly spies for the 
Japanese government and Josdnjok fought against one another, forming 
numerous political factions, while Hanjok participated in nationalist movements 
under the centralised Communist Party. Immediately after the Hanjok teacher’s 
explanation of the history, all the students in the class began to ask each other 
who was Josdnjok students, finally picking on the student representative, who is 
one of the few Josdnjok students in the class. He had been terribly disappointed 
and ashamed before he tried to look into the true historical records on his own.
His parents helped him to collect historical materials to protest against the teacher 
and the class. In the next history class, he raised his hand and presented the 
statistics and data he had collected, showing how many Josdnjok participated in 
the nationalist movements against Japan and how much they had suffered and 
how they were killed by the Japanese, pointing out that the Hanjok were also 
divided into two different political factions, the KMT and the CCP who were 
already fighting and killing each other. Also, he reported this occurrence (it is 
very common for the Chinese in this region to report anything regarded as 
important to the Communist Party) to the Communist Party Committee, saying 
that the content of the history lesson and the Hanjok teacher’s attitude obviously 
went against the central government’s nationality policy which strictly bans both 
Great Hanism and local nationalisms. Within a few days, the Hanjok principal of 
the school walked into the class with a local cadre from the Party and corrected 
the content of the previous history lesson to the class. Later on, the Hanjok 
teacher was reported to the Party as disqualified, which affected the teacher’s 
evaluation.
The passage above can be regarded as a common anecdote that could happen in any 
multinational society. It shows, however, China’s efficient and prompt way of rooting out any 
tensions between Han Chinese and the rest as it demonstrates the local government’s immediate 
intervention in ethnic relations. It shows, at the same time, the disparity between private history 
lessons and the official interpretation of historical facts, which is common in a diaspora 
community. A mass education system unavoidably imposes nationalistic views on history 
whereas first or second generation diasporas, who have been outside such a mass education
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system, provide their children with different perspectives and interpretations of the major 
historical events. The larger the gap, the more likely it is that the younger generation have 
confused experiences over the issues of nationality. Although the Josdnjok collective memory of 
warfare against Japanese colonisation is not distinctively their own historical memory and 
separate from that of the Han Chinese, their interpretation of their participation in the war is not 
identical. Whereas the Josdnjok still perceive their role in the war as guest fighters contributing 
to the foreign lands, Han Chinese regard it as the victory of the Chinese nation in cooperation 
with national and ethnic minorities. Neither of the two interpretations reflects an assumption that 
Josdnjok and Han Chinese are included in a single nation. Their experience of historical events 
occurred over the same period, but Han Chinese and Josdnjok do not share their own 
nationalised interpretations of such events. For Josonjok, the particular historical memory of 
warfare gives grounds for their justifiable existence in the Chinese territory. Because of a 
nationalistic interpretation of history in relation to Korean history, the younger generation 
Josdnjok who have been taught in the present mass education system have a feeling of collective 
shame over the history of their ancestral motherland. ‘We have learned only negative facts about 
Korea. Because of a Sino-centric historical view, we have learned that Korea had always been a 
Chinese colony until the Japanese occupation. Until recently I felt antagonistic towards South 
Korea. But after communication with South Korea, I’ve been learning about Korean history and 
I found a lot more things to re-leam’.12
Collective memory of oppression is also a key factor in building a distinctive collective 
identity. For Josdnjok, the Cultural Revolution is interpreted as a period of oppression. 
Nonetheless, for them, unlike other historical memories, the Cultural Revolution is not 
remembered as a significant period evoking nationality issues. This is because, firstly, although 
in some regions tensions between Han Chinese and non-Han Chinese eventually developed, 
such tensions were blurred by political and ideological lines and reduced to a class struggle. 
Secondly, although some remember the horrible suppressions of Josdnjok leaders condemned as 
local nationalists and feudal class enemies, the oppressed are also aware of the fact that such 
events occurred in other minority regions and even among Han Chinese. Thirdly, Deng’s regime 
successfully encouraged the people to remember the Cultural Revolution as a political error 
made by a few irrational political leaders. Throughout Deng’s regime, sufficient time was given 
for ordinary Chinese to believe that the political clique was the people’s common enemy. At the 
same time, symbolic compensations were given to the oppressed. After Deng’s succession to 
Mao, local newspapers were full of criticisms of the clique, the Gang of Four, and news reports 
on government compensation for the victims through building memorial towers or offering 
special honours.
As explained, the way of remembering historical events varies depending on groups 
even if they are under the same regime. Although the self-celebration of distinctive history
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differs case for case, the fundamental motivation of such self-celebration is, commonly among 
the Korean diaspora cases, not to be separated from the dominant society but to secure 
justifications for their existence in the host societies.
Agriculture, land and identity
At the beginning of their migration, most Korean populations settled in China were farmers who 
were searching for arable lands. Thanks to China’s policy of regional autonomy, collective 
identity among the Josdnjok has been more territorialised or regionalised than in the other two 
cases. The Josdnjok community is rather regionally self-completed with their historical lands. 
The consequence of urbanisation in previously Josdnjok dominant areas has caused the Josdnjok 
people to have apprehensions of losing their collective identity along with their territorial base. 
Josdnjok expression of fear over the disappearance of a substantial base of national culture 
displays diasporas’ resistance to assimilation. But at the same time, among Josdnjok it is also 
reasoned that the Josdnjok’s attachment to lands and a territorial base has in fact driven their 
society to become more stagnant and isolated.
Josdnjok identity relating to rice and agriculture is reflected on their expression of the 
attachment of the older generation Josdnjok to lands and loyalty to Chairman Mao, and the 
memory of Chu Duk Hae. Not only with the Korei’tsy identity attached to farming history, in 
relation to Japan, similarly, historical research has shown that in the late 1910s in Korea during 
the Japanese occupation, the nationalist uprisings increased immediately after Japanese 
exploitation of the rice crop. In his historical work, Ku (1995) points out the issues by using the 
then US consul-general in (mainland) Josdn, Burghales’ report. For a short period of eight 
months between November 1918 and June 1919, Korea had to export over nine million 
bushels13 of the rice crop to Japan. As a result, Koreans faced serious rice shortages and the cost 
of rice rocketed. As a substitute crops such as oats were to be imported from Manchu. 
Burghales, Ku cites, maintained that one of the grounds for the aggravated Korean’s hatred 
against Japanese during the Sam-il nationalist movement was the fact that Japanese let Koreans 
eat oats, which Koreans hate.14
As Miler’s (1995) ethical justification of cultural nationality implies, the needy is 
accurately understood in concrete terms only when one can define what is needy for a certain 
group of people in a culturally distinctive context. Cultural choice is often ignored as a non­
political issue by considering it as a problem of life style but, for the Koreans, rice was a 
question of life or death. The discussion of cultural choice for a particular group is inevitably a 
political subject. Ordinary Josonjok remember at least one thing that Chu Duk Hae did, 
particularly for Josdnjok. It is highly praised among Josdnjok that, in the middle of the 
Communist Revolution in the late 1940s, Chu Duk Hae was thoughtful and swift enough to
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negotiate with Communist Party leaders to grant special permission to provide rice instead of 
wheat to the Josdnjok. Cultural preferences and national dispositions in the political sphere are 
not something to be trivialised. ‘People necessarily and properly consider public issues in terms 
influenced by their situated experience and perception of social relations’ (Young, in Shafir: 
1998, 270).
To an agrarian nation, lands mean more than practical interests. Josonjok’s particular 
attachment to historical lands was evident in every political upheaval throughout history. During 
the Qing dynasty, the Josdnjok bore humiliation and discrimination under Manchurian rule in 
the region only to keep the lands that had been discarded as sterile territory. Later, the Josdnjok 
were forced to move to the region when it was discovered that they were skilful at agriculture. 
In the early 1930s, the Josdnjok population was only three per cent but over 90 per cent of the 
agricultural yield came from Josdnjok lands.15 In this period, the Josdnjok’s attachment to lands 
encouraged them to develop a form of community more easily than nomadic groups in ancient 
China. The position is far clearer to see when comparing this with the inner Mongolians or 
Manchurians. Under Japanese occupation, the Josdnjok fought for the land. As I briefly 
explained in the previous section, the Josdnjok were highly cooperative with the Chinese 
Communist Party in 1949 when fighting against the KMT mainly because the CCP allowed 
Josdnjok to own the historical lands. This is often expressed in interviews with old people who 
remember those times. With regard to Josdnjok views on their record of being cooperative with 
the CCP, the first and second generations still show strong loyalty to chairman Mao. They recall 
their destitute past, and that they had no other choice. The older generations are aware that they 
are living as outsiders, but they still have the memory that it was communist China and Mao 
Zedong that saved them: ‘Japan took our territory. We wouldn’t have been allowed to preserve 
our lands without comrade Mao and the Party’.16
It is not exaggerating to say that the region had been left infertile before the Josdnjok 
arrived and started to cultivate the discarded lands into agricultural areas. As the region became 
increasingly cultivated, Manchurians moved in and claimed land ownership. Since the region 
had always been a power vacuum, there were no fixed regulations on land property and 
migration before the Japanese occupation. With regard to the questions related to their official 
nationality as Chinese citizens, older generations answer, ‘It is difficult to betray China. We 
should carry on the historically accumulated trust between China and the Josdnjok. This is 
because China allowed us to keep our national features so well along with our lands’.17
From today’s discourse on the territory, however, a generation gap is also exhibited. 
Whereas older people, mostly first and second generation Josdnjok, deeply regret that the 
Josdnjok are losing lands which they regard as one of the most substantial aspects composing 
the national group, the younger generation, third and fourth generation Josdnjok, tend to believe 
that as long as the Josdnjok are obsessed with lands, they cannot expect any further development
84
in the long term. In fact, since 1997 public concerns about the historical lands have emerged. 
For example, Heilyongjiang shinbao [newspaper] deals with the crisis of the loss of the Josdnjok 
lands.
Recently, in D’ae-j6n-ja-chon where 75 per cent population was Josdnjok, for 
instance, over 30 per cent of Josdnjok farm households, 40 households out of 
201, have already left the lands. Their lands have been taken by other people, 
mostly Hanjok. This is mainly because since last year (1996), 280 Josdnjok left 
their hometown for South Korea, United States, or other Asian countries. As a 
result, the used-to-be Josdnjok towns are naturally losing their Josdnjok features. 
Josdnjok local government officials in such towns take actions to allow one year 
reservation period in order to let Josdnjok farmers can return and delay Hanjok’s 
taken-up. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Josdnjok who left hometowns would 
have intention to return home (Heilyongjiang shinbao, 2 April, 1997).
A similar tone of public concerns regarding the loss of historical lands has appeared 
frequently in both Ydnbydn ilbo [newspaper] and Heilyongjiang shinbao since 1997. The 
concerns are closely related to other indicators of nationality, such as population decrease and 
dispersal, and the preservation of national attributes including languages, customs and values. It 
is true that Josdnjok identity was built around agricultural activity and land ownership. Although 
such stories of building a community have become mere historical memories, such shared 
memories of activities of maintaining a distinctive group also remain as a crucial ingredient to 
retain a group identity. Nevertheless, one of the reasons why Josdnjok regions and counties have 
become increasingly less geographically defined is naturally related to political and economic 
changes in China and adjustments in implementing government policies towards non-Han 
Chinese.
From nationalised identity to regionalised identity
For the reasons of urbanisation and increasing internal migrations in China, the national or 
ethnic divisions have become less clear than before, which sometimes causes confusion and 
misunderstanding among minority ethnic or national groups, especially those who have strong 
historical attachment to their territorial bases. As a related issue with the first category, 
agriculture, lands and identity explained in the previous section, the Josdnjok fear of losing a 
distinctiveness reflects diasporas’ fundamental desire, the search for a guarantee of inclusion yet 
recognition of their difference as a group.
The principles of China’s nationality policy are One China Policy and the
national and regional autonomy § '?□). Article 4 of the Constitution given
below, indicates the overall principles of the policy, emphasising autonomy and unity at the 
same time. In other words, as Mackerras (1994) noted ‘the state permits and even encourages
85
the consciousness of individual minorities, provided that it does not threaten national unity or 
the ‘unity among the nationalities (minju tuanjie)’ (1994, 32), which is well presented in Article 
4.
Article 4, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China18
All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal. The state protects the lawful rights and 
interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops a relationship of equality, unity and 
mutual assistance among all of China’s nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression of any 
nationality are prohibited; any act which undermines the unity of the nationalities or instigates 
division is prohibited. The state assists areas inhabited by minority nationalities accelerating their 
economic and cultural development according to the characteristics and needs of the various minority 
nationalities. Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in 
concentrated communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established to exercise the 
power of autonomy. All national autonomous areas are integral parts of the People’s Republic of 
China. All nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages 
and to preserve or reform their own folkways and customs.________________________________
The principles of the relationship between the central government and local 
governments is indicated in Articles 115 and 116 of section VI which explains the degree of 
centralisation. The legal framework regarding self-government in China stipulated in section VI 
of the Constitution was adopted as a part of Constitutional Law in 1984. The specific legal 
ordinance for Josdnjok Autonomous Prefecture, among thirty other autonomous prefectures, 
was implemented in 1952. As Chinese society is still under totalitarian state control, tensions 
and conflicts can be efficiently dealt with by applying constitutional laws even to legal cases on 
| civil and private levels.
Although China’s official criteria of ethnic or national groups are not always clear, there 
are fifty-six officially recognised distinctive ethnic or national groups19 including the Han 
Chinese. In terms of population ratio, non-Han Chinese minorities make up only about 8 per 
cent of the total population. Minority national issues in China have been taken seriously. The 
reasons are that firstly, geo-politically, the minorities live in the politically sensitive territorial 
border zones. The Josdnjok themselves refer to such a group as a guagye-minjok meaning ethnic 
or national group on the territorial borderline. Secondly, the areas occupy over 64 per cent of the 
national territory, with abundant under-exploited natural resources. Finally, the population 
growth rate of non-Han Chinese is much higher than among Han Chinese. The Josdnjok, 
however, are the exception; their population growth rate is lower than Han Chinese. Since the 
One China Policy is not directly related to the Josdnjok case and China’s policy is flexible 
depending on each situation, I put my attention more on the latter policy, national and regional 
| autonomy and its impacts on Josdnjok national identity.
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! Article 115 and 116, Section VI, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China
Article 115 The organs of self-government of autonomous regions, prefectures and counties exercise the 
functions and powers of local organs of state as specified in Section V of Chapter Three of the 
Constitution. At the same time, they exercise the power of autonomy within the limits of their authority as 
prescribed by the Constitution, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National 
Autonomy and other laws and implement the laws and policies of the state in the light of the existing 
local situation.
Article 116 The people’s congresses of the national autonomous areas have the power to enact 
regulations on the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations in the light of the political, 
economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities20 in the areas concerned. The 
regulations on the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations of autonomous regions shall be 
submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval before they go into 
effect. Those of autonomous prefectures and counties shall be submitted to the standing committees of the 
people’s congresses of provinces of autonomous regions for approval before they go into effect, and they 
shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for the record.
The policy of national and regional autonomy was introduced in 1947 when Inner 
j Mongolia was designated as the first autonomous prefecture. Its direct concern was the future 
j  possibility of the Republic of Mongolia (Outer Mongolia) making a territorial claim during
j
| internal political turmoil. With a similar background against North Korea, the Josdnjok 
j community was allowed to set up its own autonomous governance. Unlike prevalent 
| misunderstandings about the principle of autonomy, from the beginning the concept of national 
autonomy was combined with regional autonomy. Among the five largest administrative levels 
of autonomous prefectures,21 Tibet is the only area where the number of Tibetans is 
outnumbered by other minority national groups that form as 95 per cent of the total population, 
although the official statistics have been fluctuating. Otherwise, the dominance of any one 
national group is not encouraged by central government. Article 113 of the Constitutional Law, 
Section VI implies such policy.
i  Article 113, Section VI, Constiution of the People’s Republic of China
In the people’s congress of an autonomous region, prefecture or county, in addition to the deputies of 
the nationality exercising regional autonomy in the administrative area, the other nationalities 
inhabiting the area are also entitled to appropriate representation. Among the chairman and vice 
chairmen of the standing committee of the people’s congress of an autonomous region, prefecture or 
county there shall be one or more citizens of the nationality or nationalities exercising regional 
autonomy in the area concerned.__________________________________________________
Since Deng’s Open Door Policy and rapid social and economic changes, it is true that 
the emphasis of government policy has moved from national autonomy towards regional 
autonomy. On some occasions, tensions are revealed, caused by the unintended but unavoidable 
consequences of confusions and misunderstandings over the discrepancy between national
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autonomy and regional autonomy. There exist some examples demonstrating this discrepancy 
between sub-national and regional lines; the protest against misjudgements of sports matches 
and the Josonjok students’ discontent about Han Chinese students’ influence in the student 
union of Y6nby6n University are such examples. The anecdote below which combines 
information from interviewees Lee and Choi, shows potential tensions developing based on the 
regional line and government response to them. On the interview question of whether 
respondents has experienced any feeling of discrimination as a minority national, the 
interviewees enthusiastically told me the events of the Yonbydn Odong Team (the Josonjok 
soccer team).
Social enthusiasm towards sports has risen since the early 1990s, although the team has 
existed since 1960. In 1998 when the Ydnbydn Odong Team had tournaments with Liaonyong 
and Harbin Teams, on at least three occasions the Hanjok referee made obvious partial 
judgements giving disadvantage to the Yonbydn Odong Team. After the matches, the Josdnjok 
people staged continuous demonstrations in front of the local government building in Yanji city. 
The interviewee recollected the atmosphere, saying, ‘I felt strong nationalist sentiments. 
Hundreds of Josdnjok were together until two o’clock in the morning to protest against the 
serial misjudgements’. The interviewee continued, ‘Josonjok believe that Hanjok are not happy 
with the fact that a small minority group like Josdnjok has an exclusive and independent sports 
team keeping good records because it is unusual for any ethnic groups to have their own teams 
which are competent in nation-wide big matches, broader regional levels than autonomous Chu 
[region]’. In fact, the team was supported by a South Korean sports association in terms of 
finance and techniques. Several South Korean and North Korean players actually participated in 
the matches as invited players of Ydnbydn Odong Team. In the end, the Ydnbydn local 
government had to dispatch a representative to central government to appeal against this 
happening. Soon after, official apologies were offered from the Chinese Central Soccer 
Association. The referee was punished. The interviewee adds his comments on this: ‘The 
Chinese government has provided extremely effective solutions to any trivial cases which might 
develop into deeper tensions. China is extremely sensitive to the nationality issues. Thanks to 
such an immediate solution at government level, now Josdnjok people seem to believe that 
maybe they themselves were too sensitive, exaggerating the referee’s individual partiality as 
discrimination.
For some time later, the South Korean association’s technical and financial support for 
the Odong Team was banned and more Han Chinese players were recruited. As in all other work 
units, in educational institutes and social organisations, one minority group’s exclusivity is not 
as tolerable as before. For the Josdnjok community, enthusiasm over exclusively Josdnjok sports 
teams would mean nothing further than cultural pride, since their final goal is only to keep a 
collective solidarity as Josdnjok in Han Chinese society. It is true that there have been trends
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where regional identities replace national identities, and sometimes they are inseparably 
interconnected. When the two boundaries are incongruent, the crucial difference between the 
two is the fact that regional identity is a more territorialised and interest-based identity without 
necessarily retaining a strong pychological sense of belonging. Once one leaves, interests shared 
with people in the region are no longer relevant. One can still keep nostalgic feelings about 
landscape, food and people of the region but this is so in a much more detached manner. When 
regional and national boundaries are congruent, however, it becomes another matter.
According to official statistics from 1982 in the Josbnjok autonomous prefecture, 16 
different national and ethnic groups, comprised of 57.4 per cent Han Chinese, 1.93 per cent 
Manchus, and 0.03 per cent Mongolians, live together with 40.32 per cent Jos6njok. The 
autonomous prefecture is composed of two major cities, Y6ngil [Yanji] and Domun [Tuman], 
and six lower level administrative districts or counties. The autonomous prefectural government 
is located in Yanji which is mostly populated by Josonjok who form approximately 57 per cent 
in Yanbian alone. A total of 61.5 per cent of Josonjok live in Gilim [Jilin] province.22
The migration policy for the purposes of encouraging various groups’ cohabitation and 
accelerating the development of minority regions has been compiled with, in accordance with 
the principle of national and regional autonomy. The migration policy began in 1949 and peaked 
during the Cultural Revolution.23 The reason for this is, in theory, that China saw the issues or 
troubles of nationality as transitory problems that would eventually disappear when the class 
struggle was completed. Although socialism is adopted in a Chinese manners, the basic logic of 
the socialist view of nationality issues in relation to the class struggle is relevant to this 
discussion. The struggle to overcome national problems in the communist movement is the most 
important task of Marxists and Leninists because the doctrine of proletarian internationalism is 
basically incompatible with nationalism. One of the most fundamental divisions of humankind is 
the vertical cleavage which divides people into ethno-national groups; meanwhile, for Marxists, 
such a division rests upon horizontal class distinctions that cut across national groupings.
Consequently, socio-economic classes rather than nations were perceived as the 
essential force of human history. Marxism outlines the nation as a historically evolved 
phenomenon which comes into existence only with the rise of capitalism. Prior to the capitalist 
stage, human groupings were in the form of tribes and clans, but the new economic relations, 
brought on by changes in the mode of production, created nations. Therefore, in Marxist theory, 
nationalism is a device of the bourgeois for identifying their class interests as the interests of 
society as a whole. Regardless of dissimilarities in culture and traditions, identification with a 
given nation rested simply upon ties to an economic unit.24 However, socialism was modified in 
the Chinese way during Mao's era. ‘The extension of Marxism to Asia ... brought with it new 
questions about universality of Marx’s, Engels’, and, indeed, Lenin’s observations concerning 
the character and endurance of the state. These concerns were intimately linked to issues
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concerning national identity’ (Hoston: 1994,40). Fundamentally, national tension was seen as a 
matter of class conflict and should be a part of class issues. The oppression of a majority of 
people within a nation and between/among nations is basically caused by a ruling bourgeois 
class which is both a class enemy and a national enemy at the same time. Thus, it was believed 
the national question would dissolve when the class struggle ends and socialism is 
accomplished.
It is true that ethnic and national minorities in China have received special attention and 
care in many fields25 due to the general character and territorial compactness of minorities 
including the Josdnjok. However, unresolved issues related to Han and non-Han Chinese are 
much more complicated than are manifested in the Constitution. The Josdnjok retain growing 
concerns over issues such as the gradual loss of political autonomy, lack of government 
subsidies and fear of the force of assimilation. More and more Josdnjok perceive themselves to 
be politically excluded and isolated. It is widely believed that China is concerned about the 
possible instigation of strong national ties between the Josdnjok and the two Koreas. 
Invigorating economic networks between Jilin province and South Korea may well lead to 
political influence, disloyalty to China and, even further, a territorial claim on the region which, 
in mainland Koreans’ psychological map, is seen as a lost land. China, meanwhile, makes 
historical claims on ancient colonies which include not only the region where non-Han Chinese 
live but also their homelands.26 Outer Mongolia is one of the clear examples.
In this section, I have analysed the evolution of the Josdnjok identity. Firstly, I discussed 
the Josdnjok interpretation of historical events. Secondly, I explained their shared collective 
memories of building a diaspora community through communal economic activities. Thirdly, I 
have shown a diaspora’s attachment and sense of belonging to their regional base, where 
Josdnjok are regarded as a majority among other national or ethnic groups.
Koreans in Japan
Zainichi history consists of tensions, struggles and contradictions. Zainichi experience 
demonstrates that their collective desire is to maintain collectivity and to secure external 
recognition. The numerous potential issues and actual problems between the Zainichi and 
Japanese society have been aggravated. Their fundamental cause is the question of mis- 
recognition, which consequently affects all aspects of Zainichi public and private life. Zainichi 
identity vis-^-vis the Japanese nation is best reflected on the issues of discrimination and 
naturalisation. I take that Kim Hee Ro and Hitachi cases as symbolic incidents. The features of 
Zainichi identity are formed while facing discriminative occurrences or participating in 
community affairs. These occurrences and collective matters reinforce the aspect of their
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differentiated national identity seeing that such particular issues are shared neither with Japanese 
nation nor elsewhere with the Korean nation.
Discriminations and naturalisation
Not all Zainichi consider changing their legal nationality to Japanese is a desirable way to 
respond to racial discriminations in Japanese society. Due to the particular relationship between 
the Zainichi and the Japanese, one cannot make a hasty conclusion that naturalised Korean- 
origin Japanese have more or less overcome internal struggles and external pressures. In the 
same vein, increasing figures of a naturalised Korean population do not safely tell us that 
naturalised Korean-origin Japanese cease to possess any other collective identity but Japanese 
national identity. As I explained in the previous section, this is fundamentally caused by Japan’s 
highly nationalised notion of citizenship. Zainichi identity has been crystallised while 
experiencing all kinds of discriminations and discussing such issues as naturalisation; that is, a 
superficial choice of national allegiance. A puzzling question may be why even now most 
Zainichi would rather remain as Korean nationals despite the fact that naturalisation into 
Japanese citizenship has been encouraged by the Japanese government and the procedure has 
been simplified and entails many other practical benefits. As for any minority national group in 
Japan, becoming a member of Japanese society is not only a matter of the socio-cultural, 
political and legal activities of citizens in liberal states. Being a tax payer, being included in the 
same pension scheme, speaking the Japanese language or even being bom in Japan are 
insufficient reasons to be regarded as a Japanese citizen. ‘Instead of any visible, identifying 
markings on the Koreans, such as tattoos or patches on clothing’, Che (2000) explains, they are 
marked ‘by their birth certificates bearing the original Korean addresses as their permanent 
domicile’ (7-8). The limitations for Koreans in Japan include discrimination in most aspects of 
life including housing, education, health care, receiving loans, all levels of legal cases, 
occupational choices, pensions, marriage, travels, political participation and so on.
Cases implying racial discrimination against the Zainichi are numerous. The stories and 
issues that I introduce here are common reflections of major aspects of discrimination. However, 
they represent only a modicum of thousands of pending social and legal issues. Mun’s story 
shows Korean frustration when they are treated as total aliens in Japanese society. On the 
question of discrimination, Mun, aged 38, illustrates her tiring experience with a well-known 
language institute in Japan concerning receiving loans. It is a custom for NOVA, an English 
language institute in Japan, to arrange the offer of loans to students in order to cover their tuition 
fees. Mun confesses the offence she felt when she was firstly rejected because of her official 
nationality and later, after complaining, required to complete absurdly complicated documents
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including a requirement to providing a Japanese guarantor, which is customarily required only 
for students under the age of eighteen.
I could have provided what they required but I was so frustrated and offended 
that I decided to fight. I had been a qualified high school teacher for over ten 
years. They did not consider a Joson school as a proper educational institute. 
Consequendy, my work experience was not taken into account. I could not accept 
the fact that I am categorised as a distrustful alien. I was bom in Japan. Both the 
loan company and the language institute shuffled off their responsibilities. At the 
end of the long annoying disputes with the institute, thanks to a helpful Japanese 
lawyer, Mr Yamaguchi, the institute received an official order of rectification 
from the Osaka Bureau of Judicial Affairs. Apart from such experience, we 
Zainichi are already excluded from all kinds of social welfare. Zainichi who are 
not naturalised and keep using Korean names, without medical insurance, had to 
pay usually ten times more medical expense. I remember when I was young, we 
had great difficulties whenever my father was ill and had to go to hospital.
Mun’s experience might be viewed as personal and particular but it is not an isolated 
example of discriminations against the Zainichi. Her frustration would not have happened if 
Mun had never attempted to get out of her segregated Zainichi circle. She had decided to 
develop her foreign language skill hoping to lead a better life, by studying abroad or by getting 
better paid work just as ordinary young Japanese do in Japan. Relying on legal accounts does 
not disentangle the hidden issue. Perhaps neither the loan company nor the institute had the 
intention of discriminating against a Zainichi individual. Legal devices functioning against 
Zainichi conveniently support popular concerns about providing the same benefits to Zainichi as 
to real Japanese citizens. Mostly due to lack of information, ordinary Japanese commonly 
question: why foreigners like Zainichi should be treated like true Japanese citizens. They have 
their own independent country in case they want to return, and if they want to be treated like 
Japanese citizens, why don’t they naturalise? Public apprehensions are rooted in misinformation 
concerning the Zainichi issue. In the above illustration, for example, Mun might have 
naturalised much earlier had the acquisition of Japanese nationality meant no more than a legal 
procedure. For historical and political reasons, issues regarding diasporas are far more 
complicated than has been understood.
Zainichi reactions to discrimination are varied, mostly depending on the generation 
involved. The observation that different generations react to the Japanese society in different 
patterns does not safely confirm the common assumption that strong collective identity is 
gradually weakened among younger generation Zainichi. Only the manners of resistance to the 
force of assimilation have changed. This is due to the different reasons for their indignation; that 
is, why and with what they are discontent. The first generation Zainichi mostly preserve 
humiliating historical experience vis-^-vis the Japanese. Their experience is on a directly 
familial or personal level. Or, at least, they remember the colonial experience as a national
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shame and consider the Japanese nation as ever enemies. The nature of indignation of the 
second and third generation Zainichi, on the other hand, is more practical. The fundamental 
discontent of the younger generation is caused by the fact that they were bom in Japan without 
choice and perfectly Japanese in many ways but hardly accepted as being the same people. This 
causes problems common in Zainichi families. During childhood, Zainichi children and 
teenagers usually show their anger towards their parents, regretting their Korean origin. Zainichi 
more or less share such collective shame, although reactions to it are varied. Korean national 
identity among the older generation Zainichi is the one nurtured during the time of the Korea’s 
anticolonial resistance. Meanwhile, the national identity of younger generations is the outcome 
of the following three causes; actual discrimination, lessons from their parents who pass down 
their oppressive historical memories, and the modem education of a democracy allowing them 
to be aware of basic human rights and the reciprocity of citizenship.
Most of the Zainichi population are engaged in small business but problems with 
Japanese banks are classic examples of discrimination. A Zainichi businessman explains the 
difficulties of interacting with Japanese banks as Zainichi. ‘With an excuse of security problems 
in cases of sending money to North Korea, Japanese banks strictly ban offering loans to Zainichi 
businessmen’. Although there are a number of Zainichi who have managed to succeed in self- 
employed business and other private sectors, a considerable number of Zainichi have been left 
unemployed. Opportunities for Zainichi are filtered through racial stratification. It is not 
surprising to see literature with Zainichi themes is full of gangster affairs, pachinko parlours, 
money-lending, violence, frustration, segregation, and identity crisis.
Zainichi are not the only non-Japanese minority group to have suffered from 
discrimination in Japan. The Burakumin and the Ainu, whose lifestyles are exhibited in natural 
history museums as being well-tamed indigenous and aboriginal, have been examples of the 
Japanese wartime ideological framework. They were used to show that, despite the persistent 
efforts of the Japanese to civilise and include them in Japanese society, they have remained 
uncivilised due to their congenital inferiority. A large group of wartime biologists and 
anthropologists were involved in proving the genetic superiority of Japanese blood, which is 
intrinsically inherited only from Japanese ancestors.27 ‘Everything else was relegated to the 
background, with the indigenous populations of Hokkaido, Taiwan and Korea classified as 
stagnant, degenerate and incapable of appreciating the resources they possessed’ (Weiner, in 
Dikotter: ibid., 110). Sophistication of Japanese racism influenced by European theorists such as 
Arthur de Gobineau and inspired by social Darwinism, was made throughout the wartime period 
and reached its peak during the 1930s, crystallised as pan-Asianism. The conceptualisation of 
Japanese racism ‘was predicated on a conflict between the white and yellow races, while, on the 
other, assumed distinct and immutable differences in intellectual and cultural capacities between 
the Yamato minzoku and those of China and Korea’ (Weiner: 1992,443). An official guidebook
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explaining the negative characters of Koreans titled Josenjin, meaning the Koreans, was 
published in 1921 by the Japanese colonial government in order to promulgate the idea that 
Koreans were by nature an inferior race and consequently subject to assimilation by the 
Japanese.28 Due to the subtle way of discriminating by the unique social pressure of 
homogeneity and by legal restrictions, Zainichi naturally built a distinctive collective identity 
from the Japanese nation.
The legal framework of Japan is structured as it was during the American occupation 
and it has been relatively consistent. The Japanese postwar policy towards Zainichi was 
institutionalised during this period. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) 
saw the remaining Koreans in Japan as illegal and disturbing elements in the context of the 
prevailing left-wing tendencies both in Japan and Korea. During this period, the immigration 
control system, the continuation of jus sanguinis and strict naturalisation criteria, and the 
uniform loss of Japanese legal nationality by ex-colonial subjects were introduced.29 It caused 
serious trouble for the Zainichi. Being categorised as sometimes the decolonised or, at times, 
wartime enemies as the Japanese, SCAP’s policy towards the Zainichi were highly ambiguous. 
Overall policy was oppressive due to the risk of the communisation of Korea. The status of the 
Zainichi was aggravated by the Korean War and the division of motherland afterwards.
According to the 1952 Immigration Control Act enacted by the Civil Affairs Bureau in 
the Ministry of Justice, it was announced that minorities in Japan were not Japanese citizens and 
paternal blood descent as the basis of nationality was emphasised. The Immigration Control 
Ordinance of 1951 and Foreigner Registration Act of 1952 were implemented. The latter 
indicates the requirement that foreigners carry an alien registration certificate at all times, and 
the establishment of a fingerprint system. People aged over fourteen who had stayed in Japan for 
at least one year were required to have fingerprints taken at the time of registration and to apply 
for a new certificate every five years.30
Ryang’s description expresses the humiliating legalised discrimination and implies its 
impact on identity formation.
The process included fingerprinting and was an altogether humiliating experience 
... especially because of the high-handed, authoritarian, and careless attitude of 
Japanese officials. Students thus had a concrete reminder of an oppressive 
institution that treated Koreans as potential criminals, part of the larger 
discrimination against them (1997,181).
Until recently, early in the 1990s, upon naturalisation, foreign names were required to 
be Japanised including family names. This might not be a particularly humiliating custom for 
other minority national groups including diasporas as, in western countries, many foreigners 
voluntarily change their names into anglicised forms. Zainichi view the regulation as highly
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offensive. Especially for the older generations of the Zainichi, it reminds them of the colonial 
period when many Koreans were harassed for resistance to the forced Japanisation. The majority 
of Zainichi take the process and requirements of naturalisation to be humiliating and unjust. This 
matter is reflected on in my interview with a well known Zainichi artist.
The problem is not laid on naturalisation itself. The process should be democratic 
and should be left as individual choice. In Japan, having Japanese nationality 
directly means to obey the Emperor. Zainichi do not want to accept it. Imposing 
such precondition itself is discrimination. Thus, unless there were structural 
change in Japanese society, Zainichi problems caused by Japanese fundamental 
social ideology would not be solved. The ideology behind naturalisation in Japan 
requires becoming completely Japanese more than acquiring another legal 
nationality. Only official nationality not our cultural and historical roots should 
be required to be changed. Spiritual change should not be forced. Why should 
such a society be kept; where Zainichi face many difficulties in openly using their 
own names and implicitly being urged to have two names?31
Many people who would have naturalised refused to do so, while many of those who did 
met with ostracisation. The naturalisation procedures have become somewhat less constraining 
in recent years. Perhaps partly because of this, as Douglas and Roberts (2000) consider, more 
people are now seeking naturalisation (6). One of the recent changes in the nationality law to 
which Zainichi organisations, especially Chory6ns\ has been against is the revision of the law 
in 1985 allowing children from different national backgrounds to follow not only the paternal 
family name and nationality but also that of the maternal side. ‘The revised law has helped many 
multinational individuals to live in Japan as Japanese citizens...However, Koreans [Zainichi] 
object to this procedure and attack it as a form of forced assimilation’ (Murphy-Shigematsu, in 
Douglas and Roberts: 2000,205-6).
Along with the system of alien registration, the re-entry permit system was enacted 
especially with reference to the Zainichi. Under this system, the Ministry of Justice could 
effectively prevent Zainichi from leaving and/or re-entering Japan. This system32 functioned 
most harshly against the Zainichi population. Concerns over methods of abuse, such a restriction 
of alien registration, have been raised. The Japanese tradition of a national phobia of 
multinational cohabitation and collective hysteria against the Zainichi is also reflected, as Soh 
explained, in the reality that no separate official institute or independent division exists to handle 
with welfare issues of immigrants in such a developed democratic country.
The Japanese government ignores the issues of the Zainichi. There’s no 
appropriate division dealing with the pending issues regarding special kind of 
immigrants like the Zainichi. Problems and issues regarding the Zainichi are 
matters of the public security division in the Ministry of Justice. To the authority 
of Japan, immigrants are not viewed as people who should be protected but 
regarded as an object of oppression and control.33
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The interviewee is aware of the fact that the main reason for this Japanese attitude is the 
concern of the North Korean connection with Zainichi society. But he believes this reason to be 
an official excuse. In fact, a dilemma for Japan relating to Zainichi issue is that the more 
exclusive Japanese society is, the closer the relationship between Choryon and North Korea 
becomes. In 1965 permanent residence had been granted to pro-South Korean Japan-born 
Zainichi, in other words, to the Zainichi who officially registered as having South Korean 
nationality. Previously, they were categorised as illegal immigrants with no nationality for the 
reason that the South Korean government did not recognise them as South Koreans for security 
reasons. Officially, Zainichi with North Korean official nationality were categorised as North 
Korean immigrants because the North Korean government issued North Korean passports to 
them. By the time permanent residence was given to Zainichi with South Korean nationality, the 
Zainichi with North Korean nationality also had to choose exclusively either a North Korean 
passport or re-entry permit scheme as a permanent residentship, issued by the Japanese Ministry 
of Justice. Zainichi who chose South Korean nationality were not allowed to have Japanese 
nationality by virtue of the South Korean nationality law. They prefered having Japanese 
permanent residence with a re-entry permit, even though a re-entry permit requires a pre­
stamped visa. This is due to the fact that, in some countries, having a North Korean passport 
causes even more trouble than having no nationality. Only since 1980 have the Zainichi without 
South Korean passports been allowed to travel outside Japan using a travel document. Another 
anecdote from Mun below shows the impact of restriction on Zainichi daily life.
When I was about to leave Japan, attempting to travel to Italy in 1997, the 
immigrant control officer kept asking me annoyingly tedious questions. It was 
around the time when all my family members were ceasing to renew special 
residentship caused by the excuse of the government’s sudden special nationwide 
investigation of Korean smugglers during Jeju 4.3 hangj’aeng. Instead, we were 
given a one-year visa just like any other foreigners but without a passport. Due to 
the insufficient residue until the expiry date in my ‘special’ visa, the Italian 
embassy refused to issue a visa. I had to explain my special status to the Japanese 
officials. Of course, the immigrant officer prevented me having a special 
document to leave Japan temporarily. In such a case, we have to choose either 
giving up traveling outside of Japan or never coming back to Japan. He was not 
aware of the issues and problems of people like us. We could have North Korean 
passports but possessing a North Korean passport gives even more trouble as the 
officials do not understand the fact that a North Korean passport for us is only 
symbolic. Normally, Zainichi traveling with North Korean passports would be 
put under a two or three hour-long investigation. Even after long explanation 
about my special status, to the end I couldn’t make the officer understand who we 
are. I had to give up and I said to him, ‘Okay, I’m from the universe. You would 
never be able to understand who on earth we are’.34
In this anecdote again, the official did not particularly mean to be discriminative against
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Zainichi. He was fulfilling his duty applying the appropriate law. If Mun had a more passive 
character, she wouldn’t have attempted to face such problems considering the fact that all 
Zainichi are aware of their unstable legal status, which may cause troubles in their efforts to 
travel out o f Japan. Actual discriminations are not always visible to all Zainichi individuals. 
Some might not face any discriminatory experiences throughout their entire life. Regardless of 
their lifestyle and actual experience, non-action for fear o f possible discrimination is also based 
on their self-awareness o f being Zainichi. Experience of direct and indirect discrimination 
evokes collective awareness of being a member of a certain group. Zainichi consciousness vis-a- 
vis the Japanese nation has naturally developed their distinctive collective identity. Since 1990, 
as the Figure 4.4 demonstrates, compared to the previous years an increasing number o f Zainichi 
has chosen Japanese legal nationality. This is mainly due to four factors: globalisation indirectly 
encouraging more people travel outside of Japan, the death of the North Korean leader Kim II 
Sung, the Japanese government’s timely adjustment of the regulations o f naturalisation, and the 
changed milieu o f political detentes between South Korea and Japan, and between North Korea 
and South Korea since the Kim Dae Jung regime.
Figure 4.4 the number of nationalised Koreans, 1955-1998
The number of naturalised Koreans, 1955-1998
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Nevertheless, legal and administrative changes in official nationalities do not solve the 
fundamental problems in relations between Japanese and non-Japanese as the problems are not 
only caused by the Zainichi’s legal status o f being permanent aliens. Unlike Josonjok or 
Korei'tsy, the Zainichi community has not yet resolved the issue of self-justification for their 
legitimate collective existence, followed by symbolic and practical negotiations over the 
relational history of the two parties: diaspora and host nation; in the Zainichis’ case, the 
inevitability of their settlement in Japan and recognition of their contributions to the host 
society. As an example, Zainichi contributions to the Japanese nation and state have never been 
officially acknowledged. Among numerous issues between Zainichi individuals and Japanese 
state, the major one is the question of government compensation for soldiers wounded in the
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Second World War while fighting for Japan, and victims of the Hiroshima nuclear bomb. They 
have been systematically excluded from government protection. Immediately after the Second 
World War, Japanese imperial historians successfully convinced the Japanese public that the 
Japanese nation itself was in fact the greatest victim. Until today within Japan’s nationalism 
discourse, there has been no room to talk about what happened to non-Japanese during these 
national disasters. I regard recognition of diasporas’ participation in host nation’s affairs as the 
first and most crucial condition of a stable coexistence of plural national groups within a state. 
My discussion on this matter was given in Chapter 2, and applies equally to the other two cases. 
Delayed negotiation over history has provided more space to build an antagonistic collective 
identity against the Japanese nation. This is normally the case, no matter which official 
nationality is chosen for the sake of convenience. Undoubtedly, there are many Zainichi who 
admire Japanese culture and wish to behave like the Japanese, but having a sense of belonging 
to such a national culture is a different matter.
Symbolic cases as watersheds in Zainichi history
Urgent problems have gradually attenuated owing to vigorous civil activities and current 
international pressure. Among those thousands of legal cases, either solved recently or 
remaining unsolved, cases including Hitachi versus Arai Shoshi and the Kim Hee Roh case are 
more widely publicised, and are consequently regarded as watersheds in Zainichi movements. 
The cases are a few of the many issues that have been trivialised by Japanese authorities. The 
issues between the Zainichi and the Japanese authorities are obviously public and political 
matters in addition to the problems of individual Zainichi. Not all individual Zainichi have 
problems vis-zi-vis the Japanese state, but if the Zainichi were not involved, the Japanese 
institutions concerned would not respond in the same way as they do towards people involved in 
legal cases. Arai Shoshi and Kim Hee Roh are obviously considered as members of the Zainichi 
as a group in the first place rather than being considered as individual culture-free Japanese 
citizens of the state. Detailed theoretical discussion was presented in Chapter 2 focusing on the 
explanations of why minority identity is significant in the political domain and why recognition 
of collective identity is necessary in order to solve problems of negative discrimination against 
minority national groups. The Hitachi case and the Kim Hee Roh case symbolically exposed 
historically rooted complicated national tensions, although such cases hardly appeal to the 
Japanese public.
There exist stereotypes of outsiders in every society. Such national stereotypes are not 
necessarily always related to political issues. However, as recent research appropriately 
discusses, ‘[r]acial and ethnic stereotypes are relevant to opinion formation about public policy, 
because they influence information processing and decision making’ (Bums et al.: 2000, 204).
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The cases I have presented have illustrated how the public and private interact to perpetuate a 
national minority’s second class citizenship and how this is inevitably a political matter. How an 
irrational judgement of a political leader influences policy making can be found in Premier 
Yoshida Shigeru’s perception of Koreans. Yoshida was known as someone who hated two 
things: communists and the Koreans. In his letter to MacArthur asking for the repatriation of all 
Koreans in Japan to Korea, Yoshida stated that ‘Koreans were harmful to Japan because many 
of them were engaged in criminal or communist activities, and because they were not 
contributing to the economic recovery of Japan’.35 It is undeniable that such a tone of discourse 
has dominated Japanese society. Immigrants or colonial diasporas in Japan can hardly be 
accepted as necessary contributors to the prosperity of Japan. I would emphasise that 
officialising the historical inevitability of Zainichi incorporation into Japanese society and 
recognising their contribution to state affairs including economic development, are the key 
issues in ameliorating the relationship between Zainichi and the Japanese.
The Hitachi case is a watershed in the sense that it put the issues of discrimination into 
the public arena: Arai Pak passed the Hitachi recruitment exam with an outstanding result but 
was informed afterwards that he had in fact failed because of his Korean origin. In the wake of 
this case, Zainichi problems were highlighted both among the Zainichi community and Japanese 
society. One of the crucial prerequisites for recruitment to standard business companies or the 
public sector in Japan is family reputation. Korean descendents have been categorised as 
outcasts. The Hitachi case was a typical event. As Japan itself is one of the most exclusive 
societies, discrimination against different origins tends to be worsened when the racial line is 
overlapped with the class line. In the case of the Zainichi, social inequality has become even 
greater for this reason.
Although Pak himself gave up taking further legal action, social movements against 
discrimination were vociferously organised. Christian associations took the initiatives of the 
anti-Hitachi movement in association with Korean-American Christian social organisations 
operated by Korean communities in the US. After a three-year long legal fight, in 1972 he 
finally won the case, and yet tensions between the Zainichi community and the Japanese 
authorities reached their peak in 1980 over the issue of alien registration. Lee Chung II, the head 
of the Korean Christian Centre in Osaka, explains the changing features of the Zainichi 
movement as depending on their periods. The first period is from 1945 before the Korean War. 
Zainichi movements during this period can be identified as preparation for settlement with 
adjusted legal status. The second period is between 1950 and 1953, during which time the 
Zainichi were deeply engaged in the political affairs of their motherland. During the third 
period, after the division of Korea until the early 1970s, the internal division of the Zainichi 
community had been consolidated like a miniature of the Korean motherland. Taking the several 
major incidents as watersheds since the early 1970s, the direction of Zainichi collective actions
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has changed into more civil and grass root movements rather than political and ideological 
disputes, although the internal political division existed throughout.
As for a turning point, ever since the Hitachi case, Zainichi movements have become 
more explicit and organised. The case stimulated Zainichi’s national sentiments, and organised 
actions were instigated whenever necessary. Thanks to the continued struggle and temporary 
amelioration of diplomatic relations between two Koreas and Japan, the fingerprinting system 
was legally abolished in August 1999. Since the academic year of 2001, Jos6n University 
graduates have been allowed to apply to Japanese national universities after passing an 
additional qualification exam for entering colleges. Some positions, such as lower level civil 
servants in local governments in a few regions such as Osaka and Kanakawa counties, have 
been slowly opened to Zainichi since 1998 after long legal fights.36 Voting rights for the 
Zainichi in local elections has been an important concern for a decade. With South Korean 
support, Japan has seriously reviewed the position but the Japanese government faces strong 
opposition both from Chorydn related Zainichi and Japanese extreme nationalist groups. 
Japanese conservative nationalists have expressed deep concerns relating to the negative 
consequences of offering political citizenship rights to the Zainichi in terms of national interest, 
including security matters and national sentiments. As a compromise, the Japanese government 
has implemented relaxed regulations for naturalisation in order to encourage more Zainichi to 
take naturalisation as a precondition of political participation. As shown below in the interview 
text, North Korean affiliated Zainichi have been opposed to the endowment of voting rights and 
official easing of the naturalisation process. For them, such changes in Japanese policies are 
interpreted as another kind of forced assimilation. Zainichi discussions on topics such as 
naturalisation and voting rights reflect one of diasporas’ common features, the inevitable 
dilemma between a deeper degree of inclusion to the host nation and segregation from the 
mainstream society for the sake of their own collectivity.
I disagree with the naive way of thinking regarding voting rights. Some believe 
suffrage rights will improve and solve Zainichi problems. There will be nothing 
changed. We’ll gain only symbolic change but the Zainichi population is not 
large enough to influence the Japan’s political process. Rather, more division will 
develop within the Zainichi community depending on political orientation 
supporting different political parties. The minimum rights that Zainichi enjoy at 
present came out of our continuous struggle. Rights are never given by Japanese 
government. Systematic struggle rather than legal and formal routes is the best 
way to secure our rights.37
Such a view above is common among the Zainichi who have been exposed to a 
communist oriented Jos6n national education in Japan. They fundamentally share sceptical 
views on the overall democratic political process. Among them, collective fights rather than 
individual incorporation are still strongly believed to be the way to respond to discriminations.
100
Along with the Hitachi incident, the case of Kim Hee Roh revealed the deep-seated 
ethnic hatred and issues of discrimination. During the legal procedure, institutionalised 
discriminations against the Zainichi were revealed, resulting in public resentment. It is well 
known that a considerable number o f Zainichi are involved in yakuza, the criminal syndicate o f 
Japan. Among the Zainichi, it is a typical story that a rebellious Zainichi youngster frustrated by 
his social environment and hopeless situation decides to join the predatory yakuza to have 
spiritual and financial stability. This explains why yakuza recruitment is normally from minority 
ethnic or national groups. Most groups and members o f yakuza are affiliated with area-wide 
syndicates that cover several prefectures. ‘Seven of these syndicates together comprise 36.3 
percent of the total number of groups, ... The seven syndicates operate in 39 prefectures’ (Stark: 
1981, 35) and, major cities such as Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka where Koreans are highly 
concentrated.
Figure 4.5 Korean poluation by region
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As, for example, Kang Tae-song’s short novel, Kizuato (meaning the Scar), which 
realistically reflects the reality o f Zainichi society, Kim (also known as Kwon) Hee Roh was one 
o f those stereotypical Zainichi. Kim, a former yakuza member, was a second generation Zainichi 
who had served 31 years of a life sentence for the murder of two Japanese yakuza members in 
February 1968. As a symbolic gesture of reconciliation with South Korea during the Kim Dae 
Jung regime in September 1999, Kim Hee Roh was freed on the condition that he leaves Japan 
for good. South Korean media sensationally pictured him as a national hero having fought with 
Japanese society against discrimination and finally returning home country after long years o f 
exile. The maximum sentence had been passed on Kim Hee Roh. Focal points were ignored.
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They include circumstances and the situation behind the murder case, such as an allegedly 
offensive discrimination within yakuza, direct motivation of the criminal act and the background 
o f the victim. Apart from that, customarily reprisal murder cases among yakuza had hardly been 
convicted under the protection of higher level yakuza members and related politicians, 
especially during the 1960s. It is regarded that, as Stark (1981) observed, no particular political 
benefits can be gained by prosecuting and fighting gangs in Japan.38 Nationwide yakuza 
networks with connection to politicians and government officials were a well known secret in 
Japan. Upon the excessive and uncustomary exposure of Kim Hee Roh’s case to the public, 
openly offensive and biased public opinions and public speeches were made by officials. While 
nobody had been convicted of being in contempt of court, Kim Hee Roh was given the harshest 
sentence. The institutionalised discriminations against the Zainichi involved in the whole 
process of investigation and conviction were never discussed.39
Figure 4.6 Percentage of the Korean population among foreign residents
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The unique mechanism of Japanese society has allowed this underground society to 
mushroom. As Kaplan and Dubro rightly describe, the history o f yakuza shows the dark side of 
Japan; the silent oppressed minority groups, such as the Burakumin and the Zainichi. By the 
time the Zainichi began to take up the lower level positions in the yakuza during the colonial 
period, Japan underwent rapid industrialisation, which requires cheap labour from so-called 
sangokujiri', Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese who had been brought into Japan to replace the 
many workers drafted into the army. In the early 1940s, a prototype o f modem yakuza leader, 
Akira Ando,40 was named guardian of Korean labourers and protector of Korean juveniles by 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. Apart from the higher salaries they earn, for minorities like
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Koreans, it is far more tempting to join the organisation. They realised that the legitimised rules 
in a normal world are never on a minority’s side. The crucial requirement of yakuza 
membership, loyalty and a family like relationship in return for emotional protection and 
material security could well be a fascinating concept for marginalised people. The nature and 
function of the yakuza have long served as attraction for alienated groups. Over 90 per cent of 
the lower positioned yakuza were composed of the Burakumin before Koreans started to take up 
such positions from 1945 onwards.
Concerning the Kim Hee Roh case, the following four facts are notable. Firstly, the 
crime was triggered by insulting statements about his Korean origin although it was begun by 
other personal and organisational reasons. Accordingly, national or ethnic division within the 
yakuza became an issue. Secondly, the process of investigation of this case demonstrated 
institutionalised racial inequality. Throughout the legal procedure, he was treated as a foreign 
national who disturbed the Japanese social order while the Japanese victims, higher ranked 
yakuza members with more extensive criminal records, received public sympathy. Thirdly, 
unlike the Kim Hee Roh case, customarily previous criminal cases within the yakuza had never 
been unleashed until exposure to media and public, and consequently the case ended up with an 
unusually harsh sentence, whereas other yakuza criminals are normally released soon after. 
Fourthly, the final gesture, sending him home, exhibited that the government had controlled this 
case for the purpose of political bargaining rather than just as a criminal case, and ultimately 
made the decision to send the criminal back to his homeland on condition that he never re-enters 
Japan. In other words, expulsion is applied. Criminals should also have citizenship somewhere. 
Even in the case of a minor legal violation, Zainichi are subject to be expulsion from Japanese 
territory or disqualified as a citizen subject to periodic renewals.
As the cases demonstrate, fundamental problems between the Japanese and the Zainichi 
have not been resolved. Cases revealing Zainichi issues have long been mistreated by the 
authorities and trivialised by an insufficiently informed public. The Zainichi has not yet been 
provided with a psychological and social sphere in which to negotiate their national identity 
with the Japanese nation and where the Zainichi can justify and legitimise their collective 
existence.
Koreans in post-Soviet central Asia
Due to the particular history of the relationship between Korea and the Soviet Union, in 
explaining Korei'tsy identity built vis-^-vis host nation, broadly speaking the following three 
aspects are noteworthy: firstly, collective memories of deportation; secondly, incorporation into 
Uzbekistan; and finally participation in the various Soviet state building projects. The Korei'tsy
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desire for legitimate inclusion in host states is reflected in their discussions and interpretations 
of related historical events.
Voluntarism: state wars and collectivisation
Korei'tsy desire for inclusion in the host nation was expressed in their memory of participation in 
major socialist state building projects: collectivisation and warfare. For them, apart from 
economic achievements, participation in socialist revolutions and the war against Nazi Germany 
have been the important historical events that Korei'tsy themselves hope to highlight. Around the 
time of their deportation, relocated Koreans had both Korean nationality and Japanese 
nationality regardless of their previously acquired Soviet nationality before resettlement. Japan 
had the diplomatic right to control the Korean population in central Asia in the absence of a 
specific treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan over the issue of nationality.
The Korean population in the Russian Far East before deportation was divided. The first 
All Gorydin Conference in May 1917 in the Russian Far East region ended up in fragmentation 
and disagreements due to the polemic issue of whether Koreans should support the Soviet 
regime or the Korean provisional government in Shanghai. Wealthier Koreans supported the 
Korean provisional government, whereas peasants and the poorer were on the Soviet side in 
keeping a close relationship with the league of nationwide proletariats. In October 1917, most 
Koreans supported the October Revolution, which they viewed as the preliminary condition for 
the independence of the Korean motherland. The direct reason why Koreans in Soviet territory 
at that time were so active in supporting the Soviet government is for the similar reason with 
Josdnjok. The issue of farmland was the most crucial incentive for Korei'tsy peasants. For 
Koreans who had been working as no better than slaves under the harsh exploitation of 
landlords, obtaining land was the most crucial issue.41 It was later in the 1930s when the 
Korei'tsy had begun to be excluded from renting land and other industrial activities, and they 
were finally deported to barren land in central Asia by 1937. Korei'tsy history of incorporation 
into central Asia is the history of building and managing kolkozes, which is the main theme of 
Chapter 5.
By the time they were resettled, the Korei'tsy had barely restored their stable lives, while 
after deportation their conditional Russian citizenship was nullified. Migration to outside 
Kazakh regions was restricted. The Korei'tsy were left as a people with no nationality. Needless 
to say, they were excluded from various duties and rights including military conscription and 
proper institutional educations in cities. For a diasporised population, exclusion from military 
conscription results in exclusion from immediate benefits for survival. In the meantime, the 
deprivation of an opportunity for education was a blow to the future of the next generation. ‘The 
right to education is a genuine social right of citizenship, because the aim of education during
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childhood is to shape the future adult’.42 It is crucial issue considering Koreans’ particular 
enthusiam for education. According to Em (1991), the average educational level for Korei'tsy is 
higher than that for other minority national groups. According to the data released in 1989, 
among Korei'tsy in Uzbekistan, about 22.4 per cent completed high school compared with about 
10 per cent of Uzbeks. The author believes that Koreans’ enthusiasm for education created the 
basis for an intellectual society in the former Soviet Union. According to data in 1989, 42.7 per 
cent of Uzbek Koreans, 36,900 out of 86,400, are reported as white collar workers. In this 
regard, for the younger generation of Soviet Koreans, restriction of movement out of central 
Asia was perceived as the most fatal discrimination, especially for those who were eager to 
pursue a better educational opportunity in larger and more modernised cities.
Older generation Korei'tsy take exclusion from military conscription during the Second 
World War as the most regrettable historical memory after deportation. ‘Koreans were fully 
motivated with strong patriotism and ready to participate in the fight against fascism’ (Um, in 
Schulze: 1996,42). As the Korei’tsy were stigmatised as distrustful minority national group, only 
a few managed to fight. Most Korei'tsy were eager to contribute patriotic victory funds and other 
donations, which had been often used as Korei'tsy justification for their further inclusion as 
Soviet citizens. Korei’tsy who had been involved in the Communist Youth League in 
Vladivostok in 1922 were extirpated, being accused as anti-revolutionary local nationalists 
before and after relocation. Korei'tsy collective sentiment of exclusion from military 
conscription has been remembered as traumatic, as it is seen from most of Korei'tsy writings.
Stalin defined Korei'tsy as a distrustful group. But Korei'tsy sincerely wished to 
participate in the war to make substantial contributions to Soviet state building. 
Exclusion from participating in a patriotic war was regarded as such an indignity 
for us. Nevertheless, no Korei’tsy have complained ... Some Korei'tsy even 
disguised their names to Kazakh or Kirgiz in order to go into the army. [The 
regulations were less strict in regions where Korei’tsy were not highly populated.]
When the Soviet country was in a difficult situation, Korei'tsy worked hard for the 
country in spite of all kinds of insulting experiences ... Korei’tsy thought that 
because they were not allowed to move freely to other regions and banned from 
political activities, success in agriculture was thought as the only legitimate way 
to act to the best of their ability and receive social recognition (Han and Han:
1999, 83-91).
Korei’tsy enthusiasm for participating in state projects was also caused by their 
apprehension of the possibility of further ethnic harassment. They had to ensure their status for 
survival. Due to the geographical isolation, Korei’tsy identity was formed more directly related 
to the people in the post-Soviet republics, including Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Kirgis, rather than the 
Russian nation. In Soviet central Asia, Uzbeks’ identification against Russians was mainly 
based on their distinctive culture as nomads and Muslims whereas Korei'tsy identity, as opposed 
to Uzbeks, was related to their sedentary and non-Islamic culture. ‘Although many Uzbeks
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eventually became sedentary, the politically active class had an interest in preserving a separate 
identity’ (Manz: 1994, 8). In the middle of such Islamic cultural environment, Korei’tsy were 
known to be highly adaptive. Kimura cites Iu. V. Ionova’s (1963) observation in the region on 
relocated Koreans in central Asia in 1937. ‘If the transportation was completed by December 
1937, many Koreans must have perished. But once they moved to central Asia ... Koreans 
found themselves well adapted to their new circumstances’ (Kimura, in Suh: 1988, 91). He 
continues, explaining Koreans’ rapid success in irrigation and agriculture under extremely poor 
conditions. Korei’tsy kolkhozes were successful ‘in bringing wasteland under cultivation in a 
short time, and in growing rice and other crops such as beans, barley and maize, as well as 
silkworm breeding’ (ibid., 92).
The fundamental spirit of collectivisation did not in fact affect negatively on Korei'tsy 
identity. The main purposes of collectivisation were, firstly, to create nationally homogeneous 
kolkhozes, not to make the volatile multinational composition worse by stimulating collective 
hatred towards different national groups. The second purpose was the disintegration of clan and 
tribal loyalty. Indigenous people in central Asia were equally oppressed by the time Korei'tsy 
were resettled. ‘[T]raditional Kazakh culture defined a man through the animals he owned, 
making private ownership of livestock almost the definition of what it was to be a Kazakh ... 
Kazakhs strongly resisted nationalization and ... sacrificed their lives and the lives of animals to 
try to prevent its introduction’ (Olcott: 1996, 248). Similarly, among Uzbeks in late 1938, ‘by 
establishing forced cotton monoculture, mass terrors and actions against collectivization were 
triggered to increase anti-Soviet sentiments’ (Simon: 1991, 161). By contrast, Korei’tsy in 
Vladivostok were already known as the most vigorously cooperative in Stalin’s policy of 
collectivisation, much more than Russians before deportation in 1920s. As Wada (1988)43 states, 
antagonism grew between the Russians, who were against Stalin’s forced collectivisation, and 
the Koreans, who are enthusiastic in implementing the policy. Great power chauvinism became 
an issue. Russian peasants resorted to violence against Korean kolkhoz members although the 
local authorities gave privileged treatment to the Russian farmers at the expense of the Koreans 
when the first collective farms were founded in Vladivostok.44
It is undeniable that the relocation project was traumatic and the process of resettlement 
was indescribably inhumane. Nevertheless, for Korei'tsy in the Soviet Far East as a sedentary 
and religiously heterogeneous national group, already holding anti-Japanese sentiments and 
socialist orientation, forced sedentarisation and collectivisation, and imposing Orthodox 
Christianity were not fatal policies so much as means of destroying collective identity. Towards 
the Korei'tsy, the Tzarist government had imposed acceptance of Russian Orthodox Christianity 
as a prerequisite for naturalisation. Acquisition of citizenship was essential to have rights to rice 
cultivation. The attempt to assimilate or exclude the Korei'tsy in this way was unsuccessful 
because their acceptance of Christian Orthodoxy was superficial. The common description in
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existing literature of Korei'tsy is a relatively quick adaptation and maintenance of their own 
culture at the same time. ‘[T]he continuing flow of Koreans and the clustering of new arrivals 
brought about the formation of Korean villages. ... This growth served to reinforce Korean 
culture and values within the Korean community’ (Chey, in Suh: ibid., 64). Korei'tsy adaptability 
was useful to provide economic labourers and as a landmark securing an unclear territorial 
boundary, but sometimes they became a national target in times of crises.
The Korei'tsy, who had completely lost their political rights, thought that hard work was 
the way to restore lost dignity, which can be understood as their way of maximising the given 
autonomy. It is recorded that by the end of 1938, there were 48 Korean kolkhozes established in 
Uzbekistan and 57 in Kazakhstan. The Korei'tsy are proud to quote the records of their economic 
achievements. They emphasise the fact that between 1940 and 1945, for example, Korei'tsy 
kolkhozes like Palamaya Zbezda could increase the area of agricultural lands for rice farming 
and cotton fields ten times. Han’s (1999) book also highlights how enthusiastic Korei'tsy were in 
their contribution to the building of the socialist Soviet nation by voluntarily funding for the 
defence of the Soviet nation (72 and 89). Similarly to the other two cases, the Korei'tsy have 
aimed for legitimate inclusion in their host society with justifiable explanations on their 
collective existence. As for a non-titular small minority national group, the Korei'tsy had perhaps 
no alternative to being cooperative with every national project of their host state, but their 
pattern of response to the host state’s policy was not quite identical with all the other non-titular 
minority national groups under the same regime.
From Soviet Korei’tsy to Uzbek Korei'tsy
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, newly independent Soviet republics in central 
Asia have implemented their own nationalistic policies. Such policies impose another official 
nationality through language policy, education and religion. In central Asia under the Soviet 
regime, especially, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, assimilation was implemented broadly in two 
ways related to religion and land ownership: sedentarisation of nomads and religious 
assimilation. The basic framework of Soviet policy in relation to central Asia goes back to the 
era of imperial Russia. As Olcott (1996) explains, from their experience of the 1830s and 1840, 
Russians saw that ‘nomads were difficult to rule’, therefore, ‘the short-term risks of encouraging 
the development of agriculture among the Kazakhs would be worth the long-term gains that 
pacification of the steppe would provide’ (84). According to Gleason’s (1997) description, 
Uzbeks took the most arable lands in the central Asian region. Uzbeks ‘captured the most 
agriculturally productive watersheds and the associated irrigated agricultural areas of the 
Chirchik River ... the Zerafshan River ... and the Surkhan-Doria’ (337). This may also explain 
one of the reasons for the economic success of Korei'tsy farmers in Uzbekistan.
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As for the minority national group in the newly independent states, Korei’tsy problems 
have been twofold: destabilised national identity due to the sudden political changes and a loss 
of an agricultural foundation caused by the introduction of market economy to the CIS in 
general. These two major problems are closely interconnected in the sense that rapid totalitarian 
reforms in Uzbekistan have influenced overall changes in society not unique in terms of 
economic system but in terms of national culture and political environment. In spite of the 
multinational composition, the Uzbek government has followed the classic way of promulgating 
strong nationhood as a major political slogan inevitably linked with Islamism. The phenomenon 
is rightly expressed in Abduvakhitov’s phrase as ‘an ongoing awareness of nationalism in the 
transitional development of independent Uzbekistan’ (Abduvakhitov, in Bourdeaux: 1995, 302).
In spite of the independence of the Uzbek Republic, the Korei'tsy prefer to learn the 
Korean language to Uzbek, or remain comfortable with the use of the Russian language. 
Korei'tsy identify themselves neither with Russians nor Uzbeks in terms of nationality, although 
they are at times inclined to express their pride of more or less sharing a Russian cultural 
heritage, speaking the language and understanding the rich history and literature. As the revival 
of ethnic nationalism remains a potential political agenda in Uzbekistan, the Korei’tsy have faced 
a new crossroads choosing their collective fate once again. As G. Smith (1999) rightly describes, 
Uzbeks are in the process of a ‘post-colonial search for national redefinition and symbol- 
building’ through three factors, ‘citizenship, Islam and form of governance’. Opting for 
citizenship develops along with ‘elevating particular epochs or past heroes’ as the process of 
building nationhood. As he holds, Uzbek ‘symbol builders look back to the supposed halcyon 
age of the fourteenth-century ruler Tamerlane’.45 My interview with a South Korean social 
worker with about seven years’ experience in Tashkent explains the situation:
At the moment, the Russian language is allowed to be used together with the 
Uzbek language, yet government policy is to impose exclusive usage of the 
Uzbek language by 2006. Already crucial public positions have been taken over 
by Uzbek speakers, who are mostly Uzbeks, and recently more and more official 
documents are written in the Uzbek language, which causes serious difficulties 
and inconvenience for non-Uzbek national groups. Yet, Korei'tsy do not seem to 
be aware of the serious situation and that their status is at stake. They are not 
sufficiently motivated or prepared to get into the newly establishing Uzbek 
society. They have somehow looked down on Uzbeks and have the tendency to 
identify themselves with Russians especially in terms of cultural heritage. Except 
a few Korei'tsy who were prepared, most Korei'tsy in public sectors along with 
other nationalities have been replaced by Uzbeks.
Under the totalitarian political culture at present, Uzbek Korei’tsy hardly express their 
personal experiences of racial discrimination on a public level. Like Russians in Tashkent, 
Korei'tsy engaged in the public sector have been slowly replaced by Uzbeks. This is especially 
the case for government officials, professors and journalists. Yoon (2000) also notes emerging
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concerns about the current situation of the Korei'tsy. ‘[M]any Korean teachers, government 
employees, and other white-collar workers in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are in danger of losing 
their jobs’ because of the new language policy. They are ‘now under severe pressure to decide 
new courses of adaptation’ (45). Such necessary adaptation, however, is not particularly a 
Korei’tsy burden but also the problem of other non-Uzbek national and ethnic groups including 
Russians. This change is not an isolated example from the rest of the former Soviet central 
Asian republics. In Uzbekistan, such tendency of national exclusion is based on the Uzbek 
language and ancestral roots rather than the Islam religion at present. However, as the passage 
below insinuates, the possibility of religious exclusion in the future is not unpredictable.
By the constitutional law, the strict division between religion and politics is 
secured and, among Uzbeks and Kazakhs, Islam is penetrated only in the form of 
customs, traditions and value system like Confucius customs in Asian countries, 
and yet the possibility of consolidation of Islam as a religion should not be 
overlooked. Uzbeks are situated under influence of Islam fundamentalists in the 
neighbouring central Asian countries and the change of power shift within the 
government is also the crucial variable although present regime is occupied by 
the moderates.46
King (1998) rightly holds that ‘newly independent states have been engaged in the 
tortuous process of defining their own sense of nationhood and staking out unique proprietary 
claims to territories that are home to a manifestly heterogeneous population’ (King, in King and 
Melvin, 5). As the result of such newly instigated Kazakh and Uzbek Islamic nationalism and 
economic and educational achievements, as in the Josdnjok case, a considerable number of 
Korei'tsy in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have migrated to other larger cities within the former 
Soviet territory. While there used be numerous collective farms where Korei'tsy took high 
positions, for example by 1993 in Kazakhstan, there is only one collective farm left where 
Korei’tsy hold important positions.
In addition to their sudden Uzbek citizenship, their renewed communication with the 
South Korean motherland provides another source of confusion. Since the early 1990s, the 
North Korean embassy has retreated. Instead, the South Korean embassy has taken a primary 
position in the Uzbek Korei’tsy community. Along with the North Korean embassy, all other 
North Korean affiliated Korei'tsy organisations have downsized or disappeared. Some Uzbek 
Korei'tsy show great concern over the future of Korei'tsy communities in central Asia. As 
mentioned, their contributions to agricultural development in the central Asian region were the 
major components of the Korei'tsy identity during the Soviet era. Uzbek Korei'tsys’ emerging 
insecurity is caused by their awareness of the fact that they, from now on, need other collective 
stories to ensure legitimacy of their existence vis-^-vis the Uzbek nation. It will be the time for 
them to rewrite Korei'tsy history, highlighting their economic cooperation with the Uzbek nation
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and their oppressive experience during Stalin’s era rather than enthusiastic participation in 
various Soviet state’s projects.
The Korei'tsy have just reached the stage where a diaspora continuously produces the 
stories of their own community with a will to preserve their shared pasts. This is stimulated by 
series of political changes, the destruction of the Soviet Union, the emergence of Uzbek 
nationalism, sudden influence from South Korea and globalisation. As Steven Lee (2002) 
mentions in explaining the emptiness of Korei'tsy identity, which he considers as a consequence 
of Soviet policy, reflected in Soviet Korean literature. He rightly contours the invisibility of 
post-Soviet Korei’tsy. ‘All that the Koreans gained during the Soviet Union was a hollow ethnic 
category; on all of their documents, they were registered as Koreans, but beyond this 
distribution, as well as a few stereotypes about them, they were highly assimilated, with 
Moscow regarding them as a model minority of sorts’ (3). In contrary to his observation, 
however, I view that the Korei'tsy have just begun to express their collective identity in a more 
organised manner.
Collective memories o f deportation
It is not entirely safe to judge that the Korei'tsy identity has disappeared or is in the middle of 
assimilation. It is also true that the population has been highly dispersed and the degree of ethnic 
maintenance, including language skills and other Korean tradition, is very low. Compared with 
Zainichi or Josonjok, the older generations of Korei’tsy have left so little of visible collectivity of 
their own. Nevertheless, their collective memories are just beginning to be expressed in various 
public forms. Among educated second generation Korei'tsy, the issues related to national identity 
have emerged as important subjects for public discussion, and consequently the meaning of 
being a Korei'tsy has been frequently questioned. The text below is one of such examples:
At dawn when I’m alone, I sometimes try to bring myself to the long past. The 
very strange history at that time made us live an entirely new life and afterwards 
the the group of people has been called Gorydsaram [Korei’tsy]. Most of us have 
long forgotten how and why our ancestors settled in this foreign soil. But in the 
deepness of our minds, the compelling question has always remained unanswered 
... ‘Who are we on earth?’ ‘Where are we from?’ (Han and Han: 1999,13).
A Korei'ski author, Em, the dean of the University of Tashkent, has written, in his 
autobiographical article, his memory of the situation around the time of deportation:
In 1937, our fate changed all of a sudden, having managed to settle down in the 
Far East after having undergone various obstacles. I was six but I remember 
clearly what happened. Sometime in July, two Soviet officials dropped by our 
house and informed us that we were supposed to move to some other region in a
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months time without any explanation when and why. ... One month later, a truck 
reached our house to pick up our family. ... My great grand father, Em Shin-en 
who was bom in Y6ngw61, Kangwon-do, was 82 years old at that time and 
desperately wished to remain where we used to live in the Far East region hoping 
to return home and be buried in his hometown. He passed away three months 
later and was buried somewhere in Kazakhstan. ... Most people didn’t even 
arrive in central Asia safely and died in the middle of the relocation. My mother,
Nam Sun-hee, at the age of 27, burnt to death in the overcrowded train by falling 
down into the heater due to severe shaking of the train. My two sisters died 
within a year of our arrival in central Asia. Only I survived after all (Em: 1991,
40-1).
As the author adds, this kind of story is very common among Korei'tsy families although 
the detailed situation of that day and sentiments are varied. Gelb’s description cited from Kim 
also helps further understanding of the situation:
The Koreans were ... crammed into overcrowded, underheated, broken down, 
filthy freight cars that transported them across the entire continent of Asia. At 
least one train derailed (near Khabarovsk), killing over a hundred. Those being 
transported did not even learn their destination until well under way. The victims 
spent approximately one month in freight cars (not including the difficult journey 
from railhead to settlement) supplied with only one stove for every forty settlers.
... Some died before reaching their new homes, and obscure way-stations of the 
Trans-Siberian remained the only markers of their graves. We have no statistics, 
but epidemics alone certainly carried off thousands during or shortly after the 
trip.
Regarding the detailed political background and process of the Korei'tsy relocation 
project, it was not until 1997 when the Russian government revoked state secrets that official 
documents listing 60,000 out of 170,000 Korei'tsy deported was obtained by some Korei'tsy 
historians. The document contains basic personal backgrounds of the deportees. In the year 
2000, the list of 1,000 out of supposedly 2,500 to 3,000 executed Koreiski was obtained by 
Gorydin organisations, the Sam-il Culture Institute and Gory&in Association.481 discovered that 
personal, familial, collective, or national, no matter what level they may be, regrets and wrath 
have grown among older generation Korei'tsy, in particular, first and second generation. Some 
older generations of Korei'tsy even refuse any kind of interviews for fear of being reminded of 
such a horrible experience. Some have kept writing on their experiences no matter whether such 
work can be published or not. Certainly, in the future, their writings will represent diaspora’s 
collective history marking a diapora’s boundary as opposed to the Russian and the Uzbek 
nations as well as the Korean nation.
It has been over 60 years since the Korei'tsy were moved to central Asia. Consequently, 
the first relocated generation has mostly died, and the age of the small number of the first 
generation survivors, about 5,000 to 6,000, is mostly over 70.49 Deportation occurred several 
decades ago, but the expression of collective memory of relocation and oppression developed
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rather recently. Writing on collective memories and historical events has been the part of 
national revival among Korei'tsy. On the brink of the disappearance of Korei’tsy collective pasts, 
more and more Korei’tsy with various backgrounds have now begun to produce written forms of 
communication which gradually ensure their distinctive identity.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explained Korean diasporas’ collective identity formed in relation to their 
host nations. I focused on the notion of exclusivity of citizenship in each host state and its 
consequences with regard to the formation of a diaspora’s identity. This focus was previewed in 
the second factor of my analytical framework in Chapter 2. The historical events and nature of 
the events making collective identity salient are varied depending on the case. Yet, the process 
of moulding a diaspora’s collective identity in the three cases commonly demonstrates that the 
evolution of diaspora’s national identity is hardly identical with that of their host nation. This 
may be explained as the first stage of forming a third type of national identity. So far, my 
explanations have been limited into the structure of the diaspora-host nation framework. One of 
the features of a diaspora’s national identity under the structure can be analysed as the desire for 
inclusion whilst retaining distinctiveness. Their identity is collectively salient whenever it is 
necessary to ensure both the citizenship of the host state and recognition of their own historical 
and cultural distinctiveness. Maintaining their identity within a group is insufficient to form a 
stable diaspora identity when their identity is misrecognised by outsiders, especially by the host 
nation. In this regard, issues of diaspora groups and their identity may not be solely the problem 
of a diaspora. They are inevitably political. Minority national groups have their intrinsic desire 
resisting the force of assimilation. Only the aspects and degrees of such desire are dissimilar. 
Josonjok perceive themselves as a successful group on two grounds: because they have 
successfully preserved their own identity so far and at the same time, their historical 
contributions are well recognised by the host government. It is also noticeable that they have 
begun to perceive themselves as a minority group at stake due to the force of the host state’s 
assimilation. In contrast, the Zainichi’s strong collective identity has been more clearly 
expressive. This is because negotiation over their historical existence vis-&-vis the Japanese 
nation has not yet concluded. Vis-k-vis the host nation, the Zainichi have cultural and political 
pressure on their non-existence. Such pressure has nurtured constant Zainichi awareness of 
being different from and antagonistic to the Japanese nation. Korei'tsy also have kept their 
collective identity. The imperative components of Korei'tsy identity are their shared historical 
memory and the pride of successful survival as a group. As demonstrated, the collective will of 
a diaspora community is not enough for it to be accepted as a political member of their host 
nation with a stable collective identity. By stable collective identity I mean a positive sense of
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belonging to their host nation as a distinctive group accompanied by a voluntary awareness of 
obligations as citizens to their host state. Nevertheless, such an identity will be developed only 
when rights to citizens are given by their host states.
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5 Boundary for Diaspora Identity
Collectivities of diasporas
Maintaining the boundaries of a collective identity
This chapter explains how the diaspora’s national identity evolves in relation to minority 
organisations. Functions of diaspora organisations and their relations with host nations have 
driven diasporas to form a diaspora identity. Diasporas’ way of maintaining identity is reflected 
in their efforts to maintain their kinds of collective features. The main focus of this chapter is the 
causal relationship between minority organisations and the formation of a diaspora identity, but 
such relationship has been continuously shaped in the context of host state’s influence. By 
analysing the interactions between organisations and diaspora groups, I explain the common 
dilemma faced by diasporas. The dilemma is fundamentally caused by the incompatibility of 
exclusive organisations with full inclusion. Well established exclusive minority institutions and 
organisations may result in a diaspora community’s isolation and segregation. And yet, the 
opposite may accelerate assimilation and dispersal.
As a generation passes and people become mobile, diaspora identity is more and more 
understood as one of the numerous identities that one can control and choose under 
circumstances rather than something that is passively forged and statistically structured. 
Questions and comparisons of different diasporas come from such various kinds and degrees of 
collectivities. It is questionable why some diasporas have formed a more legitimately political 
form of community, such as a republic or autonomous prefecture, whereas others have not. For 
this reason, I argue that, with the host state policy towards the diaspora community alone, one 
cannot sufficiently explain the way in which a diaspora’s national identity is moulded. Features 
of a diaspora’s national identity are reflected on the selected minority organisations and 
institutions. Simultaneously, such organisations and institutions play a vital role in shaping and 
reshaping diaspora identity.
Soysal (1994)1, for example, analyses the types of minority organisations as depending 
mainly on the host state factor. ‘[T]he organizing principles and incorporation styles of the host 
polity are crucial variables in accounting for the emerging organizational patterns of migrants’ 
(85-6). I agree with her view that host states shape the migrants’ organisations ‘by providing (or 
not) certain resources for and models of organizing’ (86). A host state’s involvement in 
institutionalising a minority’s identity varies according to a host society’s resources. ‘Some host 
policies afford explicit channels for the participation and organization of migrant populations’ 
(ibid.). Her analysis, however, implies that the pattern of institutionalising immigrants’ 
collective identity is somehow passively defined by the attitudes and policies of host societies.
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Her view implies that migrant’s organisations in response to host society’s policy ‘define their 
goals, strategies, functions, and level of operation in relation to the existing policies and 
resources of the host state’. Thus, ‘the expression and organization of migrant collective identity 
are framed by the institutionalized forms of the state’s incorporation regime’ (ibid.). There are 
different kinds of immigrants. The relationship between a dominant national group and a 
minority national group is mutual. Soysal’s comparative analysis of minority organisations, in 
this respect, underestimates particularities of certain minority national groups. By focusing 
equally on the latter aspect, one understands the diverse patterns of institutionalising collective 
identity among various national minority groups under the same host state. I add further 
observations on the consequences of interplay between host states and minority national 
communities. It sheds light upon a minority national group’s particular way of incorporation as a 
positive actor of community making.
Diasporas’ perception of who they (diaspora themselves) are is expressed in the origins, 
major roles, activities, and final goals of minority organisations and institutions. As 
interpretation of self as a member of a nation could mean not only those within the collectivity 
but also beyond the collectivity, the principle rule of voluntary membership of minority 
organisations also outlines a diaspora community. A community is dynamic, thus organisations 
of a community also change. Organisations are behavioural settings for human interaction and, 
at the same time, systems of institutionalised incentives governing individual behaviour and 
socio-cultural contexts in which individuals engage in symbolic interaction.2 Organisations and 
individual members continually interact.
Collectivity of Korean diasporas
Diasporas’ responses to the host state in general have been ‘conditioned by the available 
political opportunities, political resources and survival strategies’ (G. Smith: 1999, 96). Korean 
diasporas do not have a tendency to exploit their cultural dispositions as a political tool to 
maximise their collective interests. Instead, Korean diasporas have internalised national tensions 
in an adaptive way. Their internal struggle has long been concealed; Hicks (1997) defines 
Zainichi as ‘hidden apartheid’. To be accepted as a citizen in host societies, other national 
features are at times regarded as obstacles. More often than not, national identity as minority3 is 
viewed as something that should be overcome for the sake of unity and the security of the host 
state.
By boundaries for diaspora identity, I mean certain visible collective forms originated in 
host societies and primarily concerning the matters related to Korean diasporas and while are 
more or less exclusive. Minority institutions and organisations reflect the Korean diasporas’ 
efforts to maintain their own identity and compromise for material survival. It is questionable
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why, under similar circumstances and financial situation, the Tibetans in China, for instance, 
would build temples, people in Xinjiang allow a greater budget for weapons and Josdnjok 
nationalists put their energy into setting up a university. In the same way, why have the 
Burakumin been living in isolated areas whereas the Zainichi have made much more public fuss 
and built up large politically-oriented minority organisations? Why and how could Korean 
kolkhozes in post-Soviet central Asia manage to grow rice and make a good living whereas 
Uzbek or Kazakh locals had to grow cotton which is not as profitable as rice?
A collective identity is difficult to analyse when a group lacks active expression through 
collective actions such as nationalist movements. A collective identity crystallises a social 
identity, both individual and group identity, into the form of an action. Brewer’s (2001) 
distinction between social identities and collective identities is noteworthy in understanding 
national identity as one of the numerous collective identities. Collective identity is linked to 
social movements. Like group-based social identities, collective identity involves shared 
representations of the group that are based on common interests and experiences, but it also 
refers to an active process of shaping and forging an image of what the group stands for and 
how it wishes to be viewed by others. In this regard, ‘collective identities represent an 
achievement of collective efforts, above and beyond what category members have in common to 
begin with’. The concept of collective identity provides ‘a crucial link between social identity, at 
both individual and group levels, and collective action in the political arena’.4 Nevertheless, 
unless one clarifies what is meant by an active process of shaping and forging an image of a 
group, the distinction between social identity and collective identity is not convincing. There are 
numerous ways of being active in shaping an image of a group without developing social 
identity into a collective action. As a result, it does not seem feasible to distinguish social 
identity from a collective or political identity when the borderline between social identity and 
collective identity is drawn within the same group. National identity is a group-based social 
identity that can be transformed into collective action followed by some kind of movements but 
national identity can also remain a social identity which is, however, not static in itself.
It is not always clear, what we mean by being active. It would not be so safe to conclude 
that, because there have not been any serious politically-oriented conflicts or separatist 
movements that diaspora groups are passive in achieving collective ends or lack of collectivity 
in the end. For some diasporas, active interpretation of national cultures through non-conflict 
and the decision to remain seemingly passive cooperators are in fact a rationally chosen way of 
struggling for identity. Minority national organisations, namely Y6nby6n University,5 Korean 
kolkhozes and the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chorydn) and the 
Association of Koreans in Japan (Mindan) are voluntarily drawn and accumulated collectivities 
securing a diaspora’s identity, which is neither necessarily a Korean identity nor a Chinese, 
Japanese or Uzbek identity. There is no organisation without a collection of individuals and yet
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‘organizations are not merely collections of individuals’ as one can see ‘some collections of 
people constitute organizations and others do not’ (Argyris and Schon: ibid., 8). The various 
forms of diaspora organisations suggest the persistent pattern of diasporas’ search for a 
collective identity.
Making diasporic space: collective responses in the political context
In China, one can hardly expect minority political organisations such as Chorybn and Mindan, 
although the Josdnjok and the Korei'tsy not only had greater political influence from their 
motherland but were also deeply involved in political affairs. In Japan, such a large scale 
officially recognised university exclusively for a minority national group, such as Y6nby6n 
University, would have been most unlikely to be developed. In the same vein, the means of 
securing a collective identity among other national minorities in China were not quite the same 
as with the choice of the Josdnjok. Similarly, other national minorities or indigenous people in 
Japan, such as Ainu, and South East Asian immigrants have not taken similar paths to preserve 
their identity as the Zainichi community has done.
In the case of Japan, politically-oriented minority organisations were allowed to be 
active because Japan is regarded as a politically liberal state. Nonetheless, flourishing minority 
organisations do not necessarily mean that mainstream political society is open to minority 
nationalities. Zainichi organisations in Japan have been seen as a convenient arrangement of 
political segregation. Since Japan is one of the countries that conflate culture and politics, as I 
have discussed in Chapter 4, such political segregation is obvious. Being officially liberal 
towards the political actions of minorities within a legal boundary in this sense does not 
automatically imply inclusion of minorities into the mainstream political field. Japanese policies 
towards minority ethnic or national groups have consistently promoted segregation except in the 
colonial period when Japan attempted the complete assimilation of other national minorities by 
force, in particular the Taiwanese and Koreans. The idea behind assimilation is rested on the 
ideology of ‘one nation-one state’.
The former Soviet Union unintentionally provided a breathing space to the Korei'tsy 
through collectivisation. Throughout their history of immigration the Korei'tsy had been 
perceived as an economic means. Although there were beneficial aspects for Korei'tsy farmers, 
the Soviet policy toward them -dispersal, oppression and isolation- has left negative memories 
for the Korei'tsy. Their relative economic success within the given space does not mean that 
Soviet policy offered economic autonomy to minority national groups. Rather, particular skills 
of minority national groups have been rationally used. In the end, the Korei'tsy became known as 
a relatively well-off minority national group in central Asia.
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In the case o f China, it is true that a great deal o f autonomy is given to minority national 
groups. I view the Chinese case as positive discrimination at the cultural and social levels, 
especially regarding China’s differentiated policies regarding minority education, birth control, 
local languages and minority groups’ customs and lifestyles. It is also true that due to the 
geographical character o f China, such social and cultural autonomy as is allowed to minority 
national groups has been the crucial factor, hampering full inclusion o f minorities in 
mainstream societies. As a consequence, many minority national communities have remained in 
isolation in the remote borders of Chinese territory with a few exceptions of certain minority 
groups who voluntarily assimilated into Han-Chinese, including the Manchus for example. 
Isolation is different from intentional exclusion. Active and positive discrimination has resulted 
in isolation. Assimilation policy could be a positive attempt at full inclusion and not necessarily 
discrimination against different nationalities. Rather, assimilation can be seen as (negative) 
indiscrimination to people who should be seen and treated differently in some aspects of their 
lives as I discussed in Chapter 2.
The following sections explain why the opted minority organisations or institutions in 
each case are the expression o f a diaspora’s national identity and in what way the particular 
organisations and institution reflect the commonality as the common denominator of the 
comparison o f Korean diasporas. Table 5.1 below shows the certain affinity between Korean 
diasporas’ nationality and the forms of collectivity reflected in minority organisations and 
institutions.
Table 5.1 Comparisons of the interactions between diaspora and host state
Comparisons of the interactions of diaspora-host state relations
China Self-governing Isolation Identical Cultural boundary Yanhian University
Japan Segregation Disguised pattern Political segregation GA K P-G K J
assimilation of diaspora's
ExS.U. Economic Dispersal response Economic Kolkhozes
Uzbe- exploitation autonomy
kistan
In the later period, after the 1980s, however, the above described tendency has gradually 
turned towards less emphasis on collectivity than before in the cases o f the Josdnjok and the 
Zainichi. Such change is the response to apprehension of being isolated and left aside in the 
remote region in the Josonjok case. In the Zainichi case, on the other hand, such change was 
motivated by reformist movements against negative functions and structural problems of 
existing organisations. On the contrary, the Korei'tsy community has gradually moved towards 
the search for a more visible collectivity.
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Maximising autonomy
Nationalist activists, Josdnjok autonomous government and Ydnbydn University
It may be considered as an obvious outcome for the Josdnjok to have a large-scale national 
university considering that China allows cultural autonomy to minority national groups. 
Although there is flexibility in the Chinese policy towards different minority national groups, 
cultural autonomy is the main principle of China’s policy towards minority national groups. The 
Ydnbydn Josdnjok University has been the centre of reproducing Josdnjok identity. However, it 
has generated the fear of isolation from the mainstream society by helping the Josdnjok 
community to be highly self-sufficient. Ydnbydn University has provided such a mechanism of 
preserving and reproducing the Josdnjok identity. As the Josdnjok society is rapidly changing, 
the university itself has been reshuffled in many ways including the proportion of Josdnjok 
students, values of national education and government funding.
In a way, Ydnbydn University was an outcome of Josdnjok’s compromise with Chinese 
government. The most crucial elements what comprise Josdnjok identity are their pride in 
educational achievements and the maintenance of their national culture, especially language. 
This is closely related to the policy of cultural autonomy given by the Chinese government as 
enumerated in Article 119 of the Constitution. Compared with the Josdnjok community in other 
cases or with other national minority groups in China, the amount of Josdnjok intellectuals’ 
written work including academic writings and literature demonstrates the Josdnjoks’ emphasis 
on educational and cultural development.
Article 119, Section 4 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China
The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas independently administer 
educational, scientific, cultural, public health and physical culture affairs in their respective areas, 
protect and sift through the cultural heritage of the nationalities and work for a vigorous 
development of their cultures._______________________________________________________
One of the important sources for the Josdnjok loyalty towards China is based on 
appreciation of being allowed to keep their own customs and develop cultures in their own way. 
The Josdnjok believe it was only possible for them to preserve their language and customs 
because the present Josdnjok region was incorporated into China. A Josdnjok writer, Hyun 
Lyong Soon (1994), for example, mentions: ‘The attempt to found a Josdn college of education 
was cancelled in the Soviet Union and the Josdn University in Tokyo is not an officially 
recognised educational institution. Only Josdnjok in China could develop a national university 
with government support. This is the obvious result of the superiority of China’s policy towards 
national minorities’ (496). Similarly, a Josdnjok professor from the department of language in
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Y6nby6n University paid great respect to the Chinese government. His comparison is with the 
period of Japanese occupation during which the Korean language was strictly banned and 
Korean schools were forcibly shut.6 As the most recent statistics, provided by the local 
government, in 1998, show the total number of registered students in Ydnbydn University is 
8,461, with as many as 1,503 teaching staff.7
Josdnjok enthusiasm for the university stems mainly from two historical reasons. Firstly, 
early Korean nationalist activists who have been respected by local people, such as Chu Duk 
Hae, Im Min Ho, Park Kyu Chan, Bae Keuk, Lim Yu Hoon, Park Yui Hoon, Kim Moon Bo and 
Jeong Hak, were the founders of the institution. Secondly, as I mentioned earlier, people 
remember the historical memory of the Cultural Revolution during which all local national 
minority schools had to be closed. Since the university has a symbolic implication of national 
survival for ordinary Josdnjok people, the closure of the university directly meant suppression of 
the Josdnjok. During this period, Im Min Ho was beaten to death and Chu Duk Hae could not 
recover from illness caused by severe torture. These are only a few of the numerous cases.
Although it was understood that such an experience was not only that of the Josdnjok, 
they considered that the Josdnjok were more severely oppressed, being regarded as one of the 
enemies of the revolutionaries not only due to the higher ratio of intellectuals but also due to the 
geopolitical situation. Chun Shin Chul (1999) recalls that due to the particular situation of the 
Josdnjok, the Josdnjok were more oppressed. During the Cultural Revolution, many Josdnjok 
were sentenced to death, being erroneously accused as foreign spies especially during so called 
class arrangement; as many as 175 Josdnjok cadres, local officials, and policemen were accused 
as foreign special spies. The number amounted to 70 per cent of the total Josdnjok who were 
engaged in the public sector on various levels. During this period, minority national education, 
language, customs were severely oppressed. It was this period when Josdnjok schools gradually 
became mixed with the Han Chinese.8
Ydnbydn University was founded in 1949 in Yanji city before the communist 
revolution. In Ryongjdng city, meanwhile, the first college of agriculture, S’aebydk Nongmin 
University, was established in 1958. In the meeting for national affairs at the province level, 
Jilin, in 1949, Chu Duk Hae, one of the major founders, insisted on the implementation of a 
national autonomous governing system in Yanbian where the Josdnjok population was 
concentrated. There were harsh disagreements among Josdnjok leaders. Some, such as Im Min 
Ho, insisted on the establishing of a federal form of an independent republic of Josdnjok and 
others such as Im Choon Ho persisted on the incorporation of Yanbian into Korea. Chu argued 
that it had been over 100 years since the Josdnjok settled in China and while having cultivated 
the barren lands and fought against Japanese colonisation together with the Han Chinese, 
Josdnjok had become a minority national group in China already. National autonomous 
governing under the Chinese party was the only way a Josdnjok society could flourish. Other
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suggestions, he thought, were not reasonable considering the political trends and reality of China 
at that time.9 Chu believed that achieving such an arrangement as a minority national’s 
autonomous region was the best way to enjoy political equality and achieve economic 
development while securing some room for preserving national culture. He believed that the 
best model for a multinational society is gradually diminishing the differences between various 
national groups after providing sufficient time and opportunities to develop differences among 
nationalities rather than merely oppressing and assimilating minority ethnic or national groups.
Finally, Chu Duk Hae’s idea was officially supported by China’s government. As soon 
as his idea was agreed, Chu turned his efforts to founding a Josdnjok university by urging 
nationalist-minded Josdnjok leaders to participate in the educational project. Young, educated 
Josdnjok who had left the region during Japanese colonisation for inner China or Japan for the 
purposes of further study or participating in the independence movement, came back to Yanbian 
to contribute to developing their hometown. They came to devote themselves to the building of 
the Josdnjok University when, immediately after emancipation of Korea from Japan, they did 
not have a concrete idea of how to use their nationalistic spirit.10 Ultimately, Chu’s compromise 
with the Chinese government was to secure further autonomy through agreement to the 
establishment of the Yanbian autonomous government. It is not too difficult to believe that 
China would not have supported the extremists’ proposal of incorporating the region into North 
Korea. Local government concerns the welfare of region whereas Ydnbydn University concerns 
the Josdnjok collectivity and identity.
The history of the university reflects the changes in Josdnjok society. During the earlier 
period, after its foundation in the 1950s until the mid-1960s, the university used to maintain 
nationalist spirit to a deeper degree than later as the period came immediately after the 
decolonisation of their motherland and the Chinese government supported and encouraged such 
an anticolonial nationalist spirit. From the mid-1960s until the late 1970s, however, the 
Ydnbydn University was severely targeted as an anti revolutionary institute. Ever since, the 
university has become more and more symbolic, as much Korean nationality among the 
Josdnjok becomes symbolic. Josdnjok intellectuals express the belief that the Yanbian 
autonomous government is in name only. Official explanation is that this is because the 
autonomous government is a regional autonomous government rather than a national one. In 
relation to an interview question dealing with China’s general policy toward minority national 
groups, Josdnjok have expressed deep concerns of a warning sign sent by China to the Josdnjok 
region. ‘In subtle ways, China delays or hampers the further relationship between Josdnjok 
society and South Korea. Besides, the number of Josdnjok officials in Yanbian is obviously 
decreasing since late 1989’.
Also, ‘government policy is to incorporate other cities where Han Chinese is the 
dominant population to Yanbian with justification of broadening and developing the Josdnjok
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region. For instance, Dongwha, where the Han Chinese population is over 80 per cent, was 
included in the Yanbian Josdnjok autonomous prefecture in early 1990. Such a policy 
accelerates the decrease of the Josonjok population in this region. Autonomy is only nominal 
these days’, according to an interview with a researcher. Nonetheless, the notable point is that 
the Josdnjok believe that such changes in Chinese policy are things that they can or should 
challenge, and that they are natural from China’s point of view. This is because, as mentioned 
previously, Josdnjok are aware that they are not Chinese and that they are not living in their own 
state. In accordance with the changes in government policy, the Josdnjok positively adapt 
themselves to such changes. This Josdnjok attitude also supports my argument that their kind of 
collective identity is neither a Chinese national identity nor a Korean national identity. 
Evidently, the prototype of such an identity was a national identity as a Korean but their identity 
has always been heavily influenced by Chinese society. For this reason, it can be said that the 
Josdnjok have developed their own kind of national identity. Having opinions against host 
government policies or developing a sentiment of being excluded may not directly prove the 
presence of national identity. However, the Josdnjok case is rather particular in the sense that the 
regional boundary is nearly congruent with national one.
Most interviewees point out that Josdnjok officials in local government are voluntarily, 
and sometimes unnecessarily, obedient and excessively cooperative with the Party. ‘We don’t 
enjoy even a limited degree of autonomy because of the local Josdnjok officials’ voluntary 
obedience. A nationalist leader who can advocate Josdnjok’s interests does not exist in our 
society’, as a Josdnjok professor adds. ‘The head of the local government gives public speeches 
in the Chinese language whereas in other autonomous prefectures, their own local languages are 
used in public and official communication’, as another interviewee shows her regret. ‘The young 
generation does not perceive the local government as the centre of Josdnjok society any longer. 
It has remained merely as propaganda of the Chinese benevolent policy towards minority 
national groups’.
More and more, the educated younger generation Josdnjok prefer to have jobs in big 
cities rather than to stay in the Josdnjok region in spite of the government’s support of a 
minority educational institute which supposedly encourages minority national groups autonomy. 
Under the strict communist planned economic policy, minority national groups were encouraged 
to go to local educational institutions. Afterwards, they were appointed in work units of their 
own areas. The Josdnjok have rapidly taken the opportunity to work and study in big cities in 
China, South Korea, Japan and other foreign countries. One tenth of the total Josdnjok 
population had left the region for various reasons by the year 2000. The Josdnjok intellectuals’ 
claim that the decreasing number of high level Josdnjok local officials in Yanbian (Table 5.2) 
shows this trend.
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Table 5.2 The rate of Josdnjok cadres in Yanbian
Year Hanjok Josdnjok Percentage of 
Josdnjok
Percentage of 
Josdnjok in 
Yanbian
1952 550 1710 74% 62%
1965 2530 3080 58% 46%
1976 16370 25500 59.5% 41%
1985 26370 27646 51.6% 40.5%
1992 65192 58100 45% 39.5%
Source: Adapted from Kim, Jong Kuk 21s’aegiui Josdnjok (Yanbian: minjokchulpansa, 1999) 66.
As can be seen from table 5.2, the rate of Jos&njok local officials has dropped. As in the 
case of Yanbian, in 1952, the ratio is 12 per cent above the total population rate; in 1985, 10.5 
per cent above; but in 1995, only 2.5 per cent above the total percentage of population. The 
number of Han Chinese officials has steadily increased from 550 in 1952 to 65,192 in 1992 (a 
rate of 12.7 per cent), whereas in the Josdnjok case it is 9.2 per cent. This is also the case in 
local government positions in the Heilyongjiang province. The ratio of Josdnjok officials is 
steadily decreasing.11
During interview and in his book, Kim Jong Kuk (1999) rightly points out that the 
Josdnjok intellectuals’ over-representation in cultural and educational sectors is the reason for 
the decreasing number of Josdnjok officials in public sectors in Yanbian. This shows that the 
Josdnjok are exceptionally tied to their traditional heritage. Dissimilar to other ethnic or national 
minority regions in China, even after the Cultural Revolution, Josdnjok society maintains 
traditional Confucian value systems. Kim Jong Kuk views this negatively on the ground that 
such Josdnjok traditional value is one of the major reasons for Josdnjok society’s slower 
response to China’s economic and political changes. Kim’s analysis goes on as follows:
Josdnjok used to have more autonomy than now. The ratio between four major 
fields, namely, power in the Party, politics, finance, and culture and education, in 
which Josdnjok cadres participated, becomes more disproportionate. The number 
of Josdnjok cadres in the field of culture and education has gradually increased 
and now they are outnumbered. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
eastern communist bloc in 1989, China has deprived local power from politics 
and Party, thus it is impossible for minorities to enhance power in politics. 
However, such a change is not exceptional to the Josonjok’s case. To survive the 
market economy mechanism, more intellectuals should be encouraged to 
participate in the economic field rather than in culture. Educated Josdnjok still 
keep the traditional value system too strictly. Approximately seventy per cent of 
Josdnjok cadres are involved in fields which are related to culture and education, 
such as professors, teachers and researchers. Economic power in this region is 
naturally moving toward Hanjok’s hands. Among other nationalities, Josdnjok 
enthusiasm for culture and education is reflected in their vigorous publication 
activities. Today, there are twelve different Josdnjok newspapers and twenty-one 
magazines and periodicals published in the Korean language, which is above the 
average compared with other ethnic or national minority societies.
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In relation to his concerns on the weakening power of the Josdnjok, Kim mentions that 
in order to achieve the goal of training national leaders in Josdnjok society and to enhance our 
autonomy, we need to learn from other autonomous prefectures such as Xinjiang and Tibet.12 He 
positively views the way of rebellious groups’ responses to China’s policy. The only aspect in 
which minority national groups could employ their full autonomy in China is by participating in 
culture and education as this has been the safest way to survive. In the end, Korean is the 
language of culture and the arts, whereas Chinese is the language of science, politics and the 
state. The Josdnjok exceptional enthusiasm for education also supports this argument.
When speaking of Josdnjok confidence in their educational achievements, achievements 
here mean relative terms compared with the other fifty-five officially recognised nationalities in 
China. An academic article by a Josdnjok scholar demonstrates that the ratio of college 
graduates among the Josdnjok is three times higher than China’s national average and that of 
high school graduates is 3.8 times higher. Also, the rate of illiteracy is the lowest among 
minority national or ethnic groups and far lower than the overall average of China. It is 
estimated that about 82 per cent of the total population of Josdnjok are above elementary 
education compared with the China’s national average of around 70 per cent and 71 per cent of 
Han Chinese. Among the population aged above 15 years old, the illiteracy rate of Josdnjok is 7 
per cent, which is far lower than the China’s national average rate of 22 per cent, around 31 per 
cent of minorities and around 22 per cent of Han Chinese.13 Such educational performance 
among the Josdnjok was the case not only in Yanbian in Jilin but also in other cities such as the 
Heilyonjiang region where the ratio of multinational mixture is higher.
In this way, maintenance of the Josdnjok identity has meant preserving their language 
and history through education. Ydnbydn University was the essential centre for satisfying 
Josdnjok enthusiasm for cultural maintenance. Intellectual activities have been organised around 
Ydnbydn University. It was not only a mere reflection of Josdnjok identity. Simultaneously, it 
nurtures the Josdnjok identity in the sense that it has been a relatively independent sphere where 
the Josonjoks’ own issues and collective visions are legitimately produced through public 
discussions and publication activities. This is also true in other Josdnjok towns and counties in 
the three north-east provinces.14
Recently, however, Josdnjok intellectuals have been concerned that the community is 
becoming more and more isolated, and thus stagnating. Recent debates on the future of 
Ydnbydn University reflect this. Jeong (1997) mentions the recent prevalent scepticism about 
the advantages of preserving an exclusive national minority university in such a period of 
globalisation. However, he puts emphasis on the historical development of Ydnbydn University. 
Around the time of its foundation in April 1949, the Ydnbydn University was funded by the 
collection of a handful of rice from every Josdnjok farmer even in the midst of the political 
chaos in China (28 and 287). The foundation and development of Ydnbydn University was a
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great achievement not only for the sake of Josdnjok identity but also the overall development of 
Josdnjok society (286). Conservative thinkers, including Jeong himself, generally maintain that 
it is essential to keep the Josdnjok historical lands because the territory and population are the 
substantial markers of a distinctive group. In contrast, rather progressive young intellectuals 
tend to believe that with their special attachment to the territory, the Josdnjok only worsen their 
isolation, and the ‘Josdnjok community will provide a mere tourist attraction like aboriginal 
areas in New Zealand’.15
Ydnbydn University has produced as many as 20,000 professionals in all fields who 
now occupy leading positions in Josdnjok society and other parts of China. As Jeong emphasises 
on the meaning of protecting Ydnbydn University, preserving a national university abroad is not 
an easy task. Recent changes in China have threatened the possibility of maintaining such a 
sizable minority’s educational system. Due to the development of market economy and 
population policy, in certain Josdnjok areas, minority national educational institutions have 
faced serious crises. The direct causes are the rapid disappearance of Josdnjok towns and 
counties due to the recent migration tendency. Although some social organisations are eager to 
preserve Josdnjok education, without sufficient funding from outside, it seems infeasible to 
preserve Josdnjok’s exclusive education. Also, such changes have subsequently lowered the 
quality of education due to the shortage of textbooks along with other school devices and 
Josdnjok students’ extra burden to learn subjects in both languages, Korean and Chinese, and 
another foreign language.
Under such circumstances, it is only natural that the performance of Josdnjok students 
on state level entrance exams decreased. This situation continues to university level. In Ydnbydn 
University, Chinese books and language have gradually taken the place of Korean. This is due to 
the increasing number of Han Chinese students and academic staff. Obviously, without 
exclusive Josdnjok education, it is not feasible for Koreans abroad to preserve national features 
for future generations. As Rho Hak Hae points out, in spite of the Josdnjoks’ strong belief in the 
necessity of their own national education through Ydnbydn University, due to its geographical 
disadvantage there is always the risk of isolation. The mechanism of Josdnjok society is built 
around the university in a self-sufficient way by encouraging Josdnjok education and 
guaranteeing life-time jobs afterwards. Consequently, Josdnjok identity has been highly 
confined to the narrow circle of life which has kept them from mingling with mainstream 
society. Due to a government designation under the strict communist planned economy until 
1990, most Ydnbydn University graduates were appointed to local work units such as the local 
newspaper, broadcasting companies, the public sector and national educational institutions. 
Since 1992, however, Josdnjok university graduates have prefered to leave the region for the 
better salaries and opportunities in cities. Josdnjok public concerns and debates over the issue of
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maintaining their exclusive educational system have mirrored the gradual transformation of the 
community itself.
Language maintenance and recording history
The language policy has been viewed the most benevolent among China’s preferential cultural 
policies. Minority ethnic or national groups in China speak over 80 languages,16 of which 30 
have written forms.17 There exist a hierarchy within minority languages framed by the 
government. According to Dreyer’s (1998) study, there are five different ranks: the national 
standard, Mandarin Chinese; regional standard languages (that is, regional varieties of Mandarin 
Chinese, Yi, Mongolian, Tibetan and Uygur); primary minority languages with historical and/or 
modem prestige which include Qazaq, Korean, Manchu, Zhuang, Naxi, and non-standard 
Chinese dialects; secondary minority languages remaining low-prestige, usually unwritten 
languages, such as Evenki, Salar, Va; unrecognised languages meaning unclassified mixed 
languages which include Wutun, Aynu and Wakhi.18
The language policy reflects China’s way of considering minority ethnic and national 
groups. Yahuda (2000) sees that China’s policy has been consistently assimilationist throughout 
its history since Sun Yat-sen’s political agenda. Yahuda goes back to ancient China to argue that 
Chinese attitudes towards minorities is rested on Han Chinese chauvinism and racial nationalism 
applying a clear distinction between outsiders as uncivilised barbarians, and insiders, who 
understand and share the great Confucian civilisation. Yahuda somehow overlooks the period of 
modem Chinese nation-building during Mao and Deng. Communist China since 1949 is the 
essential historical period during which the present relationship between Han Chinese and non- 
Han Chinese was framed.19 Among China’s anthropologists, amalgamation (ronghe) as the next 
stage of accommodation rather than assimilation (tonghua) is viewed as an ideal final goal of 
relations among different ethnic and national groups. Those terms, however, are not always so 
explicit to distinguish. Assimilation involves one side’s incorporation into the other’s sphere 
and, at the same time, it requires the destruction of differences in favour of similarity. By 
contrast, amalgamation, in this context, involves more natural communications for a fairly long 
period of time and aims to form a third type of identity, which is neither of the previous forms 
by influencing one another. Accommodation implies a partial maintenance, allowing cultural 
autonomy including language, customs and religion in China’s case, and a transitory character 
prior to amalgamation. During the stage of accommodation, various cultural features co-exist 
with the dominant one but no forced assimilation is attempted unless it develops into political 
independence which is violating the other framework, the One China Policy. As much as ethnic 
pluralism in liberal states is political rhetoric, amalgamation is socialist rhetoric. It is difficult to 
deny that most states somehow share the view in efficiency of being congruency between
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political and cultural boundaries, and share the fear of secession. It seems to be less feasible for 
China’s minority ethnic or national groups to resist dissolving their identity into Han Chinese, 
not only because of high degree of centralised political power and the size of the population, but 
also because of cultural heritage and historical influence.
In the case of the Josonjok, the amalgamation rhetoric resulted in isolation from the rest 
of the world. I argue that none of the terms describing ethnic relations are unilateral and not all 
the minority national or ethnic groups in China are left in isolation. The Josonjok have been 
forming a distinctive identity but it is not necessarily what the goal of amalgamation is searching 
for on the ground that no other groups share the Josdnjok identity. For that reason, the Josdnjok 
would never identify themselves with Han Chinese, although they do not have any problem with 
identifying themselves as Chinese citizens (£K). Most Josdnjok people who I met prefer to 
make it clear, saying that ‘I’m Josdnjok in China. I’m not Chinese (4>^A) but I’m a Chinese 
citizen (43S 2 :S )’. Josdnjok are clear in distinguishing civic identity from their own collective 
identity as in the Korei'tsy case. This makes a good contrast with the Zainichi. Zainichi have the 
pressure of fitting themselves into either Japanese or Korean both in cultural and political terms. 
Minority nationality is inscribed in everyone’s identification card and passport in China.
For the Josdnjok, language stands as one of the most important components of 
collectivity. This is more so than in the other two cases. ‘The tension between maintaining at 
least symbolic attachment to its own language, and the practical employment of other languages, 
leads diaspora members to acquire unusually strong linguistic skills’ (Armstrong: 1976, 396). 
Language is widely acknowledged as a barometer by which one can judge the strength of their 
own collective identity. However, the inability of commanding the Korean language among 
diasporas does not safely lead to a conclusion that either they are losing their own identity or 
they are culturally assimilated. There are a number of fifth or sixth generations Josdnjok who 
speak the Korean language fluently but confidently say they are Chinese. In the same way, some 
others are reluctant to identify themselves as Chinese without speaking the Korean language.
It is also true, however, that diasporas’ concern regarding the general decline of 
emphasis on the Korean language reflects diaspora Koreans’ identity as being between national 
maintenance and adopting ‘high culture’, in Gellner’s (1983) concept, is reflected in their public 
debates over language usage. More and more Josdnjok children are sent to Han Chinese schools. 
‘Speaking two languages perfectly is not always feasible for ordinary people. Jonsdnjok who 
went to Jonsdnjok schools are not able to speak Chinese as fluently as those who were educated 
in Han Chinese schools. They naturally face difficulties when competing with Han Chinese 
outside this region’.20 Such resistance to and fear of cultural assimilation force are not 
necessarily caused by a state policy but by other external such as globalisation, industrialisation 
and urbanisation, which is pertinently expressed in Bilik’s (1998) observation ‘facing a double 
challenge of westernization and Sinicization’ (61), which exists not only in the case of the
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Jos6njok. Deep concerns of minority national groups in China caused by the dilemma between 
the maintenance of their own cultural identity and adopting high culture have developed in other 
minority regions as well.21
It is estimated that around 60 to 70 per cent of Jos6njok can communicate in the Korean 
language. Regardless of generation, this rate does not decrease overall because of increased 
interactions with the South Korean motherland. By nationality law, minority national groups 
have the right to use their own languages in public life including school, media, publications, 
official meetings, and courts; however, only the above mentioned five minority languages are 
included as official languages which have the right to have official government publications 
translated into them. Public debates on preserving Joson-mal, spoken Korean, and Joson-gul, 
written Korean, among Josdnjok intellectuals illustrate how much the Korean language means to 
them. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1978, usage of minority languages in national 
education has been re-stressed. Since then, however, the public discourse on language and 
education has gradually reflected the Josdnjoks’ threatening posture of losing their collective 
features concerning language, literature and exclusive education.
A letter from a reader of Heilyongjiang newspaper reflects such concerns:
It is extremely disappointing to come across the truth that six Josdnjok out of 
twenty-six in a work unit in Yanji city cannot read or even speak Korean. Since 
China and the Josdnjok region are opened to outside world, the importance of the 
Korean language ability in the Josdnjok region has been emphasised more. Even 
some Han Chinese in the Josdnjok region are interested in learning the Korean 
language ... We cannot expect a promising future from a national group which 
fails to preserve its own language ... When people from the outside value our 
strong will to keep our own language, I feel really proud.22
Recent debates among intellectuals on ways of writing the Korean language also reflect 
that the society has developed insecurity in language maintenance. ‘To adopt a South Korean 
way of writing our language, and mixing it with Chinese letters, may jeopardise our identity. 
South Koreans would never struggle with keeping their own language because they have their 
independent state. The Josdnjok case is different. Once we begin to adopt mixed usage of 
Chinese characters with the Korean language, it will be even more difficult to keep our 
language’.23 The language skill of diasporas echoes Armstrong’s observation of the transferable 
skills of diaspora people. ‘[T]he diasporas’ communication skills have been especially prized by 
dominant elites who rarely possess either the multilingual ability or the more subtle 
understanding of diverse communication patterns required to deal effectively with a multiethnic 
population’ (1976, 397). Having a language is neither particular to this case nor essential for a 
national identity. A notable fact, however, is that forming or preserving a collective identity 
shows an awareness of being a distinguishable group as opposed to other nations. In the 
Jonsdnjok case, such other nations refer to the Han Chinese and the Korean nation. The search
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for a national identity vis-k-vis the Han Chinese national identity has been constant to the 
present time among Koreans including today’s Josdnjok. Education and oppressive history have 
consolidated the Josdnjok national identity around the Hangul. Interviewee Pak’s remark also 
shows a linguistic identity: ‘As long as we have our own motherland nearby Jonsdnjok 
community, we will not be assimilated with Han Chinese so helplessly like Manchurians. A 
Manchurian classmate with whom I studied when I was an exchange student in Shanghai could 
not even read Manchurian characters ... And, I believe that assimilation happens only when the 
minority nation is spiritually inferior to the dominant nation’.24
Major Jonsdnjok literature written in their own language dealing with national identity 
well reflects their will to maintain language as an important collective feature. Popular literature 
is more than just part of the arts in a society where direct expressions of intellectuals’ social 
discontents are not welcomed. As censorship developed at the same time during such an 
oppressive period of history, writers’ ways of participating in reality through their literature adds 
subdety. ‘[Fjiction - especially those works that enjoy mass popularity over time - taps into a 
deeper, sometimes truer understanding about a subject than that allowed by the constraints of 
social science’ (Ling, in Lensu and Fritz: 2000,132). Apart from the well-known fictional works 
containing the historical background of Koreans in the Manjuguk era, such as Sdlya and 
Bukgando, there are numerous fictions and poems dealing with collective experience and 
sentiments.
Jeong (1997) recalls a tragic event during the period of the Cultural Revolution. The 
name of the Josdnjok university, Ydnbydn University, was itself under severe criticism by the 
Red Army because the revolutionaries believed it was named after the particular region, and 
thus naturally reflected national separatism. Teaching in the Korean language was banned and 
Han Chinese staff joined the university. More and more Han Chinese students were encouraged 
to enter the university and, consequently, Josdnjok staff who were not as fluent in Chinese as the 
Han Chinese had to leave. In the middle of the Revolution, Josdnjok professors were accused of 
promoting so-called prevailing revisionist academic ideas by the Committee of the Revolution. 
A professor Choi Yun Gap, in his Korean language class, merely explained the origins of the 
vernacular language created by King Se-jong with scholars’ support. After that, certain students 
accused him of the fore-mentioned crime on the grounds that history can be created only by the 
people, ryanmin. The committee’s argument was that as with Chinese, language is an outcome 
which is formed by ordinary people following the process of historical development. If the 
Korean language is created as a typical symbol of a feudal ruler like King Se-jong, using such a 
language reflects a trite form of traditionalism and it is destined to be abolished. In fact, these 
kinds of happenings were occurring in every minority region in China at that time.25 It is clear, 
however, that such cultural oppression of a minority national group such as the Josdnjok, who 
had maintained strong attachments to their language for historical reasons, might well be more
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traumatic. Preserving a minority’s language and the rapid adaptation of the official language 
reflects the tensions and dilemmas of Josonjok aspiring to cultural maintenance and full 
integration simultaneously. Switching linguistic skills depending on circumstances is a crucial 
part of forming a diaspora identity.
It is one of the common dilemmas among all types of minority ethnic or national groups 
including diasporas that higher degrees of cultural and historical maintenance often cause 
isolation or segregation, hampering positive interactions with the host society. I described 
Y6nby6n Josbnjok University as a symbolic centre of the Josdnjoks’ collective identity on the 
ground that it has been the largest institute representing Josonjok collectivity. As identity is not 
static, the university itself has been transformed, taking different forms. Such transformations in 
turn reflect the changes of values, views, and visions of the Josdnjok. Josonjok collective 
identity has been relatively well maintained partly because they have had a collective will to do. 
Also, this is because Chinese policy encouraged minority national groups to institutionalise their 
collective features, and yet such institutionalisation of collectivity, at the same time, 
demonstrates the Josonjok’s particular manner of responding to host sate.
Political dynamics of Zainichi identity
Fukuoka’s (2000) research on the Zainichi identity is noteworthy in the sense that it is an 
attempt to overcome the erroneous common belief that the Zainichi population has been 
perceived as highly assimilated into Japanese society without any serious conflicts. In this 
respect, Fukuoka’s paradigm of grouping the Zainichi is useful to understand various levels of 
Zainichi identity. According to the various degrees of their national allegiance, he suggests four 
different types of identity: pluralist type pursuing mutual cooperation, nationalist type living life 
as a foreign national, individualist type pursuing success in society using one’s ability, and 
assimilationist type becoming a Japanese citizen.26 Nevertheless, the individualist type would 
induce academic interests more from a psychologist rather than a political scientist. In this 
regard, I focus more on the groups who express their national identity outwardly. As my 
research is not to quantify how many people within the community regard themselves as Korean 
or Japanese, I focus more on the contents and background of a collective identity represented by 
people who are somehow aware of a national identity. Whether the rest who do not have the 
advantages of expressing themselves would share such an identity is (should be) an individual 
choice in the case of diaspora identity.
I share Fukuoka’s view regarding the issue of assimilation. Fukuoka correctly states that 
the Zainichi’s internalised psychological conflicts have long been concealed and misinterpreted. 
He disagrees with general perceptions in Japan of the younger generation Zainichi who are 
considered as being highly assimilated into Japanese society on various levels. Although his
130
efforts of scientific approach to the highly discursive issues exhibit some methodological 
difficulties, his interview texts and analyses help to discover relatively overlooked aspects of 
Zainichi identity. In a sense, the researched identity under Fukuoka’s work is represented among 
the most under-expressed generation. Their expression of identity was conveyed in the Japanese 
language and they were interviewed by a Japanese researcher. Consequently, the findings from 
numerous interviews have led Fukuoka to ask the final question: how to incorporate the ever- 
struggling Zainichi identity into Japanese society. The underlying assumption of Fukuoka’s 
work is that in spite of Zainichi aspiration to become Japanese and to be regarded as completely 
Japanese, their aspiration is ignored or unaccepted by Japanese society. His broad question 
emerges from his disagreements on the common view among Japanese that the younger Zainichi 
are already highly assimilated, thus, problems are by and large solved. And, the older Zainichi 
cannot be accepted into Japanese society due to their inseparable political loyalty either to South 
Korea or to North Korea. His methods limit generalisation of Zainichi identity as a collective 
identity. On the one hand, diaspora identity as an accumulation of diverse individuals is well 
expressed, and, on the other, diaspora identity as a kind of collective identity is disregarded 
while overlooking the multiple layers and dimensions of identity; that is, Zainichi identity as a 
part of the Korean nation and simultaneously as an individual Japanese citizen. For that reason, 
in this chapter, I focus more on the Zainichi as a group and the Zainichi identity as a collective 
identity.
As mentioned earlier, changes in the Zainichi community can be explained by dividing 
into four pre-eminent periods: firstly, the period under the American military regime between 
1945 and 1952; secondly, the transitional period between 1953 and 1963; thirdly, the rigid Cold 
War era from 1964 until 1989; and finally, the 1990s to the present. During the first period 
immediately after the Second World War, the Korean community was in great turmoil and 
suffering from their new dilemma of not knowing where to place themselves in a changing 
world. Some were in great confusion over the choices of either returning to the motherland or 
remaining in Japan. Meanwhile, others who were a more politically-minded group of people 
fought each other, setting up their own organisations in order to take an advantageous position 
promptly and implement their own political and ideological orientations in the newly established 
community. Such turmoil clearly reflects the domestic political changes in postwar Japan and 
the situation in the motherland as well as American influence in Japan. During the second 
period, the Korean community was able to achieve rather a stable settlement on the one hand. 
On the other hand, discrimination and segregation against ethnic and national minorities in 
Japan took legal and social shape by legal arrangement of the San Francisco Treaty.27
The Cold War era, in the meantime, was the peak of harsh confrontation between the 
two Korean minority organisations. Zainichi identity has been built around the two major 
organisations ever since. Identity becomes blurred but organisations remain a symbolic
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boundary of identity, while reflecting changes and continuity in a diaspora community. Since 
the late 1980s, thanks to vigorous communication with their motherlands and Kim II Sung’s 
sudden death in 1994, Korean diasporas in the Western world and more interaction with the 
international community have driven the Zainichi to form their own identity. Such periodisation, 
however, does not precisely reflect the changes in their national identity, which is relatively 
stable and resistant. The Zainichi choice was to maximise their given space by being involved in 
their motherland’s politics. The Zainichi identity formed around the structure framed by the 
three variables: division of the motherland, Japan’s segregation policy and minority 
organisations.
Chorydn, North Korea and Zainichi identity
According to statistics in March 1953, on Zainichi, 61 per cent were from Gy6ngsang, 12 per 
cent were from Jejudo and 11 per cent were from J511anamdo, which means 98 percent of 
Zainichi are from the southern part of Korea, which now is included in South Korea. However, 
in the same year, in terms of nationality, the Jos6n nationality comprises 76.4 per cent whereas 
people who recorded their official nationality as South Korean comprise 23.6 per cent. This 
shows that claimed nationality was, in this case, more to do with political affiliation rather than 
geographical origin and hometowns.28
A seemingly obvious but notable comparison between the Zainichi and Josdnjok is 
made by Jeong. Josdnjok society has not been divided by political ideology due to their 
awareness of being Chinese citizens. In China, there are no such organisations as pro-South 
Korean or pro-North Korean. Although it does not mean that Josdnjok do not have political 
views on reunification of Korea, they are aware of the fact that the reunification issue should be 
regarded as Koreans’ own problem in the first place and, secondly, they believe that they are not 
supposed to be deeply involved. This view is a helpful contrast compared with a speech by Han 
Duk Soo, the head of Chorydn, who died in 2001. By the time Chorydn made the decision to be 
separated from the Japanese Communist Party in 1955, he announced that ‘as the main purpose 
of the Japanese communist party is to seize political power within Japan, we Koreans do not 
have to intervene in Japanese domestic politics. The critical interests of Koreans abroad should 
be laid upon motherland and our political aims are the reunification of motherland and the 
protection of Korean minority’s basic human rights’ (K. K. Lee: 1983, 52). ‘The emergence of 
Chorydn in 1955 ... was a strategical reaction to the atrocious economic and political conditions 
that Koreans in Japan who were sympathetic to North Korea faced’.29 Having considered the 
fact that not all minority national groups in Japan have formed structured politically oriented 
minority organisations, the particular motivation within each minority community is to be taken 
into account.
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By the time the Chorydn was re-established in June 1955 in Tokyo, it was composed of 
49 regional offices, 419 branch offices, 2,700 sub-committees and 246 units. Under the 
organisation, there are 15 related sub-organisations and 18 business organisations. Chorydn was 
trying to break the relationship with Japanese Communist Party, and made a strong connection 
with North Korea instead. In fact, the seed of Chorydn was first set up in October 1945. It was 
led by Koreans involved in the Japanese Communist League, such as Kim Cheon Hae who had 
been jailed for 17 years before Korean independence. This was because, during colonisation, the 
two parties were inter-connected and highly cooperative since their aims for the independence of 
Korea and a communist revolution in Japan were closely interlinked.
Immediately after the Second World War, there were temporarily, about 300 Korean 
organisations advocating nationalism in Japan. By the time Chorydn had begun to absorb the 
small groups and take the shape of a major representative organisation with communist 
orientation, certain other nationalist advocates inside Chorydn who were against communism 
seceded from the organisation and established others such as Gdnchdng or Mindan, advocating 
liberal democracy. Both Chorydn and Mindan were fiercely nationalistic and anti-Japanese. The 
main purpose of Chorydn was to overthrow the South Korean government through a communist 
revolution, taking advantage of the geopolitical environment in Japan and strengthening North 
Korean strategies toward South Korea. Among the 680,000 Koreans in Japan, there are as many 
as 250,000 Chorydn members and the number of people working in related organisations 
amounts to 6,000. The severe struggle between Mindan and Chorydn is the direct reflection of 
the divided situation of the motherland and the struggle for their political identity within 
Japanese society.
Until its disintegration in 1949, Chorydn used to be the organisation which was the first 
mobilised for any Japanese leftist demonstrations or public events. Their way of protest was 
aggressive and distinctive. Such a manner was highly appreciated by Japanese communist 
organisations. In 1953, by the time the Korean War was over, the organisation was divided into 
two groups. One supported the Japanese communist party and the other supported North Korea. 
After the internal tensions were settled in 1954, in the following year on 26 May 1955, a pro- 
North Korean group was in power led by Han Duk Soo. Major events involving Chorydn 
included the Mun Se Kwang incident in 1974, and the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping incident in the 
late 1970s. When Chorydn members became sceptical about the North Korean regime, 
especially after official visits to North Korea arranged by the North Korean government, Kim II 
Sung imposed harsher ideological influences on Chorydn members to reinforce their loyalty to 
North Korea and include more of the Zainichi population. In 1980, Kim II Sung reshuffled the 
local offices of Chorydn as the implementation of a new approach called the patriotic revolution 
project, aeguk-sadp-hydkshin.
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Since the early 1990s, sceptical views on the existing system of Zainichi organisation 
have gradually developed caused by various factors. The death of the North Korean leader, Kim 
II Sung, somehow diminished the image of a sublime motherland because of the disappearance 
of a symbolic spiritual centre among Chorydn affiliated Zainichi. By dint of the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union and the subsequent international milieu of detente, the legitimacy of Chorydn 
decreased. Their collective hope, reunification of the motherland under communism, has 
disappeared. It is true that the older generation Chorydn oriented Zainichi still have a fear and 
reluctance of criticising Chorydn and the North Korean regime. Yet, Zainichi society began to 
doubt the functions of the existing organisations and began to seek other ways to resist injustice 
and recognition. The interviews below with two former members of Chorydn, Hur, a former 
professor of the North Korean-run Korean university in Japan, Josdn University, and Yang, the 
former head of a Josdn junior high school, as well as Park, the vice-president of a Zainichi 
company in Japan show the psychological tensions among insiders of the organisation. The 
tensions are caused by the problems of the oppressive mechanism of Chorydn as an untouchable 
political organisation.
Park: Since 8.15, the date of independence from Japan in 1945,1 have devoted 
myself to Korean national education for 20 years. Although my family had 
suffered, I had strong enthusiasm of providing national education to the second 
and third generation of Zainichi.30
During his interview Park explains the totalitarian mechanism inside Chorydn and the 
fundamental motivation for him to remain a member of Chorydn. One of my interviews reveals 
that nationalistic Zainichi involved in Choryon-run schools tend to view that the initial goal of 
educational institutions run by North Korea in Japan are not to instigate students with political 
ideology. Mun explains, ‘I’ve been very proud of devoting myself to Chorydn schools. Not only 
Josdn schools but all other educational institutions elsewhere advocate political ideologies to a 
certain degree anyhow. Chorydn schools obviously advocate communism but teaching 
communism is not the main goal of the Josdn schools. Instead, providing national education is 
the fundamental task of Josdn schools in Japan. Nonetheless, the Japanese government often 
wrongly promulgates Josdn schools as mere political agencies of North Korean regime. This is 
to instigate Japanese right-wings and illegalise Josdn schools. Such instigation allows Japanese 
right wing activists to target Josdn schools whenever North Korea makes political troubles’.
Hur: I was a college student when the Chorydn was first organised and an 
education fund was provided by the North Korean government. I was very 
impressed with North Korean help. Thanks to such financial support, a poor 
student like me could pursue a college degree. I strongly believed North Korea 
was definitely developing and would achieve re-unification. I had a feeling of 
security that I had my own country to return to afterwards. Although such
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positive images of North Korea and Chorydn have faded away since 1967, my 
belief in national education for the younger generation of Korean-Japanese made 
me remain in the organisation.
Park: People involved in producing textbooks for Korean schools in Japan do not 
have autonomy from the North Korean authority. We are supposed to print 
exactly the same draft of what the North Korean government sends. Even the 
head of Chorydn, Han Duk Soo, does not have the right to revise the contents 
(ibid., 229).
Mr Hur’s comment is worthy of attention. Although he had had uneasy feelings towards 
North Korea throughout his organisational experience, and also the Chorydn, he confesses, ‘I 
have been living with a strong sense of responsibility for our children’s generation to let them 
survive with national spirit’. ‘I have also undoubtedly believed that however North Korea and 
Chorydn have showed irrational attitudes, they are founded by our own nation. Only criticising 
and escaping from the organisation are not the right solution’ (ibid., 232).
On the question of how they felt after they left their posts within Chorydn, Yang, for 
example, answers that, ‘for a while, I didn’t have any motivation left and couldn’t stop asking to 
myself what I have done so far in my life. I was in severe scepticism over politics and deep 
distrust of human beings’. Hur also explains his ideas after he had to give up his position in 
Chorydn. ‘Since I escaped from Chorydn, isn’t there any other way but to choose naturalisation? 
But I soon come to think that I cannot accept myself naturalised into Japanese ... Nevertheless, I 
couldn’t find any other way ... as Yang mentioned earlier, I had to worry about how to survive 
after being unemployed, and besides, ... [f]riends were made within Chorydn, I lost all my 
friends’. As leaving Chorydn means being unemployed, it is not easy to criticise or leave the 
organisation. Chorydn never tolerates criticism. Staying within the circle and network of 
Chorydn is linked with financial security. It is notable that Zainichi with a Chorydn educational 
background develop harsher internal tensions. In the case of remaining as insiders of the 
organisation, they jeopardise their opportunities of being included in Japanese society but then 
they have to go through the psychological fear of being disloyal to the organisation and North 
Korea. This is more so the case for the Zainichi who went to Josdn educational institutes up to 
college level and have been deeply involved in Chorydn related jobs. Such a dilemma between 
inclusion and isolation is a general feature of diasporas as I have discussed earlier. Such tension 
deepens when both the diaspora community and the host nation have an exclusive culture.
As the passage below illustrates, however, within the organisation, a reformist voice has 
begun to be carefully heard. Park makes a comment on Zainichi attitudes, ‘We, Zainichi, should 
be able to make claim and urge what things should be done .... It was partly our own 
responsibility that Chorydn has gone to such a wrong direction’ (ibid., 233-235). The changed 
Zainichi view towards the Chorydn-Zainichi relationship relates also to the overall recent 
changes in Zainichi society. The passage below also reflects changed Zainichi attitudes.
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Yang: At present, the Chory6n is almost empty and only devote all their efforts to 
giving their loyalty to North Korea. Nevertheless, the more they swear loyalty, 
the faster Chorydn is declining, Accordingly, Zainichi need not be afraid of 
Chorydn and they need to be courageous enough to speak up the truth. Chorydn is 
not an organisation of Kim II Sung or Kim Jung D. Instead, it’s ours, Zainichi’s.
We need to return to the original principle (ibid., 236).
Since it was founded in 1955, Chorydn now has a number of associations. Eighteen 
affiliated organisations spread over 48 Japanese prefectures affiliated to the headquarters in 
Tokyo. It also runs Josdn University, numerous schools of all levels. Students of Korean schools 
are trained to be bilingual. Josdn University is the major educational centre reproducing the 
North Korean national identity. Although the Zainichi community in Japan has managed to 
establish several educational institutions equivalent to the Ydnbydn University, they belong to 
the minority organisations and have not been fully recognised until recently.31 For the above 
provided reasons, I view Zainichi organisations rather than Josdn University as the integral 
embodiment of Zainichi identity. However, the role of Josdn University has been more or less 
the same as Ydnbydn University in China. It has played a role in providing educated and skilled 
Zainichi to Zainichi-run companies, schools and organisations. It has contributed to maintaining 
the mechanism of the production of identity within Zainichi society. Also, it has remained the 
only university that advocates socialist ideology in Japan. For this reason, there are Japanese left 
wing scholars who support Josdn University. Economically, Chorydn has a close connection 
with North Korea by operating many joint management firms and engaging in trade with North 
Korea. Unofficially, Chorydn claims 20,000 full-time employees throughout the main and 
attached organisations and affiliations.
During the Cold War era, ideological division between two Korea was consolidated. 
This means that communications between motherland and diaspora were restricted to either side 
of Korea. Consequently, the gap between the image and the reality of the motherland widened. 
To diaspora Koreans, in part the homeland had always been a place of mystery and nostalgia. In 
Japan, North Korea actively involved itself in Chorydn affairs for strategic reasons. The more 
the motherland is involved in the Zainichi community, the more the Zainichi from identifying 
themselves either with the Japanese or Koreans. Due to communication and participation in 
homeland’s public affairs, to Zainichi, the division of Korean nation has been actual rather than 
imaginary compared to the two other cases. This is also partly because of Japan’s exclusivity, 
urging them to choose between two nationalities; South or North. Once their ideologically 
divided nationality was polarised, it could be consolidated by the two main minority 
organisations. Both have enjoyed a considerable degree of political autonomy under the strict 
condition of keeping a distance from Japanese politics.
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The relationship between North Korea and Choryon was much closer than the one 
between South Korea and Mindan until the mid-1970s. Not only does North Korea influence 
Chory6n’s political activities, but also Chorydn members participate in North Korean politics 
although such participation is nominal. Chorydn members can be elected as representatives and 
about seven members have been participating in the General Assembly Meeting as 
representatives. Nevertheless, for North Korean affiliated Zainichi Koreans, an identity detached 
from North Korea has been gradually formed through several major incidents including the 
Rangoon bomb attack and the explosion of Korean Air Line, and finally the death of Kim II 
Sung. Chorydn affiliated Zainichi began questioning their loyalty to the North Korean regime 
although, until now, some Chorydn members regard those incidents as South Korean 
manipulation. However, as Jin has mentioned, though there has been some chaos within the 
organisation following the death of Kim II Sung, Chorydn affiliated Zainichi Koreans still keep 
loyalty to North Korea based on their appreciation of financial and psychological support in the 
past. This is also related to an interview discussing Mun’s complicated attitude towards North 
Korea. She acquired a South Korean passport in 1999 although she has been teaching in a 
Chorydn school for long time and her father held a high position in Chorydn. Her decision to get 
South Korean nationality was for a practical reason. For Chorydn experienced Zainichi Koreans, 
naturalisation to Japanese is a more unbearable choice than applying for South Korean 
nationality. Mun preserves her strong loyalty towards North Korea based on the complexity of 
her Chorydn-related personal background, nationalistic sentiment and ideological orientation.
Nevertheless, younger generation Zainichi show a different view regarding the question 
of nationality. The interview below with Han Ahn Soon, a third generation Zainichi in her mid­
twenties, is one example of this.
I remember one day several years ago my father convened a family meeting. He 
asked my brother and I whether we would willingly accept his decision to change 
the nationality of our family members’ from North Korean into South Korean.
Both of us immediately said okay. My father seemed very disappointed, as for 
him it was a serious matter and he had thought about it for long time before 
discussing it with us.
The factor of generation explains such an illustration of indifference to the nationality 
question, which, for the older generation, has been considered as one of the most significant 
faiths. Along with generation, ideological orientation among the Zainichi divides its population 
when analysing the degree of national attachment. National solidarity attached to a totalitarian 
political ideology has functioned far more effectively among members of Choryon.
The South Korean government, on the other hand, displayed a lukewarm attitude 
towards Koreans abroad compared with North Korean enthusiasm. It was 1975 when the South 
Korean government provided financial support to Mindan in the wake of the Mun Sae Kwang
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incident in August 1974 and the North Korean project o f organising a Choryon members’ tour to 
North Korea. The Mun Sae Kwang incident is one of the examples of Choryon’s deep 
involvement in political confrontations between North and South Korea. Mun Sae Kwang, as a 
second generation Zainichi, who was an activist in Choryon, undertook special training and 
committed the assassination of the then first lady of South Korea who was mistakenly targeted 
while the actual target was the then President, Park Jung Hee.
North Korean efforts to secure the communist zone in diaspora communities have been 
steadier than those of South Korean. Since the 1970s, North Korea also extended its project of 
securing ideological influence over Koreans abroad to Korean communities in both the North 
and South Americas, and Europe by contacting South Koreans who have leftist political 
ideologies or who have their hometowns in North Korea.32 When a disturbing atmosphere in 
Choryon was noticed, North Korea made an effort to reconsolidate her relationship with 
Choryon through the project mentioned earlier, aeguk-saop-hyokshin. It means reconsolidation 
of patriotism including projects such as fortifying Choryon activities, re-emphasising Kim II 
Sung’s theory o f Self-Reliance, promulgation of North Korean reunification policy and 
establishing a special committee for overthrowing the South Korean regime. Depending on 
North Korean interests in influencing in the Zainichi society, the amount of financial support in 
the name of the educational fund has fluctuated. Figure 5.3 shows the trends.
Figure 5.3 North Korean fund for Zainichi community
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S o u rc e : Joong Ann Daily Newspaper 2! December 2000 data provided from Mindan head office
‘Once every year North Korea sent subsidies to Zainichi community but several years 
ago, it has been stopped. Among Zainichi businessmen, there have been discussions over 
investment for the plan of exploitation of the Najin-Sonbong area in order to encourage
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economic development of North Korea but there found too many legal and political 
difficulties’.33 Although there have been various internal and external obstacles against legalised 
transparent economic cooperation between the Chory6n-led Zainichi population and the North 
Korean government, relations between North Korea and the Zainichi community have been 
much more mutual than outsiders may consider. Whenever North Korea faced economic or 
diplomatic difficulties, the Zainichi, mobilised by Chorydn or individually, have provided 
certain sums of patriotic fund.
Ryang’s (1997) research is one of the most refined academic works, showing how 
Chorydn Koreans have formed and maintained their North Korean identity, being segregated 
from the Japanese society. She is mainly concerned with the interactions among language, 
ideology and identity in proving the formation and maintenance of national identity. Her main 
argument is that identification by nationality is socially constructed processes of a real life. In 
order to prove this, she observes Chorydn members’ self-identification to find out how 
individuals use their socially generated linguistic capacity and linguistically constructed social 
resources. Throughout her outstanding self-intervening anthropological research, she shows how 
much as a second generation Chorydn in Japan, she herself has struggled with collective 
identity.
However, the case is too extreme to demonstrate the argument that national identity is 
constructed and nothing but indoctrination. Only the passive, negative, indoctrinated part of 
minority organisations are emphasised, while overlooking the fact that once such allegiance is 
provided, it is another expression of their motivation for survival. In her work, political ideology 
and the cultural aspect of national identity are somehow entangled. Political ideology can be 
deeply entrenched in national identity. Yet, this is not because identity is merely a passive 
construction, but rather, that it is the nature of communist ideology and propaganda especially in 
the case of North Korea. In addition, Ryang’s structuralist view sees the usage of language and 
educational institutions as a tool for the ideological reproduction of social identity. Although her 
socio-anthropological concerns also touch upon the politics of identity due to the particular 
feature of this case, Chorydn’s connection with the host society, Japan, as a safety valve is 
downplayed. Ryang deals mostly with the internal mechanism of the organisation and how 
individual identity has been oppressed for the organisation’s sake. Having followed her logic, 
one can only reach the conclusion that Zainichi identity has been greatly misused and abused for 
the sake of communist ideology and the irrational North Korean regime. Due to her over­
emphasis on organisation and micro-observation of relations between North Korea and 
organisation, the exclusivity of Japanese society is somehow disregarded.
In a similar vein, identity-building through education should be viewed differently from 
indoctrination. This in turn may explain why she continuously seeks for her real identity by 
considering her constructed North Korean-in-Japan identity as a fake. Ryang assumes that there
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must be a real identity, something that should not be the result of political construction. Perhaps 
her North Korean identity is totally constructed and that is why she believes her national identity 
is forged. Ryang does not consider her Japanese identity as her real identity, either. In her view, 
the entire history of Zainichi identity formation has been a result of the intervention of North 
Korean political propaganda. Accordingly, Zainichi has been merely a political victim of such 
political propaganda and there have been no other choices for Zainichi but to remain isolated 
from Japanese society. Thus, the present way of building Zainichi identity resulted from the 
interaction between the passive Zainichi population and a hopeless Korean motherland. 
Accurately speaking, the present pattern of ethnic coexistence and negative national identity of 
Zainichi so far are the outcome of continuous interactions between the Zainichi as an actor and 
the Japanese society with North Korean intervention. A collective identity is not always 
passively constructed.
Mindan and Zainichi community
Compared with Chorydn, Mindan is much less organised. This is mainly because the people 
involved in Mindan are more individualistic and liberal-oriented. In addition, there is a lack of 
charismatic leadership equivalent to that of Han Duk Soo, although Mindan gained a more 
advantageous position than Chorydn after the summit meeting between Korea and Japan in 
1963. For Mindan, the urgent task has been improving the status of Zainichi rather than being 
involved in the politics of the motherland. After undergoing temporary disintegration of other 
minor organisations, Mindan was left as the major right-wing Zainichi organisation on 3 
October, 1946. Mindan, as a self-governing organisation, has politically supported South Korea 
and the head office is located in Tokyo. In 1985, it had 49 local offices, 388 branch offices, 601 
related groups and 4,600 activist groups. Their ultimate goal by the time of establishment was 
enhancing Zainichi rights and welfare in Japan.34
The Korea-Japan summit meeting in October 1964 was the turning point when Zainichi 
community began to care more about their own interests than the Korean nation. The pending 
issues between the two countries ever since decolonisation had been repeatedly discussed 
without any concrete agreements until the sixth meeting in 1964 during the Park Jung Hee 
regime. The issues included diplomatic relations in general, issues over the fishing rights in the 
maritime area were in dispute, issues regarding the request for property rights during the 
colonial period and the problems of Zainichi’s legal status. From the South Korean 
government’s point of view, the Zainichi problem was relatively unimportant. Between the two 
representatives, Kim Jong Pil, the then prime minister, and Tae Pyong, the Japanese counterpart, 
the Zainichi request for their private properties lost during the decolonisation period as the most 
urgent issue was settled by reaching an agreement. Japan provided USD300 million of capital
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and service, paying by spreading over ten years. The seventh meeting followed in December 
1964, the final draft was officially agreed in February 1965 after a 20 year-long fight.
Regarding this event, both Chorydn and Mindan responded fiercely for different 
reasons. Chorydn criticised the South Korean government on the ground that the normalisation 
of the diplomatic relationship between Japan and South Korea excluding North Korea would 
result in the consolidation of the division of the nation and consequently delay their unification 
project. Mindan also voiced deep concerns for the reason that the normalisation of the 
diplomatic relationship was made without setting a clear legal status for the Zainichi. Mindan- 
led demonstrations during the series of summit meetings were initially to raise a voice on the 
issue of Zainichi legal status.35 By the time the last summit meeting was ended, Zainichi status 
was left ever obscure by being transformed to temporary residents from the previous 
categorisation of special foreigners.
Kim Sang Hyun (1988), for example, points out the major problems of Mindan. 
Uneccessary bureaucratisation of the organisation is one. It worsened at the time financial 
support from the South Korean government started in 1978. Mindan has been criticised for its 
authoritarian and illiberal way of dealing with Zainichi issues. It also includes the problems of 
corruption amongst the leaders of the organisation. Secondly, Mindan has gradually lost contact 
with the younger generation Zainichi due to its lack of human resources and a clear vision for 
the community. The main purpose of Mindan’s existence was from the beginning less clear and 
less exclusive than Chorybn’s. This also causes the dilemma of being a diaspora organisation in 
general, by having to face the inevitable choice between aggressive fights against 
discriminations with clear and exclusive vision, and mild responses with less exclusive interests 
and vision.
The Mindan platforms below imply Mindan’s less exclusive views towards the Zainichi 
vis-a-vis other nations involved.
With understanding the fact that we are regional members of Japanese society at 
the same time citizens of the Republic of Korea, we aim to become respectable 
and trustful Koreans in Japanese society. Remembering our ancestors have 
contributed to cultural development of Japanese society, we make efforts to 
promote cooperation between Japanese and Koreans (Mindan platform No. 3).
Although we reside in Japan, we bear in mind that our generation and the next 
generations can acquire necessary education as international people and at the 
same time maintain Korean identity (Mindan platform No. 4).
The content of these platforms conveys that Mindan sees the ultimate aim of the 
Zainichi as inclusion into Japanese society while instigating awareness of their ancestors’ 
contribution to Japanese society as legitimacy of their existence. When it says Korean in the
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original text, it is written han-gug-in which means South Korean citizens. However, it does not 
suggest that Mindan sees South Korea as their ultimate place to settle.
Within the organisation, there are also negative views of South Korean involvement in 
Mindan. For example, Bae Sun Hee, the former director of the Women’s Committee of Mindan, 
commented that the people taking important positions in Mindan have wasted the South Korean 
people’s tax by doing nothing. The project of Korean national education gets worse. We still 
lack human resources. Another commentator, Kwon Hyuk Doo, the former director of Mindan, 
hukuoka office, mentions that Mindan was fulfilling its original aim better before receiving 
South Korean funds. People involved in Mindan had now become mere salaried men of the 
South Korean government. It became very difficult to proceed with projects of our own needs. 
In fact, during the 1970s the amount of South Korean financial support to Mindan was ten times 
larger than to any other Korean communities abroad including the one in the United States. In 
return for this financial support, South Korea acquired the rights to review overall operation and 
management not only in connection with the organisation’s future projects.36 Due to its focus on 
political orientation ever since, Mindan has been criticised by ordinary Zainichi as neglecting 
major issues such as improving their overall life conditions in Japan.
Since Kim Dae Jung government, Mindan becomes more powerful than before. I 
believe that it’s the right time for Mindan to deal with the Japanese government 
more actively to correct prevalent discriminative customs and laws. ... Among 
older generation Zainichi, there have been tendency to think that they are 
supposed to put up with discriminations because Japan is not our own country 
and at least Japan let us to survive here. But younger generations are different. 
Zainichi should raise their voice to protect their rights, and demand historical 
correctness. To do so, national minority organisations like Mindan should be the 
official route to communicate with the Japanese government ... It is also 
necessary to achieve our goals in cooperation with Choryon.37
As I have shown, until recently the Zainichi community and identity have fluctuated 
considerably according to the politics of the Korean motherland. This is the crucial difference 
between the Zainichi from Korei'tsy and Josonjok. A minority organisation is the barometer 
through which one can judge the collective will to maintain collective identity and potential 
power to mobilise the population when necessary. On the one hand, Zainichi organisations are 
well established, influencing most of the Zainichi population. On the other hand, such a firm 
influence of the two organisations on the Zainichi population has intensified a diaspora’s 
dilemma of maintaining an overt collective features with exclusive organisations whilst attaining 
fuller degree of inclusion to the host nation. The Zainichi case is one of the extreme examples 
due to historical relations between the homeland and the hostland, and Japan’s exclusivity in 
dealing with non-Japanese minority nationality issues.
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Rise o f social activism and new Zainichi organisations
The Zainichi have built their community in segregation from Japanese politics and society rather 
than being assimilated thus disappearing. The general contradiction between host countries and 
minority national groups elsewhere is the simultaneous process of inclusion and exclusion: in 
other words, assimilation and segregation. In Japan, the contradiction is relatively clearer. As I 
mentioned earlier briefly, Japanese policy towards the Zainichi is not to be regarded as 
assimilation. The Japanese government continuously restricted conditions by which Zainichi 
could willingly identify themselves with the Japanese.38
[W]e have to be critical of some common statements made by Japanese 
researchers, which overlook the complexity of the problem by saying that the 
Zainichi youths are relatively smoothly accommodating themselves into Japanese 
society. This is in fact true when compared with the first generation who had been 
struggling with feelings of bitterness toward Japan and of nostalgia for their 
Korean homeland; and the second generation who had been desperately 
attempting to establish their economic bases and fighting against discrimination 
and harsh poverty. However, the accommodation to Japanese society of the 
Zainichi youths is far from being free of psychological conflicts.39
Fukuoka’s assumption is also verified by an interview with the head of KCC (Korean 
Christian Centre), Osaka, which offers a Zainichi viewpoint.
The way of understanding the Zainichi situation is fundamentally different 
between the first and second generation. The first generation has the firm idea 
that they are foreigners living in a foreign country. Accordingly, they somehow 
accepted unfair treatment and internalised conflicts. Instead, the older generation 
has been obsessed with wealth and their children’s education. Meanwhile, the 
second generation are aware of democratic procedures, and human rights issues 
due to their educational background which differs in a great deal from that of 
their parent generation. The younger generation view the Zainichi movement in 
the same context with grass root movements in Japan since 1970s.
The Zainichi psychological conflict is also shown in a quantitative research conducted 
by Hanb’aek Research Foundation in 1997. By comparing, it explains the present problems of 
Korean minorities in each host state. According to this research, the Zainichi problem is more 
deep-seated psychological than practical. Economic difficulties are expressed as the most urgent 
issue showing, 46.1 per cent of responses among Josdnjok, communication problems due to the 
language barrier for Koreitsy particularly, in Tashkent and Almaty, showing 58.5 per cent of the 
responses. In Japan, meanwhile, social discriminations against Zainichi were expressed as the 
most serious problem, showing 35.9 per cent of Zainichi respondents.40
Among the younger generation of Zainichi, there have been vigorous movements 
towards setting up new kinds of organisations. They explicitly focus more on Zainichi welfare,
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especially aiming at giving confidence to the young Zainichi whose ultimate goal is to settle 
down peacefully in Japan. Such organisations include Mukuge no Kai, Tokkabi Kodomo Kai, 
and Seikyu Sha. They reflect the new trend of identity formation among the younger generation 
Zainichi, fighting various discriminations rather than being involved in conventional Korean 
minority organisations. Zainichi become an active actor forming their own kind of collective 
identity through actual participation in various community projects. Being aware of national 
identity for the Zainichi may not necessarily mean to be aware of Korean historical roots and 
attachment to the Korean nation instigated by a nostalgic motivation, but for them it is more 
likely to mean to continuous search for their own kind of national identity by keeping on 
questioning who we are, vis-a-vis the Japanese and the Koreans. One can also view the 
movements as an expression of searching for their own independent sphere to represent their 
real selves free from exclusive ethnocentric nationalism discourses of South Korea, North Korea 
and the Japanese nation. Such process of awareness, however, cannot be developed without a 
diaspora’s certain efforts of distancing themselves from the motherland’s influence while not 
being antagonistic to any of the nations related to them. I continue my argument on this point in 
the following chapter. Their movements, regardless of the modes of resistance, are motivated by 
a continuous trial of a search for a stable national identity and recognition as they are. Such 
efforts are future-oriented minority movements rather than backward looking revivalism. The 
interview text below represents the tendency.
Since the 1970s other Zainichi organisations neither Chorydn nor Mindan have 
been established. This was because some began to be sceptical about the roles of 
Choryon and Mindan, and the vigorous civil movements in South Korea in 
defence of civil rights and democracy which have stimulated young Zainichi. 
Around the late 1970s, young Zainichi organised a joint response with 
Mintongrydn [a South Korean organisation of civil movements for democracy 
and national reunification] towards the Japanese government. This organisation 
came into existence in 1984. The original purpose of the establishment of the 
organisation was to defend young Zainichi students who were studying in 
Japanese schools. We focused on providing national education for them in order 
to guide the development of Zainichi identity in a positive way as they did not 
have opportunities to learn about national history and cultures and as a result 
naturally develop shameful feelings about their national background under the 
Japanese educational system. At the same time, our organisation has played the 
role of mediator for the schools and Zainichi parents when there was an 
occurrence of a racially offensive situation. Within the Japanese school system, 
our organisation has also tried to implement a special class for Zainichi, teaching 
Korean history and language apart from the compulsory normal curriculum. At 
the moment, there are only a few Japanese schools which allow this project but 
we have kept lobbying with local governments and Japanese schools.41
When generalising such a change in national identity among young Zainichi, the above 
interview with Kim Kwan Min, may be considered as a special case as he has several years’
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experience of living in South Korea. His experience provided him with a sufficient period for 
reflection on his psychological conflicts regarding the issues of national identity through direct 
communication with Koreans in the motherland. Nonetheless, the recent Zainichi movements 
are initiated by Zainichi who stabilised their internal conflicts over dual national identities just 
as in the case of Kim Kwan Min. Such movements are interpreted as a sign of desire for 
inclusion in the host society with improved conditions. Meantime, their collective will does not 
denote either that the Zainichi have nurtured a separate collective identity from the Japanese 
nation, or maintained an exclusive collective identity firmly attached to the Korean nation.
Active collectivisation
Korean kolkhozes
In the former USSR, in terms of size, Koreans are the twenty-eighth largest minority national 
and ethnic groups among over 100 others comprising the former Soviet Union. Koreftsy is one 
of those whose population is decreasing and its density is dispersing. There are approximately
443,000 Koreftsy living in the territory of the former USSR according to statistics from the early 
1990s. The main elements constituting Koreftsy national identity are their pride in successful 
performances in farming and their traumatic historical collective memory of forced relocation. 
Koreftsy are known as one of those dispersed non-titular minority national groups spread over 
the vast territory.
Having been victimised, regardless of ideological disposition, Koreftsy were settled in 
separate collective farms. Due to its national division, the collective farm system was not a de- 
ethnicised state economic institute. Within collective farms, Soviets could build their own 
organisations and institutes such as cultural centres, stadiums, hospitals, schools, clubs, libraries, 
drugstores and houses. Those organisations and institutes naturally grew out of particular 
national and ethnic features. Koreftsy’s language schools and publishing houses were set up and 
their own newspapers were printed. Koreftsy local musical troupes were relocated to Koreftsy 
kolkhozes in central Asia. They played traditional Korean operas and plays such as 
Ch’unhyangjbn and Shimch’6ngj6n. The troupe played multiple roles, such as passing letters 
from kolkhoz to kolkhoz and rinding separated family members, not only being involved in 
performing arts. There is not much written record about their stories. Koreftsy have just begun to 
write or rewrite their history set by their shared collective memories.
Han’s (1999) pride in being a Korefski in the former Soviet Union demonstrated how 
Korean intellectuals in the Soviet Union perceived themselves. ‘Although we have undergone 
various tragic incidents ever since we were relocated, and although we couldn’t achieve the 
Koreftsy Republic, I was proud of my nationality, Koreftsy in the Soviet Union, when thinking
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how we have managed our successful lives. Thanks to our exceptional diligence, today we enjoy 
a relatively wealthy life compared with other minority national groups around us’ (Han and 
Han: 1999, 321). Having scrutinised various forms of Korei'tsy written work, most o f their 
writing is filled with proud comments on successful farming experience. They could develop a 
secure feeling within the boundary of kolkhozes.
At present, there are twelve to fifteen Korei'tsy kolkhozes. Regardless of the percentage 
of Korei'tsy population within a kolkhoz, in case the founders and managers are Korei'tsy, it is 
known as a Korei'tsy kolkhoz. Even when a kolkhoz begins with one hundred per cent from the 
Korei'tsy population, later, unsuccessful farms are merged with Korei'tsy farms, which decreases 
the percentage of the Korei'tsy within a previously exclusive Korei'tsy kolkhoz.42 For example, 
Kim Byung W ha kolkhoz is composed of approximately 25 per cent of Korei'tsy. At present, the 
total size o f the land is 3,127 hectares with about 1,920 households and a population o f 7,820. 
The national composition of the kolkhoz (table 5.4) is as follows according to a data provided by 
Kim Brut.
Table 5.4 Ethnic composition of the KBW kolkhoz
Ethnic composition of the KBW  kolkhoz
Nationality U zbek K azak K areiskii U gur R ussian Tatar Turk O thers
Population 2.627 2.013 1 5 4 3  847 283 250 65 200
A kolkhoz like Kim Byung Wha, however, is still regarded as a Korei'tsy kolkhoz 
although it has become less exclusive to be named as such. For this reason, Korei'tsy kolkhozes 
are left as a kind of symbolic centre rather than as principal economic bases. As for the return of 
the Korei'tsy donations to the war against Germany during the Second World War, a street and a 
high school in Tashkent state are named after Kim Byung Wha, who died in 1974. At the edge 
o f economic reshuffling, the process o f maintaining Korei'tsy kolkhozes as historical heritage has 
been supported by the South Korean government. Since the late 1980s, the main Korei'tsy 
kolkhozes have been turned into museums and are decorated with historical documents. The 
president of KBW kolkhoz explains that ‘during the period of 1937 to 1945, we grew only rice, 
but from 1945 cotton farming was accompanied. Kim Byung Wha took over the position of 
president in the kolkhoz in 1940 until 1974. His management o f the farm was outstanding. 
Unlike other kolkhozes, he installed an independent electric power plant within this kolkhoz. 
Various additional systems were successfully run including a hospital, schools covering all 
levels, ateliers, libraries and theatres. He was also actively involved in politics as a 
representative of the Republic o f Uzbek for 30 years’.43 Thanks to his political activities and
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successful management of the farm, Kim Byung Wha kolkhoz had once served as the official 
route of government propaganda during Khurushchev.
Gelb’s (1995) description below also supports the early success of Korei'tsy farms in 
central Asia after deportation.
The temporary irrigation systems of 1937 and 1938 were subsequently rebuilt, 
construction completed, marshland drained, the area under cultivation expanded, 
and the harvest per hectare raised. The doubling or tripling of the capital stock of 
the typical Korean kolkhoz by 1941 quadrupled or quintupled its income. ...Their 
rapid transformation into dynamic enterprises whose management was well 
integrated into the regional ruling structure permitted Korean kolkhozes - many 
now converted into sovkhozes- to abundantly over-fulfil their plan quotas during 
the war and emerge as models of efficiency and prosperity in the 1950s.44
The history of successful kolkhoz life became the primary source of pride of being a 
Korei'tsy. People suffered from an inhumane situation during this deportation period. 
Fortunately, however, the grassland to which the Koreans were relocated was relatively fertile 
and appropriate for rice-growing. By 1934 shortly before the relocation project, collectivisation 
of Korei’tsy farms was partially completed. Until that year, the Soviet government had given 
large funds to encourage settlement of rice-growing farms in the region. The Soviet government 
actively supported Korei’tsy farms in building irrigation systems. Korei'tsy were already well 
known to be dextrous at building irrigation systems.
In 1928, of the 470 kolkhozes in the Far Eastern Region, 110 were in the Korean 
villages in Vladivostok okrug. Koreans resented Russian peasants and Korean 
kulaks who exploited them as land lenders. Whether naturalized or not, Koreans 
could now take part in the movement towards collectivization. For Koreans, this 
movement promised a shortcut to land and citizenship ... [T]he degree of 
collectivization grew to 90 per cent by the beginning of 1930, compared with 75 
per cent in the Poyset region (Wada, in Suh: ibid., 39-41).
As collectivisation was completed, the cultural climate of Korei'tsy farms was changed 
and full of hope. The rate of illiteracy dropped and cultural institutions such as public libraries, 
reading clubs, newspaper companies and Korean schools were well operated. Their temporary 
stability, however, was interrupted by another relocation project. In the early 1940s, additional 
population adjustment had begun. Korei’tsy and Russians in the Uzbek region were moved to the 
Kazakh Republic. This project was to balance the ratio of population, avoiding Kazakhs being in 
the majority in the Kazakh region. It was common that, under the excuse of exchanging cadres 
and officials or encouraging harmonisation of different national groups, the ratio of composition 
of minority national groups was effectively controlled. Between 1968 and 1971, approximately
60,000 people from different minority ethnic and national groups had moved to the Kazakh 
Republic and 80,000 Kazakhs were sent out of the republic. Since deportation, the Korei’tsy
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were accustomed to the new environment, restoring a peaceful life once again for a short period 
up until the Second World War broke out. Moreover, ‘[t]he period of the post-Stalin regime 
about 25 or 30 years was the heyday for Soviet Koreans. Korean kolkhozes flourished, which 
was possible only within socialist regime ... The development of Korean kolkhozes could 
provide the farmers from other national minority groups with a strong hope’ (Em: 1991, 43). 
‘Even after official pressure forced many to shift to cotton, Korean kolkhozes remained 
paradigms of good economy’ (Gelb: 1995,408).
I have explained the Korei'tsy’s active participation in collectivisation as the major 
Soviet state building project. The positive identity as Korei'tsy was built around stories about 
their various successful kolkhoz lives. The accumulated stories compose the history of the 
Korei'tsy, which best reflects their collective identity. I describe this as a national identity of a 
diaspora. This identity is not antagonistic against any of the nations involved but it particularly 
construes the collective identity of Korei'tsy. The next section explores further this Korei'tsy way 
of managing kolkhozes.
Gobonjil
Although the system of collective farms appears to be identical, there are significant inequalities 
in the distribution of earnings within a kolkhoz, ‘The spread between real earnings of the top 
management and the earnings of the field workers would appear quite large’ (Khan and Ghai: 
1979, 105). This explains how the Korei'tsy could be seen as wealthier than other minority 
national groups in central Asia under the Soviet regime, ‘[t]he development of cost accounting 
since the mid-1950s; greater freedom by the kolkhozes with respect to the volume and pattern of 
investment financed either from internal sources or from borrowing; and greater self-sufficiency 
in managerial, professional and technical skills’ (ibid., 53). As the other author also mentions, 
the reason why Korei'tsy farms made more profits than others was not only owing to their 
agricultural skills but also because of their method of managing collective farms. In spite of the 
strict control of the central government and official and unofficial pressures and restrictions, 
most Korei'tsy kolkhozes acquired lands by making conditional lease contracts with other 
kolkhozes. Korei'tsy farmers could make greater achievements by altering the given systems and 
enjoyed more freedom within the system as well as with their customs of hard work and strong 
motivations. The Korei'tsy introduced the concept of lease and rent to the kolkhoz system. These 
were not legally acceptable at first. In principle, the conditions for lease and rent were just like 
the ones under the feudal system and the risks and costs for items such as fertilizers, seeds, 
usage of equipments, harvesting, and carrying agricultural goods and so on, were all their own 
responsibility.45
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The Koreitsy way of running the kolkhoz system was feasible since there were some 
variations within the system. As Khan and Ghai explain, the varied features of each kolkhoz 
explain the possibility of differentiated adaptation of the system.
As a voluntary, co-operative association of producers in a planned, socialist 
economy, the kolkhoz presents some distinctive features. It differs from state 
enterprises which are the more usual form of organization in a socialist economy 
not only in the ownership pattern of means of producing but, perhaps more 
importantly, in the greater autonomy it enjoys in principle both in production and 
management. ... in principle, the kolkhoz provides greater scope for participation 
and democratic decision-making than may be possible in a state enterprise which 
comes directly under a ministry and is, therefore, more liable to political and 
bureaucratic control (ibid., 46).
In Han’s essay, it is described as gobongjil of which the linguistic root is not yet entirely 
clear. In the 1940s, Koreitsy farmers were looking for a new way of making profits. Around the 
end of the 1940s, renting lands was first introduced. The kinds of workers who rented lands 
from collective farms were called gobongja. In accordance with the contracts, a part of a 
gobongja's harvest went to the kolkhoz and the rest was the gobongja's share. Although 
gobongja have been working freely these days, until the 1980s this kind of economic activity 
used to be illegal.46 They always had to take the risk of being accused by others who were 
discontent with the Koreitsy making a great deal of profits. However, there were two reasons for 
their survival. Firstly, most kolkhozes prefer to hire gobongja since their yields were much 
higher even in barren and seemingly infertile lands. The average harvest per kolkhoz was 20 to 
40 tons per hectare, whereas gobongja involvement usually guaranteed between 90 and 120 
tons. Without hiring gobongja, kolkhozes could not possibly reach the production plan ordered 
by government.
Such activity was illegal, consequently, gobongja had to provide bribes to officials and 
other people unavoidably involved such as drivers and technicians. In the end, gobongja was a 
good source of income for those people involved. Since the principles of gobongja are self- 
supporting accounts in terms of profits and autonomy, the earnings were entirely dependent on 
their efforts and abilities, which, in fact, provided huge incentives to develop more efficient and 
lucrative ways of farming 47 From the mid-1980s government officials in central Asia started to 
acknowledge the Koreitsy way of farming and their renting systems. This Koreitsy way of 
farming has been carried out for twenty years now. The Koreitsy way of manipulating the 
system has resulted in disparities of income and productivity among kolkhozes. In terms of 
income among various categories of employees of a kolkhoz, differences are noticeable, thus it 
is difficult to arrive at generalisations about the differences.
Regarding the meaning of gobonjil, Kim Brut explains that ‘the literary meaning of 
gobon is a portion of funds and an investment of each for a business partnership but its practical
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usage here in Koreitsy society is different. Gobonjil refers to a kind of freelance farming in other 
farms of their own region or farms in other regions out of their own farms. Koreitsy lease a 
small part of a large scale farm for rice or vegetables, and generally produce three to four times 
more tonnes of agricultural goods than local farmers normally produce. They paid a certain 
amount of products as the price for leasing part of the land. Uzbek Koreitsy normally travel to 
Russia and Ukraine. The reasons are as follows. Firstly, the size of the lands in Uzbekistan is 
relatively smaller than other regions. Secondly, Uzbek people are relatively dextrous with 
farming next to Koreitsy in comparison with the other minority national groups in the former 
Soviet republics. Thirdly, most Uzbek farms are involved in cotton farming which takes a longer 
period to gain harvest and accordingly it is difficult to make fortune in a short period. Fourthly, 
in certain regions such as Russia, the price of agricultural products are much higher than in 
central Asia. After harvest, Koreitsy sell immediately what they produce in the region and bring 
some back to central Asia’.48
The Koreitsy’s technical difference also helped the kolkhozes to be relatively more 
productive. It is proved that, as soon as the Koreitsy in the Far East were deported to central 
Asia, the demand for Japonika showed a sudden drop. Consequently, lands for rice-growing 
fields also decreased from 20,000 hectare in 1930 to 3,600 hectare in 1939, and to 510 hectare in 
1948.49 The main reason why the productive capacity of Russian state farms was not high 
enough was not only because of the institutional and structural problems of collective farming 
that discourage creativity and motivation for labour. Also, this was due to the Russian way of 
farming, direct sowing onto dry paddy fields, which is not appropriate for the soil and monsoon 
climate. The Korean or Chinese way of transplanting rice-plants on fresh watered fields was not 
familiar to Russian farmers. Koreitsy’s relative success in farming after all was based on their 
appropriate agricultural skills and their adaptability to the system. Korei'sky kolkhozes have 
existed in name only since the 1990s and they no longer function as a major economic means. In 
spite of this, the Koreitsy’s shared memories have been preserved by telling their stories to 
outsiders or to younger generation Koreitsy, and more recently, by writing them in various 
communication genres.
Conclusion
Briefly returning to my initial question, put in a simpler form, it would be: Korean diasporas, 
who are they? I do not take ‘they’ here as the accumulation of individuals’ senses of belonging 
attached to nations. I took it as a collective outcome. Thus, I investigated national minority 
organisations and institutions as representations of diaspora identity. They reflect each 
diaspora’s collective will, the history of a diaspora community, and apprehensions and visions 
of their collective future. Then again, such a collective identity of Korean diaspora can never be
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built in isolation from host nations. Some diaspora individuals have never been practically 
involved in any of those organisations. Even in such a case, however, their collective identity 
can hardly be expressed completely detached from Korean diaspora organisations and 
institutions. Regardless of a diaspora’s actual participation in those organisations, diaspora 
identity has continuously been formed and reformed while developing their own image and 
opinions of the organisations, and discussing the issues related to them.
By looking into the major diaspora organisations, the patterns of ethnic relations: 
isolation, segregation and dispersal, become clearer. Those organisations are the result of 
interplay between a host state’s policy and a diaspora’s way of responding to it. It explains why 
and how certain kinds of minority organisations emerge in a specific situation. Sound minority 
organisations and institutions are the prerequisites for a diaspora group to move forwards to 
more a self-confined diaspora community. The identical pattern of a Korean diaspora’s way of 
responding to host state and resisting assimilation can be described as a quiet struggle through 
maximising given autonomy. The vexing conflicts between nationhood and personhood are not 
only particularly applicable to diaspora groups. However, tensions are more likely to grow out 
of the internal conflicts among diaspora groups as they often face situations of having to make a 
choice between national bond and individual well-being. For diasporas, such tension makes it 
more difficult to co-exist comfortably. The tension is created by the dilemma of having to 
choose between expressing a will to fortify visible collectivity and a risk-averse decision to 
remain totally individual by concealing another national allegiance, which I regard as a 
diaspora’s particularity. On the other hand, such a tension can be viewed positively given that a 
diaspora’s collective boundary within their host nation is not an involuntary membership unlike 
the one in relation to a state.
It is also true that in the later period since the 1980s, the tendency has gradually turned 
towards emphasising less collectivity than before. This was the case for the Josbnjok as the 
response to apprehension of further isolation, left aside in the remote region, and for the 
Zainichi, as the opposition to deep rooted negative functions and the structural problems of 
organisations. The Koreitsy community has gradually progressed towards a movement that 
seeks more visible forms of collective existence. The penultimate chapter further develops the 
formation of a diaspora’s own kind of collective identity. A diaspora’s distinctive identity will 
be more clearly explicated through analysing a diaspora’s process of identifying and 
differentiating itself with/from the Korean nation.
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6 Identification vis-a-vis the Motherland
In this chapter, I present the formation of diaspora identity reflected in the relationship between 
diaspora and homeland. Prior to forming a stable dual nationality, diasporas are exposed to 
certain historical periods of confusion during which their particularities are shaped. A sudden or 
renewed communication with the homeland is one of the crucial causes of a diaspora’s initial 
confusion.1 Despite the dissimilarity among the cases in terms of pattern and duration, initially 
there is a degree of fluctuation in the sense of national identity until a stable diaspora identity is 
formed through the acceptance and reinterpretation of the diaspora’s inevitable duality and 
difference vis-k-vis the Korean nation. And yet, certain preconditions explained in the previous 
two chapters play categorical roles in due course. In other words, a de-ethnicised citizenship that 
can accommodate a diaspora’s historical existence (Chapter 4) and a diaspora’s efforts to 
maintain collectivity (Chapter 5) precondition the process of building a self-reliant mature 
diaspora community. Through analysing a diaspora’s interpretation and reinterpretation of their 
collective identity as a self-defining process, the third type of national identity is delineated, the 
theoretical ground of which was discussed in Chapter 2.
The process of differentiation as a part of identity building has continued throughout the 
history of incorporation. As a result, a diaspora’s identity evolves as a collective identity 
distinguishable from the existing national identity. This third type of national identity can be 
conceptualised as opposed to a constantly stable national identity grown out of a situation in 
which one belongs to a dominant national group with their own externally recognised 
independent state. Thus, s/he is also undoubtedly entitled to be a first-class citizen. The third 
type of national identity is also understood by comparing it against a person from a minority 
national group who views his/her dual nationality as highly negative or abnormal. On the 
contrary, the third type of national identity can be nurtured when the plurality of a national 
identity is positively accepted and interpreted as an advantage, ultimately leading to a concept 
that national identity can be regarded as an individual choice when so wished. Diasporas’ 
inherent tensions generate a particular kind of collective identity. Such tensions include, as I 
have partly explained in previous chapters, firstly, the dilemma between the maintenance of 
distinctiveness and a fuller degree of incorporation; secondly, conflicting necessity between 
certain degree of visible collectivity and concealing their own cultural or historical background 
vis-^-vis the host nation; finally, the task of selective acceptance of the motherland’s influence. 
The rest of this chapter concerns this final feature of a diaspora identity.
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The third sphere of national identity within a triangular structure
Extended claims of sovereignty and the control of diasporas
Mostly diaspora communities are seen as political means rather than humanitarian ends by the 
government of a homeland, depending on changing political agendas. Sheffer (1984) illuminates 
the common lukewarm attitudes of home countries toward their diaspora communities. ‘While 
diasporas maintain ties with their homelands, the attitudes of the homelands vis-a-vis their 
diasporas may be vague’ (11). It is common that diasporas are not always supported by their 
homelands. For example, ‘India did not intervene on behalf of its diaspora when it was 
persecuted and expelled from Uganda ... The corollary of this situation is that diasporas do not 
always support the current government in their homelands’ (ibid.). The relationship between 
Korean diasporas and their homeland is not the exception.
Seemingly, it is out of the question why diasporas develop a differentiated national 
identity from that of their homelands. Quite obviously, it is because they have undertaken 
different paths to modernisation and nation-building process. Nevertheless, it is also meaningful 
to explain to what extent a diaspora’s own sphere of collective identity has evolved differently 
from that of the Korean nation, together with accounts on its implications. Insufficient 
understanding of those issues cause confusion when dealing with problems and issues regarding 
overseas Koreans and emerging re-migrants to South Korea. The questions of to what extent re­
migrants to South Korea should be perceived as Koreans and how much the state of the 
homeland should be involved in the legal and social affairs of diaspora communities abroad 
have arisen as related issues.
Political background o f transnationalism
Korean nationalism is built on a mixture of inferiority springing from colonial memory, 
insecurity from the geopolitical condition and confidence generated by the experience of 
economic success. Both South and North Koreas are typical examples of states that promulgate 
exclusive ethnocised nationalism with strong emphasis on self-celebrating cultural dispositions, 
traditions, particular value systems and blood tie. Korean nationalism has been consolidated 
through the continuous revival of cultural and traditional heritages rather than through the 
efforts of discontinuing the historical and premodem features of nation to which Hutchinson’s 
(2000) explanation of ‘ethnic revival’ (654) is applicable. During the most rapid industrialisation 
period of the 1960s and 1970s, state nationalism was effectively consolidated by re-emphasising 
traditional values and customs. The then president Park Jung Hee took Japan as a model for 
Korean modernisation by effectively strengthening traditional values and ethnic customs as the
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bases of official political ideology. Similarly to Japanese society, South Korea has developed a 
nationalism discourse with emphasis on blood ties, familism, strong loyalty to the state and 
racial homogeneity.2 Since the late 1980s, Korean ethnic nationalism has re-emerged and spread 
to overseas Koreans. Cultural exclusivism has been accompanied by the agenda of 
transnationalism. The trend may be understood in a similar context to Huntington’s (1996) or 
Eagleton’s (2000) term ‘culture war’. In spite of some misinterpretations and exaggerations of 
the word nihonjnron, Japan is not the exception to promoting transnational soft power, being 
obsessed with nihonjnron in the mid-1980s. South Korean rhetoric of promoting pan Koreanism 
called, hanminjok-gongdongche, literally meaning the community of the Korean nation, is 
explicable in the same context.
The idea of hanminjok-gongdongche was initiated by the Roh Tae Woo regime in the 
late 1980s. The primary concern of the state project was to build a theoretical principle by which 
the unification agenda regains legitimacy. Racial and ethnic commonalities are re-emphasised. It 
was believed that political reunification would smoothly follow when the cultural and economic 
gap between the two parties is reduced. Such an agenda required support from Korean 
immigrant communities elsewhere, particularly Jos6njok, Zainichi, and Koreitsy communities. 
Naturally, academic projects related to this agenda have been encouraged. One of the examples 
is the wide range of studies on Josdnjok, Zainichi, and Koreitsy communities among South 
Korean scholars since the late 1980s, sponsored by various government institutions. Among 
historians in particular the reinterpretation of Balh’ae history has been encouraged by 
government and public alike. Table 6.1 reflects such an increasing interest in the region.
Table 6.1 Research trend on history of Manchu
South
Korea
North
Korea
Japan China Russia Total
Before 1949 10 124 18 19 171
1950-1959 2 0 24 7 9 42
1960-1969 6 10 39 15 22 92
1970-1979 18 8 44 31 33 134
1980-1989 80 17 78 432 48 655
1990-1994 131 46 51 184 20 432
Total 247 81 360 687 151 1,526
Percentage 16% 5% 24% 45% 10% 100%
Source: Guksa-py6nchan-uiounhoe ‘Balh’ae’, hanguksa, vol. 10, Seoul: Guksa-py6nchan-uiounhoe, 1996.
The agenda behind today’s culture war is the achieving or enlarging of political 
dominance. Previously marginalised groups have been reintegrated into the political discourse. 
Domestic political leaders begin to claim sovereignty over people who have the same historical 
background in order to ensure the state legitimacy of governance. The transnational agenda 
includes emphasising obscure loyalty to the Korean national culture, and stimulating nostalgia 
and historical memories. This, at times, unintentionally instigates a diaspora’s antagonism to
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their host nation and evokes a host state’s distrust of the diaspora. Economic benefits are also 
involved. During the financial crisis in the late 1990s in South Korea, statistics have shown that 
incoming funds from overseas Koreans were unexpectedly high. Diasporas’ political 
contributions to the homeland have been the vital issue while both South and North Koreas have 
taken diaspora communities as the diplomatic base and the means of ideological dominance.
With the background of changes in political environment surrounding diaspora 
communities, the incoherent motherland policies towards overseas Koreans and unarticulated 
concepts of diasporas have provided confusing routes in establishing a sound relationship 
between diaspora and homeland. However, the relationship varies depending on each diaspora’s 
specific mode of imagining its homeland and participating in homeland affairs. The key 
variables, common to all three cases, are the impacts of the division of a nation, rigid 
confrontation throughout the Cold War during 1960s and the projection of South Korean 
nationalism since the late 1980s. The Josonjok tend to regard their connection with South Korea 
as an economic opportunity although being closer, politically and ideologically, to North Korea, 
whereas the Zainichi have ever been engaged in the politics of the divided Korea. Meanwhile, 
the Koreitsy’s long period of envisaging their homeland has just ended. They recently required 
substantial interactions, in particular, a cultural aspect especially with the South.
Meanwhile, the cultivation of ties between the homeland and a diaspora ‘may also be 
aimed at ensuring that the diaspora remains diasporic, rather than becoming returnees’ (King: 
1998, 11). Established diaspora communities are useful only when they remain as Korean 
diasporas abroad. It is also seen that in the absence of a clear legal categorisation of a diaspora’s 
official nationality, systems are abused by a highly mobile diaspora population. A number of 
social and economic crimes committed by Korean American re-emigrds to South Korea since 
the late 1990s should be considered in this context. Unlike the prevalent perception, which 
comfortably assumes a diaspora’s nostalgic attachment to its motherland, significant disparities 
and tensions between the two parties are also observed. The recent symbolic cases introduced in 
the following sections demonstrate the fundamental problems between motherland and diaspora 
communities. Such problems and tensions provide diasporas with the opportunities to rethink 
their national identity and to re-interpret who they are in the extended context of motherland- 
host state and the larger international setting. It shows the process of a diaspora’s realisation of 
the disparity between a fictional image of the motherland and their practical common interest. 
On the motherland’s part, planned communication with knowledge and vision of diaspora 
communities can only mitigate and positively guide the potential antagonism of diasporas and 
their over-expectations of motherland.
Not only the changes in the two Koreas’ policy toward diasporas, but the division of the 
Korean motherland itself is one of the major factors influencing the national identity of the 
diaspora. Although the historical fact of the division of the nation occurred in 1953, the
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formation of identity regarding such a divided nation has been influential throughout history. 
This is through active involvement in the unification project, to a deeper degree in the case of 
Japan, in both sides or through imagination without actual communication in the two other cases.
National identity as a choice
Among diasporas, whether one actually belongs to the diaspora community or not is very much 
dependent on individual choice because a diaspora is not a fixed form of political or legal 
boundary or association. Although it has a kind of historical and cultural demarcation, as Tamir 
(1993) and Gutmann (2003) imply, providing the social environment to make such a choice is a 
political issue.3 Within the diaspora, there may be some who would want to live in personhood 
beyond such a categorisation as national or ethnic. One may want to live an entirely private 
existence. Social psychologists, Malesevic and Malesevic (2001) argue that both primordialism 
and modernism neglect the fact that individuals have different contextual perceptions of national 
identity. Accordingly, they suggest the consideration of different types of individuals in terms of 
orientation towards national identity. Their categorisation suggests there are different levels or 
stages of perceiving collective identity in terms of nation or ethnie; ‘Ritual ethnic identity’ 
referring to a high level of retention of the practice of ethnic traditions accompanied by a low 
level of subjective components such as feelings of group obligation, ‘ideological ethnic identity’ 
implying a high intensity of feelings of group obligation accompanied by a low level of practice 
of traditions, ‘identity of resistance/revolt’ remarking negative images of one’s own ethnic 
group, accompanied by a high degree of awareness of one’s ethnic ancestry, and finally, 
‘identity of ethnic rediscovery’ referring to positive images of one’s ancestral group 
accompanied by a practice of highly selected traditions.4 Consequently, within a diaspora group, 
there are a number of differing degrees, strengths, and reasons for interpreting a diaspora’s 
national identity.
Although I focus on diaspora identity in the extended setting: Korean motherlands, other 
diaspora communities and the globalised international community, the particular aspect of 
diaspora identity explained here is inseparable from diaspora features developed within the 
structural relationship between host nation and diaspora and between organisations and diaspora 
individuals. This is because the evolution of diaspora identity has never been separated from 
host countries’ dominance and influence. In my intention, the national identity of a diaspora is 
not limited to meaning that Korean diasporas have formed their own separate national identity. 
Self-evidently, the diasporas under this study do not have their own separate nation, but they are 
not nationless. On the contrary, they belong to plural nations, thus, plural national identities 
have evolved. Such plurality in a diaspora’s national identity has been regarded as a confusing 
and unstable collective identity, which, thus, leads to it being regarded as an untrustful
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community. But, once its duality or plurality is accepted as a stable and normal ‘hybrid’ in 
Bhabha’s term, one can understand a diaspora’s national identity as another type of national 
identity, a hybrid, as explained, not as confusing mixture but as a different domain, 
notwithstanding its inevitable linkage with the plural nations involved. As diasporas can position 
themselves in different settings, their interpretation of collective selves gradually develops into 
an awareness of clear difference and complexity. By expanding and deepening their 
interpretation of collective selves, diasporas continuously build their own sphere of identity to 
differing degrees and over differing time spans in each case. This can be explained as being the 
response to the paradigm shift: from the exclusive loyalty to a single nation in a rigid 
international framework with the hidden agenda of nation-state towards flexible understandings 
of multiple nationalities. Host state, motherland and international political environment, 
diasporas have imposed the idea on diasporas that they should position themselves in the frame 
of a citizen or a non-citizen. Through increased communication with the outside public world, 
diasporas perceive the extended structure in which they are situated. In due course, diasporas 
form a different kind of national identity of their own. For this, one may speak of an identity of 
the third kind. This implies an alternative to the conventional paradigm which perceives national 
identity as something rigidly belonging to an internationally legitimised political entity with a 
firm territorial base and exclusive attachment to a singular national culture. The third kind of 
national identity connotes more an optional and controllable national identity. Diasporas who 
have this third identity are able to think both in and out of the nation to which they are supposed 
conventionally to belong. They are exposed to multiple national cultures, and know how to shift 
their identities under changing circumstances when necessary. Diasporas may stabilise their 
plural national identities through positive interpretation of their third-ness. Throughout the 
modem history of the nationalised state building process, this third-ness of diaspora identity has 
been somehow demoralised.
Forming a diaspora identity
The major historical issues related to the formation of a diaspora’s identity broadly include the 
three elements: the colonial history of Korea, the Korean War and the subsequent division of the 
nation, and South Korean economic success and its benefits for the diaspora communities. The 
colonial history of Korea and the unsettled issues between Korea and Japan are the major 
component of Zainichi history. Meanwhile, the Josdnjok used proudly to cite their experience of 
participating in the Korean War, fighting against American imperialism by joining the North 
Korean side. In accordance with increasing communication with South Korea, Josdnjok 
intellectuals emphasise less and less their antagonistic historical memory against the South. 
Among the Koreitsy, the meaning of the Korean nation to their identity is related to South
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Korean economic support and the Christian influence of the western Korean emigrant  ^
communities.
Jos5njok identity
The Meaning o f the Korean motherland to the Josdnjok
Common to the three cases, is the division of the Korean nation, one of the key variables of 
identity formation. Although it is abstract, aspiration for reunification as a common national 
agenda has linked diaspora Koreans and the Korean motherland. As a part of a divided nation, 
for the Korean diasporas, the issue of the image of their homeland is related to their views on 
reunification. All the interviewees in China regard the issue of reunification as an imperative 
question regardless of their ideological affiliation. For them, there is no need to explain, and the 
hope for reunification is instinctive. For diaspora Koreans in the three cases, an emotive sense of 
belonging to their Korean homeland means a nostalgic feeling toward the unified Korea. Korean 
diasporas are often puzzled and made uncomfortable by outsiders’ curiosity on whether they see 
themselves as North Koreans or South Koreans. In their psychological map, such a division is 
hardly acceptable. The imagined homeland of the diaspora is psychologically expanded 
incoherently with the real political territory of the present homeland.
On the question of the impacts of the division of the nation and the issues of 
reunification in this region, ‘we have been ashamed of the fact that our nation is still in division 
and we experienced the civil war. Sometimes Hanjok friends bring out the issue of the divided 
nation in a despising way. Josdnjok used to be well-qualified to compete with Hanjok but these 
days we feel that Hanjok’s development is far faster than Josonjoks in many fields. We Josonjok 
have felt serious threats. To have a stronger nation nearby, a unified Korea, would be, no doubt, 
very encouraging for us’.5 Among intellectuals, the Josdnjok agree that they should not be 
involved in either side of the two Koreas, in order to be able to play the useful role of mediators. 
Regarding their cooperation with the CCP’s involvement in the Korean War, an interviewee 
makes the excuse that ‘[t]he whole region was in chaos and people were extremely insecure. We 
were put into a truck with a bunch of loosely armed civilians. No one knew exactly where we 
were going and what was happening’. Historical research should be carried out in greater detail 
on this issue. ‘We had just heard that our Korean homeland is again in danger because of 
American imperialist aggression’. Among historians, research on this issue is underway. 
Whatever the correct historical fact is, the notable point is that some Josdnjok have selected this 
particular collective experience as an element that may prove a confrontational national identity 
against Korean nation. Their version of the interpretation will soon be developed now that the 
Josdnjok are aware of the fact that their community may benefit South Korea less by
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highlighting their conflicting collective identity against the Korean nation. This may be viewed 
as the process of negotiation over antagonistic collective identities.
It is worth quoting interview with J. Han:
Reunification should be inevitably achieved although neighbouring countries 
including China may well prefer the status-quo.6 Reunification is what our whole 
nation aspires to and it will be achieved anyway. It’s just a matter of time. Josdn 
had been a unified independent nation for over several thousand years as the 
South Korean president Kim Dae Jung pointed out. It is nonsense to say that a 
fifty-year division would hamper us from being together again. Political ideology 
is a superficial difference. We all share the same contents of nation despite the 
superficial styles which have modified into three different modes. For example, 
we all enjoy Ch’unhyangjon, Korean traditional novels, and we sing Arirang, the 
national folk song. We may present them in different ways but still they share 
exactly the same contents.
The interviewee was in charge of mediating meetings between South and North Korean 
officials prior to the Summit Meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong II in May 2000. If 
employing Armstrong’s typology in this case, it is true that ‘mobilized diasporas have often 
been more directly involved in foreign policy’ (Armstrong: 1976,400). The interview text above 
concerning reunification is a common view among the Josdnjok people. ‘Regarding the 
unification issue, Josdnjok should not be divided into two like in the Zainichi community in 
Japan. What we can do now is to help the two regimes build a sound foundation for 
reunification. When the conditions are met, we should let our next generation decide whether 
they still want to or not’.7
Josdnjok intellectuals have been involved in reunification matters as mediators, playing 
roles between China and the two Koreas including interpretation, consultancy and research 
spurred on by the South Korean Northward policy. The government project during the Rho Tae 
Woo regime was continued by the Kim Young Sam regime. The current debates on the 
historical territory, Manchu, between South Korean and Chinese social scientists and historians 
well reflect the agenda. In the same vein, a group of South Korean historians and politicians 
have claimed Korea’s territorial sovereignty over the Balh’ae region on historical grounds by 
equating it with the Korean nation. Major historians in South Korea, who have been involved in 
this subject and provoked territorial claims, include Kim Dek Hwang, Yang Tae Jin, Yuk Nak 
Hyun, Bae Hu Seong and Cho Kwang. Scholars of international law with the same standing as 
those historians include, for example, Choi Jang Geun and Noh Young Don.
On 24 August, 1992, there was a joint declaration between South Korea and China in 
relation to the enlargement of economic relations between the two countries. For South Korea, 
the purpose of the normalisation of diplomatic relations with China was both for the sake of 
trade and the North Korean issue. South Korea had hoped China would play a more positive
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role in improving South and North Korean relations for reunification in consideration of the 
Chinese influence over North Korea. For China, South Korea was the fifth largest trading 
partner at the time that direct trade relations were started in 1987. In 1990, the Korean Trade 
Mission to China was established, recording USD3,800 million trading volume. The volume 
had increased to USD5,800 million in 1991 and the interchange of personnel between the two 
countries has reached one hundred thousand. The development in economic relations between 
the two countries was pictured in such way when the then South Korean president and his 
Chinese counterpart had a summit meeting at the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) 
conference on 12 November, 1991. Meanwhile, Josdnjok identity vis-^-vis North Korea has 
developed in a rather different way. Apart from the short period of the Cultural Revolution, the 
Josdnjok and North Koreans enjoyed relatively free movements with an application of simple 
formality. Resulting from the severe suppression during the Cultural Revolution, statistics show 
a decreasing number of the Josdnjok population between 1964 and 1982. Some changed their 
national origins and some successfully fled back to the North Korean border with North Korea’s 
support, which was strictly banned at that time.
For older generations, strong opinions for reunification are based more on the mixture of 
emotive, nostalgic aspiration and ideological reasons. Meanwhile, for younger generations in 
their 40s and younger, the issue is more related to their own identity and aspirations to obtain 
Korean national status for various practical and emotional reasons. Younger generations become 
reluctant to express their political affiliations for either South or North Korea. Psychological 
attachment to the homeland is not always the same as political affiliation. ‘The homeland 
relationship may differ from one segment of the diaspora to another’ (Butler: 2001, 204). As 
with the other two cases, some Josdnjok whose hometowns and relatives are in the South, were 
politically affiliated and cooperative with the North Korean regime and vice versa.
Diasporas’ varied attitudes towards the motherland can be explained by the factor of 
mass education which is interlinked with the generation factor. In other words, the factors refer 
diasporas’ exposure to the host nation’s institutionalised mass education in addition to the 
duration of exposure to the host society’s national culture. It is true that, unlike third and fourth 
generations, first and second generation Korean diasporas rarely had the chance to be 
incorporated into a modem mass educational system. Older generations, however, have a more 
vivid memory and the experience of anticolonial struggles which evidently nurtured their 
nationalism of sort. On the contrary, the younger generation’s national identity bears a mixed 
kind of nationalism through undergoing two different or sometimes conflicting educations. 
Their education comprises private and familial lessons on the one hand, and public state 
imposed education on the other. Among diasporas, social problems reflecting generation gaps 
are often exposed through the issues of conflicting interpretations over a diaspora’s history and 
national identity. It is common that older generation diasporas possess stronger sentiments or
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opinions regarding their homeland. However, Josdnjok society has undergone rapid changes 
since the late 1980s. During this period, public discourse has exhibited the Josdnjok’s 
reinterpretation of their national identity in relation to the Korean nation. Table 6.2 below 
summarises how Josdnjok interviewees view the consequences of renewed communication 
between South Korea and the Josdnjok community.
Table 6.2
Summary o f interviews with Josdnjok intellectuals on the issue of South Korean influence
Positive impacts Negative impacts
Professor of history Increase of communications 
in the held of culture and 
education
Sudden flow of capitalist 
culture including social 
problems such as 
prostitution, divorce and 
social crimes
Writer Stimulation of ethnic identity 
and national consciousness
Ideological barrier
Researcher of a state run 
institute
Higher possibility of 
reunification and economic 
development
Colonial relationship 
between South Korea and 
Josdnjok region 
Cultural gap
Instigating Josdnjok’s self- 
determination
Media specialist Cultural development
Retired journalist Economic development and 
family reunion
R ow o f vulgar culture 
Mis-communication 
developed into antagonism
Buisinessman Awareness of ethnic and 
national identity
Awareness of exclusion both 
from Han Chinese and South 
Koreans
Head of a social science 
research institute
Higher possibility of 
reunification and economic 
development
Local government official Increased possibility o f  
forming a strong national 
community and economic 
development
Dispersal o f Josdnjok and 
decrease of population
University researcher Awareness of globalisation 
and opportunity of economic 
development
Limited degree of 
development only 
incorporating to South 
Korean economy
Professor of social science Economic development Ideological barrier
Such process that is, differentiating diasporas’ collective identity from the Korean 
nation has been fused with the overall transformation of Chinese society. The new social value 
imposed by the Chinese government since the Open Door Policy has urged people to adjust 
themselves to the market-oriented world. ‘To survive in a competitive market society, people 
need to adjust their negative and pre-modem ideas to the rapid economic changes by 
encouraging individual wills and creativity. To do so, the urgent task for people in our 
prefecture is emancipation from ideology’.8 The social trends of emphasising economic
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development are reflected in every work unit. The newspaper article below shows the political 
atmosphere of reform taking the Ydnbyon broadcasting company as an example. ‘In the past, 
the Ydnbyon broadcasting company lacks competition mechanism. The employers in this work 
unit have been paid for doing nothing. It is time to root out equalism. Instead, entrepreneurship 
should be introduced. In the company, there are about 23 employees whose positions are already 
in jeopardy’.9 Previously regarded as Josdnjok towns and cities only nominally remain as 
Josdnjok regions due to internal migration and reshuffling of ethnic composition backed by 
industrialisation and urbanisation. National or ethnic differences had not been highlighted in the 
past; whether it was Josdnjok or Han Chinese did not matter when all people were treated 
equally in terms of salary and social position. Now people in the region have to compete with 
one another because the positions are not given by the government. By introducing a sudden 
competition mechanism into Josdnjok society, the Josdnjok have faced problems of competition 
with Hanjok. It is also the case that Josdnjok companies and South Korean companies in Jilin 
prefer to employ Josdnjok. This is mainly because of practical convenience and advantages; 
language is the most important reason. Naturally, the opposite applies to the Han Chinese-run 
employers.
In the same way, when Han Chinese take over the position of the head of work units, for 
instance, Josdnjok believe that they will be disadvantaged not only because of a natural fondness 
of their own group of people but also because of a lack of capabilities when they compete with 
Han Chinese from inner China. Meanwhile, the Josdnjok accept such changes as natural and 
politically fair. For them, the state is not an object from which they can require extended rights, 
but they perceive that the Josdnjok have been beneficiaries of the Chinese government. When 
social positions and occupations are no longer allocated by a government plan, companies prefer 
choosing employees with the same cultural background in a multinational social environment 
when other conditions of candidates are equal and unless affirmative actions are implemented. 
Overall, the Josdnjok had been positive about the continuous development of the region and 
proud of being members of a flourishing minority national group within China, until they 
realised that the Josdnjok community is in crisis in many aspects. It is also true that some 
Josdnjok believe that central government has cut the special budget for minority regions to curb 
the development of the Josdnjok region offering the excuse of institutionalising a competition 
system on a social level.
Also, class stratification in Josdnjok society occurred within the economic relationship 
between South Korea and the Josdnjok. Among the Josdnjok, there have.been many successful 
entrepreneurs and businessmen with South Korean connections. They were admired by others 
who did not succeed in making timely adjustment to the changed mechanism. Consequently, 
among Josdnjok businessmen, those who have connections with South Korea more positively 
adjust themselves to the system of market capitalism and emphasise cultural ties with South
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Korea. Many of them hope to obtain South Korean nationality. Such group of Josdnjok now 
enjoy a far higher standard of living in the region.
The rapid economic development in Yanbian has been impressive since the late 1980s. 
The changes in industrial structure prove this. Between 1980 and 1997, the primary and 
secondary industries showed sharp drops from 23.6 to 16.8 per cent, in case of the primary 
industry, and from 51.2 to 41.6 per cent, in the case of secondary industry. In contrast, in the 
sector of the tertiary industry, the ratio had markedly gone up by 16.4 per cent, from 25.2 
percent in 1980 to 41.6 per cent in 1997. Yanji city is ranked first in terms of savings per capita 
(nationwide indicator), expenditure level (province level), usage rate of communication means 
including postal services, cars and telephones. Before the Open Door policy, such prosperity 
accompanying population migration was unthinkable, especially for the immobile populations in 
remote rural areas, owing to the strict administrative regulations in China. Statistics show that in 
the case of four Josdnjok counties in the Heilyonjiang area, in 1996 the rate of television and 
telephone supply per household was 100 per cent and 45 per cent respectively, which is above 
the average in China.10 As a consequence, the industrial structure has been rapidly shifted.
As a result of urbanisation, population flow has become an important issue. The 
Josdnjok population is not only decreasing but also dispersing. The direct causes of population 
dispersal are that, firstly, labour migration to other cities has occurred continuously within China 
or to foreign countries, notably South Korea, Japan and North America. Secondly, the increased 
number of marriages between Josdnjok women and South Korean men has caused the dispersal 
of Josdnjok families. Subsequently, capital flow from Josdnjok labourers working abroad has 
made an enormous contribution to the GDP increase in the Josdnjok region. In Heilongjiang 
Province in 1996, the currency flow from abroad through Josdnjok workers in foreign countries 
was approximately USD12 million in total.11 Considering the fact that the average Josdnjok 
college graduate white-collar worker earns USD60 per month, such an amount of capital is 
sufficient to restructure the previously backward community.
As the result of the dispersal phenomenon, the number of Josdnjok peasants is 
dramatically decreasing. This spurred Han Chinese peasant penetration into the agricultural 
lands of the region. Han Chinese have taken up the Josdnjok lands. Also, occupations requiring 
relatively lower level skills, such as taxi drivers, street vendors and cleaners are being taken up 
by Han Chinese. This is because, as Josdnjok themselves interpret it the Josdnjok have a 
tendency to engage in jobs that bring them immediate rewards whereas the Han Chinese prefer 
steady long-term occupations. ‘For Josdnjok, life is supposed to be enjoyed ... Maybe it is 
because they are fundamentally insecure and do not know what would happen to them in the 
near future’.12 ‘Josdnjok earn money from South Korea and we, Hanjok, earn Josonjok’s money 
because normally Josdnjok are extravagant, which means in the end Josdnjok’s money is 
coming into our pocket anyway’.13
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In accordance with the development of a capitalistic mechanism, choosing an 
occupation and making wealth become more to do with an individual’s own efforts and abilities. 
The previously Josdnjok regions have faced the stage of the gradual retreat of government 
support in many aspects of social and economic life. People are struggling with the dramatic 
social and economic changes involved in adjusting themselves to the capitalistic spirit. The 
degree of loyalty to the communist party used to be the key barometer of a successful and 
promising life among the Josonjok. Since Deng’s reform policy especially in the late 1980s, 
successful businessmen who made a huge fortune are highly acclaimed by the party, which 
causes a fundamental impact on the value system of ordinary people. Political loyalty to the 
state and the Party with a firm belief in communism is no longer regarded as the indicator of 
success.
To the Josdnjok since 1980s during the period of rapid changes, communication with 
South Korea had brought timely opportunities and South Korea was found easier to deal with. 
Various factors boosted the Josdnjok’s Korean dream. The South Korean government took an 
active role to involve Josdnjok people in the project of enhancing communication with China 
and North Korea and other areas such as trade, cultural exchange and academic research 
followed the political project. There were both positive and negative consequences, and 
discussion of the conflicts between emotive cultural ties and practical interests have been 
developed in both societies: South Korea and the Josdnjok community. In the meantime, 
diasporas have come to realise who they are vis-it-vis the ancestral motherland and how to cope 
with their dual national allegiances depending on changing circumstances.
While hostility against the South Korean people and government is growing, some have 
been enthusiastic to trace back their family roots in South Korea. Especially among those in the 
Liaonyong Province, people who have the family name Pak have made an effort to incorporate 
their family lineage into their clan lines in South Korea. Unlike the Josdnjok in Jilin Province, 
they have been more acculturated with other ethnic or national groups, and those previously 
reported as either Han Chinese or Manchu have reported themselves as Josdnjok upon frequent 
contacts with the Korean motherland. Some Josdnjok had concealed their national origin for the 
reason that it used to be more convenient and safer, especially for those who came from the 
southern part of Korea, during the Cultural Revolution. Recently, however, having a connection 
with South Korean relatives became an important qualification for travelling or working in 
South Korea.
Among the Josdnjok, the awareness of the practical necessity of preserving some part of 
the Korean identity is accompanied by the restoration of national heritages. The Josdnjok people 
from Ryongjdng are proud of the fact that one of the national resistant poets, Yun Dong Joo, 
who suffered from Japanese oppression and died in jail as one of the victims of biological 
experiments at the age of twenty-eight, was bom and went to junior high school in Ryongjdng,
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Yanbian. For various historical and political reasons, it was not until the 1990s when Yun Dong 
Joo and his work became well-known to ordinary Josdnjok people, whereas Koreans share the 
memory of him as one of the most nationalistic figures. In the preface of the Yun Dong Joo 
memorial collection, Jeong Pan Ryong commented, as he (Yun Dong Joo) determined in his 
poem, S6-shi, he lived a life that was ‘Shameless before God’. Although he had to live in the 
dark and oppressive era during which our nation was forced to forget our own names let alone 
our language, he kept writing numerous poems and essays in our own language. He never 
compromised until death ... We hereby decide to publish his work in Yanbian in order to let 
Josdnjok people be aware of his sufferings and contributions to our nation [here, by nation, he 
means the Korean nation inclusively], not only to Josonjok but also to Chinese people.14
The collection also includes a Chinese translation, and financial support was provided 
by South Korea. The Josonjok’s national pride surrounding Yun Dong Joo suddenly emerged in 
the early 1990s. In the late 1980s, the building of Kwang-mydng Junior High School15 to which 
Yun Dong Joo went between 1936 and 1938 was opened to the public as a tourist attraction 
especially for South Korean visitors. Now people in Ryongjong compete with the Josdnjok in 
Yanbian over the issues of who more vigorously participated in nationalist movements against 
Japan, and who have maintained Korean traditions and heritage more authentically. This is an 
example of what I explained as competition among diasporas for recognition from ancestral 
motherlands upon renewed communication included in the analytical framework in Chapter 2. 
One could also see it as a revival of national traditions rather than an ‘invention of traditions’ in 
Hobsbawm’s term (1983) which have long been forgotten and left as unsophisticated. People 
would hardly celebrate arbitrarily invented traditions. Only the manner of celebrating cultural 
heritages can be modernised by inventive means.
Developing the areas as historic vestiges naturally involved frequent communication 
and active cooperation between South Korean and Josdnjok experts. These experts include 
historians, researchers, educators, social activists, politicians and financial supporters from 
various civil associations. This was stimulating not only for Josdnjok historians but also for 
ordinary people in the town. Now some Josdnjok, at least those in the city of Ryongjdng, are 
aware of the meaning of this nationalist poet to them. They begin to be aware that the reason 
why preserving some national cultures and history is valuable to them is that not only it is 
profitable, it is also valued by outsiders.
The turning point: the peskama-ho case and afterwards
The criminal case of the fishing ferry Peskama was a turning point that alerted Josdnjok 
society to reconsider the meaning of homeland and the Korean nation to them. Whereas the 
Peskama-ho incident was neglected by the South Korean media, for the Josdnjok it was a
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humiliating and irrevocable impulse damaging their collective pride. The case might be seen as 
one of the unavoidable negative outcomes of increased communication. The situation and 
development of criminal motive, however, should be considered as a symbolic case 
demonstrating the Josonjoks’ growing antagonism toward South Korea, frustrated expectation 
and psychological conflicts. By continuously dealing with the related issues in highly 
sensational ways, Josdnjok newspapers have also strongly instigated Josdnjok disappointment 
and antagonism against South Korea.
Large numbers of illegal Josdnjok workers have entered South Korea and taken jobs in 
low-waged manual sectors of the economy. The incident happened in June, 1996, by the time 
the Josonjok’s Korean dream had reached its peak. Six Josdnjok crews who were hired by the 
South Korean captain of the Peskama-ho, fishing ferry, were all involved in the murder case; 
seven South Korean crew members, along with other crews from other nationalities were 
murdered in August 1996. The six Josdnjok were charged and convicted of murder, violence 
and neglecting dead bodies.16 There was no sympathy with the Josdnjok murderers and the case 
had not been highlighted until the brutality of the South Korean crews and the captain toward 
the Josdnjok crews was revealed in great detail during the investigation period. It was 
discovered that the Josdnjok had to stand cruel discriminations, not only in terms of wage levels 
but also various forms of humiliations. The Josdnjok were shocked and infuriated by the case as 
the South Korean crews’ brutalities were reported. The trial for the case was delayed until 
recently with a South Korean civil associations’ support. The associations represented by social 
activists including lawyers, students, and ordinary citizens keep appealing to the congressmen 
and president in South Korea.
A book entitled, South Korea Doesn’t Exist, written by a Josdnjok writer called Kim Jae 
Gook and published in 1998 in Yanbian brought significant reflections to the society. The book 
warns of the Josdnjok who believe in the Korean dream. The social trends reflected in the 
publication and people’s reactions convey the Josdnjok awareness of their own situation 
separate from the South Korean nation. In the same context, Ahn Hwa Chun, during interview, 
points out that ‘some have serious misunderstandings about Josdnjok society from the very 
beginning. The Josdnjok assume that their society shares all cultural features with mainland 
Korean society in spite of different political regimes forming different states. In reality, 
however, Josdnjok culture itself has been changed a great deal. Culture is not permanently static 
regardless of any social and political changes’. He warns of the exaggeration of cultural 
attachment and emotive attachment to the motherland. Even the Josdn-mal (the Korean 
language) the Josdnjok use is modified to a considerable extent although it is still communicable 
with Koreans from the two Koreas’. Conservative Josdnjok nationalists, including Ahn Hwa 
Chun himself, tend to emphasise the Josdnjoks’ identity as being different from both the 
Chinese and the Korean nations. The distinction between culture and identity can be recalled.
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What the Josonjok are struggling for is not preserving the authenticity of national culture itself 
but to form their diaspora’s own stable identity as being Josonjok in China. As I argued in the 
second section of Chapter 2 and throughout the main chapters, the decisive constituent 
demarcating the distinctiveness of a diaspora identity is the history of their own. This is 
applicable not only to the diaspora identity vis-^-vis the hostland but also to its identity vis-a-vis 
its homeland, as diasporas have their separate collective historical memories from their nation of 
homeland. Culture is modifiable and shareable, thus acculturation occurs. A separate history 
filled with collective memories is not such a case, therefore only interpretations are refashioned. 
This is more so when the memories are oppressive and negative. For a simple example, the 
Korean nation in Korea would never be able to share the Josdnjoks’ oppressive memory of the 
Cultural Revolution.
The common view among scholars and specialists of the region is that the Josdnjok 
became antagonistic towards South Koreans mainly because the South Koreans had mistreated 
the Josdnjok between 1989 and the early 1990s, and more fundamentally because of the long 
period of interrupted communication. The formation of the Josdnjok identity is in a phase of 
highlighting differences with the Korean motherland after undergoing a short period of positive 
identification with Korean diasporas elsewhere. In a sense, however, Josdnjok antagonism 
towards South Korea has been nurtured by the host country during a particular period during 
which the Josdnjok were mobilised to participate in the Korean War, and during rigid 
communist regimes. Antagonism towards North Korea, on the other hand, was projected harshly 
during the Cultural Revolution. Until now the Josdnjok shared the painful memory of the 
government’s strict ban on moving back to North Korea during that time. It shows that forming 
images of the homeland, in the Josdnjok case, was also dependent on government propaganda 
and political ideology not only with the diaspora’s own interpretation of major historical events.
Considering the fact that the interpretation of history can vary from group to group, the 
Josdnjok history has only been incorporated into Chinese history for the past fifty years or so; 
some intellectuals are concerned about the lack of opportunity for the Josdnjok to learn their 
own history. When Josdnjok children learn historical views that contradict what they know from 
different sources, it is natural for them to feel excluded from mainstream society and to wonder 
where they belong. Also, as a compulsory subject, Political Ideology contains negative images 
of capitalist countries, including South Korea. Official policy and the content of national 
education in China make a good comparison with Korean national education in Japan, although 
in Japan Zainichi educational institutes are not officially recognised. Autonomy in national 
education is not extended to the content of education. National minorities are only allowed to 
learn the same content of Chinese history as all other national groups, including Han Chinese, 
but are allowed to learn it in their own language. In China, encouraging minority national 
education does not mean that minority national people are provided with an opportunity to learn
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their own history. In this respect, the state policy of minority national groups’ autonomy is 
strictly confined to the cultural domain.
Until 2001 following the Peskama-ho case, Josonjok antagonism towards the South 
Korean motherland had continued to grow. In February and March 2000, social crimes 
committed by the Josonjok targeting South Korean visitors and students in China became a 
serious issue. The first motive o f such crimes was financial but hatred was also involved. The 
main reason for this is that the Josbnjok has been exposed to a capitalist world without sufficient 
socialisation having been adopted. Secondly, South Koreans who had first contact with Josonjok 
failed to give a positive image of the homeland to the Josonjok. Also, the sudden influx of 
Josonjok labour in South Korea has raised serious social issues which also contributed to worsen 
the relationship between Josonjok and South Korea. Figure 6.3 shows the percentage and field 
of the smaller-sized South Korean companies’ exploitation and illegal treatment o f Josonjok 
labourers. Nevertheless, thanks to the Josonjoks’ ability to speak Korean, compared to other 
guest worker groups, the Josonjok wage is higher. Tables 6.3 indicates this.
Figure 6.3 Mistreatment of Josdnjok labourers in South Korea
Example of mistreatment of Chosenjok labour in South Korea
C o m p e n s a t io n  P a y m e n t d e la y  : 50 %
fo r  in d u s tr ia l 
in ju ry  re la te d  : 1 5
O th e rs  in c lu d in g  v io le n c e
a n d  d i s g u i s e d  m a r r i a g e  : 20 /C
S o u rc e : Refurmated from Dcmjj-a llbo. 30th November IW 6
F o rg in g  
in  s e n d in g
m o n e y  to  C h in a  : 1 5 %
Table 6.4 Wage difference among different immigrants in South Korea
C urrency  unit: won
Josdnjok Philippinos bangladeshians Nepalians Others
M onth ly  incom e 830,000 480,000 530,000 560,000 450 ,000
M onthly
consum ption
240,000 150,000 170,000 170,000 130,000
Source: D ong-a llbo , 30  N ovem ber, 1996
Thirdly, among Josonjok, it is believed that the South Korean government has 
discriminated against them. The Josonjok have accused the South Korean government of 
treating them differently from other Korean emigrants elsewhere; more exactly, Koreans in
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richer countries. Diaspora crimes abusing their dual nationalities, changeable cultural codes, and 
multiple spatial bases became transnational problems involving diplomatic issues between 
China and Korea. Appropriate laws and regulations on the transnational level have not yet been 
implemented following up on the changed situation. It is necessary to form a clearer legal and 
social categorisation of diasporas than that of re-immigrants, foreign residents, or Korean 
citizens.
Jeong (1997) also maintains that the Josonjok are simply Josdnjok ‘neither Chinese nor 
Koreans’. He emphasises that ‘we are not and never can be Koreans and we are mere Josdn 
nationality within China, we do not exist without China but at the same time neither do we exist 
without our own identity as Josonjok’. On the question as to what they believe is the most 
urgent social problem that the Josdnjok people have to solve, it is discovered that the decreasing 
level of the Josdnjok population makes them feel gravely insecure. A decrease in population due 
to its dispersion is one of the visible thrusts. Discourse on the population decrease and 
dispersion are closely related to their views on the future of the community. In analysing a 
diaspora’s discourse, conservative ideas could imply pro-Chinese communist or self 
determinism, which are not so clearly distinguishable at this stage. Conservative Josdnjok 
intellectuals prefer ‘government guarantees of jobs, housing, and economic equality’ (Parris: 
1999, 44). The division of intellectual discourse on Josdnjok identity and community does not 
include ideological difference. On this matter, the Josdnjok are beyond political ideology 
although there is still obvious division of political ideology within the community in other 
aspects. Whether they are pro-Chinese communist or the pro-South Korean capitalistic minded, 
Josdnjok nationalists are inclined to believe that they are neither Chinese nor Korean but 
Josdnjok in China. In the Josdnjok case, such self-categorisation is relatively unproblematic.
The common view shared by intellectuals is their warnings to ordinary Josdnjok people 
to prepare for South Korean investment in the Josdnjok areas. Simultaneously, they warn people 
never to forget the reality of living within the Chinese territory. At the same time, it is equally 
emphasised they should preserve their own culture lest they should lose their national roots.17 
The Josdnjok have not demanded a fuller degree of political citizenship from China because 
they are aware that they are not living in their own country. ‘Anyway we are living in other’s 
place’. By ‘others’ place’ the interviewee means not the Josdnjok’s own country. ‘Then, we 
have to admit that what China has done to Josdnjok was absolutely beneficial. We are not 
supposed to rebel against China thinking back the past. China is not our own country anyway’. 
On the question as to what would be the difficulties in mingling with Han Chinese who are 
supposed to have exclusive and strong national pride, an interviewee answers as follows:
Sometimes it is unbearable to mix together, for instance, in a university
dormitory, when Hanjok and Josdnjok students start to share a room at the
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beginning of the term, only a few, say, one out of ten turned out to be still sharing 
the room at the end of the term. In the case of mixed marriage, the situation is 
similar. The rate of inter-marriage between Han Chinese and Josdnjok, which 
used to be approximately 11 per cent, has risen almost twice these days because 
more and more Josdnjok young generation do not care about their spouse’s 
nationality, though the rate is still far below the average comparing to other 
minority national groups in China.18
It is significant, however, that all the interviewees comment that such difficulties on the 
individual level are minor. The Josdnjok think that as long as they are not living in their own 
state and the Chinese government has made efforts to keep discouraging Han Chinese great 
Hanism, most Josdnjok believe that they should bear what they take to be Han Chinese 
arrogance.
The discourse about national identity among Josdnjok intellectuals also changed after 
the period of fluctuation in national identity between 1989 and 1995. Josdnjok people refer to 
Chinese territory excluding the area of frontiers as inner China whereas they call Korean 
territory as Josdn mainland. Josdnjok intellectuals see their Josdnjok identity and the community 
to be in serious danger of disappearing. An influential Josdnjok writer holds that ‘Josdnjok 
writers in this period should strongly hold nationalistic spirit as Josdnjok. Writers should have a 
clear picture about the future of Josdnjok in the crisis of national identity’. He continues, ‘now it 
is the time to overcome political ideology and we Josdnjok should search for our own identity 
which is rather fundamental identity based on individuality. The life of our parents’ generation 
was, in a word, tragic. Now we have to overcome the past’.19
As I have emphasised, forming their national identity means interpreting and 
reinterpreting their collective existence in relation to the nations involved. As much as their 
identity as a minority national becomes clearer, national identity linked with the Chinese nation 
and state could also be either fortified or weakened. As the interviewee Pak expresses, ‘China is 
the only power which can keep check and balance role against American imperial influences on 
East Asia’.20 This may be interpreted as a political sense of belonging to China as a Chinese 
citizen. Josdnjok intellectuals have also developed Asian nationalism. During interviews about 
the western world, especially the United States, some interviewees show that they are proud of 
having official Chinese nationality. This also suggests that national identities can co-exist with 
larger category of political identities. Imposing Asian nationalism would not discourage having 
national identity. But the framework of ‘China equal East Asia, and Asia against the United 
States’ may lead them to perceive that only western power was imperial whereas Chinese 
imperialism was ever benevolent to national minority groups like the Josdnjok.
So far in this part, I have analysed Josdnjok images and understandings of the Korean 
homeland and Josdnjok discussions on the consequences of the relationship between diaspora 
and homeland. Diasporas’ expressions of who they are and who they want to be in collective
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terms vis-^-vis the Korean nation are salient upon some preeminent historical watersheds. 
Through these visible watersheds, their collective identity is represented. Diaspora stories are 
written in an organised manner and passed down to the next generations. Through keeping a 
collective history, identity becomes concrete. Such an identity is featured as being particularly 
Josdnjok at the same time as being diasporic.
Zainichi identity
In total, the Korean minority occupies 46.6 per cent of foreign migrants in Japan. If including 
naturalised Korean origin Japanese, the percentage of the Zainichi population is higher than 
official statistics show. Expression of diasporas’ collective identity becomes particular; their 
expression occurs at a significant time, in relation to regional particularities and circumstantial 
motives. The way of representing their collective identity among the Zainichi is more diverse 
and sophisticated than in the other two cases. With sophistication of expression, more 
complexities are added to the identity itself. ‘[Ojpressed peoples that may once have conceived 
of their situation in the context of ‘majority-minority’ power relations are now embracing 
diasporan discourse as an alternative’ (Butler: 2001, 190). The Zainichi experienced a longer 
period of being vigilant for such power relations and consequently, their national identity as 
Korean descendants has been shaped in an aggressive fashion against Japanese and a negative 
manner of accepting dual nationality as a minority compared with the Josdnjok and the Koreitsy. 
However, in relation to the Korean motherland, due to relatively sufficient communication, 
knowledge and understanding, the process of differentiating diaspora identity from Korean 
national identity has reached a more stable stage. The Zainichi accept the inevitable degree of 
alienation from the Korean society of the motherland whereas Josdnjok society still remains at 
the stage of developing negative and antagonistic relationships towards the Korean motherland.
Collective memories: Zainichi in the colonial setting
The division of the motherland has a crucial meaning to the Zainichi. The Zainichi community 
has been firmly constrained within the triad structure of motherland, organisations and 
diasporas. Younger generation diasporas have developed diasporic skills of controlling duality. 
As in the other two cases, the Zainichi also have their self-justifications by which they felt 
impelled to remain in Japan rather than returning to a decolonised homeland. The Zainichi 
emphasise Japan’s strict regulations which eventually, they believe, deprived them of their 
chance to return to their homeland. Selecting historical components is a diaspora’s own will. 
However, in the process of keeping diaspora history, the Zainichi have developed antagonism 
towards the Japanese nation. This contrasts to the Josonjok who focus more on their cooperation
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and contributions to Chinese state building.
Hong In Sook’s (1991) passage below insinuates Zainichi’s regret regarding the issue of 
returning to their homeland.
It may sound natural to return to their homeland right after the Korean 
emancipation. However, Zainichi Korean’s return to the homeland process was 
not a simple question as it appears. However Koreans were an independent 
nation, they were still under suspicion and supervision, and unlike traveling land 
routes, returning to Korea required ships from Japan. Zainichi Koreans gathered 
the harbors, shimonoseki, shenzaki, and hakata, everyday. Most of them had to 
stay nearby the harbors as no actions were taken by the Japanese government and 
they could not afford to prepare ships on their own (462).
Not all Zainichi wished to return to Korea. The important point here, however, is the 
question why they continuously highlight this particular aspect of history. As I have discussed in 
Chapter 6, a stable diaspora identity should be based on recognised self-justification of their 
historical existence in the host state. Zainichi’s discourse demonstrates that, between the 
Zainichi community and the Japanese nation, this precondition has not yet been negotiated. It 
explains Zainichi’s non-existence in the Japanese society. Along with their collective memory of 
returning to their homeland, most Zainichi take the Kando earthquake and the Han-shin 
educational incident as the most memorable watersheds for the mobilising of Zainichi solidarity. 
In the selection of historical events, the crucial difference between Zainichi and the other two is 
that the Zainichi selection of collective memory includes the extensive historical period of 
Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. Accordingly, Zainichi selections are naturally 
antagonistic towards the host nation and, consequently, the tensions imply national 
confrontation. In this sense, it has been difficult for them to build their own identity, being 
distanced from the Korean nation. In this regard, Zainichi identity has been more confined to the 
historical relationship between the two Koreas and Japan.
I take the passage, the selection of historical events, to mean what the Zainichi have 
chosen as their diaspora history to remember for themselves and to pass down to the next 
generations. These selections reflect their identity as Zainichi and the motivation and their desire 
for recognition by telling outsiders and themselves how they have lived. Zainichi collective 
reactions implied in such selections are viewed as spontaneous. In the end, the Zainichis’ own 
history makes their collective identity, which is distinctive from the Korean national identity and 
also from the Japanese national identity. The Zainichi often express their suffocating sentiment 
of non-existence. Most interviewees have pointed out that ordinary Japanese people in general 
are uninformed or misinformed of the problems of the Zainichi. Han Ahn Soon mentions such 
an issue:
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When I entered Japanese college after graduation from Jo-go [Josdn high school] 
and began more interaction with Japanese, I was quite bewildered by the fact that 
Japanese in general know so little about Zainichi or history of Korea-Japan 
relationship. It was a surprising experience for me to discover that most Japanese 
have been such misinformed of Zainichi issues such as the Kando earthquake and 
so on. I come to realise that I myself must have more knowledge of Zainichi 
issues and Korean history in general.21
The Kando earthquake was the most destructive earthquake in Japan. In Tokyo on the 1 
September 1923, about 100,000 people were killed and 100,000 were injured. The entire city 
was destroyed by this disaster. Zainichi were targeted immediately after the catastrophe. As 
many as 20,000 out of a total 30,000 Zainichi were indiscriminately killed in the region. By 
exploiting public sentiments against Zainichi students and left-wing workers in the region, false 
rumours and reports were spread throughout the region:
Soon after the earthquake, rumours began to circulate that the Koreans were 
planning to attack the Japanese and were setting tires, looting, and poisoning 
wells. In the midst of the confusion that followed the earthquake, many Japanese 
believed these rumours. The Tokyo police made matters worse by authorizing a 
radio broadcast warning that the Koreans, aided by Japanese anarchists, ‘were 
burning houses, killing people, and stealing money and property’. Japanese army 
reservists and civilian volunteers were organized as a vigilante corps to roam the 
streets in search of Koreans (Mitchell: 1967, 39).
Without investigation, the accused Koreans were killed by outraged mobs and armed 
policemen. Although the truth has been revealed by Japanese historians, the record of the event 
has been remembered by ordinary Japanese. The public image of the Zainichi in Japan as fearful 
and harmful has hardly changed until now. Major Japanese media and conservative politicians 
occasionally instigate and regenerate negative public perception of the Zainichi by calling 
attention to the North Korean issues. They often make connections between North Korean issues 
and the Zainichi, being ready to accuse the Zainichi of being a potential danger to national 
security. The very fact that such an incident as the Kando earthquake is continuously 
remembered as a memorable historical issue contrasts to the cases of the Jos&njok and the 
Koreitsy, who prefer highlighting historical events after incorporation. For the JosSnjok and 
Koreitsy, the Qing dynasty and the Soviet Union under Stalin are not regarded as the same host 
states into which they are presently incorporated. Korean diasporas in these regions consider 
that negative historical memories that occurred between diasporas and host nations belong to the 
Qing or Soviet regime, which no longer exist. Meanwhile, postwar Japan always remains the 
same wartime colonial Japan to the Zainichi.
The Zainichi, especially those who have been exposed only to Japanese national 
education, normally develop negative self-identification of their Korean origin for a while. The 
quotation below from Jin Saeng So’s article on his self-identification is rather typical.
173
Without adequate knowledge about my family backgrounds, I started to feel 
ashamed of being Korean. Every time I heard related words ... just sounded like 
‘kankoku/chousen’ [South Korea/North Korea in the Japanese language], I was so 
scared that somebody would find out my ethnicity and pick on me. I kept denying 
my heritage and tried to disengage in being involved in anything related to Korea 
and its culture. It is also common that Zainichi Koreans have been conditioned by 
Japanese society to believe in the inferiority of their Korean ethnicity ... The 
biggest challenge for Zainichi Koreans is the process of finding their self-identity 
with the understanding of the cruel reality that the society they live in sees them 
as inferior.22
By quoting an illustration from Hideki Harajiri’s book, Jin Saeng So explains the 
consequences when their Korean origin is revealed among their peers. It is also added, however, 
through some unexpected occasions of self discovery, many Zainichi start to use their real 
Korean names in their thirties and forties and feel great relief. The phrase in Jin Saeng So’s 
passage, ‘without adequate knowledge about family background, I felt ashamed of being 
Korean’ reflects the younger generation of Zainichis’ new mode of perceiving their collective 
selves and responding to discriminations. This trend also relates to the development of South 
Korea and its enhanced international recognition compared with the 1960s and 70s.
Interviews with Goh Chan Yoo and Kim Gwang Min also reflect the trend. They have 
led the new social movements, which I explained in Chapter 5. They explain the purpose of such 
movements as providing younger generation Zainichi with the knowledge of their national 
background. They add explanations that this is not in order to return to the Korean motherland 
but to live in Japan with confidence. ‘I lacked knowledge of Korean motherland and Korean 
nation23 and I was too ignorant of Zainichi overall problems. ... that was the reason why I had to 
feel that I was a helpless alien from both societies. But in the end, I come to realise that identity 
should be defined by myself first of all’.24 Similarly, Goh Chan Yoo, a Zainichi writer, also 
expresses the crucial moment that he comfortably felt himself as Zainichi. ‘I went to Japanese 
schools up until high school. I had been always ashamed of my Korean origin. In 1965, for the 
first time, I happened to learn about Zainichi history and the history of the Korean nation. I 
participated in demonstrations against the summit meeting between Korea and Japan in 1965 
around that time. I began to think that it is not the Zainichi who should feel ashamed; what is 
wrong is the Japanese way of teaching history. I decided to go to Jos6n University afterwards ... 
I’m happy that I finally found to what I have to devote myself for the rest of my life’.25
Such a new trend of nationalist movements among Zainichi population is not necessarily 
exclusively led or participated in by younger generation Zainichi. Regardless of generations, the 
new types of movements are spirited by a well educated group of Zainichi who have been 
somewhat indifferent to and discontent with the previous manner of Zainichi response to 
discrimination. People involved in these groups are more concerned with practical issues for
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Zainichi well-being. They prefer to face Japanese society and the government directly rather 
than the Korean motherland.
As I have mentioned, the Zainichi have had more social pressure to frame themselves 
clearly as being either Korean or Japanese. The following passage demonstrates such pressure:
[T]he population of Zainichi Koreans in Japan is often invisible to the majority of 
the Japanese, and, ironically, to a large portion of the younger generation of 
Zainichi Koreans themselves. Many Korean youths who grew up in Japanese 
society often have difficulties accepting their Korean identity because the 
Japanese culture they grew up with enforced the concepts of a homogenous 
Japanese society as well as discriminatory attitudes towards Koreans that they 
themselves have accepted as correct. This identity confusion leads to many 
different paths of identifying themselves and expressing their existence in 
Japanese society.26
However, when the Zainichi encounter South Koreans, the Zainichi are again bothered b 
y feeling pressured to frame themselves within on one side or the other in the same way as with 
Japanese society. Mun Young Sook explained her unpleasant experience. ‘I was disappointed w 
hen I happened to talk to a group of South Korean college students. When they noticed my poor 
ability in Korean language with a strong Japanese accent, they annoyingly asked me why I don’t 
go for naturalisation’. As a teacher in a Jos6n school who has been brought up in a strong nation 
alist environment and has longed to be outwardly Korean, she was extremely disappointed by th 
e exclusive attitude of those South Koreans whom she met.
Only the ways of resisting assimilation differ depending on generations and diaspora cas 
es. A hasty conclusion of voluntary assimilation among the Zainichi would seem to be unsafe. K 
orean observers have somehow misinterpreted Zainichi resistance to severe discriminations as e 
xpression of their Korean national identity. In the same way, Fukuoka misjudges the Zainichis’ a 
ntagonistic or differentiated expression against/towards Korean motherlands as an aspiration for 
Japanese identity. The layers of different identities are far more complex in the case of diasporas 
. Since the early 1990s, owing to balanced communication with both South and North Korea, Za 
inichi public discussion on their identity and community has reached a mature phase. They have 
voluntarily begun to implement national educational programmes. The programmes are to provi 
de unbiased knowledge of their national background. Such movements have led the Zainichi to 
be successfully incorporated into mainstream society with confidence. People involved in these 
projects believe that the Zainichi collective shame has been nurtured by Japan’s national mass e 
ducation and the Zainichi’s own ignorance of their history and culture. Accordingly, educational 
reform movements have recently been the greatest concern not only within Mindan associated o 
rganisations but also among Chorydn schools.
I began this section by showing the causal relations between colonial history and the 
Zainichi identity. It explains why the Zainichi community is particularly bound with the
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homeland to a deeper degree than in other diaspora cases. However, new types of social 
movements have emerged that are led by an educated group of Zainichi activists. These activists 
are more concerned with building a more self-reliant Zainichi community less influenced from 
either of the two Koreas. The next section explores further on how Zainichi identity is linked 
with their enthusiasm for national education.
Political ideology, national education and the motherland
An emphasis on the next generation’s education was almost a path of salvation for older 
generation Zainichi. Koreans’ efforts to set up schools wherever they go became a nationalised 
ritual. For diaspora people, the entire process of setting up schools in foreign lands represented a 
struggle for their future. Such a process involved discussing education, raising funds, 
negotiating the issues of minority education with host governments and deciding on curricula. 
Educational issues stemmed from concerns over their collective future and hope that all Zainichi 
would share. The special attention to the next generation’s education among diasporas can be 
explained in the following two contexts: the desire to move up the social ladder based on their 
firm beliefs in class mobility, and the fundamental insecurity of being outsiders in host states.
Historically, among Zainichi, Korean education took the crucial role of providing 
ideological means for anticolonial struggle and later as the means of promulgating North Korean 
political agendas. Accordingly, the issue of education in Zainichi society had never been 
discussed separately from the framework of diaspora and motherland. In Japan, by October 
1947, the National League of Koreans in Japan, before the division into the two separate 
organisations, had built 541 elementary schools, 7 junior high schools, 22 adolescent schools, 
and 8 high schools.27 The League developed its own curriculum which emphasised Korean 
history and geography.28 Later, however, the SCAP intervened in the establishment of Korean 
schools because they were seen as a potential source of social conflicts. The number of schools 
is included in the list of closure. Tensions between Koreans and the SCAP along with the 
Japanese government were intensified and mass protests took place in the face of the risk of 
closing down already established schools. The events are called the Han-shin/Osaka and Kobe 
education incidents. Japan in cooperation with the US military regime decided to abolish 442 
educational institutes which were categorised as below the standard of the newly implemented 
educational law. The Kobe and Osaka [Hanshin] incidents were the two major protests by 
several hundreds of Zainichi parents only to be sentenced, injured and killed. In 1948, a 
negotiation was settled and a few Korean schools were left but categorised as speciaUkakushu 
(or other category) private institutes by Article 1 of the School Education Law.
As Korean schools are not officially recognised, graduates of Korean high schools, for 
example, are not eligible to sit entrance exams for Japanese state universities. The content and
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formality of minority education shows a contrast. In China, the autonomy given to minority 
education during compulsory education periods means that the official language used in 
minority ethnic or national schools are the minority’s own languages but the curriculum and 
contents of textbooks should be uniform. In consequence, unless parents are aware of historical 
issues, students have little chance to become aware of the history of Korea or the Josonjok. The 
only difference between Jos5njok minority schools and Han Chinese schools in the region is 
whether the standard textbook is taught in the Korean language or Chinese language. Japan has 
rejected categorising Jos5n schools as proper educational institutes on the grounds that Joson 
schools do not abide by the Japanese educational laws, which require conditions that the 
Zainichi believe go against the basic norm of minority national education. ‘If abiding by the 
codes, we are supposed to teach only certain contents which the Japanese government approves 
... then, what is the point to maintain Jos5n schools under the title of Josdn national education in 
real terms’.29
Numerous problems with Chorybn education have also been pointed out. Firstly, langua 
ge is the most difficult barrier for students of Chory6n-run schools. Fluent Japanese is regarded 
as a foreign language and from second year elementary school students are supposed to speak on 
ly Korean. Adaptability to Japanese society becomes a serious problem as students grow up. Sec 
ondly, apart from language, the contents of the textbooks are not relevant to daily life in Japan si 
nee they are similar to the ones used in North Korea. Thirdly, there are difficulties in pursuing hi 
gher degrees in Japanese universities after graduating from Chorydn primary and secondary sch 
ools. Consequently, in 1960, the enrolment in Chorydn schools numbered 50,000 but this had dr 
opped to 20,000 in 1982. However, the problems with Choryon education have been gradually s 
olved by steady reforms with an ideological shift to a milder line since the mid-1990s.
Through continuous movements by the Zainichi themselves and widespread support 
from Japanese civil activists since 1994, a number of local governments have now recognised 
the minority national education and provide a modest amount of subsidies to Zainichi schools, 
although the Japanese government’s national level subsidies have not been offered. 
Approximately 40 per cent of Japanese universities on the prefectural, municipal and private 
levels have accepted Zainichi high school graduates to sit for the entrance exams. However, in 
order to enter national universities, until now Zainichi high school graduates have been required 
to take an extra exam to prove qualifications.30 It is true that the minority national school have 
been segregated from Japanese society. Students who attend the Chory6n-run schools used to be 
heavily indoctrinated by the North Korean government. As the internal mechanism of the 
Chorydn was the same as that in North Korea, Chory6n-run national schools did not provide an 
alternative to Japanese dominance and discrimination.
An increasing proportion of the Zainichi, the same as in China and elsewhere in 
multinational countries, more and more prefer not to send their children to exclusive minority
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national schools. This is due to their gradual awareness of functional necessity and steady 
decrease in options. In the end, minority schools are becoming run down, caused mainly by lack 
of funding in most cases unless they are under the special protective government scheme. ‘It is 
true that Josdn schools have been somehow political means but Zainichi education needs reform 
... In the past, we urged Jos6n school graduates to go to Jos6n University exclusively. Jos6n 
high schools these days provide active support for students who want to enter Japanese higher 
education after graduation. Accordingly, textbooks have been adjusted in more balanced way 
and we even provide them special preparation courses’.31
The Zainichi have come to believe that minority national education gives more options 
for the future and cultural choices. Han Ahn Soon went to Jos5n schools for her secondary 
education and went on to Japanese college. She expresses, ‘I felt I was in the new world ... but I 
also think that my Josdn education provided me with a unique world after all. It was advantage 
to have a chance to expose to different cultures at the same time.... When I become well-known 
and received requests for interviews, by Japanese media people, I am always asked whether I 
can speak Japanese. While speaking in Japanese, I’m always asked how I can speak such good 
Japanese ... W ell... I was bom in Japan and I am like one of them ... it is complicated and even 
annoying to explain all the details of the existence of we, Zainichi, and why we are remain as 
Korean nationality.*32
As purity of blood has been overemphasised as being one of the important national 
agendas, Japan hardly accepts a hyphenated identity. In other words, a hyphenated identity is not 
viewed as normality. It is viewed, instead, as an unstable identity that should be adjusted at 
some point. Such exclusion is deduced from the Japanese public fear that full inclusion of 
diaspora groups like the Zainichi will cause a danger to the unity and security of Japan. The 
assumption behind the fear is that two national identities are mutually exclusive. As some can 
have two occupational identities at the same time and use different identities under different 
circumstances, dual nationalities should not necessarily be seen as either unethical or infeasible. 
There is not a convincing argument why several and different levels of public spheres or public 
cultures should not exist simultaneously under the same administrative arrangement of state. On 
the other side of the coin, the very existence of a separate independent public culture does not 
give theoretical justification to claiming political sovereignty contrary to Millerian thoughts.
As I have discussed so far, the problems of Zainichi education are interwoven with 
political issues involving colonial history, Japan’s policy, and North Korean influence. Hence, 
the factors: the historical relationship between Japan and Korea, and Korea’s control over 
diaspora communities have always been the underpinning issues when discussing educational 
reform within the Zainichi community. However, as a positive interpretation of their situation 
and duality has emerged among the Zainichi, they have begun to consider the issue of education 
more as concerning a community’s own future free from political or diplomatic issues. I view
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this change as one of the reflections of the development of third type of national identity. This 
shows a trial of overcoming their restrained circumstances. Under such circumstances, Zainichi 
identity was passively constructed within the rigid trial framework of motherland-hostland- 
organizations. The Zainichi have now begun to see themselves as positive actors although their 
collective identity will always be represented from such structure.
Building an independent identity
It is not so safe to conclude that the Zainichi are assimilated and have lost their collective 
identity as they speak perfect Japanese, behave like Japanese, hide their Korean origins and 
occasionally show hostility towards the Korean nation. The former principal of the Osaka 
hangook-hak-gyo (South Korean school), Lee Young Hoon’s (1992) passage reflects Zainichi 
identity vis-^-vis the Korean nation.
Even if their children are deaf and mute, to parents, they are still their children.
How could (the motherland) give up her children only because they cannot hear 
and cannot speak the language! Even with other means of communication, as a 
family, we should share the collective identity and national attachment with 
emotion and inspiration. The problems of Zainichi education should be viewed in 
this way, too ... the rigid idea that the degree of fluency in the Korean language is 
the only standard of evaluating the achievement of national education should be 
corrected (255).
The passage above shows the Zainichi search for a collective identity. The Zainichi have 
been more confused with a national identity to a greater extent. A Zainichi painter symbolically 
expresses, ‘I often ask to myself; who, on earth, am I who knows s ’aekkihoel33 I had thought 
that eating s ’aekkihoe was common culture among all Koreans’. Among Zainichi the fluctuation 
of identity was explicit with the sudden death of Kim II Sung in July 1994. The Japanese 
government pushed harsh inspections banning Chorydn’s financial support to North Korea in 
the wake of Sato Katzumi’s, the head of Modem Korea Research Centre in Japan, 
announcement that Choryon’s 6,000 million yen fund has been used for North Korean nuclear 
weaponry. Choryon has organised a wider range of fund-raising for North Korea in return for a 
North Korean educational fund for the Zainichi. It started with 50 million yen in 1972 and 500 
million yen in 1982. Since the early 1980s, the fund from Choryon to North Korea outweighed 
North Korean support for Choryon.34
Since 1994, the relationship between Choryon and North Korea became more slack and 
internal conflicts within the organisations have been frequent. Such disturbance is proved by the 
number who changed their official nationality. Statistics shows that the number of people who 
changed their nationality from Jos6n to South Korean, Japanese or something else after Kim’s
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death is almost the same as the number as on the collapse of the Soviet Union. During 1994, as 
many as 6,200 Zainichi changed their official nationality. The number was recorded as the next 
highest to 6,600 Zainichi who changed their nationalities in 1990 on the occasion of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union,35 as I have briefly mentioned in Chapter 4. It is unclear, however, whether 
such fluctuation in nationality reflects the decline of Choryon or temporary changes. The people 
who gave up Chorydn membership do not necessarily join Mindan or change their nationality to 
South Korean instead. Even when a Choryon member changes nationality to South Korean, in 
many cases it is only for the sake of convenience. Mun is one such cases that shows a change of 
nationality to South Korean is practical, but she still keeps strong loyalty to North Korea 
although she was bom in Japan and her parents are originally from southern Korea where her 
relatives still reside.
The Zainichi identity has begun to be more stabilised. A stable diaspora identity is more 
likely to be achieved when diasporas are incorporated into mainstream society to a deeper 
degree. And yet, diasporas face many levels of barriers, both in collective and individual terms. 
Diaspora groups are not homogeneous within. Internal and external class division is one of those 
barriers. Diaspora people can take a relatively advantaged position when they are involved in 
occupations requiring transferable skills and dual nationality including trading with countries of 
origin, translation/interpretation, tourism, diplomatic affairs, and so forth. Also, they are more 
settled than immigrant groups. However, new division of labour occurs within diasporas. A 
more complicated issue arises when, in the host states, the class line is more or less congruent 
with the ethnic or national line. Japanese society is one of those examples. Among diaspora, a 
handful of upper class privileged denizens are advantaged to a deeper degree by being integrated 
into both societies whereas lower class denizens are further marginalised from both societies. 
For the reason that the Zainichi are incorporated into the relatively more developed capitalised 
host society, division among diaspora society within is more complicated.
A higher degree of diaspora incorporation into the host society is normally regarded as a 
consequence of losing a collective identity. I do not consider, on the contrary, that only 
collective actions or visible collectivities such as minority organisations are the expressions of 
collective identity. Of course, minority organisations should function well but their membership 
regulations should be voluntary to their own national members and inclusive to other 
nationalities within their host state. I regard this as a multinational and multicultural choice of a 
diaspora. Developing an independent identity via-k-vis the motherland is also a precondition. In 
such a way, diasporas may be more dispersed, yet being dispersed with more a stable collective 
identity. This stage can be described as a self-reliant diaspora community. To the host society, 
such a community will be regarded as a well established diaspora community rather than an ever 
threatening potential separatist group. The Zainichi will settle their intrinsic dilemmas in this 
way. Again, I conceive that this is also a diaspora’s active choice. Only the manner of resistance
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to assimilation is different. For that reason, it is not always safe to regard that naturalisation, 
concealing names, and discontent with organisational activities should lead to the conclusion 
that the national identity of diaspora is fading away as a generation passes and because the 
Zainichi lack a collective will to maintain their collective identity. Zainichi expressions of being 
different from the Korean nation are often erroneously interpreted as antagonism towards the 
Korean motherland, loss of national identity as Korean, or desire for being Japanese. Self- 
expression of being different is more likely to be understood as the process of securing their 
own kind of national identity. Recent changes tell us that the Korean nation of the mainland is 
seen as the object from which they differentiate themselves rather than as a model with which 
diasporas would identify themselves. Prewar Korean diasporas’ efforts to create a diaspora 
network with Korean immigrants to wealthier western countries can also be interpreted in this 
context.
Koreitsy identity
Revival o f collectivities
Unlike Zainichi or Josdnjok, Koreitsy are in a relatively advantageous situation in which the 
South Korean motherland can positively engage in shaping the community and identity. Korean 
kolkhozes are disappearing and people are dispersing but new types of collective features have 
emerged. Korean political organisations and nationalist movements were equally as active in the 
Soviet Union as in the other two countries until the independence of Korea. None of the 
political organisations survived. This was mainly because of the eradication of political factions 
before deportation. ‘[Rjecent work has documented the destruction of approximately three 
thousand Korean party and government officials, army officers, writers and teachers - nearly the 
entire administrative and cultural elite’.36 A considerable number of Koreitsy activists returned 
to North Korea after 1950. However, due to their alienation from North Korean society most of 
them actually returned to central Asia and Sakhalin. This was mainly because of Kim II Sung’s 
proclamation of self-reliance in December 1955, confirming an anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese 
stance. It is analysed that Kim’s exclusive policy was a profound ideological justification to 
domesticate communism into a Korean-style. Most Koreitsy who occupied important positions 
of party and government in North Korea were expelled to the Soviet Union or purged by 1956, 
when the DPRK’s relations with the Soviet Union was aggravated.
Since the vigorous communications with South Korea in the wake of the 1988 Seoul 
Olympic Games, Koreitsy interests in the establishment of various cultural institutions and 
organisations became fashionable. In May 1989, the Moscow Gorydin association was 
organised and others, such as the Goryoin associations and the Gory6 Culture Centre in
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Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, followed. In May 1990, the All Gorydin Association in Moscow 
was also set up in order to represent all Koreitsy under the unified organisation. After the 
independence of central Asian states, however, communications between organisations were not 
smooth enough to integrate the Korean people spread over the vast territory. Today, those 
organisations operate independently, depending on the region.37 Founding Korean organisations 
has been a noticeable trend in the post-Soviet central Asian states also, especially, Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan. While collective features centred around Koreitsy kolkhozes faded away with 
the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the South Korean nationalist agenda has 
penetrated into the region in the form of Korean schools, churches, welfare institutes, 
entrepreneurs and so forth. These institutions have instigated awareness of cultural heritages. 
Koreitsy, who could promptly make some connection with South Korean people, actually had 
advantages in job searches, study in South Korea or short trips to South Korea. All the South 
Korean - Koreitsy institutes have played relatively positive roles in developing the community.
The Gory6 Cultural Association is one the most representative Koreitsy organisations. It 
is composed of forty branch offices spread over each city and collective farms in Uzbekistan. At 
present its major functions are fourfold: fund-raising, enhancing Koreitsy welfare, enlarging 
membership and supporting cultural events. ‘In order to secure funds, we’ve purchased a few 
fishing kolkhozes in 2002 and run them in the form of a joint stock company. We also run a 
fifteen hectare size cemetery exclusively for Koreitsy upon the request of elderly Korean 
population. The organisation is also in charge of taking care of orphaned Koreitsy children 
whose family members have been dispersed to other regions of central Asia. From time to time, 
we support various cultural activities including exhibitions, shows on tour, traditional Korean 
ceremonies and so on’.38 ‘At present, in Uzbekistan there are six Koreitsy organisations. Four of 
them are supported by the South Korean government and operate in cooperation whereas the 
other two are pro-North Korean organisations. However, only one minority organisation per 
nationality is approved by Uzbek Law’.39 If including small unofficial Koreitsy organisations, 
the number rises above twenty.
Such a trend of maintaining cultural heritage is followed by discussions on the future of 
the community. Em’s (1991) passage is noteworthy.
As the Koreitsy community in post Soviet society is not a major minority national 
group, ... there are quite a few important issues to solve regarding the present 
status of Koreitsy in the new era of multinational regime. ... There is large 
number of minority ethnic and national groups which achieved exclusive 
autonomous regions or prefectures. Even minority groups such as Kalmuk, 
Kabargin, Balkar, Avhaz, which are consisted smaller number of population than 
Koreitsy have proposed an autonomous prefectures. ... The population of 
Koreitsy is nearly a half million but we haven’t acquired self-governing rights. ... 
Without achieving political, legal and territorial self-governing arrangement,
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Koreitsy only face a difficult life and it will not be possible to protect national
interests, and political and socio-economic security (52).
However, expression of their collective identity is rather a recent phenomenon. ‘At the 
absence of indigenous religion, it was relatively easy for Koreitsy to form loyalty towards 
communist ideology. Koreitsy were extremely cooperative and active in communist movement 
and projects’.40 When explaining the relatively weak maintenance of Koreitsy in comparison 
with the Zainichi or Josdnjok, the following variables are to be considered. Firstly, the size of 
population is small in comparison with other minority national groups in the former Soviet 
Union and Uzbekistan. Secondly, geographical distance from the Korean motherland hampered 
their engagement in communal affairs with the two Koreas. Thirdly, they have lived in 
multinational environments where plural national identities are not unusual. Fourthly, 
communist propaganda of equality among nationalities had masked and delayed national 
tensions. Fifthly, discussing issues of national based economic inequality is immature due to the 
overall economic underdevelopment in this region. The next point is that among minority 
groups, Koreitsy have secured relatively higher economic status, which helped them to build a 
positive idea on who they are in relation to the Korean, Soviet, and Uzbek nations. The seventh 
point is, as I mentioned earlier, that the purge of nationalist activists during the Soviet era 
quelled any potential activism. This is evidenced by official documents obtained from the 
former Soviet KGB, Committee for State Security, in 2000 and other subsequent historical 
documents. The eighth point is that self-recorded written history is very rare from the older 
generation. Written records on their own history not only reflect, but shape and guide a 
collective identity. Finally, the Soviet state has disappeared. The Koreitsy no longer have any 
responsible central government of whom to demand compensations or to whom correction of 
historical misrecognition can be addressed.
So far, in this section, I explained Uzbek Koreitsy’s emerging efforts to create cultural 
centres and organisations. Such efforts have been realised through communications with the 
South Korean government and people. The influence of the motherland has stimulated their 
awareness of the necessity of preserving Korean national heritage, and offered a practical 
opportunity for some and an emotive national connection for some others. Such an emerging 
phenomenon is seen as a revival of collectivity and identity whereas, during the Soviet era, 
institutionalisation of collective identity was strictly limited to the state-supported forms, 
notably, the kolkhoz. The South Korean role has been viewed as rather positive. This is because 
its transnational project was better planned before implementation dissimilar to the Josdnjok 
case. Also, the Uzbekistan government has been supportive of South Korean influence, not only 
on the Koreitsy community but on the overall Uzbek society for political and economic reasons.
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In the following sections, I analyse further the Koreitsy identity formation vis-a-vis the Korean 
nation.
Renewed communication, national revival and diaspora identity
Han (1999) mentions an ancient Korean popular novel, Hong-gildong-jon, in relation to his 
memory of his father and his motherland. ‘My father didn’t know the Russian language at all. 
He only spoke Korean. He often read to us Hur Gyun’s Hong-gildong-jon written in the 
fourteenth century and we have kept the story in our notebooks’. The author recalls what his 
father told him, ‘this book is about a good man called Hong Gil-dong, a Korean version of a 
Robin Hood sort of character, who continuously fought for justice throughout his life in the late 
Josdn era and people respected and admired him a lot. But he judged that in Jos6n, ultimate 
happiness and justice cannot be found, and decided to leave Josdn for yuldoguk to establish a 
new country on an island where he could guarantee the people a happy and comfortable life. 
Father said to me, ‘A long time ago, I had also left my hometown with my brothers to search for 
a place like yuldoguk’ (79).
Along with collective memory of deportation, agricultural contribution and participation 
in the socialist revolution during Soviet era, the Koreitsy identity has developed with an 
imagining of the homeland. As in the similar case of Josdnjok, the Koreitsy kept a closer 
relationship with North Korea not only their hometowns and blood ties left in the North, but also 
a political relationship between North Korea and the former Soviet Union explains this. Since 
the 1950s, after the existence of North Korea, Soviet Koreans had freedom to move to North 
Korea. Most cases of Soviet returnees to North Korea, however, were due to North Korea’s 
unpredictable policies and harsh discrimination against Soviet-based communist activists.41 
There were only a handful of Soviet Koreans who survived the process of a power struggle 
within the North Korean regime. There are many undiscovered cases regarding Soviet returnees 
to North Korea. Some were exiled and some have been missing and uncontactable for several 
decades. Kim Mikhail Sergeyvicci’s story of his missing aunt shows the relationship between 
the Koreitsy community and North Korea, although there was also a short period during which 
North Korea played the role of a warm home town for the Koreitsy.
One of my aunts was a returnee to North Korea in the early 1950s. She took a 
high position in the North Korean regime at the beginning. Our family were 
allowed to get in touch with her on a yearly basis until 1956. Sometime in 1956, 
however, she was excluded from the regime due to her Soviet background. Our 
family could manage to bring her children [interviewee’s cousins] back to Uzbek 
republic through the North Korean embassy here. My aunt has been missing since 
1962. We know she was not allowed to go to any other countries at all.
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He adds, ‘unification seems to be practically difficult but if only it happens I would be 
very proud towards Uzbeks ... but I just want to be called as Koreitsy [He means in an inclusive 
way of the Russian translation of Korean people.] Aren’t we all Koreans no matter South or 
North?’ Having worked for South Korean business entrepreneurs in Tashkent, he has developed 
his own view on how to react to South Koreans. During the Brezhnev regime, the period of 
ddtente in the 1970s, re-emigration into ancestral motherlands was allowed basically ‘in order to 
improve relations with Germany and the United States’.42 During this period, in the 1970s and 
1980s over 100,000 Germans emigrated to the federal Republics of Germany. Similarly, in the 
1960s, over 700,000 Jews emigrated mainly to Israel and the United States 43 Koreitsy attempts 
at re-emigration to North Korea also occurred during this period.
According to North Korean law revised in 1963, once diaspora Koreans or Koreans on 
North Korean territory acquire North Korean nationality, they are not allowed to give up their 
nationality. However, there was a certain period during which Soviet North Koreans could 
choose Soviet nationality by giving up North Korean nationality, when such a treaty between 
North Korea and the Soviet Union was agreed in 1957. As a result, in 1977 for example, among 
Koreitsy, there were 25 per cent Soviets while about 65 per cent remained with North Korean 
nationality. However, most of their choices of official nationality before deportation were 
dependent on convenience for survival and not to be excluded from benefits, rather than 
ideological allegiances. Until recently, North Korea did not allow North Korean nationals to 
alter their official nationality to other nationalities except labourers in specific fields of labour 
under contract. In the case of such labourers in the former Soviet Union, in accordance with 
Kim D Sung’s political order in 1955, giving up North Korean nationality was allowed for a 
short period until 1957. Apart from that, there are no specific legal codes addressing the rest of 
the Koreitsy who officially kept two nationalities, Soviet and North Korean, during the Soviet 
regime. During the Soviet period, South Korea regarded the Koreitsy rather as a North Korean 
nationality.
During the Soviet era, the younger generation Koreitsy who were educated under the 
Soviet regime, had developed a negative image of their Korean background. They were taught 
that Korean traditions and customs are unscientific feudalistic remnants that should be 
discarded. On the other hand, having some ingredients of Russian civilisation in their national 
identity becomes the source of being proud and different from Koreans from the mainland. As 
Koreitsy intellectuals rightly express, ‘It is regrettable that there have been no scientific studies 
or high level public discussions on the issues regarding fundamental problems and process of 
cultural movement for national revival led by Koreitsy organisations ... Revival of what and for 
what?’ (Han and Han: 1999, 376). Meanwhile, the authors’ suggestion implies his diaspora 
identity, which emphasises differences both from a national collective identity attached to their 
ancestral motherland, and from a collective identity as the Uzbek nation or Russian nation.
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It is necessary to adopt and understand modem North Korean and South Korean 
cultures but the process of acquisition of new cultures without deep 
understandings will make little difference from accepting mere foreign cultural 
invasions (ibid., 376-7).
The quotation above also tells us one of the diaspora’s features, selective identification 
with the nation of the motherland. Such selection, however, requires some conditions and time 
in accordance with accumulated interaction between motherland and diaspora. The Koreitsy 
community is, rather, in the primary stage of building a self-contained diaspora community. It is 
also reflected in the small amount of recorded history and cultural maintenance in comparison 
with the Zainichi or Jos6njok community. As the reflection of Korei'ski intellectuals’ common 
apprehension about negative influence from South Korea in the region, the author suggests 
discriminative acquisition in learning new cultures rather than taking all as national cultures. A 
diaspora’s fear of unwilling assimilation into the ancestral nation and culture tends to grow 
when the diaspora community is lacking security in terms of their own collectivities, such as 
voluntarily built minority national organisations, a written history of the diaspora’s pasts and 
diaspora literature and so on. As much as diasporas resist assimilation by the host nation, they 
exhibit the anxiety of being culturally absorbed in the culture of the ancestral motherland.
[T]he process of adopting Korean cultures would be no better than adopting 
another foreign culture rather than restoration of national identity ... Koreitsy’s 
attempt to imitate South Korean ways may generate the idea of a complex that 
Koreitsy is inferior to South Koreans. ... We, Koreitsy, should perceive ourselves 
as merely different kinds of people who are neither superior nor inferior just 
possessing a new collective existence inside (ibid., 377).
It is notable that the movement of national revival instigated by South Korea and the 
overall atmosphere of newly independent central Asian states, has led the Koreitsy to rethink 
and reinterpret their own identity vis-k-vis a new public world by situating themselves in a 
broader context and extended historical period. As in the cases of the Zainichi and Josonjok, the 
Koreitsy also interpret their plural nationalities in a positive way as more cultural choices are 
given. The Josbnjok and Koreitsy possess clearer collective identities as a minority national 
groups in a multinational state. In other words, they have a clearer understanding of their 
collective identity as opposed to that of the host state meanwhile, as opposed to the motherland, 
the Zainichi have developed relatively clearer identification as Korean diaspora group. 
However, as mentioned above, the Koreitsy have kept a lesser record of their own history. It is 
only recently that Koreitsy historians and social scientists have cautiously begun expressing 
their pasts and national identity in writing and public discussions, which will, in the end, serve 
as a cornerstone in building the diaspora’s own kind of community.
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Repositioning the Koreitsy vis-a-vis the South Korean motherland
Further to my discussion of the Koreitsy collective identity, this section discusses how the 
Koreitsy interpret their duality in a positive way. Some observers understand the process as 
assimilation or disappearance. I view the process, instead, as a silent struggle for recognition as 
being a distinctive group. In general, however, my fieldwork region, Tashkent, has faced other 
urgent political and economic problems that require discussion. Considering the fact that 
Uzbekistan is under a rigid totalitarian regime, issues related to nationality and sub-nationalisms 
are one of those subjects not openly discussed in public: strict laws are applied not only to 
minority national groups but also to the dominant Uzbek nation. The Koreitsy have developed a 
relatively cooperative relationship with the South Korean motherland, with the Uzbek and 
Kazakh governments’ active support. This can be understood in the context of King’s (1998) 
observation of the political roles of diasporas in the former Soviet Union. The relatively weak 
newly independent states from the former Soviet Union ‘have in many cases learned the value of 
diasporas, using their cultural and linguistic ties with co-ethnic communities abroad as 
instruments of both domestic politics and foreign policy’ (King, in King and Melvin: 1998, 2). 
In the Koreitsy case, however, economic incentives to induce foreign investment have spurred 
closer diplomatic relations between South Korea and Koreitsy communities.
Intermittently, negative problems in connection with South Korean influence are also 
noted. Ahn and Lee (1993) have reported that a government official criticised some South 
Korean newspapers that groundlessly reported that Uzbek nationalists have threatened Koreitsy 
to leave Uzbek territory within a year. The official strongly requested the Korean journalists 
concerned to investigate regional affairs thoroughly and correct such reports. The official also 
expressed unease that the All CIS Goryoin Association has conducted a survey regarding the 
issue of the establishment of a Koreitsy Autonomous Prefecture.44 There have been continuous 
discussions over the issue of urging dispersed Koreitsy to move back to Ybnh’aeju from where 
the first generation Koreitsy were deported. The goal of the project is to build a Koreitsy 
Autonomous Prefecture, regarded as the most regrettable memory shared by some groups of 
Koreitsy leaders. This project has been persistently suggested by groups of South Korean 
scholars, experts and religious activists. This issue is rooted in exclusive Korean ethnic 
nationalism. It has caused apprehension among the ordinary Koreitsy whose aim is to continue 
to manage their peaceful life in Uzbekistan with other national groups including Uzbeks.
It is also criticised as being a suggestion that ignores the Koreitsy’s own wishes. 
Interviewee, Kim Vita mentioned the issue. ‘For a short period between 1993 and 1994 
immediately after the independence of the Uzbek Republic, Koreitsy were in confusion. Uzbek 
exclusivism seemed to grow and some were threatened to return their homeland. Most Germans
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and Ukraines returned to their home countries. Quite a number of Koreitsy went to the Russian 
Far East but a few years later they returned to Uzbek and Kazakh regions again. I realised 
Uzbekistan is my homeland. I’m neither South Korean, nor North Korean nor Russian. I found I 
have nowhere to go. I just wish the economic development and political stability of the Uzbek 
republic ... But I also learned that we Koreitsy are well treated when our own nation, Korea, is 
powerful. I believe a nation without a history and collective has no future’.45
A group of Korean scholars and experts’ ethnocised perspective on diaspora identity has 
led the Koreitsy issue to the following observation and apprehension. Firstly, it is concluded that 
the Koreitsy identity has been assimilated and is thus disappearing judging from common 
statistics and anthropological barometers of the degree of cultural maintenance. The reasoning is 
based on judgements of the level of maintenance of a minority community often including the 
ability to command the Korean language, the interracial marriage rate, size of population, birth 
rate, degree of cultural maintenance including frequency of eating Korean food, Korean style 
interior design, wearing Korean traditional costumes, following Korean style ceremonies, 
knowledge of Korean national festivals, myths, folklores, and historical national figures and so 
on. Secondly, the ethnocised approach to diaspora identity frames the Koreitsy once again in the 
conventional dichotomy; that is, framing them in a single fixed category of national identity: 
either pure Korean or else Uzbek. Consequently, it has been considered that the Koreitsy history 
has been a process of assimilation as they are losing their national identity, thus requiring 
guidance from South Korea. Following their motherland’s point of view, the Koreitsy identity is 
undoubtedly disappearing. In the same way, the Uzbek government regard Koreitsy identity as a 
transitory identity which should be adjusted at some point to the Uzbek national culture. 
Nevertherless, one can view the Koreitsy identity from a different angle, even while considering 
the same categories of cultural maintenance. If recognising a diaspora’s own sphere of culture, 
the Koreitsy modifications of plural cultural and historical heritiges naturally include similarities 
and dissimilarities with/from Korean or Uzbek national cultures, some of which are completely 
different from both, and so are the Koreitsys’ own.
Legally, the Koreitsy are also excluded from South Korea’s official categorisation of 
oversees Koreans.
A special law on overseas Koreans which was initially proposed in October, 1998 
could have opened the door to Koreans in central Asia and other parts of the CIS.
The law would grant the same legal rights and privileges to overseas Koreans as 
Korean citizens in terms of exit and entry, stay, and political and economic 
activities. ... The revised law, which became effective in December 1999, 
excluded Koreans in China and the CIS by defining overseas Koreans as Korean 
nationals and their descendants who departed Korea after 1948... Because the 
majority of Koreans in China and the CIS left their motherland in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, they were not eligible for the benefits of
188
the law, which are available to Koreans in the United States and Japan who left 
the home country after 1948 (Yoon: 2000,43).
Ever since the special law was drafted, harsh disagreements have been voiced by the 
diasporas and South Korean social activists and specialists. Negotiations over this special law 
are still underway. At the same time, however, investment from South Korean companies 
steadily increased and cultural exchange and humanitarian supports have followed. Divided 
opinions are seen among Koreitsy intellectuals themselves over general issues concerning 
visions of their community. Such divisive discussions are to be viewed as a natural and sound 
process for leading the community to be founded on a stable diapsora identity. Em (1991), for 
example, views this increased communication positive. ‘I positively view Koreitsy’s recent 
effort to preserve national traditions and customs, and vigorous contacts between North and 
South Korea. Most Koreitsy’s hope is to see our ancestors’ homeland’ (51).
It is also true that among the Koreitsy themselves, there have been expressions of 
concern over losing the Korean language as Em shows in the following passage, although he 
also confesses he himself cannot speak or write the Korean language at all. It is reported that 
55.8 per cent of Koreitsy use the Korean language in their daily conversations:
One can hardly expect a bright future for the Korean minority in the former 
Soviet Union at this stage because of many problems we have faced. Among 
those problems, the most sensitive issue is on the Korean language which is 
something to do with the issues of restoring national culture, traditions and 
customs, inter-linking dispersed Koreitsy by exchanging information, and 
fostering a close relationship with our ancestors’ homeland. Furthermore, it is the 
issue of our own existence as a national group within the former Soviet Union 
(ibid., 48).
By contrast, Han (1999) discuss how the Koreitsy should react to South Korean cultural 
influence. This also demonstrates the diaspora’s common feature, selective identification with 
the nation of the homeland.
Restoring national identity could be understood as restoration of national 
traditions, customs, lifestyles and so on. However, as for Koreitsy living a totally 
different world, traditional (unsophisticated) national culture sounds no more than 
an exotic culture. Unless Koreitsy fundamentally changes our psychological 
orientation, full adoption of Korean culture is not possible. ... It is not necessary, 
either (377).
The text represents one of the preconditions of a stable diaspora community, sufficient 
information on the culture and history of the plural nations concerned. A certain degree of 
understanding of national culture and history is a prerequisite for diasporas to be able to control 
their multiple national identities as an individual choice. Upon the renewed communication with
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South Korean homeland, diasporas’ demands, economic support and recognition, from South 
Korea is also growing. A Korei'tsky historian and lawyer, Kim Vladimir, points out that ‘both 
South and North Koreas have deliberately omitted the history of Koreitsy’s participation in the 
independent movement during Japanese colonisation. Koreitsy were the most active participants 
in the independent movement but have never been fairly recognised in Korean history .... 
Consequently, we are excluded from the South Korean government compensation scheme. The 
history of Koreitsy’s independent movement should be completely rewritten. Koreitsy suffered 
the most’.
In his unpublished manuscript, he explains Koreitsy patriotism which, he insists, has not 
been properly evaluated and recognised by either North or South Korean history.
Immediately after the colonisation of Korea, Korean patriots realised that only 
with Russian support, Korean independence could be achieved. Such faith among 
those activists, organised as a foreign supportive army, became the motivation of 
their positive participations in wars against White Russians in the Far East.46
On the question why the Koreitsy have to approach the South Korean government rather 
than the Uzbek government with demand special attention for issues including development of 
Koreitsy organisations or historical recognition of Koreitsy, another interviewee, Boris Kim, for 
instance, answers, ‘Uzbekistan is still a small and weak country with only ten year of 
independent history. Economically, South Korea is in a far better situation’. Ahn and Lee (1993) 
see that the Koreitsy communities in post-Soviet central Asia are still under heavy influence 
from North Korea, although there has been an atmosphere of reconsideration from South 
Korea.47 However, the North Korean embassy has retreated from normalised diplomatic 
relations with South Korea, and pro-North Korean Koreitsy organisations have been inactive. As 
the Uzbek government is keen to induce South Korean investment, diplomatic relations between 
Uzbek Republic and South Korea have been the crucial factor for relatively positive cooperation 
between the Koreitsy community and South Korea.
Some research, notably including that of Yoon (2000), analyses one of the reasons why 
the Koreitsy show a high degree of rapid linguistic assimilation. It is considered that the Korean 
desire to achieve ‘upward social mobility via urbanization and investment in human capital has 
been the crucial motive’ (53). Yoon’s observation, for example, is evidenced by central Asian 
based Koreitsy migration to the Russian cities. Nevertheless, in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, an 
increasing number of Koreitsy are keen to learn the Korean language. Kim Brut expresses his 
views on linguistic assimilation: ‘One can say that the population of Koreitsy is decreasing, on 
the other hand, more and more Koreitsy population speak Korean these days. During Soviet 
times, it was not easy to find qualified interpreters on the occasions of official visits of North 
Korea, whereas, now there’s no longer such a problem’.48
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The Koreitsy community has recently set up a basis to induce the chain immigration of 
South Koreans. Recent South Koreans settlers, since the late 1980s, have joined in reshaping the 
Koreitsy community. Interviewee, Nam Victor, evaluates the achievement of his Department of 
Korean Studies in Tashkent College of Education: ‘Younger generation Koreitsy are more and 
more interested in learning the Korean language’. On the question of the dispersing population, 
‘Leaving the Koreitsy community is an individual choice ... but among those who share the 
same vision need to cooperate. My plan is to build a Koreitsy national university like the one in 
the Yanbian Josbnjok prefecture ... I will continue making efforts for my plan ... there are 
many things to be done for Koreitsy community but myself alone it is not possible to achieve’. 
In a similar way to the Zainichi and Josdnjok, Koreitsy discussion on language maintenance 
well reflects their concern about a collective future.
In this section, I have analysed the Koreitsy response to South Korean influence. I 
explained their response as being part of the process of building diaspora identity through 
undergoing some period of selective identification with the Korean nation. Such process features 
a particular diaspora identity.
Religion and diaspora networking
There have been growing concerns on the penetration of Korean churches into the culturally 
islamic zones, including Uzbekistan. This could generate an odd situation with the Uzbek people. 
So it is especially under these circumstances that newly independent Muslim dominant countries 
are eager to establish a genuine national identity promoted by Islamic beliefs. Diaspora 
networking has been developed within the CIS and with Korean diasporas elsewhere. Korean 
Christian missionaries from North America and South Korea have initiated networking 
supported by South Korean semi-governmental institutes such as the Hanminjok network 
[Overseas Korean Network] attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Korean diasporas do 
not share any homogenous religious rituals and worships. In the absence of substantial territorial 
or institutional boundaries, for many ethnic or national groups, religious allegiance undoubtedly 
plays a crucial role in consolidating solidarity and identity. When the division between religion 
and nation is unclear, it is much easier to mobilise peaple, when it is necessary, by adopting a 
similar collective allegiance. Religion has been rather a secondary concern for diaspora 
Koreans, whose loyalty can be flexible. This has, in fact, reduced potential tensions 
considerably. It is only recently that overseas Korean Christian associations have become 
extremely active all over the world, operating a broad network. Kim Daniel has explained how 
he believes that a religion is required at the sudden loss of strong political identity in the CIS 
countries.
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Central Asian Koreitsy’s identity has become unstable since the collapse of the 
Soviet regime and subsequent consolidation of local nationalisms, say, Uzbek 
and Kazakh nationalisms and Islamic fundamentalism. Under the Soviet regime, 
in central Asia, there were no dominant majority national groups. Now the 
situation has changed. Koreitsy will be driven to a more and more difficult 
situation with the absence of any alternative stable collective identity. The Uzbek 
government does not intentionally implement discriminating public policies 
towards other minority national groups. Koreitsy are one of the officially 
recognised minority national groups, which means they are not regarded as 
Uzbeks. In this sense, Koreitsy have relatively more religious freedom than 
Uzbeks who are expected to be Muslims. Uzbek nationalism is developing in an 
exclusive way. Koreitsy are reluctant to be accommodated to Uzbek national 
culture. They rather admire Russian culture and are inclined to identify 
themselves with Russians. At the same time, their expectation towards the 
Korean motherland is very low. Accordingly, central Asian Koreitsy are in a very 
unstable and difficult situation. This is the reason why they need their own 
religion.49
Until the independence of the Uzbek Republic, Russian colonial policy in central Asia 
had allowed the cultural aspects of Islam to remain influential. However, ‘the official structures 
of Islam were either destroyed or captured by the Soviet regime ... In its cultural aspects, Islam 
continued to serve as a guide and source of solace for the moral person’ (Gleason: 1997, 42-3). 
The cultural aspects of Islam have been explicitly reconsolidated since its independence from 
the former Soviet Union, although officially Islam still remained for life-styles and customs. 
Along with other newly independent central Asian states, Uzbekistan became the case where 
minority cultures and religion were officialised with the embodiment of legitimacy as an 
independent state. Accordingly, relationships between Uzbeks, who became the dominant 
group, and the other national or ethnic groups within the same category are under 
transformation. Along with the retreat of Russian influence and financial benefits, the Uzbek 
cultural revival explains why an increasing number of the Koreitsy are involved in Korean-led 
Christian institutions.
As with the Josdnjok, the Koreitsy make connections with Korean diasporas in 
wealthier areas for practical reasons, such as better opportunities for education and employment. 
South Korean nationalism and human rights issues are much in use and incorporated into the 
legitimacy of missionary activities in the central Asian region. Koreitsy involved in Christian 
organisations are encouraged to participate in various cultural and humanitarian projects. A 
collective identity as a member of the Korean nation regardless of where they live is instigated 
prior to developing religious faith. Consequently, Christian-influenced Koreitsy tend to have a 
stronger collective identity and be aware of the necessity of networking with Korean diasporas 
in other regions and countries. In Almaty, Kazakhstan alone, there are more than thirteen South 
Korean founded churches that also run a number of Korean language schools, business 
corporations, and charity and social welfare institutions. If churches set up by Korean diasporas
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from North America are included, the number is ever increasing. Uzbekistan becomes more and 
more religiously exclusive. It is not too difficult, considering the ratio of Muslims taking up 70 
per cent of the total population. Christian activities are strictly banned in Uzbekistan. Although 
relations between the Koreitsy and Muslims in the CIS have so far been cooperative, recently, 
due to the engagement of South Korean civil associations, churches and scholars, a few sensitive 
issues regarding religious activities have been exposed. In spite of an uneasy atmosphere which 
may evoke a disadvantaged situation, it is almost enigmatic to observe how enthusiastic the 
Koreitsy can be for Christian oriented affairs and activities. This is also the case among the 
Josonjok and, to a lesser degree, among the Zainichi. The smooth penetration of Christianity 
into the Josdnjok and and Koreitsy ways of life can be explained as a reaction to a particular 
pressure or the absence of a social ideology. Such pressure includes the disappearance of 
Maoism as a political mentor, the decline of rigid communism, the rise of Uzbek Islam 
nationalism, and the rise of western discourses such as multiculturalism and human rights under 
the influence of North American Korean diaspora Christian associations combined with civil 
activism. Christianity is also a sort of cultural relief through which Korean diasporas can 
experience western cultures and values. In addition, diaspora Korean Christian activities often 
demonstrate a strong affinity with nationalism and evoke collective sentiments and actions. This 
is due to the historical reason that, in Korean society, Christian influence once served as a strong 
belief system fortifying anticolonial nationalism against Japanese social ideologies during the 
colonial period. Now the fusion of Christian belief and political agenda has been shifted from 
Korean independence to reunification.
Comparative analysis
As my analyses have so far demonstrated, the homeland factor makes a crucial impact on the 
formation of diaspora features and identity. The basic framework of the following comparative 
analysis was included in Chapter 2. The more diasporas communicate with their homeland, the 
more likely the following diaspora features will occur.
Firstly, diasporas show a tendency to identify themselves as a distinguishable group of 
people, vis-a-vis both the nation of the host state and the nation of the homeland. Korean 
diasporas express their identity as Josdnjok, Zainichi and Koreitsy. In a positive case, diasporas 
take their dual national identity and multicultural backgrounds to be an advantage and an 
opportunity, and positively interpret them in collective terms. However, at some stages in 
communication, some diasporas nurture antagonism towards homeland society, which can be 
understood as being the necessary process of selective differentiation. A negative collective 
identity existed among the Zainichi, with a strong feeling of alienation from both the Japanese 
and Korean nations. Gradually, however, since the mid-1990s, the Zainichi have made an effort
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to build a positive collective identity, seeking a national identity of their own, notably by 
reinterpretations of their own collective memories and active participation in Zainichi collective 
affairs. After undergoing certain phases of accepting and understanding their unavoidable 
alienation from both societies and the necessity of overcoming problems of plural national 
identities, each Korean diaspora under this study has reached a stage of reorganising and 
reinterpreting their discursive collective memories in order to situate their collective existence 
again within the triad structure and further in the international setting.
The second feature is the development of a diaspora network both within a host state 
and with diasporas elsewhere. Christian missionaries from Korean diasporas in America and 
Canada have initiated networking Korean diasporas in every country of the world. The South 
Korean government also created institutional support for diaspora networking with a political 
and cultural agenda, rather than religious. In this process, for some, a stronger in-group identity 
is developed while, for others, a stronger preference for remaining in personhood also develops. 
A networking project is, however, not regarded as major feature of Korean diasporas on the 
ground that Christianity alone cannot be a basis for mobilising a religiously heterogeneous 
population. In addition, China and central Asia have not yet been comfortable bases from which 
religious Koreans can spread their beliefs.
Lasdy, diasporas tend to make political economic and cultural demands of their 
motherland by emphasising their contributions to the motherland and the maintenance of the 
homeland’s cultural heritages by identifying them with the nation of the motherland. Diasporas’ 
demands increase when their motherland is politically opened and economically more 
developed. In the opposite case, denial of cultural and historical roots is also common. For 
example, among the Zainichi, demand for political rights from South Korea has been growing. 
A group of Zainichi have demanded voting rights for major elections in South Korea to such an 
extent that Choryfin-affiliated Zainichi have representative rights in the North Korean state’s 
annual General Assembly Meeting. Economic support from South Korea is required by the 
Josbnjok. The Koreitsy demand a higher level of cultural interaction with South Korea. As 
Korean diasporas have a divided homeland nation, analysis of a diaspora’s national identity 
becomes more complicated. Additional variables are to be considered, such as political and 
cultural relationships between the two divided homelands and diplomatic relations between host 
states and the two Koreas. In such a case, a certain degree of political division among diaspora 
communities is inevitable. When trial period is over and certain conditions are met, diasporas 
will establish a more self-reliant community with their own kind of national identity while being 
aware of their own separate interests and collective future.
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Conclusion
The main purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate how diasporas define themselves vis-^-vis 
outsiders, mainly, the ancestral motherland. As one of the commonalities of all three cases, I 
explained the process of forming their own kind of collective identity. This process can be 
understood as a search for difference while resisting pressure to assimilate. In this sense, 
diasporas’ common feature, resistance to pressure to assimilate, is applicable not only to their 
relationship with the host nation but also to the nation of the homeland.
Compared with the other two cases, the Zainichi have struggled the most for identity 
and recognition due to harsher pressure from their host society and heavier influence from the 
motherland. Accordingly, their ways of resistance have diversified, and expression of a 
collective identity develops in a sophisticated manner. On the other hand, a further degree of 
demand for recognition based on their collective identity is only a possibility among the 
Josdnjok and Koreitsy. The reasons are, firstly, in both cases, a multinational environment has 
been naturally accepted. Secondly, thanks to the socialist agenda, discrimination against cultural 
differences is officially discouraged. Thirdly, there is no particular historically rooted 
antagonism in the relationship between the host state and Korea as much as with Japan. 
Fourthly, Korean minorities are not particularly disadvantaged. Problems of minority national 
groups have not yet emerged as urgent issues. Overall economic problems or political crises are 
not particular in the cases of the Josdnjok and Koreitsy. Problems are equally applicable to other 
minority national groups including the dominant national groups, the Uzbek and the Han 
Chinese. Lastly, Josdnjok and Koreitsy are not major minorities in China and the CIS in terms 
of population and they have been accepted rather as an adaptive minority national group.
In order to achieve a successful transnational agenda, some prerequisites are necessary 
for both parties, the motherland and the diaspora community. These include a clearer vision of 
the diaspora community rather than emphasis on historical and cultural proximities between the 
homeland and the diaspora. Both parties need to accept the inevitable changes in cultural 
features and interpretations of history. Meanwhile, diaspora communities need clear knowledge 
of their own history and distinctiveness vis-^-vis the nations of the host country and motherland. 
The next practical step is an appropriate legal categorisation for further regulations before 
opening the door for re-emigres. The lack of mutual understanding of the inevitable cultural and 
historical changes has generated the diasporas’ impression that the motherland’s influence is 
another pressure to assimilate, or exploitation or colonialism. Lack of legal categorisation of a 
diaspora has caused social and diplomatic confusion in the motherland. Multiplicity and the 
third-ness of a diaspora’s national identity will be accepted in the real world only when 
diasporas nurture their sense of loyalty and obligation to the larger society accompanied by
195
understanding the multiple cultures, regardless of their national or ethnic origins wherever they 
are territorially situated.
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7 Summary and Conclusion
Until now, I have characterised the Korean diaspora identity, analysed its conflicts with official 
nationality in each case, and discussed the theoretical implications of diasporas’ search for a 
distinctive identity. My hypothetical concern was that Korean diasporas have resisted the 
gradual dissolution of their collective identity into mainstream society. Only the manners of 
resistance vary. I have demonstrated, so far, that regardless of various policies and different 
conditions for political membership in each host state, Korean diasporas in all three cases do 
search for their own kind of collective identity. This is partly because, under the present nation­
state system, the yielding of a potentially political collective identity of a certain group, to a 
degree, preconditions safe inclusion in a dominant national group. The main theme of Chapter 4 
was the foreseeable dilemma of diasporas in the course of shaping a collective identity 
conditioned by the implementation of the notion of citizenship. Citizenship as an institutional 
device connotes particular conditions for shifting political membership.
However, relying on this variable, citizenship, may be a fallacy resulting in a single 
factor explanation. This is because the citizenship factor disregards the dissimilarities of various 
sorts of collective identities which are generated in particular historical contexts under the given 
structure from which diasporas generate identity. In this concern, in Chapter 5, I examined 
minority national organisations as embodiments of diaspora choices and an accumulation of a 
collective identity. It could also be understood as a particular manner of response to pressure to 
assimilate either voluntarily, or by being compelled by the host state as well as the Korean 
motherland. I developed the diaspora’s tensions in Chapter 6 in relation to the ancestral 
motherland, which marks the most critical particularity of diasporic identity in general. I 
highlighted major incidents that reflect the problems of diasporas’ mythical and nostalgic vision 
of the motherland. Discussions and interpretations of collective matters concerning diasporas’ 
visions reflect that, albeit in differing degrees, Korean diasporas have been in the process of 
transforming their communities into more self sustained communities with a clearer and more 
stable collective identity. This will be supported by rich records of collective history and a 
destiny of their own in various forms of public communication. Therefore, when the title of this 
project says, Korean identity in Japan, China and in Uzbekistan, this is not identical with the 
Korean identity on the ground that their Korean identity has already been transformed into a 
diaspora identity. The title says national identity of diaspora because, although their identity is 
transformed, diasporas still have a national identity. Such an identity is obviously different from 
the national identity of the host nation or of the homeland. Korean diasporas’ collective identity 
is regarded as Korean identity within the boundary of the host state, but when analysing their 
collective identity vis-^-vis the host nation or the motherland, their collective identity is found to
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be particular. This is the moment when they form the third identity, which originates from the 
national identities involved but is also very different from them.
Summary of the study
Collective forms of massive Korean migration began in the 1910s in the cases of Japan and 
China, and in 1937 in the case of Uzbekistan, although migration on a smaller scale started 
much earlier. At the end of the Second World War in 1945, many of the migrants settled down 
in the countries under study, and developed their communities. Officially, the Zainichi people 
have been categorised as a special type of foreigner, the Koreitsy have fallen into the category of 
one of the non-titular minority national groups under the former Soviet Union, and the Josbnjok 
have been recognised as an honourable group decorating multinational communist China. The 
origins of the early Korean settlers in those countries can be traced to a colonial diaspora under 
Japanese rule. In categorising this particular group of people, I employed the concept of 
diaspora instead of an immigrant or an ethnic group. I should admit that not all diaspora-like 
groups can be defined as diasporas as such if the term is taken exclusively to include only a few 
prototypes of ancient diasporas, such as the Greeks, the Jews, and the Armenians. In spite of the 
etymological debate, I employed the concept of a diaspora in a somewhat looser way. 
Consideration of the varieties and vicissitudes of the diaspora phenomena is necessary to 
provide better understanding of the more recent diasporas including that of Koreans in the three 
cases. They possess distinguishable origins, features and collective goals from Korean 
communities elsewhere. A diaspora group is a sort of ethnic or national group; more accurately, 
a part of an ethnic group or a part of a nation. The term diaspora must sufficiently imply one of 
the crucial features of the particular Korean groups under my research, which is collective geo­
political relocation followed by the formation of identity based on the shared historical 
memories of collective resettlement while not being mutually incompatible with the other 
related terms.
It goes without saying that there are notable disparities among the three cases as each 
has been incorporated into different states. I defined the different patterns of co-existence of the 
Korean diasporas vis-^-vis their host nations as dispersal, segregation and isolation. These were 
relatively noticeable until the mid-1990s, by the time of the decline of the Soviet system and the 
gradual political and economic transformation of China. From mid-1990s onwards there have 
been some changes in such patterns; commonly in those three cases based on different state 
projects, more positive assimilation has been encouraged, although the degrees and modes are 
diverse. The policies of host states towards their minority national groups play their part in 
shaping diaspora identities in particular ways. Such policies are based on the host country’s 
traditional views of outsiders, historical relations with diaspora’s motherlands, the various
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adaptations of the notion of citizenship, and regime types. In response to the policies, Korean 
diasporas have maintained their collective identities which show the inevitable quandary of 
diaspora identity, full inclusion with distinctiveness.
As a more concrete form of diaspora collectivity, I chose to study Korean diaspora 
organisations and institutions. The Y6nby6n University, which was set up in 1949 in the Korean 
Autonomous Prefecture in China, has functioned as a cultural and historical centre, reproducing 
a collective identity as a minority national group within the Chinese territory. In Japan, the 
Chorydn and Mindan have played a great role in shaping the Zainichi community in its present 
form. The internal problems of the two organisations, however, have deepened the division of 
the Zainichi population. Since the late 1980s, under the pressure of the conciliating political 
mood between the two Koreas and the death of Kim D Sung, the two organisations have 
undergone some structural changes. In addition, the younger Zainichi generation has built 
different forms of organisations, mainly concerning the issues related to how to enhance 
Zainichi status through collective actions in order to eradicate deep-seated discrimination 
against the Zainichi in Japan. In post-Soviet central Asia, the Koreitsy identity was preserved by 
means of building and managing kolkhozes in their own way. Korean schools, theatres and 
publishers were built around the kolkhoz system. Although the system itself originated in the 
Soviet state and was under state surveillance, the internal mechanism of each kolkhoz in the 
region did not function in the same manner, as kolkhoz were mostly built along national lines. 
The origin of each Korean minority organisation represents the diaspora’s manner of response to 
the host society. The different nature of the organisation in each state also reflects the aspect and 
degree of autonomy given to diaspora Koreans.
For a diaspora, their motherland also plays a key role in moulding its distinctive 
identity. Sufficient communication between diaspora communities and their motherland results 
in the process of building a clearer collective identity. Due to the particular condition of being a 
diaspora, that is, collective geo-political relocation, discontinuity of communication and a 
certain degree of imagination are inevitable components of a diaspora’s identity. At the 
beginning of renewed communication, the South Korean government’s political initiative was 
ill-presented and misinterpreted by the Josonjok and Koreitsy. Meanwhile, the Zainichi have 
been heavily influenced by the politics of the two Koreas. Various changes in the political 
environment in the two Koreas have directly reflected on the Zainichi society and, consequently, 
reflected in their identity as well. In accordance with the quantity and the quality of 
communications with their motherland, the process by which diasporas differentiate themselves 
from the Korean nation varies. This differentiation process helps to form a stable collective 
identity, which in turn leads to a mature diaspora community.
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Summary of the comparative analyses
In this section, I summarise the commonality and dissimilarity of the three cases. There are 
notable common features among Korean diaspora identity. They are based on their commonality 
as Korean, as well as generality as a diaspora. To the contrary of previous observations, Korean 
diasporas have developed their own kind of distinguishable identity, which I call a diasporic 
identity, as another type of national identity. Korean diasporas show their will to resist pressures 
to assimilate and their fear of vanishing as a distinctive people. At the same time they have the 
common burden of accepting other national cultures, including dominant national history, 
official language, values and so on. Their efforts to be included with due recognition are 
demonstrated by the highlights of their historical contributions to the state building process of 
their host country. Their collective history has been accumulated and initiated by diaspora 
writers, teachers, professors, activists, artists and so on. Korean diasporas have created their 
identity through recording or passing their stories down through generations. A history of a 
diaspora group is a history of making a new sphere of collective identity. How much such 
stories can be officially recognised as a part of public and official history is the key determinant 
in measuring the degree of inclusion of a minority national group’s collective identity. 
Diasporas, in line with other types of immigrants, are aware of the occasional necessity for the 
alienation of identities in return for political security and economic benefits. As diaspora 
children grew up under the situation in which private culture and public national culture are 
strictly separated in terms of language, value systems, customs, and religion, they were well 
trained to switch their cultural norms and forms depending on the situation. This has been 
relatively easier for a non-religious diaspora group such as the Korean diasporas. Korean 
diasporas’ particular enthusiasm for education, a determination to achieve upward mobility, 
secular vision of religions and the particularly insecure situation of the motherland have 
facilitated the formation of a diasporic identity.
Differences among diasporas are also notable. Firstly, differences are caused by the 
varying degrees of inclusion in the host countries. China has recognised the Josdnjok roles in 
securing the territorial boundary during the Sino-Japanese War, and officially recognised their 
contributions to building a Chinese multination after the communist revolution. In addition, their 
efforts to cultivate the barren lands in the Manchu area have been well appreciated. Although on 
a private level, there are some potential tensions among different minority ethnic or national 
groups, the Chinese government has played a positive role in intervening and rooting out 
potential conflicts. Josdnjok have developed a clearer collective identity by distinguishing their 
cultural affiliation from political citizenship. In the case of Japan, the history of diaspora has 
been segregation and antagonism. Zainichi have been constantly viewed as foreigners who are 
temporarily staying in Japan and represent potential danger for the Japanese nation in terms of
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homogeneity and security. Issues over the historical relationship between Korea and Japan have 
heavily affected relations between the Zainichi and Japan. In the case of the Koreitsy, 
agricultural and educational achievements during the Soviet regime have been officially praised. 
Koreans were flexible in changing their official nationalities without necessarily changing their 
political loyalty or way of living. Even after undergoing their inhumane deportation during the 
Stalin era, the Koreitsy in central Asia were eager to cooperate with various state projects, 
militarily and economically. This is partly because politically oriented and nationalistic minded 
community leaders had been purged before and after the deportation. Also it is because the size 
and density of the Koreitsy population in the former Soviet central Asia hampered any attempts 
at collective action.
Secondly, differences are generated by the development of minority national 
institutions. Ydnbydn University has been the cultural centre of Josdnjok society. Nationalist 
activists devoted themselves to the project of building an educational institution by the time the 
Yanbian autonomous prefecture was established. Whereas the latter has been developed as a 
political centre under the control of central government, Y6nby6n University has been relatively 
free from the influence of political power. Josdnjok enthusiasm to record their own 
interpretations of historical events and preserving shared memories has been supported by this 
large national university. In Japan, the confrontation between the two major minority 
organisations, Mindan and Chorydn, reflects the political situation of the Korean motherland. 
The official policy of segregation has spurred such confrontation, and, in turn, the division of 
the Zainichi community has held them back from being actively included in Japanese society. In 
the former Soviet Union, the only way of securing a collective identity and minority group 
national culture was through the official institution, kolkhozes. For the Koreitsy, who had 
agricultural skills, the collectivisation project through collective farms based on national lines 
unintentionally helped to secure their own psychological and cultural boundaries. Although the 
system of kolkhozes is neither unique to the Koreitsy case nor voluntary in any other ethnic or 
national minorities, the Koreitsy are proud of what they have achieved through the Koreitsy 
kolkhozes using their agricultural skills. They also tend to emphasise official recognition of such 
achievements. They certainly take such achievements as collective or national rather than 
individual. Although there are only a few collective farms left since the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union, the Koreitsy became aware of writing their own history, which definitely 
consolidates their own identity as Koreitsy.
Finally, differences are also caused by communication between diaspora and 
motherland. The Josdnjok have kept cultural features with government support under China’s 
affirmative action. The Josdnjok ability with the Korean language is greater than that of the 
Zainichi and Koreitsy. The Josdnjok’s maintenance of national culture, including their ability 
with language played a positive role in accelerating vigorous communication with the Korean
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motherland. Due to the economic disparity between the Josdnjok community and South Korea, a 
relationship with South Korea became vital to Josonjok society. As the Josdnjok community is 
more or less territorially confined, thanks to an arrangement of an autonomous government, the 
Josdnjok identity is inseparable from their strong regional attachment. In the case of Japan, the 
Korean motherland and the diasporas are much more closely interlinked. Both for North and 
South Korea, the Zainichi community have some strategic interests, for which reason financial 
transactions and cultural communications have been much more vigorous than in the other two 
cases. It is only recently that the Zainichi began to see that building a more self determined 
community with their own identity within Japan is an urgent project, rather than relying on their 
motherland. In the case of the former Soviet Union, except the Koreitsy left behind in Sikhalin, 
for the geographical reasons, the rest had been detached from their ancestral motherland. It is 
also because South Korea’s diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union were not as active 
as those with China and Japan. In addition, depending on the changes in the relations between 
North Korea and the former Soviet Union, the Koreitsy in central Asia had undergone various 
unstable political upsets at times. Recently, the Koreitsy have opened communications with the 
motherlands, especially with South Korea, by dint of enhanced diplomatic and economic 
relations between South Korea and the CIS, especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Theoretical implications
Diasporas may not strongly define their collective identity by adhering to either of the nations to 
which they are conventionally believed to belong. For diasporas, national collective identity is 
something which is relatively controllable due to their particular experience of exposure to 
multinational environments. However, such characteristics do not necessarily mean that national 
or collective identity is something less significant to diasporas. Diasporas have kept their own 
collective stories in relation to their history of being incorporated into a different political 
boundary during the period of nation state building in the postwar period. Diasporas often try to 
make their collective memories official, but such attempts should not be separated from the 
official nation, but be fully included with some justification for their existence. For both sides, 
the dominant national group and the minority national groups, overemphasising cultural and 
historical bases of national solidarity in the political process could deepen potential conflicts 
among different national groups. In theory, it is perhaps right to suggest that political decisions, 
as a public sphere, should be separate from culture. And yet, practical problems and issues 
resulting from cultural and historical biases in a society, which can be adjusted only by political 
means, have often been encouraged and manipulated by the state’s agenda through ideological 
devices including mass education, social and religious institutions, and so on. Preserving or
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creating a collective identity may well be a minority group’s task but recognition for their 
identity through negotiation is considered a critical political task.
My comparative case study also demonstrates that particularities of a group should be 
considered in making policies relating to minorities. Different kinds of groups need to be 
positively discriminated rather than categorised under the same principles used when dealing 
with immigrants, other kinds of cultural groups or refugees and stateless people. Apart from 
different histories of being a minority group, the features of Korean diasporas themselves played 
an important role in creating relatively flexible but still collective identities as diasporas. It is 
obvious to say that there are historical and cultural traditions in each host society which make 
their policies towards minorities inevitably various. At the same time, it is necessary to admit 
that there are diverse traditions and cultural heritages among different minority national groups 
for whom, in turn, policies should be varied.
As generations pass, the three cases in common are more or less going towards 
assimilation in varying degrees. Research on Korean diaspora at present would be particularly 
meaningful as several generations have intermingled from the first generation and consequently 
the character of their collective identity reflects such diversity and provides some guidance for 
seeing future trends. Although older generations with stronger Korean identity disappeared, the 
particular forms of collectivity still remain to be filled up by new generations and new comers 
from other regions. As long as the present world order of a nation-state system is preserved, 
having a stable (but not exclusive) national identity with a certain degree of collectivity will 
remain considered essential for securing various aspects of practical benefits and psychological 
comfort. In this sense, efforts to correct misperceptions of a particular group of people should be 
encouraged in the political sphere until such discussion and debates themselves are considered 
outdated.
Conclusion
I conclude by answering the main questions I posed. On the first question, ‘How do Korean 
diasporas define their collective identity in exile?’, it is discovered that a certain degree of 
collective national identity is meaningful for them in order for survival on foreign soils, and they 
have developed their own identity as a diaspora. The process is reflected on their interpretation 
of history, which shows their continuous negotiation and compromise over their own life stories, 
which became a shared collective memory within the triad structure confining diasporas. This 
leads to the answer to the second question: ‘What are the implications of such a process?’ Such 
a process proves that the more the host society tolerates cultural differences and recognises 
diasporas’ own shared collective stories as part of the heritage of a unified citizenry, it is more 
cooperative to compromise and negotiate over their history, and they are even eager to become
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active citizens. Therefore, diasporas’ dual or multiple nationalities are not to be perceived as 
suspicious as they are well trained to accommodate several cultures at the same time, and have a 
relatively clear idea of the difference between various levels of collective identities. Patriotism 
does not necessarily function effectively when it is based on cultural attachment or loyalty to a 
single nation. Diaspora cases apparently show that attachment to distinctive shared historical 
memories and citizenship can be two separate issues, despite the common fear of modem 
multinational states which are keen on promulgating the superiority of their own exclusive 
historical heritages and the purity of a national spirit. The creation of a third type or third sphere 
of national identity, diasporic identity, is an increasing phenomenon in the global era. How to 
achieve appropriate recognition and include this type of identity is more crucial than how to 
prevent such a phenomenon and how to fix such a fluid and seemingly immoral identity into one 
of the national identities to which they are expected to belong. Finally, in the case of diasporas, 
in particular, recognition of their history of being incorporated into the host society, and their 
cooperation in building a multinational society are the key determinants to reduce potential 
tensions and conflicts. Historical facts and events are in the past but diasporas’ shared collective 
memory continuously affects building the present and future multinational relationships. 
Negotiation over the interpretation of such historical memories remains an important political 
issue in every multinational state.
One has taken for granted to posing diaspora people such questions ‘Are you 
Chinese/Japanese/Uzbek/Russian or Korean?’, or ‘If there were a war between the Korean 
motherland and your host country, on which side would you fight?’. Or, ‘When there are sports 
matches, which side do you normally support?’ Having researched the nature of diaspora 
identity, more appropriate questions to pose to diaspora people would be: ‘What roles can 
diasporas play in order to prevent possible wars or in order to mediate worsened diplomatic 
relations between the homeland and host country?’ Or, ‘How can diasporas use their dual 
nationality and cultural duality in a positive way?’ When cultural norms more or less substitute 
other kinds of moral codes in the modem, unavoidably multicultural world, such norms should 
be applied in an inclusive and deterritorialised manner. The duality of diasporas should be 
recognised as what it is, rather than trying to frame it into either of the societies. Different 
national identities do not necessarily jeopardise host societies in terms of political security, 
economic development or cultural development. The history of the relationship between host 
states and diasporas has been one of abnormalisation and stigmatisation of diasporas’ duality by 
the nation-building process. Now, such an exclusive historical construction based on a 
dichotomy of citizen and alien is under deconstruction, giving room for special citizens not only 
as a historical or conceptual category, but also as a legal category, which not only will correct 
negatively formed identity that has been based on oppressive collective pasts, but also prevent 
diasporas’ abuse of their multiple political and cultural membership. Host countries are normally
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reluctant to specify such rules for them, either because they are viewed as an abnormal type of 
people who are destined to be assimilated in the long run, or benignly neglected for fear of 
encouraging a separate collective identity. At the same time, however, the future of the Korean 
diaspora community is also dependent on how they themselves develop and reshape their own 
community with a stable and inclusive identity.
Limit of the project and suggestions for the future studies
As the area of diaspora studies has been spotlighted as an academic discipline only recently, the 
previous studies lack theoretical and conceptual debates. Consequently, although there are 
abundant case studies, comparisons of Korean cases with other diaspora cases in theoretical 
terms were beyond the theme of this project. In the future, however, it will be necessary to 
conduct comparative research of Korean diasporas with other diaspora cases. For the discussion 
of the relations between motherland and diaspora, the North Korean part is less concrete due to 
the lack of precise information on North Korean policy regarding diasporas. I also discovered 
that there are a number of important historical cases that have been under-researched, especially 
during the prewar history of diasporas. Political theorisation on diasporas will become more 
convincing when it is based on thorough historical evidences. In this sense, my research is only 
the beginning of political studies on Korean diasporas. In addition, although most of the written 
work by diasporas themselves is translated into the Korean language, researchers with more 
language skills in all the three host states will be able to provide further analyses. As switching 
between two languages often accompanies switching cultures and identities, interviews in plural 
languages will allow observations of diasporas from another angle.
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Note
Introduction
1 Including this issue, for a historical analysis of the deportation of the Korean population during 
the time Stalin was in power, see T. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001) 316-9.
2 The best examples of this are the Jewish communities settled out of Israel. For a detailed 
explanation, see A. Panagakos, ‘Citizens of the Trans-Nation: political mobilization, 
multiculturalism, and nationalism in the Greek diaspora’, Diaspora (New York: Oxford 
University Press 8/3,1999) 277.
3 See, for example, E. Ringmar, Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of 
Sweden’s intervention in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
in particular, the Introduction.
4 In the Russian language, Koreitsy is a collective noun meaning Korean people as a group 
whereas Korei'ski refers an individual Korean. At times, I use Korean translations of each 
ethnonym when necessary; for example, a direct quotation from an interview.
5 As I consider that continuity is central to the understanding of a national identity in the 
historical context of each nation, I agree with ethnicists, notably A. Smith’s explanation of 
origins of national identity putting an emphasis on premodem distinctive cultural and historical 
bases forming the national identity of a political group. See, for example, A. Smith, National 
Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991) ch. 2.
6 At times, I use the terms sending and receiving, when it is necessary to avoid the common 
confusion of the word, motherland, which could also mean the country where diasporic people 
were bom in the case of the third generation to whom the term motherland does not literally
mean the country from which their parents originally came.
Chapter 2
1 Whereas national identity connotes self-definitions, nationality can be understood as the 
features of a nation; that is, depending on scholars, it is substituted for national character or 
national culture. Thus, official nationality here means the national culture of the dominant 
national group, in other words, the public culture of the host nation.
2 The German case may be the extreme but it helps in understanding other similar cases.
Germany, since the 1990s, ‘reveals ongoing tensions between political ideals and perceptions 
shaped by a volkisch concept of nationhood developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries and a civic-territorial concept of the nation-state associated, in Germany, with the 
postwar Bonn regime, with its emphasis on constitutionalism and human rights. This tension is 
represented at the level of intellectual debate by the terms Kultumation (nationhood expressed 
through ethnic and cultural identity) and Verfassungsnation (national identity based on the 
principles of legal constitutionalism)’ (P. Hogwood, ‘Citizenship Controversies in Germany’ 
German Politics, London: Frank Cass, 9/3, 2000) 136.
3 For the term, homeland, I employ King and Melvin’s definition as ‘a piece of territory having 
a (...) symbolic connection with the identity of a given ethnic group’ (See C. King and N. 
Melvin (eds.) Nations Abroad: diaspora politics and international relations in the former Soviet 
Union, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998, 2).
4 The notion of ‘denizen’ is first coined by Hammer in 1990 and is used often by scholars 
engaged in the field of international migration. ‘The “denizen” is a long-term, legally settled, 
migrant whose legal status is characterized as a halfway ... between citizen and alien. In many 
respects, including legal, civil, social, economic and often cultural rights, denizens are 
“members” of a state. They pay taxes, have households, bring up children, and are often 
involved in the cultural life of the community in which they live’ (See J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship of 
the Union: towards post national membership’, 
http://www.ieanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97.1997,13).
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5 K. Tololyan. Public lecture, ‘Armenian Diaspora’, London, LSE, 14 June 2001.
6 The basic purpose of his conceptualisation of diasporas, however, is to explain the trans-border 
ethnic groups which suddenly came to existence due to the collapse of the former Soviet Union, 
and to frame them into the categorisation of diasporas and therefore distinguishable from 
immigrants, refugees, and so on.
7 See K. Butler, ‘Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse’, Diaspora (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 10/2, 2001) 192.
8 See, for example, C. Kukathas, ‘Survey Article: multiculturalism as fairness: Will Kymlicka’s 
multicultural citizenship’, Journal o f Political Philosophy (Oxford, Malden: Blackwell 
Publishers, 5/4,1997) 412-4.
9 For the detailed discussions of the range of diasporas and the problem of semantic stretching, 
see, for example, W. Safran, ‘Comparing Diasporas: a review essay on Robin Cohen’s Global 
Diasporas’, Diaspora, 8/3, 1999, and D. Schnapper, ‘From the Nation-State To the 
Transnational World’, Diaspora, 8/3, 1999.
10 An ethnic group can mean a group of people who share distinctive collective features and are 
a distinguishable group internally and externally. Racial differences are one of those features, 
along with culture, history and religion, although they should not to be discussed on the same 
level. Some ethnic features are absolutely exclusive to particular ethnic groups, while others are 
not. The terms ethnic and national are not mutually exclusive. The Korean diasporas studied 
here are seen as a part of the Korean nation. They are a part of an ethnic group in relation to host 
nations, while being a minority national group as a part of a nation. When discussing Korean 
diasporas in relation to their host nations, to avoid confusion I use the expression a ‘minority 
national group’ or ‘sub-national group’ to refer Korean diasporas under this study. In the 
Korean language, depending on scholars, the word, ‘nation’, is translated either minjok or 
gukmin, but neither term exactly implies the meanings of a nation that is political and cultural at 
the same time. Minjok is too exclusively cultural and gukmin is too distanced from culture to 
substitute the English word ‘nation’.
11 For this reason, I use the term ‘minority’ to refer to diaspora groups in relation to hostlands. 
Sub-national group can also be used as a substitute for minority national group.
12 Individuals can be categorised as diaspora. Nevertheless, individual migration can form part 
of an existing diaspora while all the individual immigrants are not diasporas.
13 See R. Sigel, ‘An Introduction to the Symposium on Social Identity’, Political Psychology 
(New York: Plenum, 22/1,2001) 112.
14 As a good example, Berberoglu’s classification shows another way of categorising scholars 
engaged in this field. He considers that nationalism and national movements are a product of 
class relations and class struggles at both national and international levels. He divides 
nationalism theorists into two groups: the liberal bourgeois camp versus Marxist rationalists, 
rather than employing the conventional framework, primordialist versus modernist (See B. 
Berberoglu, ‘Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Class Struggle’, Critical Sociology, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 228).
15 In the same way, national and ethnic are not identical, the terms ‘multinational’ and 
‘multiethnic’ are not literally the same. However, most modem states exhibit multiethnic and 
multinational composition at the same time. This is because completely nationalising all 
different ethnic groups under one single dominant group has not yet been practically achieved. 
Japan, China and Uzbekistan are obviously states with multiethnic and multinational 
compositions.
16 Unlike private culture such as personal dispositions and individual preferences, public culture 
means a set of understandings about the nature of a political community, its principle and 
institutions, its social norms and so on (See D. Miller, Nationality, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999, 159). For criticisms and comments on Miller’s philosophical grounds on 
nationality, among many others, see, for example, A. Follesdal, ‘Future Soul of Europe: 
nationalism or just patriotism? A critique of David Miller’s defence of nationality’ Journal of 
Peace Research, London: Sage Publications, 37/4, 2000.
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17 For insightful comments on fundamental issues of identity politics, see also T. Eagleton, 
‘Culture Wars’, The Idea o f Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).
18 For Brubakers’s comparative analyses on historical contexts in which national applications of 
citizenship differ, see his Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge; 
London: Havard University Press, 1992) chapter 4.
19 Y. Soysal, Limits o f Citizenship: migrants and postnational membership in Europe (Chicago; 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
20 Habermas defines nationalism as a form of collective consciousness which both presupposes a 
reflexive appropriation of cultural traditions that has been filtered through historiography and 
which spreads only via the channels of modem mass communication. See J. Habermas, 
‘Citizenship and National Identity: some reflections on the future of Europe’, Praxis 
International (Oxford: Blackwell, 12/1,1992) 3.
21 W. Kymlicka, The Rights o f Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and 
W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (eds.), Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). For one of the fair evaluations of Kymlicka’s views on 
multiculturalism, see A. Favell, ‘Applied Political Philosophy at the Rubicon: Will Kymlicka’s 
Multicultural Citizenship', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (Dordrecht; Boston, MA; 
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1/2 1998).
22 By culture, Kymlicka means nation or people as an intergenerational community, more or less 
institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, and sharing a distinct 
language and history.
23 Scholars defending this view include Y. Tamir (1993), I. Young (2000) and A. Gutmann (2003).
24 See B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: cultural diversity and political theory (London: 
Macmillan Press, 2000) 338.
25 For more detail, see Parekh, ibid., 204.
26 J. Rutherford ‘The Third Space: interview with Homi Bhabha’, Identity: community, culture, 
difference, Rutherford (ed.) (London: Lawrence & Wishart Press, 1997) 211.
27 See H. Bhabha, ‘Culture’s In-Between’, Questions of Cultural Identity, S. Hall and P. du Gay 
(eds.) (London: Sage Publications, 1996) 59.
28 S. Hall, ‘Identity and Multiculturalism’, Public lecture (London, LSE, 13/June, 2001).
29 K. Tololyan, Public lecture. See reference 5.
30 S. Hall, Public lecture. See reference 28.
31 Cited in M. Moore ‘Normative Justification for Liberal Nationalism’, Nations and 
Nationalism (London: Blackwell Publishers, 7/1,2001) 3.
32 Although my concern is on diaspora groups in a multinational state, I occasionally put the 
terms ‘immigrants’ and/or ‘ethnic groups’ together with diasporas when the contexts are 
explanations of a host state’s policy towards minority groups. This happens when certain policy 
is relevantly addressing diasporas but not exclusively to diasporas.
33 Korean diasporas can build and create Korean communities when a degree of collectivity is 
present. More detailed discussion on such collectivity is included in Chapter 5. The term 
‘community’ can be understood as a kind of social and political collective entity connecting 
insiders with collective interests and identity. ‘Diaspora’ refers to a group of people whereas 
‘diaspora community’ is a visible collective entity built by diasporic people. For a more specific 
discussion of conditions and attributes of an ethnic community relating to ethnic categories, see 
A. Smith National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991) 20-1.
Chapter 3
1 See M. H. Bate, ‘Manchuria and Korea; Asiatic Flashpoint’ (BLPES Pamphlet collections 
D(5)/D33, 1948) 11.
2 See, for example, Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book (Tokyo: Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book Co; 
1940) 598-600; H. K. Lee, Korean Immigrants in Manchuria (Pyongyang: Union Christian 
College Press, 1931) 62.
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3 Manchu is recognised as being divided in two, North Manchu and South Manchu, but the 
division is made for Japanese and Russian convenience in accordance with the treaties of 1898 
and 1915. Roughly, Harbin was the division between Russian and Japanese interests. 
Commonly, North Manchu includes the Jilin and Heilongjiang regions, whereas the rest is 
referred to as South Manchu. See, for example, H. K. Lee, ibid., 5.
4 See O. Bae, Josdnhugi kukkydnggua s ’aekyeguanui bydnhwa (Seoul: iljisa, 1998) 71-3.
5 The translation of the original content of the demarcating stone in English is as follows:
The Great Manchurian officer Mujideng, the governor of Niaola, under the emperor's 
instruction, to patrol the border, comes to this place to superintend. To the west is Yalu (river); 
to the east is Tomun (river). Hence on the watershed the boundary stone is erected as a mark. 
The fifteenth of May, the fifty-first year of Emperor Kangxi (translated by Yu-kang Liang).
6 Korea, during the Qing period in China, kept a hostile stance towards China, considering Qing 
an uncivilised foreign power that had illegitimately seized sovereignty by overthrowing Ming, 
to whom Goryo and Jos6n kept a strong cultural loyalty. Korea had been apprehensious of the 
northern border between the two countries ever since. Korea’s cultural loyalty towards China 
accepting the Sino-centric world order gradually weakened with the disappearance of the Ming 
dynasty, culture and ideology developed during Joson which in fact reflected the efforts of a 
refining indigenous culture.
7 Gando includes Yanji, Hwa-ryong, Wang-chdng and Hun-chun in southeast Jilin. The Gando 
treaty (4 September, 1909) was made by Japan and China to cease the territorial disputes 
between Jos5n and Qing. Japan agreed the Tomun River as territorial demarcation in return for 
Chinese approval of Japanese dominance over Koreans in the region.
8 See, for example, Y. C. Han et al., sinhanchungguankyesid’aeui hangukui mir’ae (Seoul: 
jayupydngnonsa, 1993)40-1.
9 See K. B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: the story o f a phoenix (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger 
Publications, 1997) 11.
10 Disputes between ancient China and Korea over the territory of southern Manchuria began in 
the Ming era in China and the Gory6 era in Korea. After several diplomatic adjustments 
between the two parties during Ming China, the relationship between Ming and Gory6 was 
relatively peaceful, although historical records show the Gory6 apprehension of losing the 
territory. Ming China gradually expanded into southern Manchuria after the Tang Empire’s 
forty year capture of the region. Ming shared the border with Gory6 across the Amnok River. 
Ming demanded the return of territory north of Pyong-yang on the grounds that it was once 
occupied by Mongols. During Jos6n, Ming kept an amicable relationship with Korea. Ming 
respected the sovereignty of Jos5n and did not interfere with domestic politics. For nearly three 
hundred years between 1368 and 1644, Ming and Jos6n had peacefully shared the territorial 
border until later Qin (renamed Qing afterwards) frequently crossed the Amnok River and 
invaded Jos5n.
11 Cited in R. H. Mitchell, The Korean Minority in Japan (Berkeley, LA: University of 
California Press, 1967) 27-8.
12 See K. S. Latourette, A Short History of the Far East, (3rd edn.) (NY: Macmillan, 1957) 514.
13 See Mitchell, cited in S. Kim and N. Wales, Song o f Arirang, 32; Y. Kang. Grass, 242 in 
Mitchell, ibid., 15.
14 See H. K. Lee, ibid., 89. Lee, however, points out the inaccuracy of the figures. The reasons 
are the following: some households were missed out from the official statistics in the case of 
Koreans who were reluctant to register with the colonial institution; some Koreans had already 
naturalised to Chinese; Koreans in other parts of Manchuria were not included; the official 
population census by the Chinese government had not been made.
5 In fact, Korean migration from other parts of the Korean territory began earlier than this 
period, if not in a collective form. The Jos6n regime encouraged immigration of southern 
Koreans (province of old Shila) to the north into Hamgyong Province near the Manchurian 
border whenever Jos6n was threatened by Qing.
16 For more detailed explanations, see Bate, ibid., 14.
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17 There were numerous legal problems that occurred in dealing with the Korean population. 
Koreans naturalised to Chinese kept two official nationalities in accordance with the Gando 
treaty between China and Japan. Chinese officials saw naturalised Koreans as Chinese, whereas 
Japanese officials treat them as Japanese on the grounds of the treaty which agreed Japanese 
control over the Korean population. For detailed discussion, see, for example, H. K. Lee, 1931, 
160 and 240-1. Korean naturalisation into Chinese, however, was strongly discouraged by local 
Japanese government, which insisted on a legal procedure to have government recognition of 
the change of nationality prior to naturalisation into Chinese.
Chapter 4
1 I take the term ‘minority national group’ or ‘sub-national group’, to mean a non-dominant 
nation of host states under this study, who are a part of a dominant nation somewhere, such as 
Korean diasporas, Mongolians in China, or Russians and Germans in Uzbekistan, and who are 
officially recognised by their government as a titular nationality group like many other groups 
under Soviet regime, including Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks, and so on. But the prefixes, ‘minority’ 
and ‘sub’ only have relational significancy. Tibetans, for example, are a majority national group 
in Tibet but they are, at the same time, a minority national group when speaking of Tibetans in 
relation to Han Chinese.
21 employed the terms from Turner. Turner’s concept of thin or thick citizenship is based on the 
two different natures of community. The traditional (thick) gemeinschaft was an organic 
community based on hot communication in which members were bound together by 
propinquity, common cultural inheritance and shared memories. The electronic (thin) 
community and cool communication can be an association of strangers, who never physically 
connect with each other, share only a computer language, and visit each other’s sites merely out 
of idle curiosity (See B. S. Turner ‘General Theory of Cultural Citizenship’, Culture and 
Citizenship, N. Stevenson (ed.) London: Sage Publications, 2001, 29). Brubaker’s work (1992) 
is also relevant here. His comparative historical accounts on the development of the exclusive 
mechanism of the notion of citizenship insightfully demonstrate how the institute of citizenship 
has inseparably linked with modem state’s exclusive nationalising mission throughout the 
period of state building, while differentiating the French case from the German experience. 
Further, he analyses that in spite of its inclusive univeral implications, citizenship was 
conditioned by state interests with fluctuating interpretations of nationhood (See Brubaker: 
1992, chapters 1 and 4).
3 The differences of the notions of citizenship are rooted not only in different traditions and 
historical relations but also in various types of political regimes. For example, M. Keane’s 
explanations are useful. His argument on the different notion of Chinese citizenship from 
western ideas is mainly based on the latter. He argues ‘[i]n contrast with the Western democratic 
tradition that emphasizes sovereignty, participation in politics, and civil rights, citizenship in 
China is seen as a benefit granted by the State to persons bom in the People’s Republic’ (M. 
Keane, ‘Redefining Chinese Citizenship’, Economy and Society, London: Routledge, 30/1, 
2001, 2).
4 Information Office, ‘White Paper on National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China’, 
China Report (New Delhi; London: Sage Publications, 36/1,2000) 125-6.
5 See O. Luova, ‘The Use of Ethnicity in Local Economic Development: the case of Koreans in 
Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture, Jinlin Province’, Provincial China (Sydney, NSW: 
Institute for International Studies, 1999) 18.
6 For further detailed analysis on the developments of this Act, see R. Siddle, ‘An Epoch- 
Making, Event? The 1997 Ainu Cultural Promotion Act and Its Impact’, Japan Forum (London: 
Routledge, 22/1,2001).
7 See, for example, Z. Gitelman, ‘Nations, Republics and Commonwealth’, Developments in 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics (2nd edn.) S. White et al. (eds.) (London: Macmillan, 1992) 123.
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8 Note that it signifies indigenisation/ethnicisastion; the social engineering o f making 
indigenous nation.
9 For a detailed historical account on this point, see T. Martin, ibid., 177-81.
10 Cited in Martin, ibid., 317, from GARF (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii) 
1235/140/141 (1925).
11 For example, the number o f participants killed during the Sino-Japanese war shown below is 
one o f the data appearing in an unpublished booklet in the region. However the source of data is 
unclear, thus reliability is low, it gives an idea o f the way Josdnjok claim their historical 
contributions.
City Total Han Chinese Josdnjok Other
nationalities
Ydngil (yanji) 5 1 7 5 512 -
Domun
(tuman)
188 3 185
Ryongjdng
(longjin)
8 1 7 3 814 -
Hwaryong
(helung)
2 8 7 4 283 -
Ando (antu) 8 3 4 78 1 (M a n c h u r ia n )
Wangchung
(wangqing)
5 6 6 3 4 531 1 (M a n c h u r ia n )
Hunchun
(hunchun)
3 5 8 4 353 1 ( M a n c h u r ia n
Donwha
(tunwha)
2 5 6 18 1 ( M a n c h u r ia n )
12 Interview. Zhao.
13 One bushel equals 36 litter.
14 See D. Ku, hankuksaoa kukj’aeguankye yongu, vol. 1 (Seoul: ydksabipydngsa, 1995) 305.
15 See S. Chun, Josdnjok sahoeui bydnhwaoa jonmang, Liaonyong, China: Lianyong 
minjokchulpansa, 1999, 10.
16 Interview. Han.
17 Interview. Han.
18 The constitution was adopted at the Fifth National Session o f the Fifth National People’s 
Congress and promulgated for implementation by the Proclamation o f the National People’s 
Congress on 4 December, 1982, as amended at the First Session o f the Seventh National 
People’s Congress on 12 April 1988, and again at the First Session o f the Seventh National 
People’s Congress on 29 March, 1993 (www.chinalaw.cc/lib/general).
19 By 1954 the Chinese government had identified thirty-eight ethnic groups in total. Another 
fifteen ethnic groups had been identified by 1964. In addition to the Lhoba ethnic group 
identified in 1965 and the Jino in 1979, altogether fifty-five ethnic groups have been officially 
recognised. (See Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
‘White Paper on National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China’, China Report (New 
Delhi; Thousand Oaks: London: Sage Publications, 36/1, 2000) 130.
20 The Chinese term minjuo, is either an ethnie or a nation in English translation, depending on 
sinologists. Thus, the terms ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nationality’ used in the direct quotation are both 
the translation of the same Chinese word minjuo, which includes Han Chinese. However, as I 
explained, the English word, ‘nation’, in my view, should be understood as have something 
inbetween minjuo (minjok) and guomin (gukmin) in the Chinese and the Korean languages.
21 Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture is one level below. In China, there are five autonomous 
regions, which include Mongol, Hui, Tibetan, Ughur, and Zhuang, and twenty-nine autonomous 
prefectures and sixty-nine autonomous counties. Two of them are designated as Josonjok 
autonomous administrative areas, which include Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture. In 1995 the 
Josonjok population was 2,183,000, being 39.18 per cent o f the total population, and in Jang- 
baek Autonomous County, 14,700 (17.60 per cent). Article 112 o f the Constitution, Section 4,
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on the ‘Organs of Self-government of National Autonomous Areas’ indicates the basic 
administrative arrangement. ‘The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas are 
the people's congresses and the people's governments of autonomous regions, autonomous 
prefectures and autonomous counties (www.chinalaw.cc/lib/general).
2 Unpublished document provided by interviewee, Kim Jong Guk.
23 See, for example, M. S. Kang, chungongui sosuminjokjdngch’aek (Seoul: Yungsdng 
Publisher, 1988) 300-9.
24 See, for example, W. Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) chs 1 and 4.
25 Articles 114 and 122 of the Constitution indicate the regulations on chairman and cadres of 
the local governments. ‘The state provides financial, material and technical assistance to the 
minority nationalities to accelerate their economic and cultural development’ (Article 122).
26 For a good analysis of the continuity in China’s ancient attitudes to neighbouring nationalities 
and its political application in modem China, see, H. Harding, ‘The Concept of Greater China: 
Themes, Variations and Reservations’, China Quarterly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 136, 
Dec. 1993).
27 For an analysis of Japanese racism, see, for example, M. Weiner in The Construction of 
Racial Identities in China and Japan: historical and contemporary perspectives, F. Dikotter 
(ed.) (London: Hurst & Company, 1997) 99.
28 See G. Yoon, Ilbon; gu kukga, minjok gurigo kukmin, J. Ha and A. Lee (trans.) (Seoul: 
Dwolseogak, 1997) 127.
29 See, for example, C. Kashiwazaki, ‘The politics of legal status: the equation of nationality 
with ethnonational identity’, S. Ryang (ed.) Koreans in Japan: a critical voice from the margin 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2000) 21.
30 For detailed explanations of legal regulations regarding alien registration in general, see, for 
example, H. Komai, Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan (Melbome: Trans Pacific Press, 
2001) 313; in particular, for the Zainichi case with a very informative legal approach on 
discrimination, see Insup Jeong, j ’aeii gyopoui bdbjdkjiui (Seoul: Seoul National University 
Press, 1996).
31 Interview. Lee, K. J.
32 The main reasons why Chorydn was against the reform of alien registration are that, firstly, it 
has an implication of oppressive security law. Secondly, it has been misused and abused. 
Between 1947 and 1983, for 36 years, the violators numbered as many as 520,000, 80 per cent 
of the total population of Zainichi. Thirdly, Zainichi should be treated differently from other 
immigrants.
33 Interview. Soh.
34 Interview. Mun.
35 Quoted from Tanaka (1995) 72-4 in H. Inokuchi, ‘Korean ethnic schools in occupied Japan, 
1945-52’, Koreans in Japan: a critical voices from the margin, S. Ryang (ed.) (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2000) 154.
36 Daehanmaeil daily newspaper, 30 August, 1999.
37 Interview. Goh, W. H.
38 For his further insightful comparisons, see The Yakuza: Japanese crime incorporated, Ph.D. 
diss., University of Michigan, 1981, ch. 6.
39 See J. Cho, ‘Kim Hee Rho sagonulbogo’ Hanminjok (Seoul: Research Institute of Oversees 
Koreans, 1/1,1972).
40 Ando controlled Korean labour -a  valuable commodity in labour-short wartime Japan.
41 See, for example, M. Han and S. Han. korydsaram urinun nuguinga?, T. H. Kim (trans.) 
(Seoul: kodamsa, 1999) 27. This book is one of the rare pieces of literature written by the 
Koreitsy directly concerning their collective memory, history and identity. I take quite a large 
part of this book as one of the primary sources for analysing Koreitsy identity.
2 Marshall Lectures, in D. G. MacRae (ed.), ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, Sociology at The 
Crossroads and Other Essays (London; Edinburgh: Heinemann Educational Books, 1963) 84.
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43 H. Wada quoted from Syn Khva’s (1960) Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev (163), which 
was the only history book on Soviet Koreans written by a Soviet Korean. He explains that ‘in 
1928, of the 470 kolkhozes in the whole Far Eastern Region, 110 were in the Korean villages in 
Vladivostok okrug’ (Suh ed., Koreans in the Soviet Union, Honolulu, Hawaii: The Center for 
Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, 1988).
44 See H. Wada, in Suh (ed.): 1988,42; W. Kolarz, The Peoples o f the Soviet Far East (London: 
George Philip and Son, 1954) 36.
45 See G. Smith, The Post-Soviet States: mapping the politics o f transition (London; Sydney; 
Auckland: Arnold, 1999) 94-5.
46 Interview. Kwon, social worker.
47 Quoted in M. Gelb, ‘An Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation: the Far-eastern Koreans’, The 
Russian Review (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1995,54/3) 400.
48 Donga daily newspaper, 17 January, 2000.
49 See J. H. Park, ‘by6nongsa, kukydngnongjang gua gukdongrussiaui hanin’, Research Report 
109 (Rural Development Institute Agricultural Cooperative College, South Korea, 1998) 137.
Chapter 5
1 See Y. Soysal: ibid., 85-6.
2 See C. Argyris and D. Schon, Organizational Learning II: theory, method, and practice 
(Reading; MA; Wokingham: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1996) 7.
3 Their identity became ‘ethnic’ within the host society. In this regard, Peter Aspinall’s 
argument is worth consideration. His argument in the article is that the usage of the terminology 
‘ethnic’ should be reconsidered by distinguishing ‘minority ethnic’ from ‘pan ethnic’. See P. 
Aspinall, ‘Collective Terminology to Describe the Minority Ethnic Population’, Sociology 
(London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 36/4,2002).
4 Quoted in M. Brewer, ‘The Many Faces of Social Identity: implications for political 
psychology’, Political Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 22/1,2001) 116, from Gamson (1992).
Ydnbyon is Yanbian in the Korean language. I write it in the Korean way as ‘Ydnbydn 
University’ is a proper noun.
6 ‘History of Yanbian University’, Yanbian Television, 28 October, 1999.
7 See P. Jeong, gohyangttdna osipnydn (heilyongjiang: minjokchulpansa, 1997) 351.
8 See S. Chun, Josdnjok sahoeui byonhwaoa jonmang (Liaonyong, China: Liaonyong 
minjokchulpansa, 1999) 43.
9 J. K. Han, Chu Duk Hae, 512; C. R. Kang, Chu Duk Hae, 160. For similar explanations on the 
three different views of Josdnjok activists during that period, see also, C. S. Lee, bukhan- 
jungkuk guangue: 1945-2000,2000, 52.
10 See, for example, C. R. Kang et al.: 1992,161-3.
11 See S. Chun: 1999,120-1 and 155.
12 J. K. Kim, ishipil s ’aagiui Josdnjok (Yanbian: minjokchulpansa, 1999) 88.
13 See, for example, P. R. Jeong: ibid., 67.
14 P. R. Jeong: ibid, 216-7. According to 1990 statistics, although the number of students 
studying at Hanjok schools has increased, it is still only 15 per cent. The total number of 
Josdnjok students is about 355,000 studying at Josdnjok schools including 1,363 Josdnjok 
primary schools and 288 Josdnjok junior high schools. In the case of Yanbian, the percentage of 
Josdnjok elementary school students studying at Hanjok schools is only 9.2 per cent compared 
with 30 per cent in Lionyong and 22 per cent in the Heilongjiang region. This shows that 85 per 
cent of Josdnjok elementary school students are still in Josdnjok schools (ibid., 284).
15 Interview. Lee, H. S.
16 This number shows that not all ethnic groups with their own vernacular languages are 
officially recognised.
17 See M. Zhou, ‘Language Policy and Illiteracy in Ethnic Minority Communities in China’, 
Journal o f Multilingual and Multicultural Development (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 21/2,
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2000). Zhou examines minority languages in China by using three categorisations: those with 
writing systems of historically broad usage; those with writing systems of historically limited 
usage; those without functional systems (129).
18 See J. Dreyer in Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identities in China, W. Safran (ed.) (London: 
Frank Cass, 1998)71.
19 See M. Yahuda, ‘The Changing Faces of Chinese Nationalism: the dimensions of statehood’, 
Asian Nationalism, M. Liefer (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2000).
20 Interview. Hwang.
21 See N. Bilik, ‘Language Education, Intellectuals and Symbolic Representation: Being an 
Urban Mongolian in a New Configuration of Social Evolution’, Nationalism and Ethnoregional 
Identities in China, W. Safran (ed.) (London; Portland: Frank Cass, 1998) 48-9 and 51.
22 Heilyongjiang Shinbao. 6 May, 1997.
23 For detailed discussion of language usage among Josdnjok, see I. S. Nam, ‘josdnoui b’aetajdk 
sayong’ua gu hydnsil’, A Study on Josdnjok National Education: Reality and Prospects, Cui 
Xianlu JI, C. S. Kim, R. C. Kim (eds.) (Yanbian: Northeast China Research Institute of Korean 
National Education, 1995) 96.
24 Interview. Pak, K. S.
25 For more detailed historical episodes, see Jeong: ibid., 252-269.
26 See Y. Fukuoka, Lives o f Young Koreans in Japan, T. Gill (trans.) (Melbourne: Trans Pacific 
Press, 2000) 3-5 and 12-8. However, the problems of such categorisation are twofold; firstly, it 
is not safe to conclud that ‘being nationalists’ exclusively means a group of people who have a 
strong interest in their own history, and weak attachment to the Japanese community, as he 
categorises. A choice to become individualistic detached from their own diaspora community 
could also be a different expression of nationalistic identity. Secondly, ‘trying to become a 
Japanese’ could also be seen as a struggle for their own identity, in other words, a diaspora 
identity, rather than giving up their identity.
27 It was the major watershed for Koreans in Japan as they could turn their interests and energy 
to politics in their motherlands instead, until they experienced a traumatic disappointment from 
both the North Korea and South Korean governments after the Korea-Japan Summit meeting in 
1963.
28 Although the reliability of existing statistics are low, see for example, H. K. Jin, ‘bukhangua 
joch6ngryungan j6ngch’igy6ngj’ae guankye’, Unification and Economy, (Seoul; Yongin: 
Hyundai Research Institute, 120, Aug., 1996) 53.
29 See S. Ryang, North Koreans in Japan: language, ideology, and identity (Boulder, CO; 
Oxford: Westview Press, 1997) 201.
30 Research Institute of Koreans Abroad, ‘Choryon; what is the urgent problem?’, Data for 
Policies Towards Koreans Abroad (Seoul: Research Institute of Koreans Abroad, 22, 1984) 228.
31 Although it was officially accepted as a legal educational institute on 17 April, 1968, there 
have been various restrictions applied by Japan’s government. Contrary to what Choryon 
affiliated Koreans believes that Japan did not approve an already established proper university. 
From the beginning, Jos5n university was a small attached institute rather than falling into any 
official categorisation of being a school. For this reason, Jos6n University has been categorised 
as gakjong d ’aehak.
32 See, for example, M. S. Kang, ‘Chochonryonui namhan jonryak’, Data for Policies towards 
Koreans Abroad (Seoul: Research Institute of Koreans Abroad, 25,1987) 105.
33 Interview. Goh, W. H.
34 See S. H. Kim, j'aeilhankookin: j ’aeildongpo b ’aeknydnsa (Seoul: hanminjok, Seoul: 
hanminjok, 1988)91.
35 S. H. Kim provides an illuminating evaluation of Mindan in general, see ibid., 97.
36 For a more detailed discussion, see S. H. Kim: ibid., 132-3.
37 Interview. Jeong B. C.
38 See Y. Fukuoka, ‘Koreans in Japan: Past and Present’, Saitama University Review, 13/1 
http://www.han.Org/a/fiikuoka96a.html, 5.
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39 Y. Fukuoka, ‘Beyond Assimilation and Dissimilation: Diverse Resolutions to Identity Crises 
among Younger Generation Koreans in Japan’, Saitama University Review, 31/2. 
http://www.han.Org/a/fukuoka96b.html, 2.
40 See Hanbaek-jaedan, ‘A Comparative Study on National Consciousness of Koreans Abroad; 
China, Japan, United States and Russia’, Forum 21 (Seoul: Hanbaekyeonhujaedan, 22/Spring- 
Summer, 1998) 12.
41 Interview. Kim, K. M.
42 Interview. Kim, Brut.
43 Interview. President of the Kim Byung Wha kolkhoz.
44 Quoted in M. Gelb, ‘An Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation: the far-eastern Koreans’, Russian 
Review (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 54/3,1995) 405.
45 See V. A. Em, ‘sory6nhaninsa’, History, Society and Philosophy, B. J. Rhee (trans.) (Seoul: 
Ch’aemun Institute, 5, Feb., 1991) 44.
46 For more detailed explanations, see M. Han and S. Han, koryosaram urinun nuguinga?, T. H. 
Kim (trans.) (Seoul: kodamsa, 1999) 112.
47 See M. Han and S. Han, ibid., 113.
48 Interview. Kim, Brut.
49 See J. H. Park, ‘by6nongsa, kuky6ngnongjang gua gukdongrussiaui hanin’, Research Report 
(Rural Development Institute Agricultural Cooperative College, South Korea, 109,1998) 25.
Chapter 6
1 Each diaspora has particular historical reasons for being disconnected from their ancestral 
motherlands. Accordingly, having difficulties communicating with the ancestral motherlands is 
almost inevitable.
2 Detailed explanations on the correlation between official political ideology and cultural 
heritages focusing on Korean familism were dealt with in another thesis, ‘A Study of the Family 
Structure as the Ideological Source during Park Jung Hee Regime’ (MA thesis, Ewha Womans 
University, 1993).
3 For discussions of cultural rights of sub-national groups in democracy, see Y. Tamir, Liberal 
Nationalism (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) ch. 2; A. Gutmann, Identity in 
Democracy (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003) 41-4.
4 See S. Malesevic and V. Malesevic, ‘Ethnic Identity Perceptions: an analysis of two surveys’, 
Europa Ethnica (Wien: Braumuller, 58/1-2, 2001) 33, quoted from Isajiw (1990, 37-8). As I 
explained, the Korean diasporas under this study are a part of a nation while being an ethnic 
group. Thus, the two terms, an ethnic group and a national group, are sometimes used 
interchangeably, not because their concepts are identical but because my research concern, 
diasporas’ national identity is inevitably linked with ethnicity.
5 Interview. Pak, K. S.
61 consider that he presumes the matter of unification of the two Koreas is very much dependent 
on the relationship between China and two Koreas, and neighbouring countries would not be so 
positive about having a country with increased power nearby.
7 Interview. Ahn, H. C.
8 A speech by Nam Sang Bok, chief of Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture, 15 January, 
1999, at the Conference of People’s Representatives, Yanbian, China.
9 Yanbian Dbo, 27 August, 1998.
10 Yanbian Yearbook, 30.
11 Yanbian Yearbook, 18.
12 Interview. Kim, H. S.
13 Interview. Hanjok in Heilyongjiang cited from Heilyongjiang Shinbao, 20 September, 1996.
14 See the preface of Yun Dong Ju ginyomjip, M. S. Choi and D. H. Kim (ed.) (Yanji, China; 
Yanbian University Press, 1996).
15 The school is now incorporated into Ryongj6ng Junior High School.
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16 Jilin Shinbao, 6 April, 2000.
17 Heilongjiang Shinbao, 4 July, 1995 and 1 August, 1995.
18 Interview. Pak, K. S.
19 Choi Hong II. Interview with Yanbian TV, celebrating his then recently published novel, 
Tumnkang in Tears on 25 October, 1999.
20 Interview. Pak, K. S.
21 Interview. Han, A. S.
22 S. S. Jin, ‘The Self-Identities o f Zainichi Koreans’, 
(http://www.wm.edu/SO/monitor/spring2000/paperl.htm) 8-11.
23 For Zainichi, the knowledge o f nation and motherland mainly means language and history.
24 Interview. Kim, K. M.
25 Interview. Goh, C. Y.
26 S. S. Jin, T h e  Self-Identities o f Zainichi Koreans’, 1.
The table 6.5 below shows the numers and size o f Korean schools in Japan.
Numbers and size of Korean schools in Japan by 1947
P r im a r y  s c h o o l 541 1 .1 % 5 6 ,2 1 0
M id d le  s c h o o l 9 2 5 2 .2 3 0 .
H ig h  s c h o o l 3 6 140 1 .7 %
S u u m 1: Data nf policies towards overseas Koreans ( ^ o  po-jufle-chaek-ja-ryo>' 119711 So. 10. Research Institute of Koreans abroad p. 14
28 See, for example, H. Inokuchi, ‘Korean ethnic schools in occupied Japan, 1945-52’, Koreans 
in Japan: a critical voices from  the margin, S. Ryang (ed.) (London; New York: Routledge, 
2000) 148-9.
29 Interview. Kang, H.
30 For detailed survey data and information on the present situation and historical development 
of Korean schools in Japan, see ‘History and Current State of Ethnic Education By Korean 
People in Japan’ compiled and published by the Committee for Protection of Human Rights for 
Korean Residents in Japan http://www.korea-np.co.ip/pk/002nd issue/97073006.htm.
31 Interview. Kang, H.
32 Interview. Han, A. S.
33 Saekkihoe is a particular dish known as a Korean traditional one among Zainchi Koreans.
34 See H. Jin: 1996, 60.
35 See H. Jin: ibid., 61.
36 See M. Gelb, ‘An Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation: the far-eastern Koreans’, The Russian 
Review  (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 54/3, 1995) 406, quoted from S. E. Khvan, ‘Ob 
istorii n aroda\ 30; B. Kim, ‘Vetry nashikh sudeb’, 107; Medvedev, Let History, 434, Reference 
number 73.
37 See J. K. Kim, ‘minjokjongch’aesonggua Kazakhstan Goryoinui yokhwal’, Diplomacy (56) 
86-7.
38 Interviews. Kim, Brut, and Shin, Bladimir, president o f Goryo Cultural Association.
39 Interview. Shin, Bladimir.
40 Interview. Kwon, social worker.
41 Although North Korea accepted some Soviet Korean returnees during Krushchev’s regime for 
a short period, most Soviet Koreans were excluded in the course of the power struggle within 
the party.
42 Z. Gitelman, ‘Nations, Republics and Commonwealth’, Developments in Soviet and Post- 
Soviet Politics (2nd edn.) S. W hite et al. (eds.) (London: Macmillan, 1992) 135.
43 For further explanations, see Gitelman: ibid., 131.
44 See M. H. Ahn and B. Y. Lee, ‘chung’angasiaui han-insahoe’, Report (Committee of Foreign 
Affairs and Unification in Korean Parliament, June 1993) 20.
45 Interview. Kim, J. H. Vita.
2 1 6
46 Kim Vladimir, ‘Y61cha’, unpublished manuscript, 2.
47 See M. Ahn and B. Lee, ‘chung’ angasiaui han-insahoe’, Report (Committee of Foreign 
Affairs and Unification in Korean Parliament, June 1993) 14 and 22.
48 Interview. Kim, Brut.
49 Interview. Kim, Daniel. Also, for some useful information of the penetration of Korean missionary 
into Korean diaspora communities, in general, see Timothy Kiho Park, ‘A Survey of the Korean 
Missionary Movement’, Journal o f Asian Mission, 4/1, 2002, www.apts.edu/iam/02-l/K-Park.pdf.. 
116-7.
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